The continental drift controversy has been deeply analysed in terms of rationalist notions, which seem to find there a unique topic to describe the weight of evidence for reaching consensus. In that sense, many authors suggest that Alfred Wegener’s theory of the original supercontinent Pangea and the subsequent continental displacements finally reached a consensus when irrefutable evidence became available. Therefore, rationalist approaches suggest that evidence can be enough by itself to close scientific controversies. In this article I analyse continental drift (...) debates from a different perspective which is based on styles of thought. I’ll argue that continental drift debate took much longer than it was usually recognized with two styles of thought coexisting for hundreds of years. These were fixism and mobilism and they were always confronting their own evidence and interpretations and functioning as general frameworks for the acceptability of a specific theory. Therefore, this text aims to bring much broader sociological elements than usually involved in the analysis of the continental drift theory. (shrink)

The article appearing previously in this journal entitled “Styles of Thought on the Continental Drift Debate” (Pellegrini 2019) prompted a response from Weber and Šešelja (2020) which they termed as “a defence of rationalist accounts”. They argue that their self-designated “sophisticated rationalism” explains the closure of the continental-drift debate without being affected by my critiques to rationalist approaches. While ignoring the empirical evidence that shows the complexity of the debate and the necessity to include broader social elements in the analysis (...) (such as scientists denying continental drift even after the plate tectonics theory, others supporting it without being familiarized with the literature), they proclaim to be unconvinced about the analysis of the styles of thought. In order to clarify differences in the approach to the continental-drift historical controversy, I respond here to the criticism my paper drew while discussing the place of rationalism when explaining the acceptance of a theory. I will argue that their distinction between “crude” and “sophisticated” rationalism does not solve the problem of social aspects being left aside by rationalists in view of the acceptance of a theory. I will also argue that in order to understand what leads people to embrace a belief (namely scientists in accepting a theory), the analysis of mere cognitive or epistemic arguments is not enough and it leads to a reductionist explanation as to social behaviour. (shrink)

Practices related to research misconduct seem to have been multiplied in recent years. Many cases of scientific fraud have been exposed publicly, and journals and academic institutions have deployed different measures worldwide in this regard. However, the influence of specific social and cultural environments on scientific fraud may vary from society to society. This article analyzes how scientists in Japan deal with accusations of scientific fraud. For such a purpose, a series of scientific fraud cases that took place in Japan (...) has been reconstructed through diverse sources. Thus, by analyzing those cases, the social basis of scientific fraud and the most relevant aspects of Japanese cultural values and traditions, as well as the concept of honour which is deeply involved in the way Japanese scientists react when they are accused of and publicly exposed in scientific fraud situations is examined. (shrink)

We propose a synthetic description of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology with the aim of providing physicists and philosophers with an alternative linguistic and conceptual framework to address the logical and ontological problematics emerged in quantum mechanics. Phenomenology’s cognitive devices such as the dynamical relationship between object and horizon, the presumptive synthesis and the constitution of an ontology based on the indivisibility of object and subject, not only show hermeneutic efficacy when applied to the study of human perception, but may prove to be (...) sufficiently innovative to lead to novel insights towards the understanding of the quantum mechanical theoretical structure: the traditional tenet of quantum physics being in discontinuity with the major characteristics of classical physics is shaken at its fundaments and a new perspective of continuity between the two worlds is opened. (shrink)

This article discusses explanations behind theory choice, that is, ultimately, what leads people to accept a certain claim as valid. There has been a recent debate as to how closure was achieved in the continental-drift discussion. The controversy had found its usual explanation under rationalist terms: Wegener’s 1912 continental-drift theory was accepted 50 years later only after the plate tectonic theory had provided more evidence or a more in-depth problem-solving capacity. Nevertheless, a re-examination of the controversy under constructivist terms argued (...) that closure was achieved by a change in the style of thought. This analysis prompted some authors to react calling to a ‘defence of rationalism’ and insisting on explaining that the continental-drift theory was only accepted because of epistemic reasons. As the debate impacts on the way to explain scientific controversies, in this article I analyze rationalist and constructivist approaches with respect to ways to explain the social acceptance or rejection of a theory. The analytical perspectives will be contextualized within a broader theoretical discussion in philosophy and social sciences about the role of different factors that condition knowledge, which will also include an empirical approximation in the analysis of GMO and continental-drift controversies. Ultimately, the debate with rationalism is situated in a broader context about the ways of explaining the social acceptance of a theory, arguing that the problem with the rationalism that confuses a purely logical explanation with a sociological one is that it tends to judge rather than understand. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty’s remarks on quantum mechanics offer a unique perspective on the relationship between scientific results and their interpretation. This article elaborates Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological perspective on quantum mechanics by considering the main texts in which he explicitly attends to this topic: namely, La Nature: notes cours du Collège de France and The Visible and the Invisible.

Este artículo tiene por objetivo general indagar acerca de los procesos de institucionalización de una nueva disciplina científica. En particular, se analizan los desplazamientos que se producen entre disciplinas al emerger una nueva: la biología molecular. Se presenta en este artículo el caso del Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA) de Argentina, institución creada en 1956 para realizar investigaciones, innovaciones y extensionismo para el sector agropecuario. De esa manera, el trabajo presenta los cambios en las disciplinas de las que provienen (...) los investigadores del INTA, desde su creación en 1956 hasta 2010. La investigación que se presenta se centra en un análisis cuantitativo en relación a las disciplinas de origen de los investigadores que se incorporaron a la institución. Al mostrar los desplazamientos entre disciplinas, este artículo pretende contribuir al estudio sobre los conflictos entre las mismas. Pues se sugiere que la emergencia de una nueva disciplina no implica solamente la apertura de nuevas profesiones, instituciones, temas y técnicas de investigación, sino también el desplazamiento de otras anteriormente instaladas, y que tales desplazamientos estarían en la raíz de las tensiones que se registran en la institucionalización de una nueva disciplina. This article aims to investigate the process of institutionalization of a new scientific discipline. In particular, the displacements that occur between disciplines with the emergence of a new one: molecular biology. The case presented in this article is the National Institute of Agricultural Technology (INTA) of Argentina, institution created in 1956 for research, innovation and extension to the agricultural sector. Thus, the paper presents the changes in the disciplines from which INTA's researchers come, since its inception in 1956 until 2010. The research presented in this article focuses on a quantitative analysis in relation to the disciplines of origin of the researchers who joined the institution. By showing the displacements between disciplines, this article aims to contribute to the study of the conflicts between them. For it suggests that the emergence of a new discipline involves not only the opening of new professions, institutions, research subjects and techniques, but also the displacement of other previously installed. These displacements would be at the root of the tensions that occur in the institutionalization of a new discipline. (shrink)