Are any conclusions to be had? We have shown how, at all levels, the system of Soviet literature, has both persisted and fallen into disrepair. The rigid model of socialist realism that took hold during the Ždanovist period no longer exists. However, its presence is still felt not only as a constant negative point of reference, but through the numerous structures that grew out of it. Changes set in motion during the thaw continue at an accelerated pace for the sake (...) ofperestrojka. All the same, five years later the latter has yet to achieve its literary revolution.There is one fundamental change. It would be an anachronism to organize today a conference on “One or two Russian literatures?,” as in Geneva some years ago. But will this merging of the separate branches of Russian literature go beyond confusion in the direction of a development describable as “organic”? Will the different components of the transformed system become compatible?Only time will tell and, it is hoped, dispell our doubts. (shrink)

The situation in Soviet philosophy has changed radically in the course of the last 4 years. Gone is the attitude according to which philosophers fall into two camps; genuine developments are discernible in the direction of alternative thinking. Signs of the latter include the growing number of round-table discussions published in the main philosophical journals, the conversations among philosophers broadcast on television, the new textbook, with its stress on the history of philosophy, including a new look at the classics, especially (...) Marx. In general, Marxist-Leninist doctrine is now relativized to the status of a moment in the history of philosophy, and is no longer regarded as the culmination of philosophical truth.The main questions occupying philosophers today cluster around the nature of the person: individual freedom, democracy, universal values, as well as the central importance of law in civil society and a legally sanctioned State. The revival of interest in Russian religious philosophy has to be approached with care as it involves several dimensions: the question of Russia''s spiritual character as compared with the West, the confrontation with the heretofore reigning materialist view of the world in relation to the vexed question of human creativity, as well as the religious affirmation of the unity of humanity in opposition to the Marxist conception of difference and struggle. The situation in Soviet philosophy is still ambiguous so long as ideological attitudes persist which could hinder the development of autonomous philosophical thought. (shrink)

The situation in Soviet philosophy has changed radically in the course of the last 4 years. Gone is the attitude according to which philosophers fall into two camps; genuine developments are discernible in the direction of alternative thinking. Signs of the latter include the growing number of round-table discussions published in the main philosophical journals, the conversations among philosophers broadcast on television, the new textbook, with its stress on the history of philosophy, including a new look at the 'classics', especially (...) Marx. In general, Marxist-Leninist doctrine is now relativized to the status of a moment in the history of philosophy, and is no longer regarded as the culmination of philosophical truth. The main questions occupying philosophers today cluster around the nature of the person: individual freedom, democracy, universal values, as well as the central importance of law in civil society and a legally sanctioned State. The revival of interest in Russian religious philosophy has to be approached with care as it involves several dimensions: the question of Russia's spiritual character as compared with the West, the confrontation with the heretofore regining materialist view of the world in relation to the vexed question of human creativity, as well as the religious affirmation of the unity of humanity in opposition to the Marxist conception of difference and struggle. The situation in Soviet philosophy is still ambiguous so long as ideological attitudes persist which could hinder the development of autonomous philosophical thought. (shrink)

It could be argued that some in the military, like certain local officials, are the last holdouts against the reform's ideological “thaw” toward religion, though Kharčev's October–November, 1989, interview inOgonëk makes clear that there are still some higher-level forces in “the apparatus” who remain opposed to some of the changes. It could be that some of the reformers themselves are concerned about the pace of change. Even in their minds the “thaw” undoubtedly has limits. They may view the present controversy (...) over restructuring “scientific atheism” and redefining socialism's attitude toward religion as a necessary and desirable part of the dialectical process. Thus, while encouraging a tactical and more humane detente toward religion, they have not yet moved to eliminate the basis for ideological hostility toward it. They simply want that hostility to be better channeled and controlled, while exploiting the political benefits that their new-found truce with religion offers. Looking at Gorbachevism, Soviet émigré observer Aleksandr Zinov'ev believes that the reform process “in the sphere of internal political activity concerns only separate phenomena ... but by no means the very foundations of the social system, the system of power and ideology.” That system, he believes, is not yet fundamentally changing in those terms. The final answer remains to be seen. (shrink)

What is the meaning of perestrojka? There is no doubt that it led to the end of the Cold War and had a huge impact on the international situation. Nevertheless, there is no consensus as to the outcomes of perestrojka. Perestrojka brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union. This fact might be interpreted positively: it opened the possibility to restore historical truth and to create independent democratic states. From another perspective, it can be conceived negatively as (...) a destruction of the integrity of the Soviet Union and the loss of a part of the territory as well as the economy of Russia (according to the President of the Gorbačev Foundation, Viktor Kuvaldin, during the conference “Revisiting Perestroika—Processes and Alternatives”). Perestrojka has no one definite general meaning, but it has a very specific one for Lithuania. In this paper I ask: What is the meaning of perestrojka for contemporary Lithuania and for post-Soviet life? Was perestrojka a failure or a success? I approach perestrojka from a moral point of view, suggesting that the perestrojka made possible a fundamental choice between several alternatives. Once the choice was made the specificity of future goals and evaluation of the past opened up. I concentrate on the moral value of the act of accommodation (and resistance) to the Soviet regime, on the conflict of values represented by the “nation’s own” and the goodness of the political order, and on the role of freedom and determinism in history. Immanuel Kant’s conception of duty and the categorical imperative is used as a model for the analysis of the situation of choice. (shrink)

The fall of the Soviet Union is analysed in conceptual terms, drawing on Reinhart Koselleck’s Begriffsgeschichte. The author seeks to interpret the instrumental role of the concepts perestrojka, glasnost´, reform, revolution, socialist pluralism, and acceleration in the Soviet collapse. The semantics and pragmatics are related to a wider intellectual and political context, and the conceptual perspective is used to help explain the progress of events. The author argues that the common notion of the reform policy concepts as clichés is (...) not valid. (shrink)

This paper investigates the multifaceted universe of Russian intelligentsia and addresses the following, troubling, questions: What caused pro-democratic political dissent to weaken among the intelligentsia in the aftermath of perestrojka? Why has the young generation of Russian public intellectuals undergone a radical metamorphosis of their value system and plunged into political passivity and conformism? Freedom has historically been a prima facie value for the Russian liberal intelligentsia. By the mid-1990s, however, much of the intelligentsia came to be associated not (...) with advocacy of individual liberty and human rights but with the failure of liberal democracy in Russia. This paper focuses on how the generation of the 1960s liberal intelligentsia, or shestidesjatniki, who played an active role during perestrojka, gave way to a generation of the “sons,” who, characterized as Western-style intellectuals, became spin doctors and political technologists, replacing the original ideals and high moral stance of their predecessors with nihilistic nonchalance. It is argued that the demise of dissent in post-Soviet Russia derives from the younger generation of intellectuals’ view of the attainment of political power by the generation of shestidesjatniki during perestrojka and the first El’tsin term as the latter’s moral fall and abandonment of the intelligentsia’s traditional role as an outside critic of the state. (shrink)

One of the most intractable contemporary problems in the USSR is the Soviet federal dilemma. The late 1980s witnessed competing claims among the national minority groups of the USSR to rights of voice, representation, and cultural, economic, and even political sovereignty. Since the onset of perestrojka, the principle of 'national-statehood' has acquired a new legitimacy. Nationality is one of the pillars of the federal reform. The drive to create a 'new Soviet federalism' has become an important component of (...) class='Hi'>perestrojka. But, according to Leninist doctrine, the 'nation' is a transitional formation. Unless there is a significant departure from Leninist theory, the new acknowledgement of the 'rights of nations' in the USSR can only be a political -- and thus temporary -- concession. Can the ideology evolve in such a way as to provide ideologically-based political legitimacy to the notion of national-statehood? Is Gorbachev's 'dynamic' interpretation of Leninism capable of rejecting one of Lenin's most fundamental concepts? The thesis of this article is that Soviet federal reform requires a substantial departure from the Leninist tradition. The extent to which Soviet leaders are prepared to do this casts light on one of the perennial concerns of socialist thought, namely whether ideology matters at all. (shrink)

A Kantian Utopia in Russia: Erikh Solov'ëv. The article deals with Erikh Solov'ëv, a historian of philosophy who is one of the best Soviet and post-Soviet exponents of Kant. In several of his works and articles, published in the 1990s, Solov'ëv has attempted to apply the ideas of Kant's social philosophy to post-Soviet realities. Kant is important above all as a theoretician of a free subjectivity, human rights, and a critic of paternalism in social life. Several Kantian motives came to (...) the fore during the perestrojka when the Marxist "class approach" was abandoned and "all-human" values entered into the discussion. Later, Solov'ëv attempted to develop Kantian guidelines for a post-Soviet society, including moral norms for businessmen in the new Russia, but these attempts bore the distinct hallmark of social utopianism. (shrink)

Developments in Soviet ethics have been largely, but not exclusively, determined by the official ideology. Since 1917 philosophers have debated four successive models of morality. In the first, morality was regarded as tool of the exploiting classes and thus was superseded by communism. This attitude in fact fostered moral nihilism and anarchism. In the second period of ethical reflection, morality was contrued as a social, class-relative, phenomenon, conceived in utilitarian terms. With respect to Communist morality whatever serves socialism as defined (...) by the Communist Party acquires the force of a moral imperative. It is important to understand whether this perspective is true to Marx''s views. Whereas classical ethics assumed an extraworldy foundation for morality Marx adopted the humanist, immanentist perspective, according to which morality has a pragmatic sense as an ideal, the goal of activity. Soviet ethical theory of the Stalin era did not deviate from this perspective, for which reason ethics as a professional science was entirely subordinated to Party decrees about socialism as an ideal. In the third period beginning in the mid-fifties, a new view came to the fore which was codified in the 1961 Party program: moral values are now regarded as having a specific quality, social development involves a moral dimension, and moral values exhibit an all-human import. During this period the leading issue among philosophers is the question of the essence and specificity of morality as distinct from other forms of social consciousness. Just prior to the era of perestrojka beginning in 1985 a fourth model emerged which in fact prepared in most essential respects the actual new thinking in morality. The matters under consideration had to do with the global dimensions of moral problems given the common experience and fears of humanity. For this reason morality was now seen as superseding politics. Presently, this reorientation has not only enabled abandoning attitudes favoring class morality, but thrown into relief the tragic consequences of this attitude within Soviet history.The new image of morality corresponds to abstract humanism with its stress on the person and universal values. The task before Soviet ethicians is to provide theoretical and methodological foundations for their research by which they can improve the professional quality of their work and provide the discipline with a new identity over and against Marxism. (shrink)

Developments in Soviet ethics have been largely, but not exclusively, determined by the official ideology. Since 1917 philosophers have debated four successive models of morality. In the first, morality was regarded as tool of the exploiting classes and thus was superseded by communism. This attitude in fact fostered moral nihilism and anarchism. In the second period of ethical reflection, morality was contrued as a social, class-relative, phenomenon, conceived in utilitarian terms. With respect to Communist morality whatever serves socialism as defined (...) by the Communist Party acquires the force of a moral imperative. It is important to understand whether this perspective is true to Marx's views. Whereas classical ethics assumed an extra-worldy foundation for morality Marx adopted the humanist, immanentist perspective, according to which morality has a pragmatic sense as an ideal, the goal of activity. Soviet ethical theory of the Stalin era did not deviate from this perspective, for which reason ethics as a professional science was entirely subordinated to Party decrees about socialism as an ideal. In the third period beginning in the mid-fifties, a new view came to the fore which was codified in the 1961 Party program: moral values are now regarded as having a specific quality, social development involves a moral dimension, and moral values exhibit an all-human import. During this period the leading issue among philosophers is the question of the essence and specificity of morality as distinct from other forms of social consciousness. Just prior to the era of perestrojka beginning in 1985 a fourth model emerged which in fact prepared in most essential respects the actual new thinking in morality. The matters under consideration had to do with the 'global' dimensions of moral problems given the common experience and fears of humanity. For this reason morality was now seen as superseding politics. Presently, this reorientation has not only enabled abandoning attitudes favoring class morality, but thrown into relief the tragic consequences of this attitude within Soviet history. The new image of morality corresponds to 'abstract humanism' with its stress on the person and universal values. The task before Soviet ethicians is to provide theoretical and methodological foundations for their research by which they can improve the professional quality of their work and provide the discipline with a new identity over and against Marxism. (shrink)

What is the meaning of perestrojka? There is no doubt that it led to the end of the Cold War and had a huge impact on the international situation. Nevertheless, there is no consensus as to the outcomes of perestrojka. Perestrojka brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union. This fact might be interpreted positively: it opened the possibility to restore historical truth and to create independent democratic states. From another perspective, it can be conceived negatively as (...) a destruction of the integrity of the Soviet Union and the loss of a part of the territory as well as the economy of Russia · Perestrojka has no one definite general meaning, but it has a very specific one for Lithuania. In this paper I ask: What is the meaning of perestrojka for contemporary Lithuania and for post-Soviet life? Was perestrojka a failure or a success? I approach perestrojka from a moral point of view, suggesting that the perestrojka made possible a fundamental choice between several alternatives. Once the choice was made the specificity of future goals and evaluation of the past opened up. I concentrate on the moral value of the act of accommodation to the Soviet regime, on the conflict of values represented by the "nation's own" and the goodness of the political order, and on the role of freedom and determinism in history. Immanuel Kant's conception of duty and the categorical imperative is used as a model for the analysis of the situation of choice. (shrink)

The emergence of ideological and political pluralism in the Soviet Union during 1990 led to a growing number of critiques of Marxism-Leninism. The development of the internal Soviet critique of orthodox Soviet Marxism-Leninism culminated in the publication of a two-part article by Georgii Shakhnazarov in Kommunist in 1991. In this article Shakhnazarov outlined a comprehensive critique of orthodox historical materialism, and many of the ideas he developed became a central part of the Draft Party Programme of July/August 1991. This programme (...) amounted to the virtual social-democratisation of Soviet Marxism-Leninism. The collapse of Soviet Marxism-Leninism can in part be explained by the internal critique of its basic tenets which developed in the period after 1988. (shrink)

Classical Soviet Marxism-Leninism is in the process of dissolution, with some parts of the ideology being rejected, others retained in one form or another, and new components being adopted. At the same time, a wide-ranging pluralism of new objectives and forms of consciousness has emerged in Soviet intellectual life. Since both the motives for restructuring and also the braking effects acting on the process of perestrojka are significantly dependent upon intellectual and ideological developments, attentive observations of these developments is (...) of particular importance for the assessment of the evolutionary propects of the Soviet Union. At present the situation on the ideological-intellectual front can be characterized as follows:1. Although official changes in the ideology did not begin until 1989 they have caught up to the initial perestrojka in political and cultural life. 2. Perestrojka has continually waned in importance as an ideological by-word largely under the influence of Gorbachv''s new thinking which has turned attention to the dramatic history of the Soviet Union and the plight of the human individual in a society with few prospects for the future. 3. In philosophy the new textbook published in 1989/90 introduces a series of crucial innovations that put paid to a number of classical shibboleths of the Marxist-Leninist world view. 4. Academic philosophy has shifted more and more to a reexamination of the history of philosophy as well as to a reappraisal of pre-revolutionary Russian thought. 5. The critique of Stalinism has gradually given way to a critique of Marxist principles generally, and even Lenin has become the subject of criticism. 6. Fast on the heels of the new thinking and the ideological deconstruction come the voices of political orientations whose differences are so pronounced as to have warranted the compilation of an Atlas of ideologies. 7. The search for a new moral identity has concentrated on three sources: the reestablishment of links with classical Russian culture, the renewal of links with Europe, and the deep-seated need to commit oneself to some ideal for sacrifice. 8. The economic crisis has produced attitudes hostile to individual gain and speculation. 9. Given the nature of the Soviet crisis intellectual cooperation with the West has to take forms which promote the rekindling of a sense of all-human awareness of the transcendent and reinforce the experience of common humanity. 10. The establishment of all-European academic institutions designed in their very structure to engage in mutual cooperation could have a catalytic effect on the reconfiguration of Europe. (shrink)

Classical Soviet Marxism-Leninism is in the process of dissolution, with some parts of the ideology being rejected, others retained in one form or another, and new components being adopted. At the same time, a wide-ranging pluralism of new objectives and forms of consciousness has emerged in Soviet intellectual life. Since both the motives for restructuring and also the braking effects acting on the process of perestrojka are significantly dependent upon intellectual and ideological developments, attentive observations of these developments is (...) of particular importance for the assessment of the evolutionary propects of the Soviet Union. At present the situation on the ideological-intellectual front can be characterized as follows: 1. Although official changes in the ideology did not begin until 1989 they have caught up to the initial perestrojka in political and cultural life. 2. Perestrojka has continually waned in importance as an ideological by-word largely under the influence of Gorbachv's 'new thinking' which has turned attention to the dramatic history of the Soviet Union and the plight of the human individual in a society with few prospects for the future. 3. In philosophy the new textbook published in 1989/90 introduces a series of crucial innovations that put paid to a number of classical shibboleths of the Marxist-Leninist world view. 4. Academic philosophy has shifted more and more to a reexamination of the history of philosophy as well as to a reappraisal of pre-revolutionary Russian thought. 5. The critique of Stalinism has gradually given way to a critique of Marxist principles generally, and even Lenin has become the subject of criticism. 6. Fast on the heels of the new thinking and the ideological deconstruction come the voices of political orientations whose differences are so pronounced as to have warranted the compilation of an 'Atlas of ideologies'. 7. The search for a new moral identity has concentrated on three sources: the reestablishment of links with classical Russian culture, the renewal of links with Europe, and the deep-seated need to commit oneself to some ideal for sacrifice. 8. The economic crisis has produced attitudes hostile to individual gain and speculation. 9. Given the nature of the Soviet crisis intellectual cooperation with the West has to take forms which promote the rekindling of a sense of all-human awareness of the transcendent and reinforce the experience of common humanity. 10. The establishment of all-European academic institutions designed in their very structure to engage in mutual cooperation could have a catalytic effect on the reconfiguration of Europe. (shrink)