This article seeks to examine the political connotations of a recent ‘material turn’ in social and political theory and its implications for theorizations of political agency. ‘New materialist’ theories are premised upon transcending the limits which social constructivism places upon thought, viewed as a reification of the division of subject and object and so a hubristic anthropocentrism which places human beings at the centre of social existence. Yet new materialist theories have tended to locate the conditions of the separation of (...) mind and world they seek to overcome upon the terrain of epistemic or ethical error. By taking the work of Quentin Meillassoux, Jane Bennett and Karen Barad as exemplary, this article contends that new materialist theories not only fall short of their own materialist pretensions insofar as they do not interrogate the material conditions of the separation of the mental and material, but that the failure to do so has profound repercussions for the success of their accounts of political agency. This essay seeks to offer a counter-narrative to new materialist theories by situating the hierarchy between thought and world as a structural feature of capitalist social relations. (shrink)

Derrida and Foucault offers a major contribution to the interpretation of these two highly influential thinkers. By tracing the moments where Derrida and Foucault’s arguments converge but also where they deviate, this book fundamentally recasts our understanding not only of these two philosophers, but of the political more broadly.

ExcerptIntroduction Stephen K. White, whose work represents one of the more well-known recent attempts to define a paradigm of post-metaphysical political thought, is indicative of the omission of an impasse that this article will argue seems to haunt this field. White has proposed, in defense of accusations of a thoroughgoing relativism, that the discipline should be conceived in terms of what he calls, echoing a concept coined by Gianni Vattimo, “weak ontology.”1 White argues that to describe ontology as “weak” denotes (...) that in the absence of transcendent grounds there is necessarily an “essential contestability” to the…. (shrink)