Despite providing the basic theoretical framework for Western biology and all related sciences, Darwinism continues to be a controversial perspective when it comes to understanding ourselves as distinctly "human." In this paper, I try to correct a common misinterpretation of Thomas Hobbes' conceptualization of human nature which I think sheds light on some of the significant misunderstandings and sources of objection to Darwinism. I begin by contrasting this common misreading of Hobbes' philosophy of human nature with an alternative reading that (...) suggests a more subtle notion than is often allowed. I then summarize the basic ideas of Darwinism and explain why I think a Darwinian conceptualization of humanity, freed from misinterpretations of Hobbes, need not lead to an agonistic or reductive notion of human nature. Suggestions made by the philosophers Charles Taylor and Howard Gardner about how science and philosophy can help or hinder conceptualizations of personhood are considered insofar as they corroborate this idea. (shrink)
Singer argues that thinking on the Left insufficiently appropriates the broader insights about life and human nature made possible by Darwin. I think Singer has it backwards: the problem is not that Darwin has insufficiently been allowed to influence thinking on the Left, but, rather, that the meaning of “Darwinism” has been distorted by the wider scientific and intellectual communities broadly as a support for Right-wing views including patriarchy and racism since its early days. That Darwin’s theories have so often (...) been made to serve and support such views marks the power of ideology. The problem is not what bad scientists Leftists are, but why Singer thinks they bear the primary responsibility for explaining Darwinism to a world that still doesn’t get it. Even scientists have tended to associate Darwinism with a caricature of Hobbes’ “perpetual warre,”—in which only the activities of males in battle over resources, females, and territory, seem to matter. Yet, Darwinism is a theory of survival, not death. In contrast with the “Hobbesian” view of Darwinism, it is better understood as a theory that sees organisms as embedded within contexts of life-sustaining activities that define a form of life for their species’ within definite local environments. Their activities, understood as natural history, within the horizon of the life of a species in the midst of others, complete our picture of the lives of organisms. This view of life coordinates better with Leftist goals and attitudes than those typical on the Right, and it is not surprising that it has tended to be suppressed in popular and conventional scientific thinking. (shrink)
Ifeanyi Menkiti’s “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought” is criticized from the standpoint that the author assumes a dichotomous framework taken over in his decision to articulate the African view of the person in the idiom of modern philosophy. Kwame Gyekye’s critique of Menkiti in “Person and Community in Akan Thought” is also scrutinized to see if it manages to break free from this framework. I conclude by calling for a departure from quasi-scientific approaches to human nature and experience (...) that attempt to apprehend culture from a position without culture. (shrink)
A kind of political complacency has become a common complaint of Habermasian philosophy. At odds with some earlier stances, according to which he had claimed to represent the best critical hopes of a Marxist tradition that he regarded as exhausted, Habermas has come to defend the legitimacy of liberal democratic institutions and forms ofpolitical expression. No longer the last Marxist, but a hesitant post-Marxist, Habermas is today arguably the foremost intellectual spokesperson for a presently existing democracy which bears as much (...) relation to its stated principles as did the so-called socialisms suffered during the Cold War. The author seeks in this article merely to identify the philosophical bases for the seemingly increasing conservatism of Habermas’s thought. I argue that tensions between the normative dimensions of communicative rationality emerge more clearly as Habermas moves from a general account of discourse, to ethics, and then to democratic politics. Habermas increasingly embraces an abstract normativity and abandons the practical-critical dimensions which were embedded in the counterfactual moment of communicative action. The normative ground for politics itself has narrowed to accommodate the abstract normativity of discourse. (shrink)
In this chapter, Amato explores the concept of “vernacular rationality” introduced by Emmanuel Chukwude Eze in his On Reason: Rationality in a World of Cultural Conflict and Racism. Amato interrogates the different ways this idea can be unfolded, expanded, and developed in the spirit if not the letter of Eze’s employment in relation to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics—in particular, its conception of the role tradition plays in the pursuit of understanding and the idea of hermeneutics as practical philosophy. A more (...) hermeneutical conception of vernacular rationality would have the benefit of embracing the linguisticality of our circumstance, and reorienting our rationality toward one another in conversation and dialogue. From the standpoint of Philosophical Hermeneutics this requires us to engage in a critical-constitutive relation toward our tradition(s), emphasizing the work of listening within and between tradition(s), and broadening the circle of listening so as to strengthen the practical connections that allow conversation and dialogue to overcome the irrational and inhumane. (shrink)
Despite providing the basic theoretical framework for Western biology and all related sciences, Darwinism continues tobe a controversial perspective when it comes to understanding ourselves as distinctly "human." In this paper, I try tocorrect a common misinterpretation of Thomas Hobbes' conceptualization of human nature which I think sheds light onsome of the significant misunderstandings and sources of objection to Darwinism. I begin by contrasting this commonmisreading of Hobbes' philosophy of human nature with an alternative reading that suggests a more subtle (...) notion thanis often allowed. I then summarize the basic ideas of Darwinism and explain why I think a Darwinian conceptualizationof humanity, freed from misinterpretations of Hobbes, need not lead to an agonistic or reductive notion of human nature. Suggestions made by the philosophers Charles Taylor and Howard Gardner about how science and philosophy can help or hinder conceptualizations of personhood are considered insofar as they corroborate this idea. (shrink)
Philosophically robust conceptions of ethical life and moral critique would advance the struggle against capital. Marx can be read as implying that human life is irreducibly meaningful, linguistic, and cultural, but he often is not. Whether or not Marx recognized them himself, these dimensions of life have not been sufficiently thematized or developed by Marxists. I argue that we can move toward doing so with assistance from Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. A hermeneutical approach to historical materialism would help clarify and (...) articulate some aspects of Marxism which in particular have been hard to resolve within a wider view of the ethical, political, scientific, and historical dimensions of social action and change. (shrink)
Ifeanyi Menkiti’s “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought” is criticized from the standpoint that the author assumes a dichotomous framework taken over in his decision to articulate the African view of the person in the idiom of modern philosophy. Kwame Gyekye’s critique of Menkiti in “Person and Community in African Thought” is also scrutinized to see if it manages to break free from this framework. I conclude by calling for a departure from quasi-scientificapproaches to human nature and experience that (...) attempt to apprehend culture from a position without culture. (shrink)
