Some are attracted to the view that repeatable artworks, such as films, novels, plays, symphonies, photographs, and the like, are a particular kind of abstracta—namely, types. This view, however, is not unproblematic. One of the most serious problems it faces is the so-called "creation problem." The core idea behind this problem is that, on the one hand, it seems reasonable to accept the claims that (1) repeatable artworks are types, (2) types cannot be created, and (3) repeatable artworks are created, (...) but, on the other hand, these claims form an inconsistent triad. A popular solution to the creation problem is that (2) can be rejected because the justification for (2) is based on a false assumption—that no type can stand in causal relations. Although this solution looks promising, it can be accepted only if its proponent can refute what might be called the "paraphrasability argument." On this argument, types are not to be regarded as capable of standing in causal relations because any discourse implying the causality of types should be paraphrased into discourse that does not imply this. My aim in this essay is to show that there is good reason to consider the paraphrasability argument sound and, hence, that the foregoing solution to the creation problem fails. (shrink)

Paraphrase is ubiquitous in philosophy, especially in discussions about ontological commitment. But should it be? Paraphrases are seldom accompanied by evidence that would convince, say, a linguist that the paraphrase and the paraphrased sentence have the same meaning. Indeed, from the perspective of linguistics, many paraphrases would seem to be nothing but bad jokes. For this reason, many philosophers have become deeply suspicious about paraphrase. I ague in this paper that this worry is misguided--that successful paraphrases do (...) not need to preserve semantic content, and that the way that paraphrase has been used in Quinean meta-ontology, and philosophical inquiry more generally, corresponds, at least roughly, to the way it should be used. (shrink)

Philosophers often aim to demonstrate that the things we ordinarily think and say can be reconciled with our considered beliefs about the world. To this end, many philosophers try to paraphrase ordinary language claims by finding equivalent sentences that are less misleading. For instance, though we know that there is no British family that is the average one, we want to say that the average British family has 1.8 children, and we might do that by paraphrasing this claim as: (...) there are nearly twice as many British children as British families. This article aims to introduce and distinguish different paraphrase strategies, sketch their role in metaphysical debates and highlight some crucial questions that proponents of such strategies face. (shrink)

Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView. The method of paraphrasing away apparent ontological commitments is a familiar tool for trimming one's ontology. Even so, I argue that aiming to avoid commitment via paraphrase is unjustified. The reason is the standard motivations for paraphrase rest on implicit yet faulty principles regarding ontological categories and categorization- or so I argue. These results also provide indirect support for a permissivist approach to ontology.

This paper is about the status of collective actions. According to one view, collective actions metaphysically reduce to individual actions because sentences about collective actions are merely a shorthand for sentences about individual actions. I reconstruct an argument for this view and show via counterexamples that it is not sound. The argument relies on a paraphrase procedure to unpack alleged shorthand sentences about collective actions into sentences about individual actions. I argue that the best paraphrase procedure that has (...) been put forward so far fails to produce adequate results. (shrink)

Nihilists cannot square their position with common sense simply by paraphrasing away apparent ontological commitments in ordinary language. I argue for this claim by analogy. Paraphrase atheism says there is no God, but tries to square the truth of atheism with ordinary religious sentences by paraphrasing away apparent ontological commitments. Obviously, paraphrase does not reconcile atheism with ordinary language about God. I discuss two different reasons that paraphrase can fail and suggest that both reasons afflict paraphrase (...) nihilism. Hence, paraphrase nihilism cannot reconcile nihilism and common sense, and so nihilists must look for some other strategy that can evade the force of the Atheism Case. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that for the purposes of ordinary reasoning, sentences about properties of concrete objects can be replaced with sentences concerning how things in our universe would be related to inscriptions were there a pluriverse. Speaking loosely, pluriverses are composites of universes that collectively realize every way a universe could possibly be. As such, pluriverses exhaust all possible meanings that inscriptions could take. Moreover, because universes necessarily do not influence one another, our universe would not be any (...) different intrinsically if there were a pluriverse. These two facts enable anti-realists about abstract objects to replace, e.g. talk of anatomical features with talk of the inscriptions concerning anatomical structure that would exist were there a pluriverse. The availability of such replacements enables anti-realists to carry out essential ordinary reasoning without referring to properties, thereby making room for a consistent anti-realist worldview. The inscriptions of the would-be pluriverse are so numerous and varied that sentences about them can play the roles in ordinary reasoning served by simple sentences about properties of concrete objects. (shrink)

There is a puzzle about the use of paraphrase in philosophy, presented most famously in Alston's [1958] ‘Ontological Commitments’, but found throughout the literature. The puzzle arises from the fact that a symmetry required for a paraphrase to be successful seems to necessitate a symmetry sufficient for a paraphrase to fail, since any two expressions that stand in the means the same as relation must also stand in the has the same commitments as relation. I show that, (...) while this problem does undermine some conceptions of paraphrase, on a proper understanding of paraphrase the puzzle gets no purchase. Since paraphrase is an important component of Quinean approaches to meta-ontology, this paper constitutes a partial defence of Quinean meta-ontology. Since paraphrase is an important component of traditional methods of philosophical inquiry, this paper constitutes a partial defence of traditional modes of philosophizing as well. (shrink)

The Doctrine of the Trinity says that there is one God, that there are three divine Persons, and that each divine Person is God. The Logical Problem of the Trinity is that these claims seem logically inconsistent. We argue that any coherent and orthodox solution to the Logical Problem must use the technique of paraphrase: a logically or metaphysically more perspicuous reformulation. If so, discussions of paraphrase deserve more prominence in the literature on the Doctrine of the Trinity. (...) We also show that such explicit discussion has important implications for theorizing about the Trinity. (shrink)

Cette étude de la paraphrase langagière offre une vue d'ensemble sur ce procédé dans la théorie sens-texte, traite de deux problèmes théoriques liés à sa modélisation, la notion de paraphrase comme telle et les règles sémantiques d'équivalence. Elle propose une série de nouvelles règles sémantiques et lexico-syntaxique de paraphrasage.

In a recent unit of study in an undergraduate Health Sciences pathway course, we identified a set of essays which exhibited similarity of content but demonstrated the use of bizarre and unidiomatic language. One of the distinct features of the essays was the inclusion of unusual synonyms in place of expected standard medical terminology.We suspected the use of online paraphrasing tools, but were also interested in investigating the possibility of the use of online language translation tools. In order to test (...) the outputs of these tools, we used as a seed document a corpus of text which had been provided to the students as prompt for the essay. This document was put through six free online paraphrasing tools and six separate iterative language translations through the online Google Translate™ tool.The results demonstrated that free online paraphrasing tools did not identify medical terminology as standardised or accepted nomenclature and substituted synonyms, whereas Google Translate™ largely preserved medical terminology.We believe that textual indicators such as the absence of standard discipline-based terminology may be of assistance in the identification of machine paraphrased text. (shrink)

On one standard view, paraphrasing Kierkegaard requires no special literary talent. It demands no particular flair for the poetic. However, Kierkegaard himself rejects this view. He says we cannot paraphrase in a straightforward fashion some of the ideas he expresses in a literary format. To use the words of Johannes Climacus, these ideas defy direct communication. In this paper, I piece together and defend the justification Kierkegaard offers for this position. I trace its origins to concerns raised by Lessing (...) and Mendelssohn about the relationship between form and content in works of art. I maintain that Kierkegaard follows early German Romantic thinkers in applying these aesthetic concerns to philosophical writing. By way of conclusion, I discuss the implications of Kierkegaard’s position for contemporary scholarship. (shrink)

L’auteur met en évidence la façon dont Thémistius, dans sa paraphrase, réorganise les parties du texte des lignes 71a17-b8 des Seconds Analytiques. Par une analyse détaillée du propos d’Aristote dans ces lignes, il montre que la réorganisation proposée par Thémistius est fidèle à l’esprit du texte aristotélicien, et s’appuie vraisemblablement sur des indices externes dont disposait le paraphraste.

Dagfinn Føllesdal: “Developments in Quine's Behaviorism”: Quine insisted throughout his life that he was a behaviorist. He began briefly as an “ontological behaviorist,” that is, he held that there is nothing mental. However, very early he switched to evidential behaviorism: the view that behavior provides the only evidence we have for the mental and its properties. Ultimately, Quine's behaviorism springs from his empiricism. All knowledge about the world around us and about other people reaches us through our senses: “Behaviorism, as (...) far as I'm concerned, is only an intersubjective empiricism.” Quine applied this to language and communication. His acute problem awareness led him from the discussion of stimuli in Word and Object to a much more refined behaviorism in his latest works, in which full‐fledged perception and the individuation of the world into objects play a crucial role. (shrink)

La Metaphysique d'Aristote culmine dans le livre Lambda (XII). Il resume les livres precedents, puis se lance dans une fantastique description de Dieu, Premier moteur immobile de l'univers et Penser se pensant soi-meme. Le premier a nous en avoir laisse un commentaire est Themistius, au IVe siecle. Entre lui et l'epoque d'Averroes, d'Albert le Grand, de Thomas d'Aquin, rien ne nous est reste sur Lambda. Themistius paraphrase le texte et y mele de tres importantes digressions. L'original grec est perdu. (...) De la traduction arabe, nous n'avons que des fragments. Mais elle avait ete integralement traduite en hebreu. C'est a partir de ces deux sources que Remi Brague propose ici une traduction litterale, avec une introduction et des notes explicatives. (shrink)

Reconciling paraphrases, this chapter states, are intended to show that two apparently inconsistent claims are in fact consistent. A growing number of philosophers have come to doubt the legitimacy of reconciling paraphrases due to the lack of ‘respectable’ evidence that can be provided on their behalf. Specifically, these critics think that in order to be plausible, reconciling paraphrases must be accompanied by evidence that would be of interest to linguists, semanticists, or philosophers of language. Since reconciling paraphrases are almost never (...) offered with such evidence, these critics maintain that such paraphrases can be dismissed as mere wishful thinking. This chapter argues that this concern is mistaken: for many paraphrases, a lack of such evidence is not even a concern, much less a condemnation. (shrink)

Summary: This essay rejects the widespread thesis that conceptually creative metaphors are unpara‐phrasable on grounds that it misconceives the nature and function of paraphrase. Encouraged by a deceptively parallel rejection of the positivist reducibility thesis by philosophers of science, defenders of the unparaphrasability thesis mistakenly equated paraphrase with literal translation and in so doing failed to appreciate paraphrase's critical role in the systematic exploitation of metaphor's creative potential. This essay attempts to recast the terms of the paraphrasability (...) debate by separating paraphrase from literal translation and defending paraphrase's essential epistemic role in theory development. Three arguments for the paraphrasability of creative metaphor are presented followed by a critique of the major arguments for their unparaphrasability as formulated by Black, Cohen and Ricoeur. Résumé: Cet essai rejette, parce qu'elle repose sur une incomprehension de la nature et de la fonction de la paraphrase, la thése répandue selon laquelle des métaphores conceptuellement créatives ne peuvent pas être paraphraseées. Encouragés par un rejet faussement paralléle, par les philosophes des sciences, de la réductibilité positiviste, les défenseurs de la non‐paraphrasabilité ont confondu paraphrase et traduction littérale et, ce faisant, n'ont pas tenu compte du rôle critique de la paraphrase dans l'exploitation systématique du potentiel créatif de la métaphore. Cet essai tente de reformuler les termes du débat sur la paraphrasabilité en distinguant la paraphrase de la traduction littérale et en défendant le rôle épistémologique essentiel de la paraphrase dans le développe‐ment des théories. Trois arguments sont présentés pour la paraphrasabilité de la métaphore créative; suit une critique des principaux arguments contre la paraphrasabilité tels qu'ils ont été formulés par Black, Cohen et Ricoeur. Zusammenfassung: Es wird die weitverbreitete Auffassung widerlegt, wonach begrifflich kreative Metaphern nicht paraphrasierbar sind, weil sie Natur und Funktion der Paraphrase missversteht. Durch den scheinbar parallelen Fall der Verwerfung der Reduktionsthese durch Wissenschaftstheoretiker getäuscht setzten die Vertreter der These der Unparaphrasierbarkeit die Paraphrase mit der wört‐lichen Übersetzung gleich und sind deshalb nicht in der Lage, die kritische Funktion der Paraphrase bei der systematischen Verwertung des schöpferischen Potentials der Metapher zu erfas‐sen. Es wird versucht, das Problem der Paraphrasierbarkeit neu zu formulieren, indem die Paraphrase von der wörtlichen Übersetzung unterschieden wird und indem die erkenntnistheorelisch wesentliche Rolle der Paraphrase bei der Entwicklung von Theorien hervorgehoben wird. Es wer‐den drei Argumente zugunsten der Paraphrasierbarkeit von schopferischen Metaphern vorgelegt und die wichtigsten Argumente von Black, Cohen und Ricoeur gegen die Paraphrasierbarkeit kri‐tisiert. (shrink)

Much previous work on generation has focused on the general problem of producing lexical strings from abstract semantic representations. We consider generation in the context of a particular task, creating full sentential paraphrases of fragments in dialogue. When the syntactic, semantic and phonological information provided by a dialogue fragment resolution system is made accessible to a generation component, much of the indeterminacy of lexical selection is eliminated.

Theodore Metochites’ Aristotelian paraphrases (c. 1312), covering all 40 books of the Stagirite’s extant works on natural philosophy, constitute one of the major achievements of late Byzantine learning. This volume offers the first critical edition of Metochites’ paraphrases of the three books of the De anima, accompanied by an introduction and an English translation with an apparatus of parallel passages in Aristotle’s ancient commentators. The first part of the introduction presents and evaluates the sources for the text, consisting of thirteen (...) Greek manuscripts, a 15th-century Greek epitome and a 16th-century Latin translation. The genealogical relationships between these are established on the basis of separative and conjunctive errors, identified, inter alia, through critical discussions of more than 300 passages. The second part of the introduction discusses the nature, purpose and sources of the paraphrases as well as several linguistic questions with implications for editing and translating the text. The third part of the introduction sets out the principles of this edition and translation. (shrink)

In Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s _Metaphysics_ 12, Yoav Meyrav offers a new critical edition and study of the Hebrew text and the Arabic fragments of Themistius’ 4th century paraphrase, whose original Greek is lost.

Philosophers have alleged that paraphrases of metaphors are inadequate. They have presented this inadequacy as a datum predicted by, and thus a reason to accept, particular accounts of ‘metaphorical meanings.’ But to what, specifically, does this inadequacy claim amount? I argue that, if this assumption is to have any bearing on the metaphor debate, it must be construed as the comparative claim that paraphrases of metaphors are inadequate compared to paraphrases of literal utterances. But the evidence philosophers have offered does (...) not support the comparative inadequacy of paraphrases of metaphors. I offer my own empirical evidence against the inadequacy assumption. (shrink)

It is persons who are ontologically committed. But a person is not ontologically committed by virtue of his character, his height, his social standing or whatever, but by virtue of the sentences he assents to. Hence we should look to sentences for a criterion of ontological commitment. This is precisely what is done by advocates of what I will call the Referential theory. In this paper I argue that the Referential theory faces serious objections related to the role paraphrase (...) must play in it. I then present a modified Referential theory and go on to discuss certain implications of the modified theory. More precisely, the paper divides up as follows. In §1 I present the Referential theory. In §2 I argue that it is in trouble over paraphrase. In §3 I consider a general objection to the arguments of §2. In §4 I present the modified theory. In §5 I consider the implications of the modified theory for polemic over what there is and for the existence of properties or universals. (shrink)

Baker (Mind 114:223–238, 2005; Brit J Philos Sci 60:611–633, 2009) has recently defended what he calls the “enhanced” version of the indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism. In this paper I demonstrate that the nominalist can respond to Baker’s argument. First, I outline Baker’s argument in more detail before providing a nominalistically acceptable paraphrase of prime-number talk. Second, I argue that, for the nominalist, mathematical language is used to express physical facts about the world. In endorsing this line I follow (...) moves made by Saatsi (Brit J Philos Sci 62(1):143–154, 2011). But, unlike Saatsi, I go on to argue that the nominalist requires a paraphrase of prime-number talk, for otherwise we lack an account of what that ‘physical fact’ is in the case of mathematics that seemingly makes reference to prime numbers. (shrink)

Michel Roberge Cet article examine la polémique antibaptismale par laquelle se termine la Paraphrase de Sem, en fonction de ce que nous savons du mouvement baptiste elkasaïte et de ce que nous apprend le Codex manichéen de Cologne. À la lumière de ces sources, on peut formuler l’hypothèse que le jeune Mani a été témoin de la polémique qui a dû s’instaurer entre les membres de la communauté elkasaïte à laquelle il appartenait et ceux qui propageaient la doctrine de (...) la Paraphrase dirigée contre leurs pratiques baptismales. Les controverses suscitées par cet écrit ont pu influencer Mani dans sa décision de quitter sa communauté et dans l’élaboration de sa doctrine antibaptismale, mais aussi, de façon plus générale, dans quelques points de l’élaboration de son système. (shrink)

A casual comment by a student alerted the authors to the existence and prevalence of Internet-based paraphrasing tools. A subsequent quick Google search highlighted the broad range and availability of online paraphrasing tools which offer free ‘services’ to paraphrase large sections of text ranging from sentences, paragraphs, whole articles, book chapters or previously written assignments. The ease of access to online paraphrasing tools provides the potential for students to submit work they have not directly written themselves, or in the (...) case of academics and other authors, to rewrite previously published materials to sidestep self-plagiarism. Students placing trust in online paraphrasing tools as an easy way of complying with the requirement for originality in submissions are at risk in terms of the quality of the output generated and possibly of not achieving the learning outcomes as they may not fully understand the information they have compiled. There are further risks relating to the legitimacy of the outputs in terms of academic integrity and plagiarism. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the existence, development, use and detection of use of Internet based paraphrasing tools. To demonstrate the dangers in using paraphrasing tools an experiment was conducted using some easily accessible Internet-based paraphrasing tools to process part of an existing publication. Two sites are compared to demonstrate the types of differences that exist in the quality of the output from certain paraphrasing algorithms, and the present poor performance of online originality checking services such as Turnitin® to identify and link material processed via machine based paraphrasing tools. The implications for student skills in paraphrasing, academic integrity and the clues to assist staff in identifying the use of online paraphrasing tools are discussed. (shrink)

What makes Book Lambda the most important book of Metaphysics is to mention the fundamental substance of being. Therefore, Book Lambda is a book that has been regarded as valuable and has been studied extensively. Arabic translations of this book were in high demand in the Islamic world. We have also considered Arabic metaphysical translations, especially the translation of Book Lambda. The translation you will read is a commentary of the ninth chapter of Book Lambda by Themistius. The Greek original (...) commentary of Lambda was lost, and after the Arabic translation, it was transferred to Latin and Hebrew. However, later parts of the Arabic text were also lost. In this chapter, Themistius comments on the part in which Aristotle discusses the difficulties on the nature of divine intellect and tries to prove that the object of reason, the act of thinking and the object of thinking are the same things. (shrink)

Le texte récuse l’opinion selon laquelle la métaphore ne se paraphrase pas. La paraphrase est censée ne rendre que la référence, non le sens d’une expression. Afin de montrer que la paraphrase peut bien intervenir au sens d’une métaphore, le personnage fictif est invoqué comme paradigme pour la constitution du sens. L’entité de sens qu’est un personnage fictif n’est pas réductible à une expression unique, mais dépend de l’interaction au sein d’un réseau d’expressions différentes. Si le sens (...) de la métaphore se constitue de manière analogue, force est de conclure que la reformulation ne relève ni de l’aplatissement ni de la distorsion, mais qu’elle est constitutive du sens.The paper argues against the common assumption that metaphors cannot be paraphrased. Paraphrase is assumed to capture only the reference not the meaning of an expression. In order to show that a paraphrase may well concern the meaning of a metaphor, the case of fictive persons is considered as a paradigm for meaning constitution. The meaning entity that a fictive person constitutes is not reducible to a single expression but depends upon the interaction within a network of different expressions. If the meaning of metaphors is constituted in an analogous way, it must be asserted that reformulations neither trivialize nor distort their meaning but constitute it. (shrink)

One important challenge for contingentists is that they seem to be unable to account for the meaning of some apparently meaningful modal discourse that is perfectly intelligible for necessitists. This worry is particularly pressing for higher-order contingentists, contingentists who hold that it is not only contingent which objects there are, but also contingent which semantic values there are for higher-order variables to quantify over. Objections against higher-order contingentism along these lines have been presented in Williamson (Mind 119(475):657–748, 2010; Modal logic (...) as metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2013, ch. 7), and Fritz and Goodman (Mind 126(504):1063–1108, 2017). This paper presents a way for contingentists to respond to these challenges. The upshot is that the contingentist can account for the meaningfulness of the problematic modal claims by pretending necessitism to be true, but in some cases it turns out to be indeterminate whether they are true. I defend this strategy against the objections against pretence-strategies presented in Fritz and Goodman (Mind 126(504):1063–1108, 2017, §4). Furthermore, I defend the plausibility of the resulting indeterminacy from the contingentist’s perspective. (shrink)

In Study 1, college professors determined whether each of 6 rewritten versions of a paragraph taken from a journal article were instances of plagiarism. Results indicated moderate disagreement as to which rewritten versions had been plagiarized. When another sample of professors was asked to paraphrase the same paragraph, up to 30% appropriated some text from the original. In Study 3, psychology professors paraphrased the same paragraph or a comparable one that was easier to read. Twenty-six percent of the psychologists (...) appropriated text from the original version, whereas only 3% appropriated text from the one that was easier to read. The results of these studies are discussed in the context of existing definitions of paraphrasing and plagiarism. (shrink)

Le Magasin des enfants (1756) de Leprince de Beaumont inclut une Bible pour la jeunesse, qui repose sur une réécriture oralisée des épisodes les plus connus de l’Ancien Testament. L’histoire d’Adam, que nous examinons précisément, est représentative à la fois de la technique du retelling et de la fonction pragmatique du discours. La paraphrase se fait parabole, de façon à inclure le lecteur dans son dispositif et dévoiler le fonctionnement de la lecture. L’histoire doublée d’un conte, qui s’avère être (...) une allégorie de la lecture, expose alors implicitement les conditions de l’herméneutique biblique. (shrink)

Philosophers and critics alike often contend that metaphors cannot or should not be paraphrased, ever. Yet a simple and decisive empirical argument — The Horse’s Mouth Argument—suffices to show that many metaphors can be paraphrased without violating the spirit in which they were put forward in the first place. This argument leaves us with urgent unanswered questions about the role of paraphrase in a more inclusive division of exegetical labor, about the tension between its notorious openendedness and its claim (...) to restate something already stated, and about the relation between the content of a paraphrase and the content (or contents) of the metaphor the paraphrase purports to explain. But it leaves us in a position to state such questions more clearly and hopefully than we could before. (shrink)

It is often claimed that, in at least some areas of language use, the relation between form and content is such that any attempt at reformulation or paraphrase amounts to a distortion of the significance of the original wording. In this article, I set out to vindicate an undemanding yet nontrivial conception of paraphrase. According to the rhetorical relations account of textual cohesion proposed, the meaning specifications required by a collection of sentences in order to constitute a text (...) pave the way for a kind of reformulation which is in solidarity with the possibility of paraphrase. I substantiate my approach with prosaic and poetic examples from Woolf and Dickinson, respectively. (shrink)

A recent challenge to Russell’s theory of definite description centers upon the divergent behavior of definites and their Russellian paraphrases in non-extensional contexts. Russellians can meet this challenge, I argue, by incorporating the familiarity theory of definiteness into Russell’s theory. The synthesis of these two seemingly incompatible theories produces a conceptually consistent and empirically powerful framework. As I show, the coalescence of Russellianism and the familiarity theory of definiteness stands as a legitimate alternative to both Traditional Russellianism and alternative semantic (...) frameworks. (shrink)