The review focuses basically on Leader’s paper "Toleration without Liberal Foundations". First, the author makes some semantic remarks about the uses of the word “toleration”; second, he offers some criticisms of Leader’s paper; and, finally, he puts forward the outline of a modest proposal.

This paper considers certain aspects of Aarnio’s theory of legal reasoning. Criticism is limited to the notion of legal certainty and to the related notions of the justification and reasonable acceptability of interpretative standpoints.

Il volume si propone di sondare, a livelli diversi di profon­dità, alcuni problemiaperti dell’etica e della metaetica, intendendo tali termini in un senso assai lato. ‘Etica’ è infatti usato per riferirsi all’intero dominio del diritto, della politica e della mo­rale; ‘metaetica’ per riferirsi a qualunque discorso che verta sull’etica. Nella prima parte sono analizzati, a livello metaetico, alcuni concetti-chiave in ambito pratico: tra gli altri, quelli di tolleranza, di uguaglianza e di diritti umani. Nella seconda parte vengono affrontati, a livello (...) prevalentemente teorico, alcuni problemi cruciali del ragionamento giuridico, presentando soluzioni che, specie in tema di interpretazione, denunciano una chiara connotazione realista. Nella terza parte sono discussi criticamente, a livello metateorico, le tesi di alcuni eminenti filosofi del diritto contemporanei. (shrink)

The purpose of Aarnio and Peczenik is very ambitious: on the one hand, providing an explanatory picture of social interaction; on the other hand, offering a comprehensive conception of the best arrangement we can get of the so called Democratic Rule-of-Law State. In the paper, Comanducci first outlines some of the most important aspects of Aarnio and Peczenik work, mainly stressing the conclusions he agrees with, at the three different levels in which the authors’ discourse places itself— namely, at the (...) meta-ethical, ethical and explanatory levels. Secondly, Comanducci advances some critical remarks regarding each of the three levels, with the aim of bringing to light a few minor deficiencies of Aarnio and Peczenik’s approach and, consequently, with the aim of strengthening their position. (shrink)

What principles explain or justify legal institutions or decisions, thereby transforming coercion to authority? Are there or could there be any such universal principles? Can any philosophical theory account for such principles? How, if at all, do philosophical theories of law and politics apply to particular issues? And finally, what, if any, do such practical applications tell us about general theories and principles? The essays in this volume represent the efforts of an international group of scholars to understand these general (...) aspects of legal philosophy. (shrink)