O artigo investiga a possibilidade de pensar a questão da justiça sociopolítica a partir da ideia de alteridade.

P S Wilson; Child-Centred Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 3, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 105–126, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1969.

Монография предназначена для студентов, аспирантов, преподавателей юридических и философских факультетов, а также для всех тех, кто интересуется философско-правовой проблематикой.

P S Wilson; Interests and Educational Values, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 8, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 181–199, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

P S Wilson; Interests, Values and Educational Language, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 10, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 147–166, https://doi.org/10.1.

The fertilizing ability of spermatozoa is inhibited by certain substances present in the seminal fluid. Most of these antifertility factors are proteinaceous in nature and differ in their physical characteristics. They inhibit fertilization by inhibiting either motility, capacitation, acrosome reaction or penetration of the ovum investments by the spermatozoa. This review describes and discusses the properties of these factors and their possible role, individually and collectively, in the regulation of fertility.

P S Wilson; Perspectives on Punishment—Reply to Pamela Moore, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 8, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 103–134, https://doi.org.

IT has been some time now since anyone professing himself to be a phenomenalist has characterized physical objects as ‘logical constructions out of sense-data’ in the strict sense of this expression. If he is to be justified in applying the expression in the strict sense, the phenomenalist must demonstrate that there exists a relation of mutual entailment between a statement implying the existence of a physical object and a statement referring exclusively to our ‘sense-experiences’. As a matter of historical fact, (...) no phenomenalist has ever succeeded in doing this; and it is now generally acknowledged, even by those who still wish to adhere to some form of a phenomenalistic analysis of physical object statements, that there are difficulties in principle why the reductivist programme of the early phenomenalists cannot be carried out. The modern-day phenomenalist, in an attempt to avoid the pitfalls in his predecessors’ position, tends to regard physical objects as fruitful and convenient theoretical constructions for interpreting and predicting our sense-experiences. Thus, although still committed to the view that physical objects are ‘constructed’ out of sense-data, he is no longer committed to the thesis of a strict logical equivalence between statements about objects and statements about experiences. Professor A J Ayer, perhaps the foremost exponent of this type of view today, put the matter this way not so long ago. (shrink)

IN the final section of his chapter on ‘Perception’ in The Problem of Knowledge, Ayer makes the statement that ‘The failure of phenomenalism does not mean, however, that there is no logical connection of any kind between the way physical objects appear to us and the way they really are’. To prove his contention, he sets out ‘a pair of limiting cases’ of conditions in which the truth of premises referring exclusively to ‘appearance’ would allegedly afford logical guarantees for the (...) existence, or the non-existence, of physical objects. In this paper I wish to raise some serious reservations concerning the viability of the second of these two limiting conditions, which reads. (shrink)

The concept of philosophical anthropology is polysemous. These words carry the most diverse and sometimes mutually incompatible nuances of metaphysical thought. It is difficult to judge what criterion would enable us to draw the necessary demarcations. For example, the early writings of the French moralists, in which they discussed human nature, are considered to belong to philosophical anthropology. However, few would classify Arthur Schopenhauer's Aphorisms of Everyday Wisdom [Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit] as metaphysical literature, although they contain a typology of human (...) needs. (shrink)

Happiness has been at the centre of philosophical reflection ever since Plato and Aristotle. Epicureans thought of happiness as the satisfaction of one's minimal needs and the absence of further desires. True happiness may be the love of another, or successful and virtuous public service recognized by society, or successful engagement in a favoured activity. Youthful happiness involves intensity of feeling, engagement with the passing moment, the discovery of first love and of sexuality, and the joys of dedication to a (...) beloved. The different forms of human engagement involve different kinds of happiness. Physical normality and good health are patently preconditions of happiness inasmuch as physical abnormalities and persistent diseases are barriers to leading a healthy and normal human life. A person's social conditions are highly relevant to the possibility of happiness. Happiness can be marred or shattered by a multitude of accidents of fate and by human malice, political upheavals, and economic disasters. (shrink)

For psychology to mature into a natural science, it must confine itself to what can be observed, viz. behaviour. Behaviourist psychology, according to Watson, aims to discover scientific laws correlating external stimulus and behavioural response. A stricter psychological behaviourism would disregard physiology and concentrate upon searching for laws correlating stimulus and behavioural response. A stricter logical behaviourism would search for analyses which restrict the analysans of psychological statements to specifications of behaviour and behavioural dispositions. Behaviourism is first cousin to dualism. (...) Cartesians pictured the soul's relation to the body rather like that of an immaterial hand within a visible glove. Disillusionment with dualism bred behaviourism, which rightly rejected the Cartesian (and empiricist) conception of the mind, but accepted the associated conception of the body and behaviour. The human body is the best picture of the human soul not because the soul is something bodily, but precisely because the soul is manifest in behaviour. (shrink)

A life devoid of meaning is a life without happiness. But one may find meaning in one's life and in one's activities without being happy. Like pleasure and happiness, goodness and beauty, the meaningfulness one may find in one's life comes in degrees. Many achievements may mean something to a person without being of sufficient significance to lend meaning to their life, such as winning in some competitive activity or passing an important examination. Forms of illusory meaning, that is meaning (...) that rests on false or misconceived beliefs, can impart meaning to a person's life and make it genuinely meaningful, as long as it involves neither evil doing nor evil beliefs. The human condition as language‐using, self‐conscious social animals with limited capacities for good and evil, with highly competitive and killer instincts is anything but ludicrous, farcical, silly, or ridiculous. (shrink)

Human emotions are passions – ways in which the soul is affected. It is noteworthy that the Cartesian conception, especially in its concern with the physiology of the emotions and with their causal order, inspires neuroscientific investigation of the emotions to this day. A detailed empiricist account of the character of the concepts of the emotions and of their mode of acquisition is to be found in the writings of John Locke. In his view, all ideas are derived either from (...) sensation or from reflection. The most influential psychological account of the emotions advanced in the late nineteenth century was the James‐Lange theory. It dominated reflection upon the emotions among experimental psychologists until the rise of behaviourism, and it again had a substantial influence towards the end of the twentieth century upon the somatic marker theory of the emotions advanced by the cognitive neuroscientist Antonio Damasio. (shrink)

The extant MSS. of the Pervigilium Veneris, which all derive from a single archetype, are unanimous in their reading at line 74. Yet, as is widely agreed, this reading cannot be correct. The poet is describing the descendants of Venus.

Avtor khudozhestvennyĭ kak teoreticheskai︠a︡ problema -- Avtor khudozhestvennyĭ kak istoriko-kulʹturologicheskai︠a︡ problema.