77 found
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  1. Towards a Cognitive Theory of Emotions.Keith Oatley & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1987 - Cognition and Emotion 1 (1):29-50.
  2.  46
    Syllogistic inference.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Bruno G. Bara - 1984 - Cognition 16 (1):1-61.
    This paper reviews current psychological theories of syllogistic inference and establishes that despite their various merits they all contain deficiencies as theories of performance. It presents the results of two experiments, one using syllogisms and the other using three-term series problems, designed to elucidate how the arrangement of terms within the premises affects performance. These data are used in the construction of a theory based on the hypothesis that reasoners construct mental models of the premises, formulate informative conclusions about the (...)
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  3.  50
    Towards a Cognitive Theory of Emotions.Keith Oatley & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1987 - Cognition and Emotion 1 (1):29-50.
  4.  49
    Believability and syllogistic reasoning.Jane Oakhill, P. N. Johnson-Laird & Alan Garnham - 1989 - Cognition 31 (2):117-140.
    In this paper we investigate the locus of believability effects in syllogistic reasoning. We identify three points in the reasoning process at which such effects could occur: the initial interpretation of premises, the examination of alternative representations of them (in all of which any valid conclusion must be true), and the “filtering” of putative conclusions. The effect of beliefs at the first of these loci is well established. In this paper we report three experiments that examine whether beliefs have an (...)
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  5.  32
    Mental Models in Cognitive Science.P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1980 - Cognitive Science 4 (1):71-115.
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  6.  29
    Possibilities as the foundation of reasoning.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Marco Ragni - 2019 - Cognition 193 (C):103950.
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  7.  10
    Mental models in cognitive science.P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1980 - Cognitive Science 4 (1):71-115.
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  8.  18
    Reasoning about properties: A computational theory.Sangeet Khemlani & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2022 - Psychological Review 129 (2):289-312.
  9.  88
    The language of emotions: An analysis of a semantic field.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Keith Oatley - 1989 - Cognition and Emotion 3 (2):81-123.
  10.  18
    Reasoning by model: The case of multiple quantification.P. N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. J. Byrne & Patrizia Tabossi - 1989 - Psychological Review 96 (4):658-673.
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  11.  47
    Meta-logical problems: Knights, knaves, and rips.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1990 - Cognition 36 (1):69-84.
  12.  51
    Naive causality: a mental model theory of causal meaning and reasoning.Eugenia Goldvarg & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2001 - Cognitive Science 25 (4):565-610.
    This paper outlines a theory and computer implementation of causal meanings and reasoning. The meanings depend on possibilities, and there are four weak causal relations: A causes B, A prevents B, A allows B, and A allows not‐B, and two stronger relations of cause and prevention. Thus, A causes B corresponds to three possibilities: A and B, not‐A and B, and not‐A and not‐B, with the temporal constraint that B does not precede A; and the stronger relation conveys only the (...)
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  13.  52
    Strategies in Syllogistic Reasoning.Monica Bucciarelli & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1999 - Cognitive Science 23 (3):247-303.
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  14.  52
    Basic emotions, rationality, and folk theory.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Keith Oatley - 1992 - Cognition and Emotion 6 (3-4):201-223.
  15.  54
    Illusory inferences: a novel class of erroneous deductions.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Fabien Savary - 1999 - Cognition 71 (3):191-229.
  16.  46
    The mental representation of the meaning of words.P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1987 - Cognition 25 (1-2):189-211.
  17.  99
    Logic, Models, and Paradoxical Inferences.Isabel Orenes & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (4):357-377.
    People reject ‘paradoxical’ inferences, such as: Luisa didn't play music; therefore, if Luisa played soccer, then she didn't play music. For some theorists, they are invalid for everyday conditionals, but valid in logic. The theory of mental models implies that they are valid, but unacceptable because the conclusion refers to a possibility inconsistent with the premise. Hence, individuals should accept them if the conclusions refer only to possibilities consistent with the premises: Luisa didn't play soccer; therefore, if Luisa played a (...)
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  18.  28
    In defense of reasoning: A reply to Greene (1992).P. N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. Byrne & Patrizia Tabossi - 1992 - Psychological Review 99 (1):188-190.
  19.  38
    The Truth of Conditional Assertions.Geoffrey P. Goodwin & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (8):2502-2533.
    Given a basic conditional of the form, If A then C, individuals usually list three cases as possible: A and C, not‐A and not‐C, not‐A and C. This result corroborates the theory of mental models. By contrast, individuals often judge that the conditional is true only in the case of A and C, and that cases of not‐A are irrelevant to its truth or falsity. This result corroborates other theories of conditionals. To resolve the discrepancy, we devised two new tasks: (...)
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  20.  25
    Reasoning From Inconsistency to Consistency.P. N. Johnson-Laird, Vittorio Girotto & Paolo Legrenzi - 2004 - Psychological Review 111 (3):640-661.
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  21.  45
    Referential continuity and the coherence of discourse.Alan Garnham, Jane Oakhill & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1982 - Cognition 11 (1):29-46.
    Two experiments were carried out to investigate the role of referential continuity in understanding discourse. In experiment 1, a group of university students listened to stories and descriptive passages presented in three different versions: the original passages, versions in which the sentences occured in a random order, and randomised versions in which referential continuity had been restored primarily by replacing pronouns and other terms with fuller and more appropriate noun phrases. The original stories were remembered better, and rated as more (...)
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  22.  37
    The Relation Between Factual and Counterfactual Conditionals.Ana Cristina Quelhas, Célia Rasga & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (7):2205-2228.
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  23.  67
    Mental models and temporal reasoning.Walter Schaeken, P. N. Johnson-Laird & Gery D'Ydewalle - 1996 - Cognition 60 (3):205-234.
  24.  32
    A Model Theory of Modal Reasoning.Victoria A. Bell & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1998 - Cognitive Science 22 (1):25-51.
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  25.  93
    The processes of inference.Sangeet Khemlani & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2013 - Argument and Computation 4 (1):4 - 20.
    (2013). The processes of inference. Argument & Computation: Vol. 4, Formal Models of Reasoning in Cognitive Psychology, pp. 4-20. doi: 10.1080/19462166.2012.674060.
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  26.  28
    Why models rather than rules give a better account of propositional reasoning: A reply to Bonatti and to O'Brien, Braine, and Yang.P. N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. J. Byrne & Walter Schaeken - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):734-739.
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  27.  39
    The Analytic Truth and Falsity of Disjunctions.Ana Cristina Quelhas, Célia Rasga & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2019 - Cognitive Science 43 (9):e12739.
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  28.  24
    A hyper-emotion theory of psychological illnesses.P. N. Johnson-Laird, Francesco Mancini & Amelia Gangemi - 2006 - Psychological Review 113 (4):822-841.
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  29.  28
    A model theory of modal reasoning.Victoria A. Bell & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1998 - Cognitive Science 22 (1):25-51.
    This paper presents a new theory of modal reasoning, i.e. reasoning about what may or may not be the case, and what must or must not be the case. It postulates that individuals construct models of the premises in which they make explicit only what is true. A conclusion is possible if it holds in at least one model, whereas it is necessary if it holds in all the models. The theory makes three predictions, which are corroborated experimentally. First, conclusions (...)
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  30. On imagining what is true (and what is false).Patricia Barres & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2003 - Thinking and Reasoning 9 (1):1 – 42.
    How do people imagine the possibilities in which an assertion would be true and the possibilities in which it would be false? We argue that the mental representation of the meanings of connectives, such as "and", "or", and "if", specify how to construct the true possibilities for simple assertions containing just a single connective. It follows that the false possibilities are constructed by inference from the true possibilities. We report converging evidence supporting this account from four experiments in which the (...)
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  31.  29
    Illusions in Reasoning.Sangeet S. Khemlani & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):11-35.
    Some philosophers argue that the principles of human reasoning are impeccable, and that mistakes are no more than momentary lapses in “information processing”. This article makes a case to the contrary. It shows that human reasoners commit systematic fallacies. The theory of mental models predicts these errors. It postulates that individuals construct mental models of the possibilities to which the premises of an inference refer. But, their models usually represent what is true in a possibility, not what is false. This (...)
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  32.  68
    The psychological puzzle of sudoku.N. Y. Louis Lee, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (4):342 – 364.
    Sudoku puzzles, which are popular worldwide, require individuals to infer the missing digits in a 9 9 array according to the general rule that every digit from 1 to 9 must occur once in each row, in each column, and in each of the 3-by-3 boxes in the array. We present a theory of how individuals solve these puzzles. It postulates that they rely solely on pure deductions, and that they spontaneously acquire various deductive tactics, which differ in their difficulty (...)
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  33.  36
    Conceptual illusions.Geoffrey P. Goodwin & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2010 - Cognition 114 (2):253-265.
  34.  95
    Descriptions and discourse models.P. N. Johnson-Laird & A. Garnham - 1979 - Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (3):371 - 393.
    This paper argues that mental models of discourse are key in any theory of the interpretation of definite descriptions. It considers both referential and attributive uses of such descriptions, in the sense introduced by Donnellan.
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  35.  31
    Semantic primitives for emotions: A Reply to Ortony and Clore.Keith Oatley & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1990 - Cognition and Emotion 4 (2):129-143.
  36.  50
    A model point of view.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1995 - Thinking and Reasoning 1 (4):339 – 350.
  37.  22
    The Meaning of Modality.P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1978 - Cognitive Science 2 (1):17-26.
    This paper describes a semantics for modal terms such as can and may that is intended to model the mental representation of their meaning. The basic assumption of the theory is that the evaluation of a modal assertion involves an attempted mental construction of a specified alternative to a given situation rather than the separate evaluation of each member of a set of possible alternatives as would be required by a “possible worlds” semantics. The theory leads to the conclusion that, (...)
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  38.  37
    Transitive and pseudo-transitive inferences.Geoffrey P. Goodwin & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):320-352.
  39.  61
    Models rule, OK? A reply to Fetzer.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (1):111-118.
  40. Adi-Japha, E., 1 Ahn, W.-K., B35 Amsterlaw, JA, B35 Arnold, JE, B13.R. N. Aslin, P. Barrouillet, P. Bloom, S. A. Gelman, T. JaČrvinen, P. N. Johnson-Laird, C. L. Krumhansl, J. F. Leca, M. J. Spivey & K. Sullivan - 2000 - Cognition 76:297.
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  41. Peirce, logic diagrams, and the elementary operations of reasoning.P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2002 - Thinking and Reasoning 8 (1):69 – 95.
    This paper describes Peirce's systems of logic diagrams, focusing on the so-called ''existential'' graphs, which are equivalent to the first-order predicate calculus. It analyses their implications for the nature of mental representations, particularly mental models with which they have many characteristics in common. The graphs are intended to be iconic, i.e., to have a structure analogous to the structure of what they represent. They have emergent logical consequences and a single graph can capture all the different ways in which a (...)
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  42. When 'or'means 'and': a study in mental models.P. N. Johnson-Laird & P. E. Barres - 1994 - In Ashwin Ram & Kurt Eiselt (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Erlbaum. pp. 475--478.
     
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  43.  27
    Strategies in sentential reasoning.Jean-Baptiste Van der Henst, Yingrui Yang & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2002 - Cognitive Science 26 (4):425-468.
    Four experiments examined the strategies that individuals develop in sentential reasoning. They led to the discovery of five different strategies. According to the theory proposed in the paper, each of the strategies depends on component tactics, which all normal adults possess, and which are based on mental models. Reasoners vary their use of tactics in ways that have no deterministic account. This variation leads different individuals to assemble different strategies, which include the construction of incremental diagrams corresponding to mental models, (...)
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  44.  17
    Logical expertise as a cause of error: A reply to Boolos.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Bruno G. Bara - 1984 - Cognition 17 (2):183-184.
  45.  53
    The psychological puzzle of Sudoku.P. N. Johnson-Laird, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & N. Y. Louis Lee - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (4):342-364.
    Sudoku puzzles, which are popular worldwide, require individuals to infer the missing digits in a 9 9 array according to the general rule that every digit from 1 to 9 must occur once in each row, in each column, and in each of the 3-by-3 boxes in the array. We present a theory of how individuals solve these puzzles. It postulates that they rely solely on pure deductions, and that they spontaneously acquire various deductive tactics, which differ in their difficulty (...)
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  46. An antidote to illusory inferences.M. R. Newsome & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1996 - In Garrison W. Cottrell (ed.), Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 820.
     
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  47.  40
    Illusions of consistency in quantified assertions.Niklas Kunze, Sangeet Khemlani, Max Lotstein & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2010 - In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society.
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  48.  22
    Models, necessity, and the search for counterexamples.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):775-777.
  49.  52
    Does everyone love everyone? The psychology of iterative reasoning.Paolo Cherubini & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2004 - Thinking and Reasoning 10 (1):31 – 53.
    When a quantified premise such as: Everyone loves anyone who loves someone, occurs with a premise such as: Anne loves Beth, it follows immediately that everyone loves Anne. It also follows that Carol loves Diane, where these two individuals are in the domain of discourse. According to the theory of mental models, this inference requires the quantified premise to be used again to update a model of specific individuals. The paper reports four experiments examining such iterative inferences. Experiment 1 confirmed (...)
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  50.  4
    What's wrong with grandma's guide to procedural semantics: A reply to Jerry Fodor.P. N. Johnson-Laird - 1978 - Cognition 6 (3):249-261.
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