How much do animals matter--morally? Can we keep considering them as second class beings, to be used merely for our benefit? Or, should we offer them some form of moral egalitarianism? Inserting itself into the passionate debate over animal rights, this fascinating, provocative work by renowned scholar Paola Cavalieri advances a radical proposal: that we extend basic human rights to the nonhuman animals we currently treat as "things." Cavalieri first goes back in time, tracing the roots of the debate from (...) the 1970s, then explores not only the ethical but also the scientific viewpoints, examining the debate's precedents in mainstream Western philosophy. She considers the main proposals of reform that recently have been advanced within the framework of today's prevailing ethical perspectives. Are these proposals satisfying? Cavalieri says no, claiming that it is necessary to go beyond the traditional opposition between utilitarianism and Kantianism and focus on the question of fundamental moral protection. In the case of human beings, such protection is granted within the widely shared moral doctrine of universal human rights' theory. Cavalieri argues that if we examine closely this theory, we will discover that its very logic extends to nonhuman animals as beings who are owed basic moral and legal rights and that, as a result, human rights are not human after all. (shrink)

" From the divergences between analytical and continental approaches to the relevance of posthumanist thinking in contemporary ethics, the psychology of speciesism, and the practical consequences of an antiperfectionist stance, The Death of ...

Strangers to Nature brings together many of the leading scholars who are working to redefine and expand the discourse on animal ethics. This volume will engage both scholars and lay-people by revealing the breadth of theorizing about the human/non-human animal relationship that is currently taking place.

After rejecting Carruthers' conflation of levels of consciousness as implausible and conceptually muddled, and Carruthers' claim that nonhumans are automata as undermined by evolutionary and ethological considerations, we develop a general criticism of contemporary philosophical approaches which, though recognizing nonhuman consciousness, still see animals as mere receptacles of experiences. This is, we argue, due to the fact that, while in the case of humans we grant a self - something that has not only a descriptive but also a prescriptive side, (...) requiring at least non-interference - in the case of nonhumans we focus only on the descriptive aspects. Consequently, we treat humans as equals whatever their capacities, but we order nonhumans in a hierarchy based on their cognitive level. We conclude that such double standards are not only inconsistent but also self-serving. (shrink)

This edited collection testifies to the fact that the animal liberation movement is now entering its political phase, after a period dominated by ethical approaches that undermined the paradigm of human supremacy and demanded justice for nonhuman beings. The contributors of this book collectively confront and take on questions of social transformation, guided by the idea that philosophy has an important role to play even at such a new level. They start from such diverse perspectives as critical theory, left liberalism, (...) and biopolitical thought. The result is an articulated picture in which, beyond any principled divergence, it is possible to detect the emergence of a relevant set of shared political preoccupations. This exploration of those offers fresh theoretical insights and suggestions for praxis. (shrink)

Liberalism is often under attack because of its alleged excessive "formalism". In the words of one of its main contemporary defenders, "the defining feature of liberalism is that it ascribes certain fundamental freedoms to each individual. In particular, it grants people a very wide freedom of choice in terms of how they lead their lives".1 In more continental language, this core idea has been summarized in the statement that what liberalism is all about is "the handling and organization of the (...) conditions in which freedom can be realized".2 For liberals, individuals must be recognized as the ultimate arbiters of what gives value to their own existences, and the liberal principle of legitimacy is not satified whenever the state seeks to impose any particular comprehensive doctrine about the good life.From many sides, however, it is said that an acceptable society in which to live needs a more substantial conception of the good, without which individuals are uprooted and anonymous.3 Somewhat along the lines of the traditional criticism of the Kantian doctrine, turning upon its focus on procedure and universalism to the detriment of content and particularism, contemporary liberalism is sometimes seen as an empty morality that, abstracting as it does from experience, is not able to provide the ethical resources necessary to ground acceptable pragmatic policies.4 I want to argue instead that, at least from one point of view, liberalism in all its versions is not formal enough. There is, I will claim, a specific problem with respect to which an important substantive aspect is surreptitiously introduced into the theory: the problem of moral status. As my argument unfolds, I shall deal with three different senses of "formal": formal as procedural, formal as neutral, and formal as analytic. (shrink)