Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 56 Heft: 3 Seiten: 331-347.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGIm Rahmen des Artikels wird die Debatte zwischen Schelling und Eschenmayer inden Jahren 1803–1804 als eine Kontroverse analysiert, die deren vorherige um die Naturphilosophie weiterführt. Der Zentralgedanke Eschenmayers wird in dessen Theorie der »Potenzierung« gesehen. Auf dieser Grundlage entwickelt Eschenmayer 1803 eine Theorie der intellektuellen Anschauung, die seine Theorie des »Überganges« in methodischer Hinsicht tragen und dabei den Glauben in einer grundsätzlichen Bedeutung für das Wissen und die Philosophie wiedereinführen soll. Ferner soll damit die Generierung von Differenz in der absoluten (...) Identität erklärbar sein. So erscheint die Debatte über den Zusammenhang von Philosophie und Religion von 1803 und 1804 zunächst als eine Debatte um die Methodik und die Theorie der Philosophie selbst. Die Analyse von Schellings Methodik, der »Konstruktion«, macht die tiefen Differenzen zwischen Eschenmayer und Schelling deutlich. In der Konsequenz hat auch die von Schelling zwischen 1802 und 1804 präsentierte Religionsphilosophie eine grundlegend andere Bedeutung als Eschenmayers.SCHLUSSELWORTENIDENTITÄTSPHILOSOPHIE, NATURPHILOSOPHIE, INTELLEKTUELLEANSCHAUUNG, RELIGION.ABSTRACTWithin the scope of this article the debate between Schelling and Eschenmayer inthe years 1803–1804 is analysed as a controversy, that continuies the former concerning the philosophy of nature. The central thought of Eschenmayer in his theories of matter and also in his theorie of the philosophy proceeding to »Nichtphilosophie«, is seen in the »Potenzierung«. On this basis he develops a theory of »Intellektuelle Anschauung« that should bear methodically his »progress in Nichtphilosophie« and reintroduce the religious belief in a fundamental meaning for the philosophy. Moreover it should explain the genesis of difference in the absolute identity. So the debate about the connection of philosophy and religion in 1803 and 1804 seems to be mainly one about the methods and theory of philosophy. Looking at Schellings method of »Konstruktion« the fundamental differences between both get visible. In the consequence Schellings philosophy of religion, that he presented between 1802and 1804, has strictly another meaning than Eschenmayers.KEY WORDSphilosophy of identity, philosophy of nature, intellectual intuition, religion. (shrink)

English summary: During his time inWurzburg from 1803 to 1806 Schelling read his lectures on the System der gesammten Philosophie und der Naturphilosophie insbesondere several times. They are the only complete exposition of Schellings identity philosophy, which comprises the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of mind. The articles discuss the Wurzburger System in the context of problem history and in light of the history of Schellings works and of the history of debates concerning them. With contributions by Christopher Arnold, (...) Ulrich Barth, Christoph Binkelmann, Christian Danz, Georg Essen, Michael Hackl, Patrick Leistner, Jan Rohls, Alexander Schuhbach, Sebastian Schwenzfeuer, Clemens Tangerding and Paul Ziche. German description: In seiner Wurzburger Zeit von 1803 bis 1806 hat Schelling mehrfach sein System der gesammten Philosophie und der Naturphilosophie insbesondere vorgetragen. Hierbei handelt es sich um die einzige Gesamtdarstellung der identitatsphilosophischen Konzeption, welche sowohl Natur- als auch Geistphilosophie umfasst. Die Beitrage des Bandes thematisieren das Wurzburger System vor seinem werk- und problemgeschichtlichen Hintergrund sowie in seinem debattengeschichtlichen Kontext. Mit Beitragen von Christopher Arnold, Ulrich Barth, Christoph Binkelmann, Christian Danz, Georg Essen, Michael Hackl, Patrick Leistner, Jan Rohls, Alexander Schubach, Sebastian Schwenzfeuer, Clemens Tangerding und Paul Ziche.Mit Beitragen von Christopher Arnold, Ulrich Barth, Christoph Binkelmann, Christian Danz, Georg Essen, Michael Hackl, Patrick Leistner, Jan Rohls, Alexander Schuhbach, Sebastian Schwenzfeuer, Clemens Tangerding und Paul Ziche. (shrink)

The Polymath Project is an online collaborative enterprise that was initiated in 2009, when Timothy Gowers asked whether and how groups could work together to solve mathematical problems that “do not naturally split up into a vast number of subtasks.” Gowers proposed to answer this question himself by actually trying to set up such a collaboration, based on interactions taking place in the comment-threads of a series of posts on a WordPress blog. Hence, the first project officially started in early (...) 2009, to be proclaimed successful only 6 weeks later (Gowers and Nielsen 2009). From its inception until April 2018, 15 more Polymath problems (and a handful of smaller or related ones) have been launched. These projects have attracted attention from different scholarly communities, including the philosophy of mathematical practices, from the perspective of which the Polymath Project can be seen as a vast repository of mathematics in action. This chapter continues previous work by its authors on the topic in question and topics related. More specifically, for the purposes of this volume, it is our aim to both summarize and expand upon these earlier contributions. The starting point is the above observation that in the past decade, the issue of “massively collaborative mathematics” (to be qualified below) has drawn quite some attention. However, does it also warrant intensive philosophical attention in particular? For, as exciting as these developments might be from mathematical and other points of view, the enhanced possibilities that have come with it do not per se give rise to any philosophical import. In Van Bendegem (2011), one of us has indeed tentatively argued for the philosophical relevance of these new dynamics of proof construction flowing from the wide availability and efficiency of Internet technology. We shall below briefly rehearse and update the argument given there. (shrink)

By resituating Alexander von Humboldt in the “working world” of mining, this essay offers a case study of the way in which industry has shaped practice and theory in the history of science. While Humboldt’s experience as a miner in Saxony and Prussia provided him a venue in which to study fossilized vegetation, revealing a fundamental link between the migrations of plants and of peoples, industrial concerns about miners’ safety inspired a study of the interplay between plants and people that (...) shaped his later articulation of the verticality of plant distribution. Moreover, the cartographic methods Humboldt employed during his American journey depended as much on drawing practices indebted to mining as they did on patterns of vertical mobility above and below the surface of the earth. These arguments ultimately encourage a departure from “Humboldtian Science,” a term that has veiled an originally Prusso-Saxon science beneath a set of Anglo-American connotations. (shrink)

Informational semantics were first developed as an interpretation of the model-theory of substructural (and especially relevant) logics. In this paper we argue that such a semantics is of independent value and that it should be considered as a genuine alternative explication of the notion of logical consequence alongside the traditional model-theoretical and the proof-theoretical accounts. Our starting point is the content-nonexpansion platitude which stipulates that an argument is valid iff the content of the conclusion does not exceed the combined content (...) of the premises. We show that this basic platitude can be used to characterise the extension of classical as well as non-classical consequence relations. The distinctive trait of an informational semantics is that truth-conditions are replaced by information-conditions. The latter leads to an inversion of the usual order of explanation: Considerations about logical discrimination (how finely propositions are individuated) are conceptually prior to considerations about deductive strength. Because this allows us to bypass considerations about truth, an informational semantics provides an attractive and metaphysically unencumbered account of logical consequence, non-classical logics, logical rivalry and pluralism about logical consequence. (shrink)

Confirmation in evolutionary biology depends on what biologists take to be the genuine rivals. Investigating what constrains the scope of biological possibility provides part of the story: explaining how possible helps determine what counts as a genuine rival and thus informs confirmation. To clarify the criteria for genuine rivalry I distinguish between global and local constraints on biological possibility, and offer an account of how-possibly explanation. To sharpen the connection between confirmation and explaining how possible I discuss the view that (...) formal inquiry can provide a kind of confirmation-theoretic support for evolutionary models, and offer an example of how-possibly explanation interacting with testing practice. (shrink)

The distinction between distributive and non-distributive profiles figures prominently in current evaluations of the ethical and epistemological risks that are associated with automated profiling practices. The diagnosis that non-distributive profiles may coincidentally situate an individual in the wrong category is often perceived as the central shortcoming of such profiles. According to this diagnosis, most risks can be retraced to the use of non-universal generalisations and various other statistical associations. This article develops a top-down analysis of non-distributive profiles in which this (...) fallibility of non-distributive profiles is no longer central. Instead, it focuses on how profiling creates various asymmetries between an individual data-subject and a profiler. The emergence of informational, interest, and perspectival asymmetries between data-subject and profiler explains how non-distributive profiles weaken the epistemic position of a profiled individual. This alternative analysis provides a more balanced assessment of the epistemic risks associated with non-distributive profiles. (shrink)

Food uncertainty has the effect of invigorating food-related responses. Psychologists have noted that mammals and birds respond more to a conditioned stimulus that unreliably predicts food delivery, and ecologists have shown that animals consume and/or hoard more food and can get fatter when access to that resource is unpredictable. Are these phenomena related? We think they are. Psychologists have proposed several mechanistic interpretations, while ecologists have suggested a functional interpretation: The effect of unpredictability on fat reserves and hoarding behavior is (...) an evolutionary strategy acting against the risk of starvation when food is in short supply. Both perspectives are complementary, and we argue that the psychology of incentive motivational processes can shed some light on the causal mechanisms leading animals to seek and consume more food under uncertainty in the wild. Our theoretical approach is in agreement with neuroscientific data relating to the role of dopamine, a neurotransmitter strongly involved in incentive motivation, and its plausibility has received some explanatory and predictive value with respect to Pavlovian phenomena. Overall, we argue that the occasional and unavoidable absence of food rewards has motivational effects that facilitate foraging effort. We show that this hypothesis is computationally tenable, leading foragers in an unpredictable environment to consume more food items and to have higher long-term energy storage than foragers in a predictable environment. (shrink)

Awareness that moral beliefs and practices have changed across time threatens our confidence in our current moral beliefs: if past moral beliefs turned out to be wrong, how can we be sure ours aren't likewise mistaken? In this paper, I set up four desiderata for a successful theory of moral progress: it must allow us to judge that progress has occurred, avoid the image of increasing correspondence towards ahistorical truthmakers, allow for revision in belief, and yet not be disobligating. Rorty's (...) pragmatist account of moral progress delivers on the first three, but at the cost of failing to meet the fourth: it drains moral beliefs of their categorical force. I then outline K.E. Løgstrup’s understanding of the relation between the ‘ethical demand’ and changing, socially mediated norms. While Løgstrup does posit an unchanging ground of normativity - the "ethical demand" to act for the sake of the other whose welfare is in our hands – he also thinks that changing social norms are an indispensable part of ethical life. I argue that Løgstrup's discussion of the ‘refraction’ of the ethical demand through changing social norms provides resources for an account of moral progress that fulfils these four desiderata. (shrink)

In this book, fifteen authors from a wide spectrum of disciplines (ranging from the natural sciences to the arts) offer assessments of the way time enters their work, the definition and uses of time that have proved most productive or problematic, and the lessons their subjects can offer for our understanding of time beyond the classroom and laboratory walls. The authors have tried, without sacrificing analytical rigour, to make their contribution accessible to a cross-disciplinary readership. Each chapter reviews time's past (...) and present application in its respective field, considers the practical and logical problems that remain, and assesses the methods researchers are using to escape or resolve them. Particular attention is paid to ways in which the technical treatment of time, for problem-solving and model-building around specific phenomena, call on - or clash with - our intuitive perceptions of what time is and does. The spans of time considered range from the fractions of seconds it takes unstable particles to disintegrate to the millions of years required for one species to give way to another. Like all central conceptual words, time is understood on several levels. By inviting input from a broad range of disciplines, the book aims to provide a fuller understanding of those levels, and of the common ground that lurks at their base. Much agreement emerges - not only on the nature of the problems time presents to modern intellectual thought, but also on the clues that recent discoveries may offer towards possible solutions. (shrink)

The main object of this book is to present the theoretical outline of a temporalized sociology; that is, a sociology which both takes novelty as its starting point, and makes the link between the shorter and longer temporal spans. This temporalized sociology draws upon a variety of sources. Firstly, it builds on the legacy of four theoretical traditions: positivism, functionalism, structuralism and ethnomethodology. Although these four traditions are criticized for failing to take a temporalized perspective themselves, they yet offer a (...) number of fruitful ideas and concepts which form the basis of this author's approach. The core of the argument for a secondary, but not umimportant, aim is to demonstrate the contemporary significance of G.H. Mead's writings. (shrink)

In this paper I present a more refined analysis of the principles of deductive closure and positive introspection. This analysis uses the expressive resources of logics for different types of group knowledge, and discriminates between aspects of closure and computation that are often conflated. The resulting model also yields a more fine-grained distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, and places Hintikka’s original argument for positive introspection in a new perspective.

Based on a fresh examination of the original, this is the first ever full-length commentary and English translation of one of Sallust's major works. It covers the years 78-67 BC, one of the least-documented but eventful periods of the era.

Substructural pluralism about the meaning of logical connectives is best understood as the view that natural language connectives have all (and only) the properties conferred by classical logic, but that particular occurrences of these connectives cannot simultaneously exhibit all these properties. This is just a more sophisticated way of saying that while natural language connectives are ambiguous, they are not so in the way classical logic intends them to be. Since this view is usually framed as a means to resolve (...) paradoxes, little attention is paid to the logical properties of the ambiguous connectives themselves. The present paper sets out to fill this gap. First, I argue that substructural logicians should care about these connectives; next, I describe a consequence relation between a set of ambiguous premises and an ambiguous conclusion, and review the logical properties of ambiguous connectives; and finally, I highlight how ambiguous connectives can explain our intuitions about logical rivalry. (shrink)

This paper argues against a common misunderstanding of Foucault's work. Even after the release of his lectures at the Collège de France, which ran throughout the 1970s until his death in 1984, he is still often taken to have made an "ethical" turn toward the end of his life. As opposed to his genealogies of power published in the 1970s, which are relentlessly suspicious of claims of individual agency, his final monographs focus on the ethical self-formation of free individuals. I (...) suggest that this basic misinterpretation makes possible interpretations of Foucault's work as being sympathetic to neoliberal government, by linking the ethical turn to a "liberal" or "neoliberal" turn in his thought. I present a case against the ethical turn by arguing that Foucault's main focus, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, is a concern for the ways in which we become obligated by truth. (shrink)

An American conservative movement developed rapidly after World War II. It brought together intellectuals and politicians opposed to the New Deal in domestic policy and Soviet communism in foreign policy. The movement's first presidential candidate, Barry Goldwater, lost the election of 1964 but its second, Ronald Reagan, won the election of 1980. It has remained an influential force in American life up to the present, despite strong internal contradictions, which include disagreements about centralized power, about religion, about tradition, about elites, (...) and about the free market. To some of the movement's early luminaries, such as Russell Kirk, free-market capitalism was the antithesis of conservatism since it required perpetual innovation and the sweeping away of traditional forms. To others, such as Ayn Rand, capitalism was the heart and soul of conservatism because it alone preserved the dignity and freedom of the individual. (shrink)

partial translation of "Duties Regarding Animals" (Kain 2010), translated by Jena-Christophe Merle and Diogo Campos Sasdelli.

This article examines the relationship between authority and music. It starts with the proposition that music—as an art or an educative enterprise in Western environs—remains a highly idealized enterprise and this idealization creates an alibi for action that is characteristically narrow and guided by authority. Schmidt claims that authority is the false alibi of music, arguing that the naturalizing power of authority limits the manner in which music is perceived and facilitates a narrow engagement with its teaching. Central here is (...) the significant capital that is produced toward establishing an acquisitive frame for teaching and learning—where to know is to acquire—and thus creates an alibi for individuals to be schooled by narrow understandings. Realizing that this is a most complex and even worn-out issue, the article offers a provocation and thus an invitation toward further reflection and future action. Schmidt offers the notion of complex texts, such as pedagogy, suggesting that they may carry with them an interesting entry-point for raising the valance of variability in our musical practices. Derrida is used to construct said provocation, particularly his proposition that a text is always already incomplete and imbued by supplement; that is, any text requires our interaction and contribution. (shrink)

Die Studie handelt von Nietzsches ursprünglicher Fragestellung, Sie geht von Nietzsches Satz in der vorrede zur Genealogie der Moral "Was habe ich mit Widerlegungen zu schaffen!" aus und zeigt, wie er zu verstehen ist. Nietzsche verschiebt sowohl die Fragestellung wie die Methode des Philosophierens: von der traditionellen Frage nach der Wahrheit über die Frage nach den Werten , nach der décadence, der Moral und der Rangordnung zur Frage nach der Kultur und zur Aufgabe der "Züchtung" im Sinne einer "Erhöhung der (...) Kultur". Diese Aufgabe ist das zweite Strukturmoment von Nietzches Denken neben der Genealogie.Diese bereitet die "Erhöhung der Kultur" nur vor.The purpose of this study is to identify the original problem which organizes the whole of Nietzsche's reflection. Starting from the statement, "what have I to do with refutations!" and the analysis of its meaning, it shows that Nietzsche imposes a mutation on both the problem of philosophy and its method; he dismisses the traditional question of truth and replaces it with the problem of culture, of which the questions of values , of morals, of décadence or hierarchy are particular aspects. Consequently, the task he assigns to the philosopher is that of Züchtung, which is to be understood as "the enhancement of culture". This task appears therefore as the second dimension of Nietzsche's reflection, in addition to geneology, which merely prepares the "enhancement of culture". (shrink)

The fundamental constants and initial conditions of the universe seem "finely tuned" for human habitation. The anthropic principle attempts to explain this fine tuning in terms of the eventual development of intelligent life. A closer look at the principle’s explanandum, however, reveals that it is teleologically and anthropocentrically biased. Our ignorance of the physical requirements of nonhuman forms of life forces the principle to be more unjustifiably anthropocentric and more speculative than is commonly admitted. Leslie’s, Barrow’s and Tipler’s attempts to (...) avoid an overly anthropocentric anthropic principle fail to solve these problems. (shrink)

Les auteurs, à partir de rencontres entre historiens et spécialistes de littérature ou de cinéma, se penchent sur la récurrence du thème de la défaite. Vercingétorix, Jeanne d'Arc, Waterloo, Sedan, juin 1940 : la France exalte volontiers vaincus et pertes. La défaite permet de refonder une nation, un peuple, une communauté, elle est l'occasion d'un sursaut.

Government whistleblowers are those who disclose classified government documents in violation of the law but do so to bring to light serious government wrongdoing. Scholarly debates have identified...

The heavily discussed (neo-)Lucretian symmetry argument holds that as we are indifferent to nonexistence before birth, we should also be indifferent to nonexistence after death. An important response to this argument insists that prenatal nonexistence differs from posthumous nonexistence because we could not have been born earlier and been the same ‘thick’ psychological self. As a consequence, we can’t properly ask whether it would be better for us to have had radically different lives either. Against this, it’s been claimed we (...) can form preferences as to which ‘thick’ (psychological) self our ‘thin’ (metaphysical) self would be better off ‘associated’ with. I argue that these discussions draw the right distinction, but do so in the wrong place: understanding the ‘thin’ self phenomenally instead of metaphysically allows us to understand how we can rationally form preferences to have been somebody else. (shrink)