The essay deals with problems that emerge in new interpretations of Hume’s famous argument concerning induction. In modern Hume scholarship there is a growing tendency to view Hume’s argument not as reasoning concerning the evidential value of our inductions but rather as a kind of explanation of the cognitive process of making causal inferences. The essay describes the main tenets of two currently dominant interpretations . In addition to discussing both interpretations, the article engages in a discussion about the meaning (...) of Hume’s argument by confronting the old skeptical reading of Hume with new interpretations. My contribution to the discussion consists of two arguments against the explanatory tradition of viewing Hume’s argument. (shrink)

Passions and Good Emotions. A Defence of the Stoic Idea of Apathy The article tries to defend the stoic idea of apathy against some typical objections which are formulated against it in ancient and contemporary philosophical debates. My defense of it relies on the correction of interpretative assumptions which are shared by the critics of stoic apathy. First, I discuss the assumption that the crucial stoic term pathe is coextensive with our modern notion of emotion. In the stoic theory of (...) emotions, pathe refers to destructive irrational emotions, not to emotions in general. Secondly, the critics of apathy ignore the key role played in the stoic theory by the idea of good emotions. In order to fill this gap, I present the main assumptions of that theory. (shrink)