An introduction to playing god -- The birth and explosive growth of GMOs -- Human cloning -- Messing with mother nature : the first GMO sapiens -- Build-a-baby better via genetics -- DIY guide to creating GMO sapiens -- Eugenics and transhumanism -- Cultural views on human genetic modification -- GMO sapiens today and tomorrow.

In some previous work, I tried to give a concept-based account of the nature of our entitlement to certain very basic inferences (see the papers in Part III of Boghossian 2008b). In this previous work, I took it for granted, along with many other philosophers, that we understood well enough what it is for a person to infer. In this paper, I turn to thinking about the nature of inference itself. This topic is of great interest in its own right (...) and surprisingly understudied by philosophers. A correct understanding of inference promises to shed light on a number of important topics. In particular, it threatens to undermine the sort of concept-based story about entitlement to which I had previously been attracted. (shrink)

Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience. Our mutual understanding and even our introspection may then be reconstituted within the conceptual framework of completed neuroscience, a theory we may expect to be more powerful by far than the common-sense psychology it displaces, and more substantially (...) integrated within physical science generally. My purpose in this paper is to explore these projections, especially as they bear on (1) the principal elements of common-sense psychology: the propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc.), and (2) the conception of rationality in which these elements figure. (shrink)

"First published in this translation 1955; second edition (revised) 1974; reprinted with additional revisions 1987; reissued with new Further Reading 2003; reissued with new introduction 2007"--T.p. verso.

Jusqu'ici l'emplacement de l'antique Méthone n'avait pu être exactement déterminé : on la mettait le plus souvent au Sud du village de Néa Agathoupolis, près de l'actuelle Méthoni, où cependant il n'y a plus de vestiges antiques (mis à part quelques tombes). La localisation désormais assurée de Pydna et d'Aloros, cités entre lesquelles se trouvait Méthone selon les sources écrites (notamment Strabon, avec indication des distances) permet de situer cette ville juste au Nord de Néa Agathoupolis. De fait, les auteurs (...) ont repéré là deux sites importants, l'un tout proche du village et caractérisé par une céramique essentiellement archaïque et classique, l'autre un peu plus éloigné et datant visiblement d'une époque plus tardive. Il semble donc que le premier puisse être identifié de façon sûre avec la ville fondée (à la fin du vme siècle?) par des Érétriens et détruite en 354 av. J.-C. par Philippe II, tandis que l'autre pourrait être la bourgade hellénistique, puis romaine, où les survivants du siège avaient reçu l'autorisation de s'installer. Les témoignages antiques sur l'histoire de Méthone sont réexaminés à la lumière de cette double identification. Chemin faisant, les auteurs proposent de rapporter à Méthone de Magnésie une citation de l'historien Théopompe qui, d'après Strabon (VII fr. 20C et VIII 6,15; cf. FGrH 115 F 384) concernerait la ville de Piérie, Méthone dite tantôt de Macédoine, tantôt (plus anciennement) de Thrace. (shrink)

Dieses historische Buch kann zahlreiche Tippfehler und fehlende Textpassagen aufweisen. Kaufer konnen in der Regel eine kostenlose eingescannte Kopie des originalen Buches vom Verleger herunterladen (ohne Tippfehler). Ohne Indizes. Nicht dargestellt. 1910 edition. Auszug:...endliche als durch sie erzeugt; oder diese in jener involviert und aus ihr sich evolvierend. Der wahre Erzeuger der endlichen Grosse ist nicht die unendlichkleine" Grosse (das Unendlichkleine ware dem Grossenwert nach vielmehr Null), sondern es ist das Gesetz der Grosse (als Veranderlicher), das man sich nun wie (...) in einen Punkt zusammengezogen, d. h. fur den einzelnen Punkt ausgedruckt, oder an einer endlichen Erstreckung sich darstellend denken kann, das aber dem letzten Sachgehalt nach dasselbe ist fur den Punkt und die endliche Erstreckung, wenn es auch in Bezug auf beide verschiedene, im allgemeinen auseinander ableitbare Ausdrucke erhalten muss. Da aber die endliche Grosse uberhaupt von Punkt zu Punkt entstehend (d. h. veranderlich) gedacht wird, so ist insofern der punktuelle, d. h. infinitesimale Ausdruck der fundamentale, aus dem der extensionale gleichsam erst hervorwachst. Die Differenz entsteht eben von der Null an; nicht aus ihr; aus Null wird keine extensive Grosse; wohl aber von der Null, d. h. dem Nichtsein dessen, was werden soll, oder ganz schlicht1) vom Ausgangs wert an; woraus? Aus dem Gesetz; eine andere Antwort ist nicht zu geben und nicht zu verlangen. Durch dies Gesetz aber ist die Grosse als Eines, Identisches, im Unterschied von den sukzessiven Grossenwerten, also in ihrem Gattungsausdruck definiert. i) Vgl. oben S. 122. Fragt man also: wie soll aus der Null gewordenen, verschwundenen" Grosse die endliche Grosse wiederentstehen? so ist zu antworten: die Grosse zwar (yuantitas). (shrink)

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY PRIZE for the best published book in the history of philosophy [Awarded in 2010] _______________ -/- Although it is widely recognized that David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) belongs among the greatest works of philosophy, there is little agreement about the correct way to interpret his fundamental intentions. It is an established orthodoxy among almost all commentators that skepticism and naturalism are the two dominant themes in this work. The difficulty has been, (...) however, that Hume's skeptical arguments and commitments appear to undermine and discredit his naturalistic ambition to contribute to "the science of man". This schism appears to leave his entire project broken-backed. The solution to this riddle depends on challenging another, closely related, point of orthodoxy: namely, that before Hume published the Treatise he removed almost all material concerned with problems of religion. Russell argues, contrary to this view, that irreligious aims and objectives are fundamental to the Treatise and account for its underlying unity and coherence. It is Hume's basic anti-Christian aims and objectives that serve to shape and direct both his skeptical and naturalistic commitments. When Hume's arguments are viewed from this perspective we can solve, not only puzzles arising from his discussion of various specific issues, we can also explain the intimate and intricate connections that hold his entire project together. This "irreligious" interpretation provides a comprehensive fresh account of the nature of Hume's fundamental aims and ambitions in the Treatise. It also presents a radically different picture of the way in which Hume's project was rooted in the debates and controversies of his own time, placing the Treatise in an irreligious or anti-Chrisitan philosophical tradition that includes Hobbes, Spinoza and freethinking followers. Considered in these terms, Hume's Treatise constitutes the crowning achievement of the Radical Enlightenment. (shrink)

A study of how syntax relates to meaning by a leader of the new generation of philosopher-linguists.

In view of the classification of the Amphictionic decrees, which forms the basis of the 3rd c. B. C. Delphic chronology, the historian K. J. Beloch methodically exploited what information was available relative to the vicissitudes of the Euboean cities in their relations with the king of Macedonia. But his assumption that a state under Macedonian domination could not send a representative to the Amphictiony has often been questioned, notably in the case of Athens (although certainly wrongly there). Here, in (...) the light of new facts on both the Delphic and Euboean side, the case is examined of the three cities of Eretria, Chalcis and Histiaea. On the way, it is proposed to correct the sequence and date of several of the Delphic archons (group formed by Straton-Athambos-Thessa- los-Eukles), with not inconsiderable conséquences for the history of central Euboea. In particular an attempt is made to show, while treating the problem of Histiaea's représentation in about 260, that the treaty between Athens and Aetolia must date from the beginning of the Chremonidean war and that the assembly of the Soteria, called Amphic- tionic, was held every three years and not annually. From this a new dating follows for the disappearance of the Histiaea hieromnemon, which would now be connected with the revolt of Alexander, Crateros' son, in 251. Two appendices complète this study of one of the most obscure periods in Greek history. (shrink)

The twentieth century has witnessed an unprecedented 'crisis in the foundations of mathematics', featuring a world-famous paradox, a challenge to 'classical' mathematics from a world-famous mathematician, a new foundational school, and the profound incompleteness results of Kurt Gödel. In the same period, the cross-fertilization of mathematics and philosophy resulted in a new sort of 'mathematical philosophy', associated most notably with Bertrand Russell, W. V. Quine, and Gödel himself, and which remains at the focus of Anglo-Saxon philosophical discussion. The present collection (...) brings together in a convenient form the seminal articles in the philosophy of mathematics by these and other major thinkers. It is a substantially revised version of the edition first published in 1964 and includes a revised bibliography. The volume will be welcomed as a major work of reference at this level in the field. (shrink)

Επανεξέταση λίθου του Μουσείου Χαλκίδας που φέρει δύο αποσπασματικές επιγραφές, μια από τις οποίες είχε μείνει ανέκδοτη. Πρόκειται για το τέλος ενός ψηφίσματος της Ευβοϊκής Συμπολιτείας. Το.

Découverte près d'Alivéri en Eubée, cette importante inscription du milieu du IVe siècle av. J.-C. est demeurée longtemps inédite. Il s'agit d'une grande stèle amputée en haut et à gauche, où se lisent encore 35 lignes gravées stoichédon (à raison de 51 lettres par ligne après restitution). Sur la base du lieu de trouvaille, de la langue et du contenu, on peut rapporter à la même stèle le fragment IG XII 9, 190, en dépit du fait que ce petit morceau (...) — perdu depuis longtemps — n'a pas été présenté comme un texte stoichédon par son unique copiste. Ce rapprochement permet de restituer le frag ment en question (A) plus sûrement qu'on n'avait pu le faire jusqu'ici : c'est le début de la loi, avec l'énoncé des récompenses prévues pour le tyrannoctone, modulées en fonction de son statut politique et social. Le texte du nouveau morceau (B) se compose lui-même de deux sections distinguées par une asyndète significative. La première section (1. 1-17) comporte une série de clauses ayant pour objet la protection de la constitution démocratique contre toute tentative de mise en place d'un régime tyrannique, notamment par le biais d'une motion subversive : le contrevenant se verra non seulement privé de ses droits civiques (discussion sur la notion d'atimia à cette date) et de ses biens (confiscation par l'État — avec une dîme pour Artémis Amarysia, dont la prééminence dans le panthéon érétrien est ainsi confirmée), mais proscrit à perpétuité (interdiction d'inhumer ses restes dans l'Érétriade ou Érétrias gê; impunité et même récompense accordées à son meurtrier). Cette première section s'achève par une imprécation solennelle visant à décourager toute atteinte contre les dispositions de la loi elle-même (rôle intéressant des prêtres et des prêtresses — avec le mot rare, sinon même nouveau, hiéris pour hiéreia — lors des Dionysia et des Artémisia) ; entre les termes de cette imprécation et le libellé des grands serments « internationaux » (attestés à partir du IVe siècle précisément) il y a plus d'un point commun à relever. (shrink)

The second part of this publication deals with 1. 17-36 in the unpublished fragment (B), which without doubt form the most original part of the law. For it was not only a question of creating an obstacle to a coup d'État that that would overturn a genuine democracy (represented by a boule and prytaneia of Athenian type, whose members were chosen by lot among the Eretrians), but also of henceforth reestablishing this constitution if a tyranny or oligarchy — interesting association (...) — was imposed by violence. Each citizen was invited to take up arms spontaneously (this clause offered a remarkable dialectical form, a semi-passive participation of Northwestern origin). An eventuality is envisaged of the People being no longer in control of the civic centre, in particular the zone of the boukuterion designated there probably by the term Agoraion (= Metroon at Athens?), or even of them being kept outside the town : in this case the democratie elements should regroup in some part of the territory, a tactic well attested in Greece and even Eretria (the role of the maritime fortress of Porthmos) in order to retake the power. Lastly, sanctions are envisaged against citizens who had not served the cause of the People, while its defenders would be rewarded by the grant of lands and goods belonging to those who had been guilty. A considerable conduding section reviews the principal problems posed by this document : the date, circumstances of its promulgation, place(s) it was exhibited, identity of the legislator, and possible juridical and/or philosophical models. Today it seems certain that the law (necessarily before 336) has to be related to the liberation of Eretria in the autumn of 341, a relatively well documented event. As is a priore probable, an influence by Athenian legislation can be detected in the first part of the text. But a comparison with the celebrated law proposed by Eucrates of Piraeus in 337/6 shows that the Attic model would not account for ail its particularities. The Eretrian law — which is, moreover, the oldest of its kind to have survived on stone — appears radier to be the fruit of an unhappy political experience undergone in the recent past. (shrink)

La ligne 9 du décret de Rhamnonte pour Épicharès (SEG XXIV 154) n'a pu jusqu'ici être restituée de façon satisfaisante, parce que l'on a cru que l'adjectif κρυπτούς appelait nécessairement dans la lacune la présence d'un terme (nom de chose ou bien plutôt de personne) avec lequel il s'accorderait. Or, on a ici affaire à un adjectif substantivé, qui désigne manifestement une sentinelle à couvert. Il y avait donc à Athènes, comme à Sparte, une κρυπτεία, des unités de soldats camouflés. (...) Il est dès lors assez aisé de restituer le début de cette ligne 9, où un fragment nouveau assure le supplément του [στ]ρατο[πέδου β]ντος [εν τεΐ] χώραι. L'armée en question ne peut être que celle d'Antigone Gonatas. C'est donc par le Nord-Est de l'Attique que le roi de Macédoine a attaqué Athènes au commencement de l'été 267. L'Eubée centrale, avec la région d'Oropos, a été ainsi le premier théâtre de la Guerre de Chrêmonidès. (shrink)

Étude du relief Gonze 2120 (IG II², 11546), d'époque impériale : cette pierre errante, dont l'onomastique (Τείχιππος = Τήχιππος, nom exclusivement érétrien sous cette forme) trahit une origine eubéenne, doit être en fait identifiée à une stèle vue en 1850 par Rangabé près de K. Vathia-Amarynthos (IG, XII 9, 168). On examine alors cinq autres stèles eubéen- nes publiées à tort comme attiques : il s'agit de IG, IP, 12983 ; 12652 ; 12795 ; 12816 et 12888, identifiables respectivement à (...) IG, XII 9, 132; 1092; 1100, 1165 et 1103. Observations sur divers anthroponymes : f Τησώ (Κτήσων!), Χαον, Θεόδαισις, Τήθτη (sic), Φίλαγρος, Άσκληπιόδωρος et l'expansion du culte d'Asklépios dès la fin du Ve s. avant J.-C. Voyageurs en Eubée au XIXe s. : l'architecte Schaubert, le consul von Hahn, Rangabé et Pittakis. La contribution de Koumanoudis au dictionnaire de Pape-Benseler. Remarques générales sur le corpus des épitaphes attiques. Stèles de Kythnos au Musée d'Athènes. (shrink)

In this chapter, we analyze the relationships between the Internet and its users in terms of situated cognition theory. We first argue that the Internet is a new kind of cognitive ecology, providing almost constant access to a vast amount of digital information that is increasingly more integrated into our cognitive routines. We then briefly introduce situated cognition theory and its species of embedded, embodied, extended, distributed and collective cognition. Having thus set the stage, we begin by taking an embedded (...) cognition view and analyze how the Internet aids certain cognitive tasks. After that, we conceptualize how the Internet enables new kinds of embodied interaction, extends certain aspects of our embodiment, and examine how wearable technologies that monitor physiological, behavioral and contextual states transform the embodied self. On the basis of the degree of cognitive integration between a user and Internet resource, we then look at how and when the Internet extends our cognitive processes. We end this chapter with a discussion of distributed and collective cognition as facilitated by the Internet. (shrink)

The twentieth century has witnessed an unprecedented 'crisis in the foundations of mathematics', featuring a world-famous paradox (Russell's Paradox), a challenge to 'classical' mathematics from a world-famous mathematician (the 'mathematical intuitionism' of Brouwer), a new foundational school (Hilbert's Formalism), and the profound incompleteness results of Kurt Gödel. In the same period, the cross-fertilization of mathematics and philosophy resulted in a new sort of 'mathematical philosophy', associated most notably (but in different ways) with Bertrand Russell, W. V. Quine, and Gödel himself, (...) and which remains at the focus of Anglo-Saxon philosophical discussion. The present collection brings together in a convenient form the seminal articles in the philosophy of mathematics by these and other major thinkers. It is a substantially revised version of the edition first published in 1964 and includes a revised bibliography. The volume will be welcomed as a major work of reference at this level in the field. (shrink)

The first study of this ancient text in over 70 years, Rituals of the Way explores how the Xunzi influenced Confucianism and other Chinese philosophies through its emphasis on "the Way.".

Supporters of G.W.F. Hegel's philosophy have largely shied away from relating his logic to modern symbolic or mathematical approaches. While it has predominantly been the non-Greek discipline of algebra that has informed modern mathematical logic, philosopher Paul Redding argues that the approaches of Plato and Aristotle to logic were deeply shaped by the arithmetic and geometry of classical Greek culture. And by ignoring the fact that Hegel's logic also has this deep mathematical dimension, conventional Hegelians have missed some of (...) Hegel's greatest insights. In Conceptual Harmonies, Redding develops an account of Hegel's logic against a classical and modern historical background that is rarely considered. He stresses Hegel's attention to the Platonic background of Aristotle's original syllogistic and beyond. He then links these Platonic elements to Leibniz's modern revitalization of the logical tradition and then to new forms of algebraic geometry emerging in Hegel's lifetime. Redding thereby reestablishes aspects of Hegel's philosophy that are essential if Hegel is to be taken as a thinker relevant not only to contemporary philosophy, but also to current philosophical conceptions of logic. (shrink)

For over twenty years, Paul Weithman has explored the thought of John Rawls to ask how liberalism can secure the principled allegiance of those people whom Rawls called 'citizens of faith'. This volume brings together ten of his major essays, which reflect on the task and political character of political philosophy, the ways in which liberalism does and does not privatize religion, the role of liberal legitimacy in Rawls's theory, and the requirements of public reason. The essays reveal Rawls (...) as a thinker deeply engaged with political and existential questions that trouble citizens of faith, and explore how - in firm opposition to political realism - he tries to show that the possibility of liberal democracy and the natural goodness of humanity are objects of reasonable faith. The volume will be of interest to political philosophers, political theorists, moral theologians, and religious ethicists. (shrink)

According to the subset account of realization, a property, F, is realized by another property, G, whenever F is individuated by a non-empty proper subset of the causal powers by which G is individuated (and F is not a conjunctive property of which G is a conjunct). This account is especially attractive because it seems both to explain the way in which realized properties are nothing over and above their realizers, and to provide for the causal efficacy of realized properties. (...) It therefore seems to provide a way around the causal exclusion problem. There is reason to doubt, however, that the subset account can achieve both tasks. The problem arises when we look closely at the relation between properties and causal powers, specifically, at the idea that properties confer powers on the things that have them. If realizers are to be ontically prior to what they realize, then we must regard the conferral of powers by properties as a substantive relation of determination. This relation of conferral is at the heart of a kind of exclusion problem, analogous to the familiar causal exclusion problem. I argue that the subset account cannot adequately answer this new exclusion problem, and is for that reason ill-suited to be the backbone of a non-reductive physicalism. (shrink)

Although thinkers of the past might have started from presumptions of fundamental difference and inequality between (say) the genders, or people of different races, this is no longer the case. At least in mainstream political philosophy, we are all now presumed to be, in some fundamental sense, basic equals. Of course, what follows from this putative fact of basic equality remains enormously controversial: liberals, libertarians, conservatives, Marxists, republicans, and so on, continue to disagree vigorously with each other, despite all presupposing (...) some kind of basic equality. They may argue about who gets what, how much, and why, but the starting point - that all people are in some sense deserving of prima facie equal consideration - has become an axiom of our moral and political thinking. But why? Why are we basic equals? The trouble is that as soon as one asks for an explanation of this foundational premise, it begins to look shaky. After all, on any conceivable metric human beings are notably unequal, and often to striking degrees. Philosophers in this area tend to talk of equal worth, but often without trying to specify what exactly that means. Philosophically, basic equality is neither acceptable nor rejectable. It is not rejectable because we appear to be, as a matter of fact, profoundly committed to the truth of the claim that we are all one another's basic equals. But to the extent that there appear to be no philosophical arguments for believing in the truth of basic equality, it is not acceptable either. The aim of this book is to try and show why basic equality is acceptable. To do so, however, it will also contend that we need to approach the question rather differently to how it has mostly been handled so far. What's required is an exercise in what Bernard Williams called 'impure philosophy': it must include insights from other areas of human intellectual endeavour, whether psychology and history or even what we learn from how we go about practicing basic equality in our collective lives. (shrink)

Proponents of public reason views hold that the exercise of political power ought to be acceptable to all reasonable citizens. This article elucidates the common structure shared by all public reason views, first by identifying a set of questions that all such views must answer and, second, by showing that the answers to these questions stand in a particular relationship to each other. In particular, we show that what we call the ‘rationale question’ is fundamental. This fact, and the common (...) structure more generally, are often overlooked or distorted within the literature. As a result, we argue, several prominent argumentative moves made by both critics and defenders of public reason are unsuccessful. Our overall conclusion is that discussions of public reason views would be more fruitful if they made consistent use of the common structure we identify. (shrink)

Free Will & The Tragic Predicament : Making Sense of Williams -/- The discussion in this paper aims to make better sense of free will and moral responsibility by way of making sense of Bernard Williams’ significant and substantial contribution to this subject. Williams’ fundamental objective is to vindicate moral responsibility by way of freeing it from the distortions and misrepresentations imposed on it by “the morality system”. What Williams rejects, in particular, are the efforts of “morality” to further “deepen” (...) or “refine” the notion of the voluntary, with a view to securing “ultimate justice”. It is these aims and aspirations, he argues, that take us to the precipice of scepticism. In Shame and Necessity (1993) Williams advances a vindicatory genealogy that unmasks the “illusions” and “fantasies” of our current ethical ideas as they relate to agency and responsibility. What we are then left with is the task of “recasting our ethical conceptions” . It is here that Williams is especially insistent on the importance and value of historical consciousness and reflection. The role of our reflections about the Greeks and tragedy is precisely to show that in order to move forward, into the future, we need to first look back at where we have come from. The value of these “untimely” observations is that they provide us with alternatives and options that we might otherwise lack. What we discover, when we consider the Greeks, is their commitment to a “pessimism of strength” that rests on rejecting scepticism. It is this two-sided perspective on our ethical predicament that delivers a more truthful account of our human situation, one that will help us discard those illusions and fantasies of "morality" that we are “better off” without. An account of this kind refuses to accept an optimism that insists that any form of responsible ethical life must be one that is immune to the influence of luck and fate. This is the fundamental lesson that we can learn from the ancient Greeks and that Williams seeks to “recover” for us. (shrink)

This is a book about the Hilbert space formulation of quantum mechanics and its measurement theory. It contains a synopsis of what became of the Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics since von Neumann's classic treatise with this title. Fundamental non-classical features of quantum mechanics-indeterminacy and incompatibility of observables, unavoidable measurement disturbance, entanglement, nonlocality-are explicated and analysed using the tools of operational quantum theory. The book is divided into four parts: 1. Mathematics provides a systematic exposition of the Hilbert space and (...) operator theoretic tools and relevant measure and integration theory leading to the Naimark and Stinespring dilation theorems; 2. Elements develops the basic concepts of quantum mechanics and measurement theory with a focus on the notion of approximate joint measurability; 3. Realisations offers in-depth studies of the fundamental observables of quantum mechanics and some of their measurement implementations; and 4. Foundations discusses a selection of foundational topics (quantum-classical contrast, Bell nonlocality, measurement limitations, measurement problem, operational axioms) from a measurement theoretic perspective. The book is addressed to physicists, mathematicians and philosophers of physics with an interest in the mathematical and conceptual foundations of quantum physics, specifically from the perspective of measurement theory. (shrink)

Ricoeur’s theory of productive imagination in previously unpublished lectures. The eminent philosopher Paul Ricoeur was devoted to the imagination. These previously unpublished lectures offer Ricoeur’s most significant and sustained reflections on creativity as he builds a new theory of imagination through close examination, moving from Aristotle, Pascal, Spinoza, Hume, and Kant to Ryle, Price, Wittgenstein, Husserl, and Sartre. These thinkers, he contends, underestimate humanity’s creative capacity. While the Western tradition generally views imagination as derived from the reproductive example of (...) the image, Ricoeur develops a theory about the mind’s power to produce new realities. Modeled most clearly in fiction, this productive imagination, Ricoeur argues, is available across conceptual domains. His theory provocatively suggests that we are not constrained by existing political, social, and scientific structures. Rather, our imaginations have the power to break through our conceptual horizons and remake the world. (shrink)

De Marco and colleagues claim that the standard account of invasiveness as commonly encountered ‘...does not capture all uses of the term in relation to medical interventions 1 ’. This is open to challenge. Their first example is ‘non-invasive prenatal testing’. Because it involves puncturing the skin to obtain blood, De Marco _et al_ take this as an example of how an incision or insertion is not sufficient to make an intervention invasive; here is a procedure that involves an incision, (...) but it is regarded as non-invasive. However, this ignores the context, and the term should really be understood in reference to the fetus. It is hard to believe healthcare professionals regard taking blood to measure, for example, ferritin levels as invasive but taking blood to look for fragments of fetal DNA as not. If anyone uses the term thinking it is not invasive to the mother, the... (shrink)

David Hume (1711-1776) is widely recognized as one of the most influential and significant critics of religion in the history of philosophy. There remains, nevertheless, considerable disagreement about the exact nature of his views. According to some, he was a skeptic who regarded all conjectures relating to religious hypotheses to be beyond the scope of human understanding – he neither affirmed nor denied these conjectures. Others read him as embracing a highly refined form of “true religion” of some kind. On (...) the other side of this spectrum, it is claimed that Hume was committed to atheism, although due to social conditions at the time, this had to be (thinly) concealed or masked. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of Hume’s core concerns and arguments on this subject and to provide the reader with a framework for interpreting and assessing his various contributions. (shrink)

This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature – a constitutive aim, principle, or standard – that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to derive normative claims. In short, the authority of certain (...) normative claims arises from the bare fact that we are agents. This essay explains the constitutivst strategy, surveys the extant attempts to generate constitutivist theories, and considers the problems and prospects for the theory. (shrink)

Iris Murdoch claims that “clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort.” Our experience of the world can be blurred by egoism, inattentiveness, and other failings. I ask how we distinguish clear vision from distorted vision. Murdoch’s texts appeal to four factors: (A) attention; (B) unselfing; (C) a form of conceptual articulacy; and (D) love. I ask three questions about these standards: - Are these standards directed at the same goal? (For example, are they all geared toward (...) securing purely epistemic goals?) - Are these standards criterial for improvements in vision? (That is, does the presence of some combination of (A)-(D) constitute or guarantee better vision?) - Does Murdoch think that there’s a single best form of vision? (Such as the one attained by the person who manifests (A)-(D)?) In the secondary literature, the typical answers to these questions are: yes, yes, yes. But I give different answers: no, no, no. (shrink)

Conservatism about perceptual justification tells us that we cannot have perceptual justification to believe p unless we also have justification to believe that perceptual experiences are reliable. There are many ways to maintain this thesis, ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated. Most of these ways lead to at least one of two problems. The first is an over-intellectualization problem, whereas the second problem concerns the satisfaction of the epistemic basing requirement on justified belief. I argue that there is at (...) least one Conservative view that survives both difficulties, a view which has the further ability to undercut a crucial consideration that has supported Dogmatist views about perceptual justification. The final section explores a tension between Conservatism and the prospects of having a completely general account of propositional justification. Ironically, the problem is that Conservatives seem committed to making the acquisition of propositional justification too easy. My partial defense of Conservatism concludes by suggesting possible solutions to this problem. (shrink)

This paper poses a puzzle for contemporary Kantian political philosophy. Kantian political philosophers hold that the state’s purpose is to secure the conditions for people’s innate right to equal freedom, while at the same time claiming that innate right does not give a determinate set of conditions that the state is to bring about. Officials, then, have to make decisions in cases where the considerations of innate right provide no further guidance. I argue that, intuitively, in such cases there are (...) (i) some further considerations that officials may appeal to and (ii) some further considerations that officials may not appeal to in order to decide among the options consistent with people’s innate right and then raise difficulties for the ability of current Kantian accounts to explain how they can accept both (i) and (ii). I conclude by suggesting one potential path forward for Kantians to address this puzzle. (shrink)

Why do people persist in commitments that threaten their happiness, security, and comfort? Why do some of our most central, identity-defining commitments resist the effects of reasoning and critical reflection? Drawing on real-life examples, empirical psychology, and philosophical reflection, this book argues that these commitments involve an ethical stance called devotion, which plays a pervasive—but often hidden—role in human life. Devotion typically involves sacralizing certain values, goals, or relationships. To sacralize a value is to treat it as inviolable (trade-offs with (...) ordinary values are forbidden), incontestable (even contemplating such trade-offs is prohibited), and dialectically invulnerable (no rational considerations can disrupt the agent’s commitment to the value). Philosophy of Devotion offers a detailed philosophical account and defense of these features. Devotion and the sacralization of values can be reasonable; indeed, a life involving meaningful, sustained commitment depends on these stances. Without devotion, we risk an existential condition called normative dissipation, in which all of our commitments become etiolated. Yet devotion can easily go wrong, deforming into the individual and group fanaticism that have become pervasive features of modern social life. The book provides an alternative to fanaticism, investigating the way in which we can express non-pathological forms of devotion. We can be devoted through affirmation and through what is termed the deepening move, which treats the agent’s central commitments as systematically inchoate. Each stance enables a wholehearted form of devotion that nevertheless preserves flexibility and openness, avoiding the dangers of fanaticism on the one hand and normative dissipation on the other. -/- (The attached file contains the introductory chapter.). (shrink)

This is a contribution to a Book symposium on The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays by Paul Russell. Russell provides replies to three critics of The Limits of Free Will. The first reply is to Robert Wallace and focuses on the question of whether there is a conflict between the core compatibilist and pessimist components of the "critical compatibilist" position that Russell has advanced. The second reply is to Angela Smith's discussion of the "narrow" interpretation of moral responsibility (...) responsibility (as defended by R. Jay Wallace) and how best to respond to it. The third and last reply is concerned with Christopher Bennett's criticism of Russell's views concerning "motivational scepticism" and the possibility of pure practical reasons. (shrink)