I develop a notion of nonlinear stochastic integrals for hyperfinite Lévy processes and use it to find exact formulas for expressions which are intuitively of the form $\sum_{s=0}^t\phi(\omega,dl_{s},s)$ and $\prod_{s=0}^t\psi(\omega,dl_{s},s)$ , where l is a Lévy process. These formulas are then applied to geometric Lévy processes, infinitesimal transformations of hyperfinite Lévy processes, and to minimal martingale measures. Some of the central concepts and results are closely related to those found in S. Cohen’s work on stochastic calculus for processes with jumps (...) on manifolds, and the paper may be regarded as a reworking of his ideas in a different setting and with totally different techniques. (shrink)

According to the ‘fact-plus-value’ model of pathology propounded by K. W. M. Fulford, ‘disease’ is a value term that ought to reflect a ‘balance of values’ stemming from patients and doctors and other ‘stakeholders’ in medical nosology. In the present article I take issue with his linguistic-analytical arguments for why pathological status must be relative to such a kind of medico-ethical normativity. Fulford is right to point out that Boorse and other naturalists are compelled to utilize evaluative terminology when they (...) characterize the nature of diseases and biological dysfunctions. But the relevant ‘biofunctional judgements’ are no less factual and empirical for that. While it is indeed evaluative to say that biological dysfunctions involve failures to execute naturally selected functions, such judgments are not bound to entail anything about what is good or bad for us, and what should be treated or not. In the last part of the paper I ruminate briefly on the relationship between ‘biological evaluationism’, on my construal, and descriptions of ‘causal biology’. As I note in my conclusion, a strict bioevaluative concept of disease can be valid for every species on earth, and thus be of particular usefulness in general biological contexts. (shrink)

Critics of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) have repeatedly argued that there is no proof for the condition being symptomatic of an organic brain disease and that the current "ADHD epidemic" is an expression of medicalization. To this, the supporters of ADHD can retort that the condition is only defined as a mental disorder and not a physical disease. As such, ADHD needs only be a harmful mental dysfunction, which, like other genuine disorders, can have a complex and obscure etiology. This article (...) argues that such a line of argument fails to save ADHD as a valid diagnostic category. Given the general diagnostic logic of the DSM-IV and how ADHD has been defined in terms of everyday (male) child behaviors, there are compelling grounds to disbelieve that ADHD can be a true medical syndrome united by some type of harmful dysfunction. Indeed, strong logical and empirical reasons will be adduced to show that people may qualify for ADHD diagnosis without suffering from any type of underlying pathology. (shrink)

The period in the foundations of mathematics that started in 1879 with the publication of Frege's Begriffsschrift and ended in 1931 with Gödel's Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I can reasonably be called the classical period. It saw the development of three major foundational programmes: the logicism of Frege, Russell and Whitehead, the intuitionism of Brouwer, and Hilbert's formalist and proof-theoretic programme. In this period, there were also lively exchanges between the various schools culminating in (...) the famous Hilbert-Brouwer controversy in the 1920s. -/- The purpose of this anthology is to review the programmes in the foundations of mathematics from the classical period and to assess their possible relevance for contemporary philosophy of mathematics. What can we say, in retrospect, about the various foundational programmes of the classical period and the disputes that took place between them? To what extent do the classical programmes of logicism, intuitionism and formalism represent options that are still alive today? These questions are addressed in this volume by leading mathematical logicians and philosophers of mathematics. (shrink)

A. N. Prior’s writings should obviously be studied already for historical reasons. His inventions of modern temporal logic and hybrid logic are clearly important events in the history of logic. But the enduring importance of studying his works also rests on his methodological approach, which remains highly relevant also for systematical reasons. In this paper we argue that Prior’s formulation in the 1950s of a tense-logical paradigm for the study of time should be understood in the light of at least (...) three other principles or perspectives which were manifest already in his studies during the 1940s and further developed in the 1950s: his emphasis on the value of interdisciplinary studies, his reflections on formalisation and his view of the role of symbolic logic in conceptual studies and in the philosophy of science. Our investigation into Prior’s basic tenets and principles makes extensive use of Prior’s Nachlass. It is thereby also exemplified how his correspondence and unpublished papers contain important information for a deeper understanding of Prior’s paradigm for the study of time. (shrink)

Temporal Logic: From Ancient Ideas to Artificial Intelligence deals with the history of temporal logic as well as the crucial systematic questions within the field. The book studies the rich contributions from ancient and medieval philosophy up to the downfall of temporal logic in the Renaissance. The modern rediscovery of the subject, which is especially due to the work of A. N. Prior, is described, leading into a thorough discussion of the use of temporal logic in computer science and the (...) understanding of natural language. Temporal Logic: From Ancient Ideas to Artificial Intelligence thus interweaves linguistic, philosophical and computational aspects into an informative and inspiring whole. (shrink)

The fragment 140 a S.-M. = G 8 Ruth. is likely to deal with two different feats of Herakles. The lines b 21–b 33 seem to concern Cycnus, an impious hero killed by Herakles by order of Apollo. The rest of the fragment seems to concern the beginning of Herakles’ expedition against Laomedon. I think Pindarus presupposes a legend according to which Herakles spent the most part of his life in Thebes; such an interpretation might explain both the obscure expression (...) πέραν ἰσϑμὸν διαβαίς and other details. The opinion the fragment belonged to the Paianes is in my view right. (shrink)

Background: Thrombolytic drugs to treat an acute ischaemic stroke reduce the risk of death or major disability. The treatment is, however, also associated with an increased risk of potentially fatal intracranial bleeding. This confronts the patient with the dilemma of whether or not to take a risk of a serious side effect in order to increase the likelihood of a favourable outcome. Objective: To explore acute stroke patients’ perception of risk and willingness to accept risks associated with thrombolytic drug treatment. (...) Design: Eleven patients who had been informed about thrombolytic drug treatment and had been through the process of deciding whether or not to participate in a thrombolytic drug trial went through repeated qualitative, semistructured interviews. Results: Many patients showed a limited perception of the risks connected with thrombolytic drug treatment. Some perceived the risk as not relevant to them and were reluctant to accept that treatment could cause harm. Others seemed to be aware that treatment would mean exposure to risk. The patients’ willingness to take a risk also varied substantially. Several statements revealed ambiguity and confusion about being involved in a decision about treatment. The patients’ reasoning about risk was put into the context of their health-related experiences and life histories. Several patients wanted the doctor to be responsible for the decisions. Conclusion: Acute stroke patients’ difficulties in perceiving and processing information about risk may reduce their ability to be involved in clinical decisions where risks are involved. (shrink)