In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.2 (2001) 233-244 [Access article in PDF] Joseph Butler on Forgiveness: A Presupposed Theory of Emotion Paul A. Newberry "I forgive him as far as humanity can forgive. I would do him no injury." Mrs. Dale in Anthony Trollope's The Last Chronicle of Barset, 1867. In the recent philosophical literature on forgiveness, a topic of great concern is the proper characterization of forgiveness (...) or, said in another way, the proper definition of forgiveness. Forgiveness has been defined in a multitude of ways: among others, as the overcoming of resentment, the overcoming of moral hatred, as a speech act, and as forbearance. Of these definitions the one that enjoys anything close to a kind of consensus is that forgiveness is the overcoming of resentment. This position, with various qualifications and stipulations, is held by numerous philosophers, among them R. S. Downie, Kathleen Dean Moore, A. C. Ewing, Martin Hughes, and Jeffrie Murphy. 1 The progenitor of this view is widely acknowledged to be Joseph Butler, who wrote sermons on both resentment and forgiveness nearly three hundred years ago. 2In this paper I will demonstrate that the attribution of this definition of forgiveness to Butler is in error: he did not define forgiveness as the overcoming of resentment but rather as the checking of revenge, or forbearance. Aside from the goal of setting the historical record straight, I have a broader and more important purpose in this essay. One sees that such an interpretation of Butler must provoke two questions. First, why did Butler define forgiveness only in terms of how one is to act, therefore paying no attention, apparently, to how one feels? Second, how do Murphy and the others incorrectly attribute this view to Butler? [End Page 233] I contend that these answers can be addressed if we take a close look at the role of emotions and theories of emotion in the definitions offered by Butler and Murphy (as representative of the group). I will attempt to establish that Butler's definition of forgiveness as the checking of revenge presupposes a feeling theory of emotions which is distinct from and in conflict with--in many ways pertinent to forgiveness--the cognitive theory of emotions presupposed by Murphy's definition. If I am successful in showing this claim to be plausible, then I will also have demonstrated that more attention needs to be paid to theories of emotion underlying work on forgiveness. But since the misinterpretation of Butler is widespread among contemporary writers on forgiveness and not peculiar to Murphy, my claim is a gesture toward what I take to be a problem greater than mere misinterpretation. Given the fact that a feeling theory of emotions was the predominant theory among philosophers in Butler's day until the end of the nineteenth century and that cognitive theory is currently a dominant philosophical theory, I fear that what has happened is that modern commentators on Butler are unaware that they are imposing their own presupposed theories of emotion onto a text from an earlier historical period.The plan of the paper is first to show by careful exegesis how Butler characterizes forgiveness and then, after a brief sketch of the difference between feeling theory and cognitive theory, to demonstrate how Butler's definition presupposes the former and Murphy's the latter. I will conclude with a few remarks about the import of these findings.Joseph Butler's treatment of forgiveness is found in a collection of his sermons first published as Fifteen Sermons in 1726. 3 Included in this collection are two sermons of primary importance to the topic of forgiveness: a sermon on resentment (Sermon VIII) and a subsequent sermon on forgiveness (Sermon IX). An understanding of Butler's definition of forgiveness properly begins with his sermon on resentment in which he distinguishes between two different kinds of resentment. One kind he calls "hasty and sudden" resentment, the other "settled and deliberate" resentment. 4 Hasty and sudden resentment is generally (and naturally) the result of sudden hurt or violence. 5... (shrink)

CRITICAL THINKING: A USER’S MANUAL offers an innovative skill-based approach to critical thinking that provides step-by-step tools for learning to evaluate arguments. Students build a complete skill set by recognizing, analyzing, diagramming, and evaluating arguments; later chapters encourage application of the basic skills to categorical, truth-functional, analogical, generalization, and causal arguments as well as fallacies. The exercises throughout the text engage readers in active learning, integrate writing as part of the critical thinking process, and emphasize skill transference. A special feature, (...) called Your Turn! encourages students to not just skim through the book’s explanations, but stop, think, and apply what they are learning. CRITICAL THINKING: A USER’S MANUAL offers multiple opportunities for different kinds of practice and options for appealing to different learning styles. The quantity and variety of exercises allow for group work, reflection and application, and writing practice as well as traditional homework exercises. Aplia, an online homework solution that increases student effort and engagement, is available as an option with this text to provide additional critical thinking practice with immediate feedback to reinforce the skills students are building in class. (shrink)

This dissertation analyzes and critiques three definitions of 'forgiveness'--that of Joseph Butler, Jeffrie Murphy, and Jean Hampton--paying special attention to the question of the theories of emotion these authors seem to presuppose. I have chosen these definitions for my focus for several reasons: Murphy's definition has a central role in the current debate about forgiveness, as it is cited in much of the subsequent literature and is a version of a well-known definition. Also, Murphy considers Butler's definition to be his (...) own starting point. Hampton's definition is a direct response to Murphy's. By looking at these three we have a series of definitions, each a reaction to its predecessor, and also three representatives that illustrate the diversity of the definitions of 'forgiveness.' ;I argue that each of these definitions of 'forgiveness' is incomplete. Ordinary language usage shows that forgiveness is a more complex concept than these philosophers indicate. Forgiveness consists of three dimensions: what I term the 'speech act,' the 'emotional,' and the 'concomitant action' dimensions. A proper definition of 'forgiveness' must account for all three dimensions of the concept; these three only define the emotional dimension. Further, even as definitions of only the emotional dimension of forgiveness, each of these definitions is still too narrow, failing to account for the complexity of that dimension. ;A second focus of this dissertation is the theories of emotions these definitions presuppose. As these three definitions are of 'forgiveness' in its emotional dimension, all depend upon some view of the nature of emotions. I argue that these three definitions of 'forgiveness' presuppose different and incompatible theories of emotion which contributes to confusion about the proper definition of 'forgiveness.' Some of the putative disagreement about forgiveness is actually disguised disagreement about the nature of emotions. Therefore, not only should philosophers seek to define 'forgiveness' broadly enough to capture the complexity of the concept of forgiveness in all three dimensions, they should focus attention on the theory of emotion on which such a definition must rely. (shrink)

Recent philosophical literature contains several definitions of ‘forgiveness.’ These fail because the meaning of one part of a complex notion is taken as the meaning of the whole. Ordinary language use indicates three kinds of sufficient conditions for forgiveness where by people canforgive by meeting any one of those conditions.