Contacts between Polish historians, French historians and French centers of historiography – espcially with the prestigious milieu of Fernand Braudel's Annales – were unusual and extraordinary in comparison with other forms of scientific cooperation with foreign countries: both with the West and the “friendly countries.” Because of the undeniable uniqueness of these relations many scholars from various countries claim that the annalistic methodology “influnced” Polish historiography. What is characteristic, however, is that these statements are most often completely a priori. This (...) paper is a reflection on the nature of the methodological influence of one historical school on the other and discusses such a possibility, taking into consideration models of circulation of ideas proposed by Pierre Bourdieu and Jerzy Maternicki. It is also an attempt at answering whether historical sciences are able to freely interfere on a supra-national level or whether they are by nature characterized by provincialism, understood here as a limitation to national frameworks outside of which they cannot be understood. (shrink)

The main goal of this article is to show diverse approaches in political culture and some of the problems arising from this, as well as to point out the differences between the two perspectives – theories of political science and political philosophy. The author starts by analysing the classic definition of political culture developed by Gabriel Almond and presents the critique of this definition. He also describes a new approach proposed by researchers, such as Władysław Markiewicz, Andrzej W. Jabłoński and (...) Zbigniew Blok. The main problem with Almond’s concept – as the political scientists indicate – is that it is of little relevance for empirical studies. The researchers try to make this concept more useful as a research tool for examining political reality. On the other hand, Cezary Kościelniak and Janusz Wiśniewski attempt to define political culture in political philosophy’s terms. Their intention is to make this concept work as a counterfactual conceptualization of political reality. (shrink)

This paper undertakes the question concerning methodological consequences of understanding phenomenology from the viewpoint of the category of the gift. In regard to the philosophical enterprise of Jean-Luc Marion, manifestation is understood as an act of givenness, which has a radically non-objective character. Next, this paper points out the classical source of the concept of givenness. It also mentions that givenness is a result of material interpretation of the Husserlian term “Gegebenheit.” Then, givenness is presented as a figure that requires (...) a phenomenological method to bracket mere terms that phenomenology employs. This mechanism helps to describe reduction as a radical method of bracketing metaphysics. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to discuss the “multimedia encyclopedia” genre launched in the 1980s, the era of “the multimedia revolution.” Encyclopedias of this kind were released on CD-ROM by several well-respected encyclopedia publishers and were widely discussed as an innovation which would lead to information and communication technologies extending rather than replacing the Gutenberg Galaxy. While discussing the launch of multimedia encyclopedias I aim to show how the culture of the printed word was perceived in “the information revolution” (...) discourse of the time by relevant cultural intermediaries. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present lucid and sympathetic approach to Heraclitean paradoxes. I do not intend to resolve them in terms of Aristotelian logic. Instead, I attempt to reveal their connection with language, their dependence on Greek semantics and syntax. From such a point of view one may eventually see the great significance of language in general as an epistemic guide in Heraclitus' philosophical investigations.

The paper deals with the mythological background for the philosophical concept of being. Against this background the early development of this concept and its conditions are shown. Also, some attention will be paid to certain linguistic aspect behind this process.

IS THE ANOMALOUS MONISM AN ALLY OF THE ANTI-CONSTRUCTIVE NATURALISM? The paper argues that Davidson’s thesis of the anomalous character of mental life is a natural supporter for McGinn’s anti-constructive naturalism. In the first two parts of the article I discuss both positions. In the third I will try to show similarities and differences between them and the way in which anomalous monism can support McGinns theory.

FRAGMENT OR THE BORDERLANDS OF PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE IN EMIL CIORAN’S WRITINGS This article concerns fragmentary writing of Emil Cioran. The author tries to show that the fragment is a specific type of artistic creativity that is situated between literature and philosophy. The initial part of the article deals with the problem of modern fragmentarism that was born in the times of German romanticism. Then, the author investigates the causes of Cioran’s fragmentary writing, which are: the opposition to systematic philosophy, (...) the opposition to modern idea of a literary „work” and the intellectual honesty which shows heterogeneity of life. All this makes the fragment very difficult to interpret: we wish to adopt the whole sense of it, but we cannot do this. Also, the title issue turns out to be unsolvable. Cioran escapes fixed categories. And fragment, as an unsuccessful, fractured discourse, can be both literature and philosophy, or none of them. That makes it similar to Jacques Derrida’s ideas of farmakon, aporia or différance. (shrink)

The article puts forward the thesis that Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics can be useful for conceptualising the issue of the Anthropocene. Both speculative features of hermeneutics generally and specific Gadamerian insights are helpful for this matter. As for the speculative features of hermeneutics, the concept of understanding may be used, as well as Gadamer's analysis of prejudices and of the history of effect. Further, Gadamer's ecological insights anticipated some problems raised by the philosophy of the Anthropocene and are therefore also helpful (...) in our current articulation of the concept. (shrink)

In the article we study the existence predicate \(\varepsilon\) in the context of semantics for first-order modal logic. For a formula \(\varphi\) we define \(\varphi^{\varepsilon}\) - the so called existence relativization. We point to a gap in the work of Fitting and Mendelsohn concerning the relationship between the truth of \(\varphi\) and \(\varphi^{\varepsilon}\) in classes of varying- and constant-domain models. We introduce operations on models which allow us to fill the gap and provide a more general perspective on the issue. (...) As a result we obtain a series of theorems describing the logical connection between the notion of truth of a formula with the existence predicate in constant-domain models and the notion of truth of a formula without the existence predicate in varying-domain models. (shrink)

The General Formal Ontology is a top-level ontology that is being developed at the University of Leipzig since 1999. Besides introducing some of the basic principles of the ontology, we expound axiomatic fragments of its formalization and present ontological models of several use cases. GFO is a top-level ontology that integrates objects and processes into a unified framework, in a way that differs significantly from other ontologies. Another unique selling feature of GFO is its meta-ontological architecture, which includes set theory (...) into ontology and which accounts for its specific role in common representation approaches. The second level of that architecture starts from the distinction of categories and individuals, which forms the backbone of the world’s structure. Furthermore, GFO comprises several kinds of categories, among them universals and concepts, and it considers several ontological regions and levels. In the context of this special issue paper, we study five pre-determined use cases from the perspective of GFO. The results of these analyses yield insights into how the ontology treats several important notions. Very abridged, this covers material objects and their composition; roles and social entities; properties with their relations to objects and processes, and their changing; changes of processes, including a functional perspective; and, eventually, the nature and changing of concepts as well as terminology. A final part summarizes application projects that use GFO in various contexts. (shrink)

The paper is a critical reaction to Marcin Trepczyński article “Thomas Aquinas Non-Monotonically” (Filozofia Nauki 2/2011). It is shown that the author misunderstood the real forms of Thomas Aquinas reasoning. I present arguments which show why these reasonings are monotonic by analyzing some of the examples which Trepczyński is using to justify the opposite thesis.

Tematem artykułu jest tom poetycki Tomasza Bąka XXI. Nagi wodnik w śródmieściu (2021). Autor interpretuje go jako zawoalowaną próbę wyjścia z realizmu kapitalistycznego, która odbywa się pod pretekstem opowieści o jednym aspekcie katastrofy klimatycznej: wzroście poziomu morza. Bąk wydaje się traktować ów „potop” jako swego rodzaju interwencję Realnego, które coraz silniej przebija spod szczelin kapitalistycznej zasady rzeczywistości. Strategia poetycka Bąka polega na odnajdywaniu tego rodzaju szczelin w samym środku realizmu kapitalistycznego i wykonywaniu pracy żałoby po świecie, który już się skończył.

This paper discusses the conditions under which an agent is rationally permitted to leave some uncertain propositions relevant to her decision out of her deliberation. By relying on the view that belief involves a defeasible disposition to treat a proposition as true in one’s reasoning, we examine the conditions under which such a disposition can be overridden and under which an agent should take into account her uncertainty as to a proposition she believes in the course of a particular deliberation. (...) We argue that, in some contexts, an agent can be faced with the choice of either accepting or not accepting a proposition she believes in the course of her deliberation. We provide a description of such higher-order deliberations within the framework of expected utility theory and draw conclusions regarding the phenomenon of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge. (shrink)

In his ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance’, Lewis argued that a particular kinematical model for chances follows from his principal principle. According to this model, any later chance function is equal to an earlier chance function conditional on the complete intervening history of non-modal facts. This article first investigates the conditions that any kinematical model for chance needs to satisfy to count as Lewis’s kinematics of chance. Second, it presents Lewis’s justification for his kinematics of chance and explains why (...) it is bound to be problematic. Third, it gives an alternative justification for Lewis’s kinematics of chance that does not appeal to the principal principle. Instead, this justification appeals to a well-supported requirement for chance, according to which any prior chance function must be a convex combination of the possible posterior chance functions. It is shown that under a plausible assumption, Lewis’s kinematics of chance is equivalent to this requirement. Finally, by focusing on this requirement, it is explained why the so-called self-undermining chances fail to obey Lewis’s kinematics of chance. (shrink)

This paper shows how a particular resiliency-centered approach to chance lends support for two conditions characterizing chance. The first condition says that the present chance of some proposition A conditional on the proposition about some later chance of A should be set equal to that later chance of A. The second condition requires the present chance of some proposition A to be equal to the weighted average of possible later chances of A. I first introduce, motivate, and make precise a (...) resiliency-centered approach to chance whose basic idea is that any chance distribution should be maximally invariant under variation of experimental factors. Second, I show that any present chance distribution that violates the two conditions can be replaced by another present chance distribution that satisfies them and is more resilient under variation of experimental factors. This shows that the two conditions are an essential feature of chances that maximize resiliency. Finally, I explore the relationship between the idea of resilient chances so understood and so-called Humean accounts of chance—one of the most promising recent philosophical accounts of chance. (shrink)

The standard principle of expert deference says that conditional on the expert’s credence in a proposition _A_ being _x_, your credence in _A_ ought to be _x_. The so-called Adams conditionalization is an attractive update rule in situations when learning experience prompts a shift in your conditional credences. In this paper, I show that, except in some trivial situations, when your prior conditional credence in _A_ obeys the standard principle of expert deference and then is revised by Adams conditionalization in (...) response to a shift in your conditional credence for a proposition _B_ given _A_, your posterior conditional credence in _A_ cannot continue to obey that principle, on pain of inconsistency. I explain why this tension between Adams conditionalization and the standard principle of expert deference is puzzling and why the option of rejecting the update rule appears problematic. Finally, I suggest that in order to avoid this inconsistency, we should abandon the standard principle of expert deference and think of an expert’s probabilistic opinion as a constraint on your posterior credence distribution rather than your prior one. (shrink)

In sequential decision problems, an act of learning cost-free evidence might be symptomatic, in the sense that performing this act itself provides evidence about states of the world it does nothing to causally promote. It is well known that orthodox causal decision theory, like its main rival evidential decision theory, may sanction such acts as rationally impermissible. This paper shows that, under plausible assumptions, a minimal version of ratificationist causal decision theory, known as principled ratificationism, fares better in this respect, (...) for it never labels symptomatic acts of learning cost-free evidence as rationally impermissible. (shrink)

This article aims to analyze the scope and limits of common cause abduction which is a version of explanatory abduction based on Hans Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause. First, it is argued that common cause abduction can be regarded as a rational inferential mechanism that enables us to accept hypotheses that aim to account for the surprising correlations of events. Three arguments are presented in support of common cause abduction: the argument from screening-off, the argument from likelihood, and the (...) argument from simplicity. Second, it is claimed, that common cause abduction is a defeasible reasoning, i.e., common cause abductive hypotheses are not always more plausible than separate cause abductive hypotheses. Finally, it is outlined what factors should be taken into account in order to use common cause abduction in a reasonable way. (shrink)

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 26, Issue 3, Page 348-351, September 2012.

The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Bruno de Finetti's view that the axiom of countable additivity of the probability calculus cannot be justified in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability. After presenting the core of the subjective theory of probability and the main de Finetti's argument against the axiom of countable additivity (the so called de Finetti's infinite lottery) I argue against de Finetti's view. In particular, I claim that de Finetti does not prove the (...) impossibility of using Dutch Book argument for the axiom of countable additivity. Consequently, we can use Dutch Book argument for the justification of the axiom of countable additivity and regard de Finetti's lottery as a special case when the axiom does not hold, or we can justify countable additivity by Dutch Book argument and reject de Finetti's lottery as irrational. The second strategy, represented especially by Jon Williamson, is much more compatible with the idea of subjective interpretation of probability. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Bruno de Finetti's view that the axiom of countable additivity of the probability calculus cannot be justified in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability. After presenting the core of the subjective theory of probability and the main de Finetti's argument against the axiom of countable additivity (the so called de Finetti's infinite lottery) I argue against de Finetti's view. In particular, I claim that de Finetti does not prove the (...) impossibility of using Dutch Book argument for the axiom of countable additivity. Consequently, we can use Dutch Book argument for the justification of the axiom of countable additivity and regard de Finetti's lottery as a special case when the axiom does not hold, or we can justify countable additivity by Dutch Book argument and reject de Finetti's lottery as irrational. The second strategy, represented especially by Jon Williamson, is much more compatible with the idea of subjective interpretation of probability. (shrink)

We explore the question of whether cost-free uncertain evidence is worth waiting for in advance of making a decision. A classical result in Bayesian decision theory, known as the value of evidence theorem, says that, under certain conditions, when you update your credences by conditionalizing on some cost-free and certain evidence, the subjective expected utility of obtaining this evidence is never less than the subjective expected utility of not obtaining it. We extend this result to a type of update method, (...) a variant of Judea Pearl’s virtual conditionalization, where uncertain evidence is represented as a set of likelihood ratios. Moreover, we argue that focusing on this method rather than on the widely accepted Jeffrey conditionalization enables us to show that, under a fairly plausible assumption, gathering uncertain evidence not only maximizes expected pragmatic utility, but also minimizes expected epistemic disutility. (shrink)

In the debate about the legal value of naked statistical evidence, Di Bello argues that (1) the likelihood ratio of such evidence is unknown, (2) the decision-theoretic considerations indicate that a conviction based on such evidence is unacceptable when expected utility maximization is combined with fairness constraints, and (3) the risk of mistaken conviction based on such evidence cannot be evaluated and is potentially too high. We argue that Di Bello’s argument for (1) works in a rather narrow context, and (...) that (1) is not exactly in line with the way expert witnesses are required to formulate their opinions. Consequently, Di Bello’s argument for (2), which assumes (1), does not apply uniformly to all convictions based on naked evidence. Moreover, if Di Bello’s analysis is correct, it applies also to eyewitness testimony, given empirical results about its quality, and so the distinctions drawn by DiBello cut across the distinction between naked statistical evidence and other types of evidence. Finally, if we weaken the rather strong requirement of precise measurability of the risk of mistaken conviction, to the availability of reasonable but imprecise and fallible estimates, many field and empirical studies show that often the risk of mistaken conviction based on naked statistical evidence can be estimated to a similar extent as the risk of mistaken conviction based on any other sort of evidence. (shrink)

The idea of superintelligence is a source of mainly philosophical and ethical considerations. Those considerations are rooted in the idea that an entity which is more intelligent than humans, may evolve in some point in the future. For obvious reasons, the superintelligence is considered as a kind of existential threat for humanity. In this essay, we discuss two ideas. One of them is the putative nature of future superintelligence which does not necessary need to be harmful for humanity. Our key (...) idea states that the superintelligence does not need to assess its own survival as the highest value. As a kind of intelligence that is not biological, it is not clear what kind of attitude the superintelligent entity may evolve towards living organisms. Our second idea refers to the possible revelation of superintelligence. We assume that the self-revelation of such entity cannot be random. The metaphor of God as a superintelligence is introduced here as a helpful conceptual tool. (shrink)

Does Thomas Aquinas use non-monotonical reasonings? In my recent paper Thomas Aquinas Non-monotonically I argued that he does. However Patryk Pogoda has opposed to my statement. In this paper I try to disarm his arguments. What is more this polemic became for me an occasion to develop some crucial problems concerning non-monotonicity. Before all while answering to some arguments of my opponent I had an opportunity to show that non-monotonical reasoning is a proper way of inferention in theology. The (...) main causes of this fact are: the plurality of meanings in theology, the process of deeper and deeper penetrating the revelation and the fact that information studied in theology is given not by a human, but by God. These three causes create a specific situation for the theologian who cannot translate a revealed information which looks as it was metaphorical to some simple unequivocal sentences. In the starting point he does not know the status of this information and should first trust to God’s word to became aquainted with it, so he has to accept it as it is and on this basis infere what he can. But if he (or another theologian) get some other premises he may dismiss the former correct inference – and this is exactly what we call non-monotonical reasoning. (shrink)