Gilbert Ryle's book The Concept of Mind was published in 1949. According to Ryle, his "destructive purpose" was to show that "a family of radical category mistakes" is the source of the "official doctrine," that is, a "double-life theory," according to which "with the doubtful exception of idiots and infants in arms every human being has both a body and a mind." By numerous examples, Ryle showed quite forcefully how psychology and philosophy at the time were misled into asking the (...) wrong kinds of questions. More than 50 years have elapsed since the original publication of Gilbert Ryle's book and, as Ullin T. Place wrote shortly before passing away, Ryle's conceptual analysis is now due, if not overdue, for a comeback. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the persistent relevance of category mistakes to current problems in the analysis of behavior. (shrink)

This article aimed at studying how the Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research's intention of digitalization and specific primary goals of learning and teaching issued in 2017 could be retrieved in the overarching documents related to education in the Norwegian Armed Forces (NAF). A second aim was to investigate if digitalization and any digital tools were mentioned in the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC) organization's study programs and subject plans for teaching, or if specific goals of digitalization was lost from (...) the NAF to the NDUC documents. Finally, a third aim was to investigate if digital tools were implemented in the new NAF Basic Officer's Education, as this would reflect the level of intention of digitalization and specific primary goals of learning and teaching. A mixed methods approach was used in the study as we first investigated documents issued from the government issued for the university and college sector in Norway, the NAF and the NDUC to see if the overall plan for digitalization from the Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research could be traced. In addition, we investigated the answers that officer cadets had given to questions in three course evaluations related to the use of digital tools in their education. Our three hypotheses were the following: Hypothesis 1: Several of the original demands regarding digitalization from the Norwegian government is lost through the dissemination down through the governing documents issued from the ministry to the NAF Basic Officer's Education. Hypothesis 2: No plan has been prepared as part of the educational change process for the introduction and implementation of new digital tools in the NAF Basic Officer Education. Hypothesis 3: It is up to single individuals to introduce and implement the use of new digital tools in the NAF Basic Officer Education. Support for all three hypotheses were received. The article discusses some leadership challenges that are actualized based upon the results we found. (shrink)

This article contends that an ethics of care has a particular moral ontology that makes it suitable to argue for the normative significance of relational responsibilities within professional health care. This ontology is relational. It means that moral choices always have to account for the web of relationships, the relational networks and responsibilities that are an essential part of particular moral circumstances. Given this ontology, the article investigates the conditions for health care professionals to be partial and to act on (...) the basis of particular responsibilities to their patients. We will argue that priorities could be partial in three ways: first, because there may be exceptional circumstances that allow for giving priority to one patient over another; second, because the integrity of the patient and a health care worker may be connected in special ways; and, finally, even if impartiality is essential, the institutional basis of health care must always give ample space for an ethically qualified individual and personal care for patients. Even if difficult priorities may be necessary, the conditions of institutional health care should always seek to create the prerequisites for nurses and doctors to administer proper care. (shrink)

The precautionary principle is frequently referred to in various momentous decisions affecting human health and the environment. It has been invoked in contexts as diverse as chemicals regulation, regulation of genetically modified organisms, and research into life-extending therapies. Precaution is not an unknown concept in medical contexts. One author even cites the Hippocratic Oath as a parallel to the precautionary principle.

When we forgive, we do so for reasons. One challenge for forgiveness theorists is to explain which reasons are reasons to forgive and which are not. This paper argues that we forgive in response to a perceived change of heart on the part of the offender. The argument proceeds in four steps. First, I show that we forgive for reasons. Second, I argue that forgiveness requires the right kind of reason. Third, I show that these two points explain a common (...) distinction between forgiving and letting go and, in doing so, solve a problem facing many accounts of forgiveness. Finally, I consider candidate reasons to forgive and argue that all of them are either the wrong kind of reason or are instances of a more general reason of the right kind, namely, a perceived change of heart. (shrink)

Since Varian (Econometrica 50:945–973, 1982; Review of Economic Studies 50:90–110, 1983) made checking for consistency with revealed preference conditions more accessible to empirical researchers; researchers have often used revealed preference procedures to test their maintained hypotheses and narrow the scope of their demand studies. The tests developed by Varian are for the direct utility function, while researchers estimating demand systems often find it convenient to model consumer behavior with an indirect utility function. Unfortunately structure revealed in the direct utility function (...) does not necessarily follow for the indirect utility function. To remedy this problem, we set forth conditions for checking consumer data for consistency with revealed preference conditions for minimization and weak separability of the indirect utility function. (shrink)

Rebecca Brown and Julian Savulescu argue in ‘Responsibility in Healthcare Across Time and Agents’ that if responsibility should play a crucial role in healthcare, then we need a concept of responsibility that reflects that an individual’s behaviour is sometimes, if not routinely, influenced by external factors in various ways. As Brown and Savulescu convincingly show, health-related behaviour in particular is often affected by other agents and typically involves multiple decisions on different occasions. Smoking and a poor diet are but two (...) examples where these factors are salient. Since health-related behaviour is often influenced by others, and often spread out over time, a notion of responsibility that does not take these two factors into account will be inadequate. In this comment to their paper I wish to raise an issue concerning Brown and Savulescu’s characterisation of individual responsibility for health-related behaviour that involves multiple choices by the same agent over a period of time. For simple acts—smoking a cigarette or eating some junk food for example—Brown and Savulescu assume two necessary conditions for responsibility: a ‘control condition’ and a ‘epistemic condition’. These conditions are intended to capture the plausible idea that …. (shrink)

This article argues that there should be a stronger emphasis on morality, involving a clear articulation of a normative point of view, in education as well as in child raising, with a continuity from early childhood to higher age levels, such that the asymmetry of roles (child – adult) gradually gives way to genuine reciprocity and a shared sense of responsibility. Drawing on Zygmunt Bauman’s work, we explore the historical conditions of moral education. Solid modernity was an age of authorities, (...) sometimes changing into authoritarian education and politics. This prompted a reaction in the form of liquid modernity, followed by anxiety and indecision among parents and teachers now that the old certainties informing normative thinking and practice were gone. Today, wee again witness a reaction and a change in cultural trends: a rebirth of solidity that carries a potential for a new normativity, a potential we consider betrayed in the current wave of claims of productivity, competitiveness and self‐sufficiency in neoliberalism, notions we regard as difficult to unify with moral education, if not in outright conflict with its deeper aspiration. Accordingly, authority in school these days is a matter of obtaining discipline and achievement, not promoting values or serious engagement with moral issues. This calls for a new discussion about education as well as an extended framework of morality. We urge that such a framework question the anthropocentric premises on which Bauman’s understanding of the discontents of late modernity is premised, highlighting the crises and pathologies involving human society at the expense of those affecting nonhumans. (shrink)

The first part of this paper seeks to clarify how interpersonal relationships are generally rooted in considerations about trust, vulnerability and interpersonal dependence. However, for nurse–patient relationships, and from the point of view of justice and fair rationing, it is essential to investigate their distinct moral nature. Hence, the second part of the paper argues that nurse–patient relationships, as a special kind of interpersonal relationship, raise particular normative issues. I will discuss dilemmas facing nurses and professional care‐givers in general who (...) are torn between their obligations to existing patients and more general and impartial considerations regarding the distribution of nursing care. This discussion concerning the normative claims of immediacy and mercy vs. fairness in health care is a pressing issue for nursing care. The claims that arise from particular relationships in nursing care are typically associated with closeness to a person's vulnerabilities. The pressing issue is how considerations of mercy and protection of individual patients can be safeguarded within today's nursing and health‐care practices in which distributivist considerations are crucial. (shrink)

The present paper is a commentary on an article by Larry Churchill [1]. Churchill has argued that the negative attitudes and adverse behavior we commonly encounter in connection with AIDS patients may be understood in terms of a dualistic myth inspiring a ritual avoidance of dirt, of dirt as something that does not belong to a clean world order. The deep-seated mythical character of attitudes and behavior here makes them less accessible to the kind of rational argument commonly employed in (...) ethics. Churchill also proposes a remedy for the dualistic mythical-ritual behavior he has focused — a remedy that may be overly intellectualistic.Three further comments are made: on the metaphorical meaning of myth, on a reductionist tendency in Churchill's deep-looking project, and on an ethically crucial ambiguity in the meaning of the other person's otherness. These comments do not, however, detract from a positive overall evaluation of Churchill's basic idea that we will understand more about adverse attitudes and behavior in connection with AIDS if we think in terms of myth, ritual, dirt, and cleanliness. (shrink)

Introduction: The concept of ” work ability” is central for many sciences, especially for those related to working life and to rehabilitation. It is one of the important concepts in legislation regulating sickness insurance. How the concept is defined therefore has important normative implications. The concept is, however, often not sufficiently well defined. Aim and Method: The objective of this paper is to clarify, through conceptual analysis, what the concept can and should mean, and to propose a useful definition for (...) scientific and practical work. Results: Several of the defining characteristics found in the literature are critically scrutinized and discussed, namely health, basic standard competence, occupational competence, occupational virtues, and motivation. These characteristics are related to the work tasks and the work environment. One conclusion is that we need two definitions of work ability, one for specific jobs that require special training or education, and one for jobs that most people can manage given a short period of practice. Having work ability, in the first sense, means having the occupational competence, the health required for the competence, and the occupational virtues that are required for managing the work tasks, assuming that the tasks are reasonable and that the work environment is acceptable. In the second sense, having work ability is having the health, the basic standard competence and the relevant occupational virtues required for managing some kind of job, assuming that the work tasks are reasonable and that the work environment is acceptable. Conclusion: These definitions give us tools for understanding and discussing the complex, holistic and dynamic aspects of work ability, and they can lay the foundations for the creation of instruments for evaluating work ability, as well as help formulate strategies for rehabilitation. (shrink)

It has been argued, by Penrose and others, that Gödel's proof of his first incompleteness theorem shows that human mathematics cannot be captured by a formal system F: the Gödel sentence G(F) of F can be proved by a (human) mathematician but is not provable in F. To this argment it has been objected that the mathematician can prove G(F) only if (s)he can prove that F is consistent, which is unlikely if F is complicated. Penrose has invented a new (...) argument intended to avoid this objection. In the paper I try to show that Penrose's new argument is inconclusive. (shrink)

Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. This paper defends abolitionism against the claim, made by P.F. Strawson and others, that abandoning these attitudes precludes the formation and maintenance of valuable personal relationships. These anti-abolitionists claim that one who abandons the reactive attitudes is unable to take personally others’ attitudes and actions regarding her, and that taking personally is necessary for certain valuable relationships. I dispute both claims and argue that (...) this objection exaggerates the role of the reactive attitudes and underestimates the importance of non-reactive moral emotions. (shrink)

This paper argues that there is a dimension of human consciousness which allows for a pre-intentional and non-cognitive intuition of sensibility. A sensibility which allows for the vulnerability of the human other is by nature characterized by passivity and receptivity. Moreover, sensibility invokes the significance of relating to the human other in an affective way of being touched by his or her pain and suffering. This capacity of being distressed by the distress of another person opens up for ethical responsibility (...) and even in a fundamental sense is a presupposition for full-fledged clinical knowledge in medical care and health care. (shrink)

The article is a brief response to Jacob Blair’s critique of David Rodin’s argument in War and Self-Defense that there are circumstances in which war conceivably could be justified not as self-defence, but as law enforcement or punishment. It argues that while Rodin’s position potentially is less dilemmatic than Blair suggests, Blair nevertheless usefully highlights tensions within it. Blair’s own argument in favour of ar as law-enforcement is suggestive, but in no way conclusive.

This is the first book in welfare economics to be primarily intended for undergraduates and non-specialists. Concepts such as Pareto optimality in a market economy, the compensation criterion, and the social welfare function are explored in detail. Market failures are analysed by using different ways of measuring welfare changes. The book also examines public choice, and the issues of provision of public goods, median voter equilibrium, government failures, efficient and optimal taxation, and intergenerational equity. The three final chapters are devoted (...) to applied welfare economics: methods for revealing people's preferences, cost-benefit analysis, and project evaluation in a risky world. The book is intended for introductory and intermediate courses in welfare economics, microeconomics, and public economics. It will also be suitable for courses in health economics, environmental economics, and cost-benefit analysis, as well as those undertaking project evaluations in government agencies and private firms. (shrink)