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  1.  6
    The Doing of Justice and the Priority of Acting From Virtue.Patricio A. Fernandez - 2021 - Phronesis 66 (4):366-401.
    Aristotle famously distinguishes between merely doing a virtuous action and acting in the way in which a virtuous person would. Against an interpretation prominent in recent scholarship, I argue that ‘acting virtuously,’ in the sense of exercising a virtue actually possessed, is prior to ‘virtuous action,’ understood generically. I propose that the latter notion is best understood as a derivative abstraction from the former, building upon a reading of a neglected distinction between per se and coincidentally just action in Nicomachean (...)
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  2. Reasoning and the Unity of Aristotle's Account of Animal Motion.Patricio A. Fernandez - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 47:151-203.
  3. A Realistic Practical Conclusion.Patricio A. Fernandez - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):115-128.
    At least for those who uphold the rationality of morality, ethics and practical reason are not two distinct topics: an ethically sound agent is one whose practical reason functions as it should. Take, for instance, the greatest historical figures. Aristotle claimed that no virtue of character can exist without practical wisdom—the excellence of practical, deliberative reason. And Kant thought that the categorical imperative, the ultimate moral principle that governs a good will, was at the same time the fundamental principlof practical (...)
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  4. The Power of a Practical Conclusion and Essays in the Economic Analysis of Legal Systems.Patricio A. Fernandez - unknown
    Part One defends the thesis, first advanced by Aristotle, that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and argues for its philosophical significance. Opposition to the thesis rests on a contestable way of distinguishing between acts and contents of reasoning and on a picture of normative principles as external to the actions that fall under them. The resulting view forces us to choose between the efficacious, world-changing character of practical thought and its subjection to objective rational standards. This is (...)
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  5.  26
    Weighing Reasons, Editted by Errol Lord and Barry Maguire.Patricio A. Fernandez - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (6):791-794.
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  6.  33
    Ἡ Κίνησις Τῆς Τέχνης: Crafts and Souls as Principles of Change.Patricio A. Fernandez & Jorge Mittelmann - 2017 - Phronesis 62 (2):136-169.
    Aristotle’s soul is a first principle of every vital change in an animal, in the way that a craft is a cause of its product’s coming-to-be. We argue that the soul’s causal efficacy cannot therefore be reduced to the formal constitution of vital phenomena, or to discrete interventions into independently constituted processes, but involves the exercise of vital powers. This reading does better justice to Aristotle’s conception of craft as a rational productive disposition; and it captures the soul’s continuous causal (...)
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  7. When Life Imitates Art: Vital Locomotion and Aristotle’s Craft Analogy.Patricio A. Fernandez & Jorge Mittelmann - 2020 - In Colin Guthrie King & Hynek Bartoš (eds.), Heat, Pneuma and Soul in Ancient Philosophy and Science. Cambridge: pp. 260-287.
     
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  8. The Good Will Be First.Patricio A. Fernandez - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8:78-101.
    Good-willed or morally worthy action is one that is morally right non-accidentally: as she performs it the agent is, in some way, responsive to its rightness. Several recent accounts have analyzed good-willed action in terms of a composition of right action plus some requirements on the agent’s psychological condition, but tend to leave unexamined the direction of conceptual dependence between right action and good-willed action. I argue that significant difficulties arise when right action is taken as primary and intelligible independently (...)
     
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