The place of evidence regarding joint commitment and plural action is mostly reserved for documents and explicit linguistic expressions. This paper considers the problem of evidence in cases of engaged (jointly committed) social acts where there is no explicit expression or binding document, yet can still be ascribed to a plural subject. The argument rests on the double meaning of the term factum as fact (factum brutum) and deed (factum practica), as well as contemporary debates about the topic of fact (...) of reason in Kant. The text seeks to show that in certain cases, the execution of an act or the obligation produced by it can be considered evidence of a plural subject. Thus, these facts deserve a special position in relation to scientific evidence. (shrink)

This paper is structured in three sections. The first discusses the institutional framework pertaining to bioethics in Serbia. The functioning of this framework is critically assessed and a number of recommendations for its improvement presented. It is also emphasized that philosophers are underrepresented in public debate on bioethics in Serbia. Second, this underrepresentation will be related to two issues that figure prominently in Serbian society but are not accompanied by corresponding bioethical discourses: the first is abortion and the second is (...) the largely unrestricted use of neuropharmacology since the 1990s, both for therapeutic and for cosmetic/recreational purposes. Finally, the perspective of bioethics in Serbia is addressed. It is asserted that this perspective can be based on the enhancement of public philosophical debate on bioethical issues, especially those with notable features in Serbian society . Such enhancement would also strengthen the corresponding institutional and legal frameworks. (shrink)

Violence and Messianism looks at how some of the figures of the so-called Renaissance of "Jewish" philosophy between the two world wars - Franz Rosenzweig, Walter Benjamin and Martin Buber - grappled with problems of violence, revolution and war. At once inheriting and breaking with the great historical figures of political philosophy such as Kant and Hegel, they also exerted considerable influence on the next generation of European philosophers, like Lévinas, Derrida and others. This book aims to think through the (...) great conflicts in the past century in the context of the theory of catastrophe and the beginning of new messianic time. Firstly, it is a book about means and ends - that is, about whether good ends can be achieved through bad means. Second, it is a book about time: peace time, war time, time it takes to transfer from war to peace, etc. Is a period of peace simply a time that excludes all violence? How long does it take to establish peace? Building on this, it then discusses whether there is anything that can be called messianic acting. Can we - are we capable of, or allowed to - act violently in order to hasten the arrival of the Messiah and peace? And would we then be in messianic time? Finally, how does this notion of messianism - a name for a sudden and unpredictable event - fit in, for example, with our contemporary understanding of terrorist violence? The book attempts to understand such pressing questions by reconstructing the notions of violence and messianism as they were elaborated by 20th century Jewish political thought. Providing an important contribution to the discussion on terrorism and the relationship between religion and violence, this book will appeal to theorists of terrorism and ethics of war, as well as students and scholars of Philosophy, Jewish studies and religion studies. (shrink)

The relation between violence and the institution was truly thematized for the first time in the writings of Hume, and in an entirely different way in Saint-Just's texts on the Republic and the institution. Gilles Deleuze's early works represent an original attempt at reconstruction of a possible dialogue between these two dissimilar authors. Regardless of the possibility of reconstruction of Deleuze's own theory of the institution , and analysis of the various combinations of the terms institution and revolution, the intention (...) is above all to examine the link between violence and the institution. Deleuze's attempt to make a preliminary systematic examination of the figure of the institution came about as a result of the conjoining of several fragments of his famous predecessors. (shrink)

It is my intention to attempt to define pacifism, in its engagement and concept, as a necessary requisite of war and military action, following a phrase used over a hundred years ago by Franz Rosenzweig when speaking of pacifism as “necessary equipment of war.” I will try to defend the importance of pacifism as an integral part of war (as such, pacifism as a requisite of war ought to shorten the period of war and mitigate destruction) and oppose this concept (...) of pacifism to Jan Narveson’s old attempt at constructing pacifism as a position and then designating it as “untenable and unreasonable,” and then further oppose this to his later attempt to find in pacifism the cause of further (and more) violence for ever more vicious wars. (shrink)

My intention in this text is to present the most significant contribution of some French philosophers and anthropologists to the notion of reconstruction and advancement of institutions. The paradox of change, reform or transformation of the institution – is an entirely new institution possible? How do institutions die? – lies in the difficulty or even impossibility to change something that manifests what we are as a group. If institutions really present or represent the relations among all of us, how can (...) they be changed in the first place? Whence the capacity for change? What allows for the idea of the “new”? (shrink)

Paraphrased within the title of this text is a note Hannah Arendt made in August 1952. After reading Carl Schmitt?s Nomos der Erde, Arendt tries to confront Schmitt?s idea of a just war. In the text I attempt to reconstruct Arendt?s readings of differing political philosophy texts within the context of her thinking concerning the relationship between violence and power, force and law. Arendt?s refusal to accept the existence of violence which can "conquer" freedom and "create" right and democracy, brings (...) contradiction to the great tradition of the followers of Marx, to whom Arendt undoubtedly belongs: how is and is revolutionary violence even possible and does violence as resistance to injustice bring justice?. Naslov ovoga teksta je parafraza jedne beleske Hannah Arendt koja je napisana avgusta 1952. godine. Posle citanja Schmittove knjige Nomos der Erde, Arendt pokusava da se suprotstavi njegovom razumevanju pravednog rata. U tekstu rekonstruisem njena razlicita citanja mnostva tekstova politicke filozofije, u kontekstu Arendtovog razlikovanja izmedju nasilja i vlasti, snage i zakona. Arendtovo odbijanje da prihvati postojanje nasilja koje moze "osvojiti" slobodu i "stvoriti" pravo i demokratiju, suprotstavlja je velikoj tradiciji sledbenika Marxa, kojoj ona nesumnjivo pripada: da li je i na koji nacin moguce revolucionarno nasilje i da li nasilje kao otpor nepravdi donosi pravdu?. (shrink)

My intention is to demonstrate how Hobbes’ attempts to adapt two ancient institutions from Roman Law to his own time and knowledge of theology and philosophy. Treason could be quite significant within the context of Hobbes’ understanding of the figure of the sovereign and sovereignty. The central part of the text is an endeavor to ascertain the source and unconditional condition for treason as such, within the framework of Hobbes’ theory of representation which he writes about in Chapter 16 of (...) the Leviathan. The act or performance in which we could perhaps recognize a traitorous gesture could be found in the so-called paradox of representation. The “traitor” breaks the chain of the transfer of power and empowerment, thus stops representation, and puts an end to speaking in the name of the other. If it is possible to discover whether this is possible and whether speaking and acting in one’s own name always carries elements of treason, then we can conclude that differing forms of “direct” speech and action are “acts of treason.” In that case, what interests me is whether “treason” is found within the heart of representative democracy, and thus if it is de facto an integral part of a democratic order and society. (shrink)

U Rozencvajgovom tekstu?Das?lteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus. Ein handschriftlicher Fund?, iznenadjuje nepostojanje komentara jednog od najmisterioznijih fragmenata tog kratkog dvostranog rukopisa koji je Rozencvajg otkrio 1914. godine u Pruskoj drzavnoj biblioteci u Berlinu. Rozencvajg detaljno analizira svaki njegov deo dokazujuci cinjenicu da rukopis kojim je napisan ovaj dokument ne podrazumeva da je Hegel i autor tog teksta, potpuno stavljajuci u drugi plan onaj slavan, sasvim anarhistican i radikalan fragment o drzavi. Dakle, moje pitanje je zasto izostaje Rozencvajgova argumentacija o Selingovom (...) razumevanju drzave ili preciznije, kako su Selingovi stavovi o drzavi inkorporisani i transformisani u tekstovima Franca Rozencvajga? Kako Rozencvajg upotrebljava ove fragmente i zasto nigde ne tematizuje Selingove refleksije o drzavi ili Selingovo revolucionarno ucenje o drzavi, kako ga naziva u pomenutom tekstu? (shrink)

The main aim of this article is to analyze a recent text by Nenad Miščević dealing with social epistemology in the context of Foucault's theory of knowledge. In the first part, we briefly note Miščević's thoughts on the difference between analytic and continental philosophy and his thoughts on the latter. In the second part, we analyze both Miščević’s thesis about Foucault's dual understanding of knowledge and his placement of social epistemology as a proper framework for Foucault’s concept of “new” knowledge. (...) In opposition to Miščević's dualistic view, we are more inclined to accept Goldman’s characterization of Foucault’s position as a revisionist project in the context of standard analytical epistemology that legitimately embraces even very serious expansions of epistemological themes. Finally, we propose that Miščević’s dualistic interpretation reflects his general dualistic position concerning the previously described distinction between “continental” and “analytic” philosophy. (shrink)

The text reconstructs the protocol of 'victory' as part of the interruption of enmity and establishment of temporary peace. Different understandings of the enemy and enmity imply that victory in war and cessation of conflict can essentially determine the way war is conducted, and that they follow rules of war. Victory is supposed to be a crucial moment that characterizes the ethics of war. Particular testimonies and thematizations of victory in the Orthodox Christian tradition can provide an intro-duction into a (...) potential ethics of war that could ensure a new relationship towards the enemy and killing the enemy. (shrink)

Pokusacu da objasnim vezu izmedju nasilja, potom mog ili Levinasovog ili drzavnog nasilja kao odgovora na ovo prvo nasilje i na kraju, nasilja koje preostaje u ustima, u grlu, u ukusu [gout] ili u gadjenju [degout]. 'Cet arri?re-go?t de violence' ili 'un quelconque arri?re-go?t de degout' [neki zaostali ukus gadjenja; a sort of aftertaste of disgust].

Pokusacu da objasnim vezu izmedju nasilja, potom mog ili Levinasovog ili drzavnog nasilja kao odgovora na ovo prvo nasilje i na kraju, nasilja koje preostaje u ustima, u grlu, u ukusu [gout] ili u gadjenju [degout]. 'Cet arri?re-go?t de violence' ili 'un quelconque arri?re-go?t de degout' [neki zaostali ukus gadjenja; a sort of aftertaste of disgust].

This critique is focused on a small theory regarding the constituting of a group through the simultaneous exclusion of some other group. Is it possible, then, to produce social and non-social acts at the same time? Or is it possible to construct a group which acts?genocidally?, meaning that it destroys another group or?the groupness? of a group, and at the same time affirm its own unity and its ontological stability? Finally, does this thematization of the group through inter-group antagonism have (...) anything to do with Lemkin?s word?genocide?? (shrink)

In his poems, Paul Celan does not use words such as territory, border, border crossing, and only very rarely the word space. I would like to reconstruct the traces of?Heimat? in Celan, and perhaps try to describe what Heimat might have meant for the young Paul Antschel. That is to say, I would like to understand whether?Heimat? is synonymous with what Celan speaks about, many years after his name change, in the address given on the occasion of the Georg-Buechner-Preis:?Ich suche (...) auch, denn ich bin ja wieder da, wo ich begonnen habe, den Ort meiner eigenen Herkunft.? In the poems written at the time when Antschel is learning Hebrew as well as reading Martin Buber for the first time, I look for some basic figures Celan ties to his life in Bukovina at the time, in the environment of Czernowitzer Judentums. Aside from the works by Israel Chalfen, Else Keren and Elke Guenzel, I would like to make use of a book published some ten years ago, a detailed listing of Celan?s Paris library. I would like to consult this archive in the coming period, since Celan punctuated the margins of many of those books with evocations of his early creative period. (shrink)

Notre intérêt se centrera sur quelques textes que Franz Rosenzweig, soldat autrichien combattant dans la défense anti-aérienne, a écrit au cours des dernières années de la Première Guerre mondiale sur le front des Balkans. Nous nous proposons deux tâches : examiner dans le contexte des différents penseurs de la politique de ce siècle la tentative rosenzweigienne de comprendre la guerre, les découpages territoriaux dans la guerre, l’appropriation de la terre, sa compréhension de la frontière, de l’espace, du peuple, de la (...) géopolitique, du rapport entre la mer et la terre, du monde et de l’État mondial. La seconde direction consiste à tenter de déterminer le statut de ces textes politiques de Rosenzweig à l’égard de la totalité de son œuvre, de même que l’influence implicite et explicite de sa judéité sur sa compréhension de la guerre et du monde. (shrink)

If we attempt to find signs of messianism within the rebellion as such, if, for example Korah, "contrary to" but always "together with" Benjamin, is the "first left oppositionist in the history of radical politics," then the final and divine violence carried out by God would, in fact, be Benjamin's pure revolutionary violence perpetrated precisely against this first revolutionary. The circulation of the alternative title of this text ("Benjamin's 'Divine Violence' and the case of Korah") within the subtitle ("The Rebellion (...) against Moses as the First Scene of Messianism [Numbers, 16]"), and conversely, is an accurate description of the "misunderstanding" in connection to the understanding of revolution in Benjamin, because the one who carries out revolutionary violence is not found where we, all this time, had expected him to be. Is it precisely this betrayed expectation that constantly brings us back to Benjamin's "Critique of Violence"? But what exactly do we expect? Do we expect a final violence of catastrophic proportions negating every future violence and time of expectation? Do we expect the subject of this positive violence – the noble [edle] subject of the revolution? (shrink)

Im Text dieses Projekt wird das Wort "Geheimnis" ausschließlich in Zusammenhang mit dem Staat und der "Ragion di Stato" /Staatsräson/ gedacht. Die unterschiedlichen Formen und Transformationen des Geheimnisses und des Verbergens bilden eine der grundlegenden Quellen und Bedingungen für die Souveränität. Die berühmte Fiktion von der Schwierigkeit, das "mystery in the soul of state", die Shakespeare, Bacon, Thomasius, Kant und Heidegger verwenden, zu erklären, könnte der Beginn eines anderen Verständnisses der Souveränität und der Figur des Souveräns sein. Ist der Souverän (...) ein Teil einer Einheit, der mystifizieren und ein Geheimnis produzieren kann? Was bedeutet "geheim" oder für den Staat bzw. für die geheime Souveränität eines Staates zu dienen? Was ist das Staatsgeheimnis? Und ist es das Geheimnis der Verteidigung einer Einheit, die ihren Souverän etabliert und den "Terror der Souveränität" erklärt? (shrink)

The articles intention is to construct a possible minimal response to violence, that is, to describe what would be justified противонасилие. This argument is built on reviving several important philosophical texts in Russian of the first half of the twentieth century as well as on going beyond that historical moment. Starting with the reconstruction of Tolstoys criticism of any use of violence, it is then shown that, paradoxically, resistance to Tolstoys or pseudo-Tolstoys teachings ends up incorporating Tolstoys thematization of counter-violence (...) into various theories, which sought to legitimate the use of force. In particular, Tolstoys discovery of a force, which, on the one hand, is not grounded in violence and, on the other hand, which is capable of countering violence, becomes fundamental in reasoning about the just use of force. The connection is made between Tolstoy and Petar II Petrović Njego, who also thematizes the use of force in Christian perspective. In his view, justice, blessed by the Creators hand, has the capacity to protect from violent force. Any living thing defends itself from what endangers it by means Creator bestowed it with. Living force and protective use of force are conceptually linked in Njegos reasoning. Thus, only protective force can defeat aggressive force. This is shown to be Njegos contribution to the Orthodox Christian discourse on violence. If a force can be counter-violent, the next step in our argument would be to search for a protocol that should have universal validity, that is, it has to be valid for all conflicting sides, The protocol of counter-violence requires that, firstly, it is a response to violence; secondly, it interrupts violence and forestalls any possible future violence ; thirdly, it is subject to verification, it addresses those who are a priori against any response to violence. Finally, it is shown that state power does not create law, but it is being right that makes law or gives life to social order, and thereby can authorize the use of force. This is the innovation in the histories of justification of force, absent in the West. Aggressive violence can necessarily be opposed only in the way that implies the possibility of constituting law and order. (shrink)

Znano je, da so negativne velikosti svojo legitimnost od svojega nastanka dalje dobile skozi to, da so bile interpretirane kot dolg. S pretvorbo matematike v prirodoslovje pa je ta interpretacija postala nezadostna. Kantov spis iz leta 1763 o negativnih velikosti predstavlja poskus, da se po vzoru na Eulerjev argument o neizogibnosti iz dela Réflexions sur l'espace et le temps pokaže realnost negativnih velikosti izhajajoč iz tretjega Newtonovega zakona akcije in reakcije. Kantov pojem realne zoperstavljenosti skuša dotedanjo interpretacijo – dolg, spraviti (...) z novo – silo. V tekstu nas zanima težava, ki pri tem nastopi: potlačitev paradoksa negativnih velikosti, ki ga je lahko interpretativno zadovoljil le dolg. Drugače rečeno, paradoksna lastnost negativnih velikosti, ki jo je lahko za realno naredil dolg kot družbeni objekt, postane glavna prepreka za njihovo fizikalno intepretacijo. (shrink)

What interest me are the reasons why?human? or?human rights? could be important or possibly most important in constituting a group? in the subtitle). If I had to justify the existence of the latest debates on nature, justification and universality of human rights, on their distinction from other normative standards, on the philosophy and foundation of human rights, on?Human Rights without Foundations?, then I would immediately conclude that this?process of grandiose concretization? of a complete fabrication is far from over. Despite the (...) innumerable pacts and international conventions established after World War II, the slew of obligations to which states have agreed in the last few decades, the establishment of rights to secession or humanitarian intervention it is as if the constitution of classification of basic human rights and their universality is far from over. (shrink)

The main aim of this article is to analyze a recent text by Nenad Miščević dealing with social epistemology in the context of Foucault's theory of knowledge. In the first part, we briefly note Miščević's thoughts on the difference between analytic and continental philosophy and his thoughts on the latter. In the second part, we analyze both Miščević’s thesis about Foucault's dual understanding of knowledge and his placement of social epistemology as a proper framework for Foucault’s concept of “new” knowledge. (...) In opposition to Miščević's dualistic view, we are more inclined to accept Goldman’s characterization of Foucault’s position as a revisionist project in the context of standard analytical epistemology that legitimately embraces even very serious expansions of epistemological themes. Finally, we propose that Miščević’s dualistic interpretation reflects his general dualistic position concerning the previously described distinction between “continental” and “analytic” philosophy. (shrink)

The main cause of Schmitt?s and Koj?ve?s friendship, and consequently, their correspondence, lies in their common affinity for philosophy of Hegel. When they began corresponding in 1955, Schmitt was something of an academic pariah; in 1933, the legal scholar had joined the Nazi Party, publicly declared his anti-Semitism, was later interrogated at Nuremberg, and retired from his post at the University of Berlin in 1946. After his famous lectures on Hegel?s Phenomenology ended in 1939, Koj?ve joined the Resistance. At the (...) end of the World II War, he wound up in the French ministry of economic affairs, where he worked until his death in 1968. This text is written on the margins of two letters, one written on 14.XII.1955. by Schmitt and the other, Koj?ve?s answer, dated on 4.I.1956. The subject of those two letters is the interpretation of the enemy in philosophy of Hegel.. Ljubav prema Hegelovoj filozofiji nalazi se u osnovi prijateljstva i prepiske Koj?va i Schmitta. Kada su 1955. poceli svoju prepisku, Schmitt je bio u potpunoj nemilosti. Ispitivan u Nirnbergu, 1946 godine bio je udaljen sa Univerziteta u Berlinu. Posle cuvenih predavanja o Hegelu koja su se okoncala 1939. godine, Koj?ve se prikljucio Otporu. Od 1946 godine radio je u francuskom Ministarstvu za privredu. Ovaj tekst je inspirisan Schmittovim pismom od 14. XII 1955. i odgovorom Koj?va u vezi sa Hegelovim razumevanjem pojma?neprijatelj?. (shrink)

This paper is a reconstruction of Levinas’ reading of Hegel and his understanding of violence. Combining Franz Rosenzweig’s reflections which concern the sick philosopher and Hegel’s state, as well as Derrida’s interpretation of the different attributes of violence, our aim is also to give full evidence of Derrida’s critical reading of Levinas. The first part illustrates the various classifications of the figures of violence from the different periods of Hegel’s life and the traces that these figures have left in Levinas’ (...) texts beginning with ‘Liberté et commandement’ in 1953. In the second part we discuss Hegel’s well-known analogy from his Rechtsphilosophie on sovereignty and the organism—that is to say the parallel reading of some paragraphs of Naturphilosophie too—and the relation between totality and violence, in Levinas’ ‘ontology as allergy’ and in Derrida’s autoimmunology. (shrink)

Was ist vom Begriff der "Souver?nit?t" geblieben, mit anderen Worten: ist es nach der Schaffung einer Vielzahl kleiner souver?ner Staaten in Osteuropa noch m?glich,?ber die Figur des Souver?ns zu sprechen? Was ist ein Staat sofern er kein Souver?n ist bzw. sofern er nur teilweise ein Souver?n ist? Wieviel Souver?nit?t bedarf es damit ein Staat wirklich souver?n ist? Verhandelt der Internationale Gerichtshof f?r Kriegsverbrechen, die innerhalb des ehemaligen Jugoslawien begangen wurden, de facto die Folgen jener Verbrechen, die die Grundlage der Souver?nit?t (...) und der Unabh?ngigkeit aller dieser neuen kleinen Staaten liegen, w?hrend er de iure auf einer rein pers?nlichen Verantwortlichkeit insistiert? Die Ausf?hrungen versuchen, eine der grundlegenden Aporien der internationalen Rechts zu problematisieren, die - von Kant bis heute - die Unverletzlichkeit der Souver?nit?t eines Staates und, im selben Moment, das Recht auf humanit?re Intervention und auf pr?ventive Gewalt betrifft. Sta je preostalo od pojma "suverenosti", drugim recima, da li je moguce i dalje govoriti o figuri "suverena" posle stvaranja mnostva malih "suverenih" "drzava" istocne Evrope? Sta je to drzava ukoliko nije suverena, ukoliko je samo delimicno suverena? Kolika je to nuzna kolicina suverenosti, da bi jedna drzava zaista bila suverena? Da li Medjunarodni sud za ratne zlocine, za zlocine pocinjene na teritorijama bivse Jugoslavije, de jure insistirajuci samo na pojedinacnoj odgovornosti, de facto prihvata posledice istih tih zlocina koji se nalaze u osnovama suverenosti i nezavisnosti svih tih novih malih drzava? Nase izlaganje pokusava da problematizuje jednu od osnovnih aporija medjunarodnog prava koja se tice nepovredivosti suverenosti jedne drzave i, u isti mah, prava na humanitarnu intervenciju i preventivno nasilje od Kanta do danas. (shrink)

»Protiinstitucija« je »francoska stvar« in je del tistega, kar bi sam poimenoval francoski institucionalizem. Moj namen je tematizirati ta contre ali »proti«, to upiranje instituciji, a hkrati želim rekonstruirati nekaj več kot zgolj upiranje samo. Prvič, contre vedno implicira penser autrement, ki je na neki način povezno z utopijo. Drugič, zdi se mi, da je Saint Simon naš večni sodobnik in da je njegovo razglabljanje o Evropi še vedno aktualno – tako kot včasih je tudi danes Evropa autre chose in (...) contre-institution. Tretjič, sledeč Humu in nato Deleuzu, bi lahko zatrdil, da gre pri contre-institution ali upiranju instituciji v resnici za poskus zmanjšanja neizbrisne sledi nasilja znotraj institucij. (shrink)

The text examines different assumptions of Hegel?s understanding of the corporation across various versions of his Lectures of the Philosophy of Right, given recent contemporary reflections on?the end of capitalism.? My intention is to take Hegel?s thematization of the poor and poverty, as well as the significance Hegel ascribes to common work and the constitution of a working group as the foundation of civil society, and formulate these as real conditions of a potential reconstruction of the corporative model and new (...) common action. nema. (shrink)

Interesuje nas, prednost koju Delez daje sintagmi?revolucionarna institucija? u odnosu na manje originalnu sintagmu?institucionalna revolucija?. Delez nekoliko puta upotrebljava u svojim tekstovima?revolucionarna institucija?, sigurno sasvim svestan da ova sintagma ima jednu prilicno haoticnu i nejasnu istoriju tokom post-revolucionarnog perioda, ali i da je ona savrseno u duhu Sanzistovih namera. Treba da proverimo da li ova sintagma najbolje opisuje jednu Delezovu imaginarnu teoriju institucije, ali i njegov angazman u teoriji uopste. Preeliminarna teskoca, koja automatski dovodi u pitanje i devalvira nasu intervenciju, (...) jeste Delezovo odbijanje da on s?m zaista tematizuje instituciju i svoj napor, te da zaista odgovori na pitanja koja s?m postavlja pedesetih godina proslog veka:?sta je to sto objasnjava instituciju?? i?koje bi to trebalo da budu savrsene institucije, to jest one koje se suprotstavljaju svakom ugovoru i pretpostavljaju tek najmanji broj zakona??. (shrink)

Interesuje nas, prednost koju Delez daje sintagmi?revolucionarna institucija? u odnosu na manje originalnu sintagmu?institucionalna revolucija?. Delez nekoliko puta upotrebljava u svojim tekstovima?revolucionarna institucija?, sigurno sasvim svestan da ova sintagma ima jednu prilicno haoticnu i nejasnu istoriju tokom post-revolucionarnog perioda, ali i da je ona savrseno u duhu Sanzistovih namera. Treba da proverimo da li ova sintagma najbolje opisuje jednu Delezovu imaginarnu teoriju institucije, ali i njegov angazman u teoriji uopste. Preeliminarna teskoca, koja automatski dovodi u pitanje i devalvira nasu intervenciju, (...) jeste Delezovo odbijanje da on s?m zaista tematizuje instituciju i svoj napor, te da zaista odgovori na pitanja koja s?m postavlja pedesetih godina proslog veka:?sta je to sto objasnjava instituciju?? i?koje bi to trebalo da budu savrsene institucije, to jest one koje se suprotstavljaju svakom ugovoru i pretpostavljaju tek najmanji broj zakona??. (shrink)