A key element of Plantinga’s religious epistemology is that de jure objections to Theistic belief succeed only if de facto objections to Theistic belief succeed. He defends that element, in part, by claiming that human beings have an innate theistic faculty, the sensus divinitatis. In this paper, I argue that Plantinga’s religious epistemology makes Christian Theism open to a de facto objection due to the characteristics and distribution of religious beliefs in the world. I defend my argument from a potential (...) objection from skeptical theism, before concluding with a comparison to a similar argument. (shrink)

This article aims to explore the attitudes and behaviors of persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD) related to their information privacy when using information technology (IT). Six persons with IDD were recruited to participate to a series of 3 semistructured focus groups. Data were analyzed following a hybrid thematic analysis approach. Only 2 participants reported using IT every day. However, they all perceived IT use benefits, such as an increased autonomy. Participants demonstrated awareness of privacy concerns, but not in (...) situations involving the use of technology; their awareness is not transferred to the abstract context of IT use. Privacy breaches were revealed to be a major risk for persons with IDD, who did not seem to understand how their personal information was used. Most protection mechanisms and tools reported were those suggested and implemented by caregivers and close relatives who had a great influence on the participants’ attitudes and behaviors toward IT and privacy. Our findings suggest that when using IT, persons with IDD often experience the consequences of a trade-off between autonomy and privacy. Further research and action is needed to support persons with IDD to understand and balance the benefits of IT use and the inherent threats to information privacy. (shrink)

Skeptical theism is a family of responses to the evidential problem of evil. What unifies this family is two general claims. First, that even if God were to exist, we shouldn’t expect to see God’s reasons for permitting the suffering we observe. Second, the previous claim entails the failure of a variety of arguments from evil against the existence of God. In this essay, we identify three particular articulations of skeptical theism—three different ways of “filling in” those two claims—and describes (...) their role in responding to evidential arguments of evil due to William Rowe and Paul Draper. But skeptical theism has been subject to a variety of criticisms, several of which raise interesting issues and puzzles not just in philosophy of religion but other areas of philosophy as well. Consequently, we discuss some of these criticisms, partly with an eye to bringing out the connections between skeptical theism and current topics in mainstream philosophy. Finally, we conclude by situating skeptical theism within our own distinctive methodology for evaluating world views, what we call “worldview theory versioning.”. (shrink)

Ayn Rand, née Alise Rosenbaum en URSS en 1905 et disparue en 1982 à New York, est aux antipodes de la pensée critique européenne : son éthique de l'égoïsme, son culte de la rationalité doublé d'une ode à la liberté, sa pensée capitaliste intransigeante, sa brutalité intellectuelle en font un personnage controversé. Anticonformiste radicale, elle reste aussi une curiosité en Amérique, puisqu'elle parvient tout à la fois à fustiger l'interventionnisme économique de Roosevelt et Kennedy, condamner la guerre du Vietnam, défendre (...) l'avortement, critiquer la religion et tailler en pièces le racisme. S'il importe de comprendre son œuvre, c'est au moins à double titre. D'abord pour saisir sa popularité aux États-Unis, où son roman La Grève reste considéré comme un des ouvrages les plus influents après la Bible. Ensuite, pour opérer un droit d'inventaire sur une pensée de l'émancipation qui exalte la confiance en l'individu, acteur de son propre destin. Elle réhabilite ainsi la notion d'héroïsme, à la croisée des idées et d'une passion pour le cinéma qui imprègne toute son œuvre. Mathilde Berger-Perrin s'essaie avec brio et empathie à ce difficile exercice d'admiration et de distanciation."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Feldman’s criticisms. I’ll argue that Feldman’s arguments ultimately turn on a view about the relation between epistemic duties and epistemic value that is implausible and underdeveloped.

Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong, or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false. Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese (...) and Bob Beddor defends “Modal Virtue Epistemology”: knowledge is a belief that is maximally modally robust across “normal” worlds. We'll offer new objections to these recent Modalist projects. We will then argue for a rival view, Explanationism: knowing something is believing it because it's true. We will show how Explanationism offers a better account of undermining defeaters than Modalism, and a better account of knowledge. (shrink)

Cet article a pour but de montrer comment le recours au concept de sphère, issu des travaux de la psychologie expérimentale de l’école de Würzburg, révèle une évolution remarquable du traitement de la signification par Karl Bühler dans ses recherches en psychologie puis en théorie du langage. En 1907, le concept de sphère était introduit comme le corrélat de la visée dans le but de remettre en cause la définition de la signification comme association de représentations . Mais, si le (...) concept de visée apparaît alors comme le levier de l’argumentation, il ne constitue pas l’essence de la signification – laquelle se réalise dans les trois fonctions du modèle instrumental du langage. Or, le retour du concept de sphère au rang des « auxiliaires matériels » du champ symbolique de la représentation dans la Théorie du langage, contribue à réévaluer les conditions de compréhension et de réalisation de la signification, en introduisant dans la fonction de représentation même une prise en compte des choses du monde sous la forme d’un savoir factuel. (shrink)

Evidentialism has shown itself to be an important research program in contemporary epistemology, with evidentialists giving theories of virtually every important topic in epistemology. Nevertheless, at the heart of evidentialism is a handful of concepts, namely evidence, evidence possession, and evidential fit. If evidentialists cannot give us a plausible account of these concepts, then their research program, with all its various theories, will be in serious trouble. In this paper, I argue that evidentialists has yet to give a plausible account (...) of evidence possession and the prospects for doing so are dim. (shrink)

What we call “the evidential argument from evil” is not one argument but a family of them, originating (perhaps) in the 1979 formulation of William Rowe. Wykstra’s early versions of skeptical theism emerged in response to Rowe’s evidential arguments. But what sufficed as a response to Rowe may not suffice against later more sophisticated versions of the problem of evil—in particular, those along the lines pioneered by Paul Draper. Our chief aim here is to make an earlier version of skeptical (...) theism more responsive to the type abductive atheology pioneered by Draper. In particular, we suggest a moderate form of skeptical theism may be able to resist Draper’s abductive atheology. (shrink)

Christophe Perrin ABSTRACT: What does it mean to ‘make love?’ Or, rather, what are we doing when we ‘make love?’ This expression makes of love a praxis on which the history of philosophy, rather modest, has said little. Philosophy has certainly evoked love, but always as a passion, an emotion, a feeling, and rarely as an...

There’s a growing sense among philosophers of religion that Humean arguments from evil are some of the most formidable arguments against theism, and skeptical theism fails to undermine those arguments because they fail to make the inferences skeptical theists criticize. In line with this trend, Wes Morriston has recently formulated a Humean argument from evil, and his chief defense of it is that skeptical theism is irrelevant to it. Here I argue that skeptical theism is relevant to Humean arguments. To (...) do this, I reveal the common structure of skeptical theism’s critiques. Seeing the common structure reveals why some versions of skeptical theism are irrelevant to Humean arguments from evil. It also points the way forward to formulating a relevant version. By combining skeptical theism with a plausible principle concerning reasonable belief, I formulate a version of skeptical theism that undermines Morriston’s argument that is also immune from his objections. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest among philosophers of memory in the questions of how to characterize and to account for the temporal phenomenology of episodic memory. One prominent suggestion has been that episodic memory involves a feeling of pastness, the elaboration of which has given rise to two main approaches. On the intentionalist approach, the feeling of pastness is explained in terms of what episodic memory represents. In particular, Fernández has argued that it can be explained (...) in terms of memory representing itself as being caused by a past perceptual experience. On the metacognitive approach, which we have recently developed in, the feeling of pastness results from the monitoring and interpretation of the processing features of episodic remembering. In this paper, we show that the metacognitive approach should be preferred over the intentionalist approach. We argue that intentionalism, and Fernández’ causal self-referential view in particular, ultimately fail as accounts of the feeling of pastness. The difficulties faced by intentionalism allows us to single out three constraints that any satisfactory account of the temporal phenomenology of episodic remembering needs to meet. We conclude by arguing that the metacognitive view satisfies those constraints in a neat way, and as such, that it should be preferred over intentionalism. (shrink)

Peter Singer argues, on consequentialist grounds, that individuals ought to be vegetarian. Many have pressed, in response, a causal impotence objection to Singer’s argument: any individual person’s refraining from purchasing and consuming animal products will not have an important effect on contemporary farming practices. In this paper, I sketch a Singer-inspired consequentialist argument for vegetarianism that avoids this objection. The basic idea is that, for agents who are aware of the origins of their food, continuing to consume animal products is (...) morally bad because it leads to not appropriately disvaluing the origins of their food. That is a morally bad outcome that can be avoided by becoming vegetarian. (shrink)

In Part I of this book Professor Perrin evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of Scheler's pioneering study. Part II provides an explication of the main features of Scheler's ethics and explores their implications in light of more recent studies of moral cognition and development.

Envy is, roughly, the disposition to desire that another lose a perceived good so that one can, by comparison, feel better about one’s self. The divisiveness of envy follows not just from one’s willing against the good of the other, but also from the other vices that spring from it. It is for this second reason that envy is a capital vice. This chapter begins by arguing for a definition of envy similar to that given by Aquinas and then considers (...) its relationship to other vices (e.g. jealousy, schadenfreude, and hate). At the heart of envy is a disposition to make relative comparisons which lead to a sense of inferiority. This is turn can lead a person to feel and act in ways destructive of community and the self. The present chapter also addresses recent work in both psychology and economics related to envy. (shrink)

In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas offers an adept account of the vice of envy. Despite the virtues of his account, he nevertheless fails to provide an adequatedefinition of the vice. Instead, he offers two different definitions each of which fails to identify what is common to all cases of envy. Here I supplement Aquinas’saccount by providing what I take to be common to all cases of envy. I argue that what is common is a “perception of inferiority”—when a person perceives (...) her ownself-worth to be inferior to another and thereby feels her own self-worth diminish. By incorporating perceptions of inferiority into the definition of envy, we obtain adefinition that retains the spirit of Aquinas’s thought, while improving upon its letter. (shrink)

L’article propose une lecture groupale, centrée sur la famille, des comportements d’hétéro-agressivité dans la clinique de l’autisme et de la déficience intellectuelle sévère et présente l’intérêt de l’articulation de dispositifs groupaux thérapeutiques. Pour cela, l’auteure met au travail une situation clinique familiale. Elle aborde l’actualisation des dépôts d’un espace à l’autre, les enjeux d’historicisation grâce à une écoute polyphonique et au redoublement d’emboîtement. Enfin, elle montre comment les comportements d’hétéro-agressivité se manifestent comme travail psychique de la pulsion de mort au (...) sein de la famille. (shrink)

Une hydrie à figures rouges offre une scène mythologique inédite : un satyre fait face à Héraclès, agenouillé. Autour d’eux, une sphinx et des oiseaux semblent observer la scène. Découvert en 1955 à Apollonia d’Illyrie, ce vase est aujourd’hui exposé au musée archéologique du site. Cet article propose une analyse détaillée de l’iconographie et des modèles qui ont pu influencer le peintre, afin d’en affiner l’analyse, mais aussi la datation et d’en déterminer l’origine, probablement locale.

In France, the practice of clinical ethics, and more specifically of clinical ethics consultation (CEC), is marked both by a heritage of practices from across the Atlantic and by a desire to adapt to the needs of the national context, which is increasingly giving a voice to patients. While the practice remained marginal in France for a long time, a number of structures developed in the wake of the Covid-19 health crisis. The aim of this article is to take an (...) initial national look at the practice of CEC in France, from its origins to its prospects. An exploratory questionnaire was drawn up by 5 teams offering CEC and linked by a historic partnership. It consisted of 4 parts: presentation of the structure, form taken by the CEC, whether or not they agreed with the fundamental proposals, and whether or not they wanted to form a national CEC collective. The results cover 38 organizations, 26 of which say they practice CEC. Although the practices of these 26 organizations varied, they all agreed on the objective of offering case-by-case medical decision support, with the majority adhering to the basic principles identified and wishing to participate in a CEC collective. This initial exploration provides an opportunity to put the practice of CEC in France into perspective in the international context and opens up prospects for collective work on the practical and methodological fundamentals, both by drawing on the similarities and the differences between different countries. (shrink)

The implementation of pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) as a new tool for prevention against HIV raised particular ethical concerns regarding the individuals’ and the collective's best interests in France. It was questioned whether the beneficence of taking or prescribing PrEP regarding its high efficacy to protect people from HIV is always more important than the maleficence represented by the risks involved, such as healthy people taking a pill with side effects, the growth of sexually transmitted infections or the potential generalization of (...) risk-taking sexual behaviour. The main objective of this study was to explore patients’ and health professionals’ ethical questioning on PrEP. Sixty-nine qualitative interviews were conducted with 45 users and 24 healthcare professionals. Overall, this study shows that those primarily concerned by PrEP tend to dismiss ethical questions regarding PrEP itself in the name of its efficacy and the empowerment it allows, but they would rather stress the impact PrEP can have on individuals’ sexual behaviour and how it can affect their autonomy if it is prescribed blindly without taking into consideration the specific living context and life history of each PrEP user. (shrink)

Cet article a pour but de montrer comment le recours au concept de sphère, issu des travaux de la psychologie expérimentale de l’école de Würzburg, révèle une évolution remarquable du traitement de la signification (Bedeutung) par Karl Bühler dans ses recherches en psychologie puis en théorie du langage. En 1907, le concept de sphère était introduit comme le corrélat de la visée (meinen) dans le but de remettre en cause la définition de la signification comme association de représentations (Vorstellungen). Mais, (...) si le concept de visée apparaît alors comme le levier de l’argumentation, il ne constitue pas l’essence de la signification – laquelle se réalise dans les trois fonctions du modèle instrumental du langage. Or, le retour du concept de sphère au rang des « auxiliaires matériels » du champ symbolique de la représentation (Darstellung) dans la Théorie du langage, contribue à réévaluer les conditions de compréhension et de réalisation de la signification, en introduisant dans la fonction de représentation même une prise en compte des choses du monde sous la forme d’un savoir factuel. (shrink)

Showing a very early interest in Descartes, after having first considered him as a Christian thinker in the perspective of a deconstruction of religious life, Heidegger soon regards him as the major obstacle to the phenomenological analyses he wants to develop, as part of the first ontological search he gave himself: that of a hermeneutics of facticity. Therefore, the latter immediately takes in his work the shape of a hermeneutics of the I think, therefore I am, its author being blamed (...) for having entirely ignored the sense of being in the I am, focused as he is on the thinking ego, the ins and outs of which he develops. But the criticism also applying to Husserl, it is by laying the blame on his master, that Heidegger intends to radicalize the project of his own master, hence the necessity to throw light on the origin and the foundations of what we can call the Cartesian question in Heidegger. (shrink)

Eric Perrin-Saminadayar The Official Welcomes of Sovereigns and Princes in Athens during the Hellenistic Period p. 351-375 In reporting the official visit made by Attalus I to Athens in 200 BC, Polybius stresses the exceptional welcome the sovereign received on the part of the entire city. He describes a protocol of apantesis in accordance with a model met with elsewhere for other sovereigns. Now at Athens, if a protocol indeed existed regulating the welcome of important persons, this was not (...) uniquely reserved for sovereigns on an official visit: in the Hellenistic period the representatives of the "friends and allies" of the people, as well as of the Romans, were treated in just as sumptuous a manner. The Athenian protocol, which several inscriptions and some literary texts make it possible to reconstruct, envisaged a welcome at Piraeus by the ephebes and magistrates, who escorted the honoured personage to Athens with great pomp: this was the apantesis. Afterwards the visit itself (apodoche) was also regulated and its organisation entrusted to a magistrate specially allocated for the reception. At Athens this consisted of sacrifices in the civic sanctuaries, a public dinner and — an Athenian speciality — an oration before the people. (shrink)

Almost everyone agrees that many testimonial beliefs constitute knowledge. According to non-reductionists, some testimonial beliefs possess positive epistemic status independent of that conferred by perception, memory, and induction. Recently, Jennifer Lackey has provided a counterexample to a popular version of this view. Here I argue that her counterexample fails.

This paper tackles the issue of the diversity of déjà experiences. According to the standard view in the neuropsychological literature, they should all be defined by means of a psychological criterion, by which they are experiences triggered by a perceived item and consist of a conscious clash between a first-order feeling of familiarity about the item and a second-order evaluation that assesses the first-order feeling as erroneous. This paper dismisses the standard view and contends there are two types of déjà (...) experiences, labeled déjà vu and déjà vécu respectively. But it also takes issue with the rare proponents of a distinct déjà vécu type. Contrary to their achievement view, it argues that recollection is not involved in déjà vécu experiences as an actual mental state or a component thereof. In our ability view, déjà vécu involves the feeling that one could recollect past occurrences of a currently lived episode of experience. (shrink)

The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview. Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key assumption that we (...) find unlikely to be true. Second, we identify two features of typical natural properties that ethical properties lack. We conclude that Cornell Realism falls short of dispelling the tension between ethical conservativism and ethical naturalism. (shrink)

Truthmaker theorists hold that there is a metaphysically explanatory relation that holds between true claims and what exists. While some critics try to provide counterexamples to truthmaker theory, that response quickly leads to a dialectical standoff. The aim of this paper is to move beyond that standoff by attempting to undermine some standard arguments for truthmaker theory. Using realism about truth and a more pragmatic account of explanation, I show how some of those arguments can be undermined.

In On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith criticizes Sosa’s distinction between animal and reflective knowledge. His two chief criticisms are that reflective knowledge is not superior to animal knowledge and that Sosa’s distinction does not identify two kinds of knowledge. I argue that Sosa can successfully avoid both of these charges.

According to a common view, animals have moral status. Further, a standard defense of this view is the Argument from Consciousness: animals have moral status because they are conscious and can experience pain and it would be bad were they to experience pain. In a series of papers :277–291, 2015a, J Agric Environ Ethics 28:11270–1138, 2015b, J Agric Environ Ethics 30:37–54, 2017), Timothy Hsiao claims that animals do not have moral status and criticizes the Argument from Consciousness. This short paper (...) defends the Argument from Consciousness by providing two simple responses to Hsiao’s criticism. (shrink)

Is an appropriate causal connection to the past experience it represents a necessary condition for a mental state to qualify as an episodic memory? For some years this issue has been the subject of an intense debate between the causalist theory of episodic memory (CTM) and the simulationist theory of episodic memory (STM). This paper aims at exploring the prospects for an embodied approach to episodic memory and assessing the potential case for causalism that could be founded on it. In (...) a critical section, it argues that the empirical data to which STM appeals are both incomplete and inconclusive, and on closer examination even provide support for a proceduralist version of CTM. In a constructive section, it elaborates on the notion of a necessary causal connection in terms of particular procedural patterns acquired at encoding and operative at retrieval, grounding this move on recent empirical data about eye movements in mnemonic mental imagery. (shrink)

La pensee de Ludwig Wittgenstein est animee, tout au long des annees 1930 et 1940, par une meditation de la question du temps. C'est un de ses aspects les plus mal connus. Ce livre vise a restituer cette meditation dans sa force et sa singularite, afin d'etablir la contribution qu'elle apporte a la tradition qui s'est consacree a cette question majeure de la philosophie. Il montre d'abord comment la tentation d'accorder un privilege au present constitue un element essentiel du projet (...) phenomenologique wittgensteinien de 1929, avant d'explorer le travail critique auquel Wittgenstein soumet ce projet au cours des deux decennies suivantes, et qui le conduit a situer dans un certain rapport a notre langage l'origine de notre facon de penser la temporalite. Une analyse originale du langage ordinaire permet ainsi de reevaluer les theories classiques du temps que proposent la phenomenologie, la philosophie de la psychologie et la philosophie du langage. (shrink)

In this article, I describe the need for tomorrow's scientists to be tutored in a personal ethic that values ethical responsiveness as the core, organizing principle for guiding research, teaching, application, and career direction. To address this need, I describe a teaching approach that instills science students with an understanding that moral reflection and action are the core tenets of scientific thinking and practice. The approach empowers students to reflect openly and discuss ongoing, ethical concerns as they face them in (...) their research and scholarship. Out of this, students naturally see the urgency to explore ethical issues and thinking from multiple perspectives, to develop and refine their ethical thinking, and to make moral choices in their routine scientific activities. (shrink)

Simone Weil was a defining figure of the twentieth century; a philosopher, Christian, resistance fighter, Labour activist and teacher, described by Albert Camus as 'the only great spirit of our time'. In 1941 Weil was introduced to Father Joseph-Marie Perrin, a Dominican priest whose friendship became a key influence on her life. When Weil asked Perrin for work as a farm hand he sent her to Gustave Thibon, a farmer and Christian philosopher. Weil stayed with the Thibon family, (...) working in the fields and writing the notebooks which became _Gravity and Grace _and other posthumous works. Perrin and Thibon met Weil at a time when her spiritual life and creative genius were at their height. During the short but deep period of their acquaintance with her, they came to know her as she actually was. First published in English in 1953, and now introduced by J.P. Little, this unique portrait depicts Weil through the eyes of her friends, not as a strange and unaccountable genius but as an ardent and human person in search of truth and knowledge. (shrink)

S’il est bien une passion libre pour Descartes, c’est la générosité. Or, si toutes le sont pour Sartre, la générosité n’en est pas moins la passion de la liberté. On ne s’étonnera donc pas que Sartre puisse, avec Descartes, faire l’éloge de la générosité. On le fera néanmoins à le voir aussi bien, contre lui, en faire la critique. Sans doute cette ambivalence dans le traitement de la générosité par Sartre s’explique-t‑elle par l’ambiguïté de cette passion elle-même. Mais son auteur (...) n’est pas sans jouer double jeu, feignant d’être stupide dans la présentation qu’il donne de la position de Descartes relativement au problème des passions, pour que sa propre conception de celles-ci et de la liberté qui y préside paraisse d’autant plus subtile. (shrink)

The mind body problem in psychoanalytic theory and practice -- Philosophy and the mind-body problem, influences on psychoanalysis -- Psyche and soma in the work of Sigmund Freud : psychoanalytic foundations -- Psyche and soma in Klein and object relations : contemporary developments -- Psyche and soma in Kohutian, intersubjective, and relational theories -- Attachment theory and neuropsychoanalysis -- Conclusions.