There is a classical paradox in education that also affects the epistemic virtues: the paradox inherent in the demand to develop general strategies for training persons to be free and creative individuals. This problem becomes particularly salient with respect to the epistemic virtue of creativity, the more so if we consider a radical form of creativity, namely, genius. This paper explores a historical constellation in which rigorous claims about the standards for knowledge and morality were developed, along with a highly (...) influential notion of genius: the philosophy of Kant and of immediate post‐Kantian philosophers. The paper shows how in this historical moment came together a new notion of “science,” a theory of “genius” and of virtues, and an analysis of the promises and difficulties inherent in educating a virtuous or creative individual. In this constellation of ideas, there also emerges a potentially fruitful account of how to teach intellectual creativity. (shrink)

Since 1790, the term Naturwissenschaften occurs in the lecture lists of the University of Jena published in the Allgemeine Literatur‐Zeitung of Jena. Naturwissenschaften is used as a title for lectures previously listed under the headings of Philosophie or Naturgeschichte. The introduction of the concept of Naturwissenschaften is interesting for several reasons: Firstly, at that time it is not the usual label in this context, and one therefore has to ask whether it already implies the connotations that are associated with the (...) modern concept of Naturwissenschaften, i. e. science in the modern sense. Secondly, the lecture lists of the University of Jena give insight into the various changes in the established ordering scheme for academic lectures that lead to the introduction of the term Naturwissenschaften, thus contributing to a better understanding of both the history of this concept and of the development of the university faculties as we know them. A close look at the concept of Naturwissenschaften as it was used around 1800 may, thirdly, help to understand the use made of this concept in philosophy, especially in the philosophy of nature of this period. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment can be, or otherwise ought to be, regarded as a transcendental phenomenology of hope. Kant states repeatedly that CPoJ mediates between the first two Critiques, or between the theoretical knowledge we arrive at on the basis of understanding and reason’s foundational role for practical philosophy. In other words, exercising the power of judgment is implicated whenever we try to bring together the (...) ethical issue of strictly determining our actions on the one hand and the necessity to act in the physical world on the other. We will argue that this mediating function is properly understood only if the ideations produced by self-understanding are characterized as objects of rationally required hope or fear. (shrink)

Quite remarkably, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling uses the notion of “drive” in analysing important cognitive achievements: An important instance of this attitude can be found in his characterizing Kant as a philosopher who operates in the basis of instincts. His key argument in adopting “drives” as key to the cognitive faculties of humans derives from the conviction that cognitive endeavours need to be open and directed towards grasping reality not in individual items, but as a totality. He arrives, in employing (...) these terms, at an understanding of science, and of cognition in general, as an open, future-directed, and dynamic process. This chapter presents an overview of Schelling’s usage of “drive”-related terms, discusses his rather detailed description of the mechanics of drives within the structure of human faculties, and draws some conclusions as to Schelling’s understanding of “science” and the dynamics of science. (shrink)

Science and the History of the Sciences. Conceptual Innovations Through Historicizing Science in the Eighteenth Century. The historical reconstruction of science is linked to philosophical discussions of the eighteenth century in many ways. The historiography of philosophy and the historiography of science share the conceptual problem to assemble the multitude of scientific and philosophical practices under general concepts. The historical analysis of scientific progress offers a clue by problematizing definitions of “science” and “sciences” as well as the system of sciences (...) as a whole. By analyzing these conceptual problems and the typology of historical enterprises of the eighteenth century, this paper will discuss the close interrelations which existed between philosophical and historical discourses of eighteenth‐century reflection on science. (shrink)

Ernst Haeckel, vor 100 Jahren am 9. August 1919 in Jena verstorben und im Garten seines Hauses beigesetzt, hat als Wissenschaftler und Person so polarisierend gewirkt wie kaum eine andere Figur des ausgehenden 19. und des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts. Es ist unmöglich, sich der Figur Haeckel zu bemächtigen, ohne sofort inkompatibel auftretende Beschreibungen zu gebrauchen: In seiner zoologischen Forschung war er mit größter Hingabe mit der mikroskopischen Erforschung kleinster Meereslebewesen befasst. Dies betraf insbesondere einzellige Radiolarien, von denen er hunderte neuer (...) Arten erstmals beschrieb und klassifizierte. (shrink)

The ‚Naturforschende Gesellschaft’︁, founded in 1793, proved instrumental for the development of science at the University of Jena around 1800. Its library can be considered as one of its most important facilities provided for research and for the education of students. Since this library has been preserved almost without losses, we can ask whether this library served the purpose of a research library in the newly established field of ‚science’︁. In consequence, the role of scientific societies and the genesis of (...) specialised libraries in the area of science can be investigated in an exemplary case, with implications for the concept of scientific research around 1800. (shrink)

The notion of a μέσον, formally defined as the «middle term« in a syllogism, plays a pivotal role in Aristotle's theory of scientific demonstrations in his Analytica Posteriora. It is via the μέσον that the distinctive traits of a demonstration – the employment of causal notions and of statements concerning the essence of things – enter into demonstrative syllogisms. This, however, raises problems with respect to the provability of statements concerning the essence of things that Aristotle seems to accept in (...) certain passages of the Analytica Posteriora, as opposed to well-known passages in the Metaphysics. It is shown in which sense essences are in fact demonstrated by their being employed – via the μέσον – in a demonstration, without, however, being mentioned in the conclusion of such a demonstration. The importance Aristotle ascribes to the μέσον in Analytica Posteriora suggests a more flexible, less formalistic understanding of Aristotle's view of science, while still being based on an analysis of the formal structure of the syllogism. (shrink)

[ Philosophy against the natural sciences: “Dogmatism” in the dispute about “scientific monism” after 1900].

Schelling und Hegel benutzen in ihren philosophischen Texten mathematische und naturwissenschaftliche Modelle wie Unendlichkeit oder Gleichgewicht. Die Strukturen dieser Begriffe liefern einen Massstab fur den Vergleich der Positionen Schellings und Hegels, der fur Schellings Identitatsphilosophie und Hegels erste Jenaer Schriften durchgefuhrt wird. Als wichtigstes Resultat kann eine grundlegende Differenz zwischen beiden Positionen bereits um 1801 nachgewiesen und gezeigt werden, dass diese auf einer unterschiedlichen Auffassung der Rolle des Absoluten beruht.

Paul Ziche entwickelt in seinem Beitrag „Philosophische Psychologie jenseits von Psychologismus, Phänomenologie und deskriptiver Psychologie: Oswald Külpes experimentelle Untersuchung philosophischer Probleme“ Külpes Konzeption einer philosophischen Psychologie, die einerseits den philosophischen Ansprüchen seiner Zeit gerecht zu werden beansprucht, andererseits aber an der Leistungsfähigkeit experimentell psychologischer Arbeit festhält, dabei aber den Spagat versucht, einem reduktiven Psychologismus zu entgehen. Dabei konzentriert sich der Beitrag auf die Experimente Külpes hinsichtlich philosophischer Begriffe und Probleme einerseits und der Ermittlung der Külpischen Strategien zu einem umfassenden philosophischen (...) Projekt unter dem Titel „Realisierung“ andererseits. Somit scheint sich der Psychologismusstreit in der Person Külpes gleichsam aufzulösen, was Ziche zu dem Versuch veranlasst, die Situation der Zeit nicht als eine Kontroverse, sondern vielmehr als eine Interaktion zwischen den Lagern zu verstehen. Dabei kann Ziche in seiner Rekonstruktion der experimentellen Arbeit Külpes zeigen, dass dieser das Verhältnis von Psychologie und Philosophie im Ausgang seiner Experimente als ein wechselseitiges „Stützen“ versteht. Zudem gelinge es Külpe – so Ziche – die Kritiken, welche von beiden Lagern gegen seine Experimente ausgingen, positiv zu nutzen und als „komplexe Grundlagen aller Wissenschaften“ auszuweisen. (shrink)

Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) spielte als genialer Entdecker von Naturgesetzen eine zentrale Rolle in der frühen Naturphilosophie Schellings und Hegels; die Romantik feierte ihn als Prototypen des Genies schlechthin. Um 1840 setzt sich Schelling in einem veränderten Kontext für die erste Gesamtausgabe der Werke Keplers ein: Die Naturphilosophie wird nun vom Empirismus und Induktivismus scharf kritisiert. Neu entdeckte Dokumente belegen, wie man dennoch auf Kepler zurückgreifen konnte; gezeigt wird, dass sich idealistische und nach-idealistische Philosophieauffassungen also nicht ausschließen, so...

„Weltanschauung“ ist ein Schlüsselbegriff philosophischer Diskurse der Zeit um 1900, der weit über den Bereich der Philosophie hinausreicht und beansprucht, umfassende kulturelle Phänomene beschreiben und analysieren zu können. Simmel verwendet insbesondere den eng verwandten Begriff der „Lebensanschauung“, und behandelt unter diesem Begriff immer wieder die für ihn zentralen Bezugsfiguren Kant und Goethe. Simmels eigene Perspektive auf diese Begriffe wird deutlich, wenn er die Einheitsfunktion einer Welt- bzw. Lebensanschauung verbindet mit einer spannungsvollen Komplexität der hiermit bezeichneten kulturell-philosophischen Produkte und Haltungen. Insbesondere (...) bieten ihm diese Begriffe die Möglichkeit, ein nicht-hierarchisierendes Nebeneinanderstehen unterschiedlicher Positionen und Bedeutungselemente methodologisch zu unterbauen und hiermit seinen Wahrheitsbegriff, angesichts relativistischer Herausforderungen, präziser zu fassen. (shrink)

The systematization of the sciences as a cultural task. Options for an open understanding of culture in Paul Hinneberg's Encyclopedia. – Paul Hinneberg promises, in his multi‐volume Kultur der Gegenwart (1906sqq.), to capture the ‘culture’ of his time in its entirety; only a veritable encyclopedia could be adequate to the task of synthesizing the manifold and disparate tendencies of ‘Kultur’. Surprisingly, however, any attempt to make explicit the systematic principles governing his encyclopedic synthesis is missing from his project. It is (...) argued that this – unusual – feature of Hinneberg's Kultur der Gegenwart can itself be understood as a result of typical analyses of ‘Kultur’ at the turn of the century; culture, as an open, multi‐sided, and integrative concept may indeed best be captured in an open system that avoids strict and explicit demarcations. In these respects, the task of capturing Kultur turns out to be closely linked to another task prominent around 1900: that of providing a systematic ordering of the various ‘Wissenschaften’. (shrink)

The Naturforschende Gesellschaft (NFG) of Jena, founded in 1793, became instrumental for the development of the sciences in Jena in this period. New experimental facilities, new organizational structures and new scientific topics such as antiphlogistic chemistry and galvanism were introduced into Jena via the NFG. An investigation of the letters that were sent to the NFG shows, 1., how important the NFG was for the reception of these new results and for transmitting them to a wider audience; 2., how scientists, (...) both in Germany and abroad, tried to establish a network for scientific communication via the NFG, and 3., how personal contacts between scientists and how various forms of written exchange interrelate in the activities of the NFG. The letters to the NFG, therefore, show how, in the period around 1800; smaller scientific organizations such as the NFG managed to form a focus for scientific research and scientific exchange, with these societies being particularly important for the reception of the, by the time, latest developments in science. (shrink)