The contents of this book were originally published in the September 1966 issue of Scientific American. A more appropriate-but perhaps less "catchy"—title would have been "Computers." The book is all about them and what they can—and cannot—do. Conspicuously missing is a chapter on the underlying mathematical theories of information, control, and computation. Nevertheless, there is a good deal of interesting material between the covers of this book. Of greatest concern to philosophers are the chapters on "Information" by John McCarthy, "Computer (...) Logic and Memory" by David C. Evans, "The Uses of Computers in Science" by Anthony G. Oettinger, "The Uses of Computers in Education" by Patrick Suppes, and "Artificial Intelligence" by Marvin L. Minsky. The first of these consists of a brief history of computing machines, an outline of the general principles of digital computers, and an interesting discussion of some of the moral and social issues which such machines raise. Evans' article is a popular description of binary logics and logic devices. The present reviewer has used some of the material in this chapter as embellishments in an undergraduate course in logic. Oettinger's article describes the novel way in which computers may aid in the formation of scientific theories. The paper by Suppes ought to be required reading for members of the "Teaching machines undermine intellectual development" school of thought. Finally, a philosopher of mind might have a field day with some of the remarkable and outrageous notions in Minsky's article; what, for example, is the difference between "thinking" and "exhibiting intelligence"? In sum, this is a stimulating book about a technological development which, for good or ill, is going to affect all of us.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This third volume of Paul Feyerabend's philosophical papers, which gathers together work originally published between 1960 and 1980, offers a range of his characteristically exciting treatments of classic questions in the philosophy of science. It includes his previously untranslated paper 'The Problem of Theoretical Entities', and the important lecture 'Knowledge without Foundations', in which he develops the perspective on early philosophy and science put forward by Karl Popper. Other themes discussed include theoretical pluralism, the nature of scientific method, the relationship (...) between theory and observation, the distinction between science and myth, and the opposition between 'rationalism' and relativism. Several papers from the 1970s detail his increasing preoccupation with the social status of science and with the decline in quality within the philosophy of science itself. The volume is completed by a substantial introduction and a comprehensive list of Feyerabend's works. (shrink)

Ernest Nagel once remarked that it is fortunately not necessary to be clear about scientific philosophy and methodology in order to practice good science. He went on to say, "Even eminent scientists can make unholy spectacles of themselves when they don the mantle of philosophy and attempt to discuss the broad implications of their specialized labors." Feynman's recent venture into the philosophy of science is, unfortunately, a lucid illustration of the validity of Nagel's observations. The book is a rather literal (...) transcription of seven semi-popular lectures delivered by Feynman at Cornell in November of 1964. Feynman is a wonderful iconoclast, a legendary virtuoso of the bongo drums and—by the way—a Nobel laureate and one of the great theoretical physicists. But this is all the more reason to expect something a little more intellectually solid than is offered in this volume. It was obviously Feynman's intent to discuss some compelling problems which lie on the borderline of physics and philosophy with an intelligent lay audience. But few will be enlightened by Feynman's clever, if uninformative, discourse about such issues as the relation of mathematics to physics, symmetry and conservation laws, and probability and uncertainty. Feynman's finest hour undoubtedly comes in the lecture on quantum mechanics, in which some aspects of the wave-particle duality are presented. But the value of much of the rest of the book is severely qualified by the author's penchant for imprecise and confusing statements and, in some cases, outright mystery-mongering. This is a great pity because theoretical physics, especially in the hands of Richard Feynman, is a source of ideas which are most worth discussing.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This book is an anthology of various approaches to the dream and its significance, from neurophysiological, anthropological, religious, sociological, and psychological points of view. Articles in it range from extremely technical and sophisticated to rather nebulous and rambling. The phenomenon of dreaming has long perplexed man. Various approaches to it have been attempted, from the occult interpretation of dreams as signifying and portending future events, to the psychoanalytical interpretation as representing, in part, past occurrences in the life history of the (...) dreamer, to the neurophysiological investigations which correlate the electrical events of the present dream-state with other physiological and neural changes. All of the above approaches are represented in this volume. In addition, this book covers a wide spectrum of contemporary research into this problem. While not sufficiently comprehensive coverage is given to any particular aspect of dream research, it serves as a general guide to present avenues of dream investigations. Most of the essays contained therein are not too technical for the interested lay reader to comprehend.—L. P. K. (shrink)

Basing his detailed exposition of Barth's understanding of our knowledge of the divine existence chiefly on volume II, part 1 of the Church Dogmatics, this American Catholic scholar exhibits the thorough-going consistency of Barth's exclusively a prioristic approach, while indicating some fundamental difficulties for it, and arguing the superiority of the Thomist position. One of the fundamental issues discussed is whether God discloses himself only through special, "vertical" acts of grace, or whether, as the Thomists affirm, the abstractive power of (...) the intellect, itself a gift of God, may not apprehend the radical dependence of all finite things on a first, unique, cause. The critical problem is whether or not the perfect certitude of faith demands a "sacrifice of the intellect," as Barth seems to contend.--P. K. J. (shrink)

This book is a clear, concise, and conceptually unified treatment of various problems, both formal and philosophical, of inductive logic and probability. Ackermann's main concern throughout the book is the problem of adducing inductive support for various hypotheses, and of deciding between two competing hypotheses which is more reasonable given the available evidence. The author begins with a general consideration of the criteria to be met by satisfactory rules of inductive inference: accordance with intuitive notions of reasonableness in simple cases, (...) sensitivity to the given evidence, capacity for unambiguous intersubjective application. Ackermann quickly disposes of the argument that valid inductive rules must be made to rest upon a "postulate of the uniformity of nature": "If past projections of regularities suddenly begin to go wrong, nondeductive rules satisfying the criteria suggested above will begin to select regularities other than the ones which have failed." This clears the way for a consideration of the general problem of evidential support or confirmation, with its well-known paradoxes and difficulties. Ackermann, like Goodman, locates the source of these in problems bearing on the semantics of scientific language, and cautiously points to Goodman's theory of projection and entrenchment as the way out of most of the muddle. Succeeding chapters deal with the notion of probability of hypotheses, statistical inference, and the application of Bayesian techniques and decision theory to science. A well-chosen bibliography completes this modest but rewarding little book.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This is undoubtedly one of the most well-conceived and nicely executed introductory books on special relativity ever written. The authors take the view that relativity theory is no longer an advanced and esoteric branch of physics, but ought to be part of the basic intellectual equipment of any bright college student. To this end, the theory of special relativity is presented as a complete and unified set of concepts and not merely as a kind of gloss on classical Newtonian mechanics. (...) This is accomplished in a manner which captures the flavor and excitement of theoretical physics and makes it available to persons of modest mathematical means, and at the same time avoids the overpopularizing and lack of rigor which so often afflict works of this kind. The text is accompanied by numerous non-trivial problems, many with solutions, and a large number of helpful drawings. There is also a reasonable amount of discussion of matters of philosophic interest, and of the most recent experimental inquiries, including a section on the significance of the Mössbauer effect. Altogether, a first-rate job.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This book is an extremely comprehensive review of the status of contemporary psychiatry, both in its theoretical and clinical aspects. While heavily dominated by a psychoanalytic bias, it explores other theoretical and clinical approaches. Included in its contents are the historical beginnings and later development of psychiatry, psychological testing and its utility for psychiatry, nosology of psychiatric disorders, various types of therapies currently in vogue, the organic as well as the psychotic disorders, psychopathic and sociopathic behavior, drug and alcohol addiction, (...) and the general usefulness of psychiatry to medicine, law, and society. The authors generally discuss the investigations and proposals of other behavioral scientists, and then offer their own view of the topic at issue. Of interest to students of philosophy are: considerations relevant to the mind-body problem, problems of normative statements inherent in attempts to determine criteria for distinguishing normal from abnormal behavior, and general matters of methodology, confirmation, and other problems in the philosophy of science which pervade all of behavioral science as well as physical science. The authors may have their personal axe to grind, but freely admit to the tenuous theoretical status of every psychodynamic system so far advanced. Their style is tedious and sometimes cumbersome. However, the book is an extremely contemporary survey, in some depth, of the state of psychiatry, and serves as a valuable reference for both lay and professional reader.—L. P. K. (shrink)

The publication of this book constitutes a real service to students of logic and of the foundations and philosophy of mathematics. Here, "under one roof," are translations of seventeen of the most important papers on logic and metalogic by Ajdukiewicz, Chwistek, Jaskowski, Jordan, Lesniewski, Lukasiewicz, S upecki, Sobocinski, and Wajsberg. All but two of them appear in English for the first time. Notably absent are papers by Alfred Tarski, but this omission is fully justified in view of the publisher's well-known (...) companion volume devoted exclusively to this most important logician. Within the contents of this volume, the major topics covered are various systems of sentential logic ; philosophically-motivated foundational studies ; miscellaneous papers on logical syntax, intuitionism and metalogic; and historical studies of the development of Polish logic. One cautionary note: the protothetic notation of Lesniewski is extremely difficult to read. Before undertaking that author's articles, the reader will do well to turn to the explanatory footnotes in the subsequent articles by Sobocinski. The book has a bibliography, but no index. In general, this is a worthwhile and long overdue book.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This somewhat unusual introductory logic text has been clearly designed to bring the student into contact with the mathematical aspects and problems of logical systems as quickly and naturally as possible, at the expense of "fundamental" discussions of logical theory, language and philosophy. In the introductory chapter, the student is introduced to elementary logical technique via Gentzen-type rules of inference, given the requisite set-theoretical background, given a preliminary orientation with respect to the concept of an axiomatic theory, and then shown (...) the full first-order language of the basic predicate calculus. The following chapter develops an axiomatic version of first-order logic with identity, and exhibits proofs of the deduction theorem, completeness theorem, and various applications of equivalence and replacement theorems and other materials to formal number theory. Finally, in what is undoubtably the most valuable part of the book, a good treatment of first-order mathematical theories is given in the third chapter. This includes an extensive discussion of Tarski's semantical theory of truth and a detailed version of Henkin's completeness theorem. Sections on decidability and Gödel's theorem complete this fine introduction to basic mathematical logic. There are numerous exercises throughout the book.—H. P. K. (shrink)

One would like to be able to say that a large part of the material in this book is so obvious as to be unnecessary. Unfortunately, this book is worthwhile precisely because one cannot. Bandman's problem may be stated as follows: By what canons and criteria does one evaluate arguments in the philosophy of education? How, in particular, do we correctly evaluate arguments about what ought to be taught? The book is thus an exercise in the "metaphilosophy" of education. In (...) the first, polemical half of the volume the author convincingly demonstrates that numerous and typical patterns of argument employed in the philosophy of education by many authors violate some of the most basic and pervasive logical rules. The really striking thing here is that Bandman persuasively charges numerous well respected educational thinkers with informal fallacies that a freshman logic student would not commit. The constructive side of Bandman's work is a bit more dubious. Initially, he distinguishes between two senses of "argument": Sense I and Sense II. These are, respectively, a "special evaluative type of argument, which does not intend to demonstrate the conclusion, and is used in giving intellectual backing to [it]," and the usual sense of argument common to formal logic. Bandman's thesis is that arguments in Sense I are "capricious," inconclusive, and typically unsound, while educational arguments in Sense II are either unsound or irrelevant. He proposes a middle way between the horns of this dilemma by urging a third sense of "argument" as the provision of "good enough" and "cogent" reasons. At least two lines of attack on Bandman's position are available. In the first place, in dismissing the utility of Sense II arguments, he makes rather facile use of the noncognitivist view that moral statements are neither true nor false. Secondly, Bandman does not adequately spell out his Sense III notion of "argument," and the few necessary conditions that he does provide fail to clarify in what sense the premisses support the conclusion and how Sense III really differs from Sense I. Despite these criticisms, the merits of the book are many, and it deserves a wide reading by philosophers and educators alike.—H. P. K. (shrink)

The contents of this book, pedagogically sound and intellectually rigorous, live up to the high standards one would expect of its author. A two or three semester course based upon this book will carry the student through all of the requisite foundational material to many of the important contemporary results in recursion theory, nonstandard arithmetic, and other more esoteric areas. The book combines features of a rigorous logic text and a book on the foundations of mathematics and elementary recursion theory. (...) In the first chapter of this latter part, Kleene gives a discussion of such topics as countable sets, Cantor's diagonal method, the paradoxes, axiomatic vs. intuitive thinking in mathematics, metamathematics, formal number theory and various formal systems. The material here parallels that in Part I of the author's previous work, Introduction to Metamathematics, but is more reliant upon logic and less upon informal set theory. The chapter on recursion theory begins with the concept of the Turing machine, and then uses this to develop the incompleteness and undecidability results of Church and Gödel. Additional topics include Gödel's completeness theorem for various types of formal systems, Skolem's paradox and nonstandard arithmetic, Herbrand's theorem and Craig's interpolation theorem. Many results and theorems of the present work bear the same indexical number as the corresponding item in IM, and the book as a whole can serve as a prolegomenon to that more advanced work.—H. P. K. (shrink)

The "new age" to which Sir Harrie refers in his title is none other than the contemporary one of particle accelerators, electronic devices, high-powered rockets, space probes, nuclear reactors and other fancy "things" which have their intellectual foundations in the theories of relativity, quanta and particle physics. This volume is a sort of intelligent layman's guide to the huge enterprise which is modern physics. The author refuses to recognize any artificial distinction between experimental and theoretical physics, but considers them to (...) be complementary aspects of one science. His technique is to consider various experimental items and recent technological developments, and to explain them in terms of the laws and theories which they bring into play. In general, Sir Harrie's exposition is excellent on the description of experiments and their results, and on applications of theories to technology, but it is a bit off the pace when it comes to exegesis of theories and answers to "why?" questions. This is understandable to the extent that the book was written for the mathematical novice, but there is a residual and glib thinness to the text. But despite its shortcomings the book will provide the scientifically curious layman with stimulating reading, an overview of a rich and complex subject, and a nonrigorous "working knowledge" of contemporary physical science.—H. P. K. (shrink)

The serious formal investigation of n-valued systems of logic for n>2 dates back to Post's 1921 doctoral dissertation. The primary use for such structures, however, has been as model-theoretic devices in the investigation of systems of lower order. Ackermann's short book now comes as a welcome addition to the literature dealing with the formal properties and applications of n-valued systems in their own right. Ackermann begins with a general discussion of implicational calculi in which fundamental ideas of validity, well-formedness, and (...) other basic notions are set forth elegantly and clearly. While assuming the classical implicational calculus as an underlying substructure, Ackermann next motivates a consideration of possible modifications of the formal system in the direction of greater generality by means of the standard Lewis objections to the reading of "⊃" as "implies." This leads to the well known story of strict entailment, introduction of modal operators, and then a four-valued matrix as an underlying semantics for the expanded system. There then follows a good general discussion of the properties of many-valued logics, various nonstandard propositional calculi, and an admirable presentation of the Lukasiewicz-Tarski propositional calculus, accompanied by a number of important metatheorems. Ackermann also includes chapters on alternative multivalued [[sic]] systems and a glance at their applications. One would like to see, however, some discussion of such controversial matters as n-valued quantificational theory and the well-known objections to the entire program of nonstandard logistic theory. There is a good bibliography of important books and articles in the field.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This is a book about statistical theory without sample theory. A very substantial portion of the modern theory of statistics can be treated without involving oneself in problems of analysis consequent upon the treatment of sampling. Accordingly, Rozeboom has written a book which, while sophisticated, does not demand any high-powered mathematical knowledge or competence. A good deal of the theories of distribution, statistical regression, factor analysis, variance structure, reliability, and miscellaneous applications of probability theory is covered. The author concentrates upon (...) questions of algebraic structure and foundations of the theory, although this is a "practical" text in the best sense of the word. To that end, Rozeboom has designed a special notation which facilitates comprehension of the text, although it does not mix well with the standard modes of logical and mathematical expression. In general, this book is quite well suited for use by students of the social and behavioral sciences and the philosophy of science who have a special interest in the theory and technique of statistical inference. There are a large number of typographical errors in the notation, which are corrected in a six-page addenda supplied with the book.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This uncommonly fine textbook of the modern theory of functions of a real variable is particularly well-suited for mathematically mature students in the fields of philosophy and foundations of mathematics, philosophy of physics, probability theory, and statistics. Those who wish to achieve first-hand acquaintance with the quantum theory will also need to have a grasp of the material presented in this book. The first chapter presents a capsule survey of topics in abstract set theory and algebra, including a discussion of (...) relations, functions, the axiom of choice, and the well-ordering theorem, and leading up to the construction of the fields of real and complex numbers. The second chapter is an introduction to topology and spaces of topological functions. The approach is set-theoretical. Chapter three deals with the theory of the Lebesgue integral and measure theory. This chapter is quite comprehensive, rigorous and embellished with many exercises for the student. Subsequent sections include the theories of function spaces, Banach spaces, abstract Hilbert spaces, and differentiation. This is clearly one of the more worthwhile texts in its field.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This is a very fine elementary-to-intermediate level text of mathematical logic. The initial chapter of the book consists of a good discussion of standard topics in modern formal logic including arguments and argument forms, logical functors, validity, proof, the axiomatic method, interpretations, and logical systems. The book then proceeds in subsequent chapters to a development of increasingly rich systems of sentential logic, systems of natural deduction, and a chapter on consistency and completeness of formal systems. This takes the student through (...) approximately one half of the book. The second half is devoted to more advanced topics such as non-standard systems of propositional logic, and predicate logic of the first order. Finally, there are chapters on higher functional calculi, the logical paradoxes, and non-standard functional systems. A good deal of attention is paid throughout to completeness and consistency properties, the decision problem for various systems, and algebraic structure. There are no frills or "gimmicks" in this book, but good intelligent discussions of important mathematical issues, and many theorems which are left as exercises to the student. Some items which one wishes had been included are normal forms, and elementary discussions of the theories of recursion and logical models.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This is a well chosen anthology of articles, both modern and classical, on logical, epistemic, and metaphysical issues of time. The editor, whose own work on the philosophy of time is well known, has provided interesting and informative introductory essays to each of the five sections of the book. Topics dealt with include general philosophical inquiry into the nature of time ; static versus dynamic theories of time, including Donald Williams' celebrated article, "The Myth of Passage," as well as two (...) articles by Findlay and Smart which are practical prerequisites for any subsequent inquiries into modal tense logic; a section on "open future" theories, leading off with Aristotle's famous passage from De Interpretatione. This section also includes a brilliant article on temporal logic by Nicolas Rescher. Section concerns problems of "human" time. Philosophically, this is the least substantial group of selections in the book. Worthy of mention, however, is Grünbaum's controversial theory of temporal becoming, represented by an extract from the first chapter of his recent book on Zeno's paradoxes. These paradoxes, finally, comprise the topic of the final section of this book, and here again Grünbaum scores high with his article "Modern Science and Zeno's Paradoxes of Motion." Also contained in this final section are articles by Bergson and J. F. Thomson. The book has a bibliography which unfortunately is arranged textually rather than indexically. This makes it difficult to use.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This imposing textbook bears the subtitle, "Readings in Metaphysics from Classical Philosophy to Existentialism," and appears to be uniquely designed for courses in metaphysics as taught in predominantly Catholic colleges and universities, although the selections reflect a distinct catholicity of concerns. In fact, when Bertrand Russell, A. J. Ayer and Rudolf Carnap get wind that some of their most polemical and positivistic pieces have been reprinted in a book of metaphysics, they are likely to reflect that Ecumenism has gone too (...) far. Their inclusion is justified, however, by the introductory assertion that "There is such a thing as antimetaphysical metaphysics, and empiricism specializes in this theory." But whatever the merits of this statement, the open-minded inclusion in this volume of spokesmen for "the opposition" is certainly to be applauded—the more so since this section contains a long and perceptive introduction by Jerzy Wojciechowski. Other sections of the book display classical and Christian thought on knowledge, being, God, potency and act; the dialectical tradition ; American pragmatism and naturalism ; and existentialism and phenomenology as represented by Heidegger, Sartre, Tillich, Marcel, Berdyaev and Buber. In addition to the generally good introductions to each of the five sections, the editors have provided glossaries of philosophical terms, lists of topics for discussions and term papers, and usually well-chosen "recommended readings."—H. P. K. (shrink)

The philosophical problems discussed by the author of this scientifically erudite work concern the usual and much debated questions of the role of causality in microphysics and the "completeness" and "indeterminism" of statistical theories in natural science. Blokhintsev, the author of a highly-regarded Russian text on quantum theory, advocates the direct opposite of the Einsteinian thesis; and furthermore, he seems to interpret the alleged irreducibly statistical nature of physical theory in a quite literal ontological sense. "We must now accept," he (...) says, "that we cannot ignore the element of games of chance in the behavior of the universe." The materials adduced in support of this thesis consist almost entirely of various essays in theoretical physics, which, while undoubtedly relevant to the question at issue, will be accessible in their details and content only to those philosophers with better than average mathematical acumen, particularly in classical analysis. Unfortunately, as so often happens in discussions of this type, the author's scientific expertise is not matched by his degree of philosophical rigor and awareness of important conceptual distinctions. Thus, although the concept of measurement in quantum mechanics and the differences between "direct" and "derived" measurement play a central role in his argument, the author seems unaware of the important logical differences which are brought out by rigorous postulational treatments of measurement theory. Moreover, when the author argues, convincingly enough, that even classical Newtonian mechanics is not a fit candidate for the label of "deterministic theory" if such factors as random fluctuations in the initial conditions and lack of isolation of actual physical systems are taken into account, he seems to forget that this is not the basis on which deterministic status is properly assigned to classical physical theory in the first place. It is physical theory as applied to suitably idealized physical systems which is held to be deterministic, and the same sort of idealizations are commonly assumed when quantum mechanics is said to be indeterministic.--H. P. K. (shrink)

Here is a fine semipopular book about the ideas which have motivated the much-talked-about revolution in the theories of information, control and communication. Jagjit Singh is one of those rare science writers who knows how to present intricate technical concepts to the less-than-expert reader without compromising the original sense or significance. The book begins, appropriately enough, with a discussion of the concept of information, culminating in the technical definition which enables us to assign numerical values to its quantity. The following (...) chapters present the conceptual heart of the Shannon-Weaver theory, the theories of automatic computing machines and the intriguing neurological theories of Warren McCulloch and John Von Neumann. The chapter on Turing Machines does not pay enough attention to the purely mathematical applications of these devices for the present reviewer's taste. The closing chapters deal with mathematical theories of intelligence and the brain. The text is accompanied by many good drawings and appropriate mathematical demonstrations. A book of this quality could have been produced only by an author with absolute command of his topic.—H. P. K. (shrink)

In this series of four lectures a scientist examines some philosophical implications of what one might loosely call "the modern scientific view of life". Bronowski has produced numerous books and articles on everything from the poetry of Blake to the clock paradox of relativity theory. It is therefore to be regretted that his latest work suffers from an annoying amount of oversimplification, and a tendency to substitute rhapsodizing for reasoning. Those concerned with the "two cultures" debate and related matters will (...) nevertheless find this book valuable and enjoyable, especially for the author's argument—which is convincing—that science and the arts need not be antithetical either in subject-matter or in spirit.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This is a very high quality book with a slightly misleading title. It is difficult to see how it could serve as an introduction for anyone except the mathematically mature or, at least, a student who has already been introduced to formal logic through the lower predicate calculus. Not that these topics are not covered in the book—they comprise the first 92 pages; but the discussion quickly moves into intellectual high gear with sophisticated treatments of the independence of systems of (...) propositional logic, first-order theories, isomorphism of interpretations, and completeness and decidability. With this caveat, Mendelson's book is one of the best of the "second generation" of books on mathematical logic. It is lucid and rigorous, and contains no "frills." It does, however, contain numerous exercises in which the student will have the pleasure of developing for himself some of the more important theorems in the various subjects treated. Among these are chapters on formal number theory, including Gödel's incompleteness theorem, recursive undecidability, Tarski's theorem; a chapter on axiomatic set theory with Hartog's theorem, the axiom of choice, and the axiom of restriction ; and a truly excellent chapter on effective computability which takes off from the notion of an algorithm, and then uses this as a basis upon which to develop the theories of Markov algorithms, Turing algorithms, the theories of Herbrand and Gödel, recursively enumerable sets and undecidable problems. An appendix contains a version of K. Schütte's consistency proof for formal number theory.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This book about philosophical and methodological problems in psychoanalytic theory is surely one of the best pieces of literature on this subject of recent vintage. The author, a psychiatrist on the faculty of Harvard Medical School, displays considerable logical skill and philosophical sophistication, in addition to the expected familiarity with the psychoanalytic literature. The major purport of the book is a logical and philosophical defense of the claim that psychoanalytic explanations of human behavior--if constructed with proper and adequate regard for (...) relevant clinical data--are methodologically sound and genuinely scientific. One useful and novel feature of Sherwood's argument is the particular type of illustrative case material which he employs: instead of mustering various bits and instances of behavior from large numbers and varieties of cases, Sherwood considers the psychiatric explanation actually given by Freud in one of his recorded clinical case histories--the famous "Karl Lorenz" or "rat man" case. Sherwood devotes two chapters to a detailed description of this case, and an analysis of the logic of Freud's explanations of the behavior presented therein. From the point of view of logical and methodological considerations, there is an obvious advantage in such an approach, for it enables the critic to avoid leveling charges against the theory which might originate simply from extracting portions of explanatory material from their proper context. Sherwood also includes a chapter of criticism of what he calls "the thesis of the separate domain"--the view that there are fundamental differences in the logic of explanations of human behavior, cognition, and other phenomena involving reasons and intentions on the one hand, and other forms of explanation characteristic of the physical sciences, on the other. Philosophically, this is the most mature chapter of the book, and will be of interest to philosophers of mind, as well as philosophers of science, particularly for its criticism of the views of R. S. Peters. Unfortunately, however, Sherwood's argument is not unmarred by serious flaws and deficiencies. These include a highly psychologistic analysis of the logic and structure of explanation whose subsequent use repeatedly involves the author in context-of-discovery vs. context-of-justification confusions. Moreover, an apparent lapse into a non-Humean account of causality in the second section of the fifth chapter leads Sherwood to an unfortunate petitio principii on the issue of causes vs. reasons. Sherwood's critical discussion of the classical "covering-law" model of scientific explanation in the penultimate chapter exhibits numerous failures to come to grips with the essential aspects of the Braithwaite-Hempel-Oppenheim theory. Finally, an important sin of omission: Sherwood completely ignores the highly germane and decisive issues raised by authors such as Nagel and Arthur Pap, who charge the theoretical concepts of psychoanalysis with lack of cognitive and empirical significance. In sum, this is a flawed but eminently worthwhile book in the philosophy of behavioral science.--H. P. K. (shrink)

The "textbook explosion" in recent years in the field of logic has frequently been deplored on the grounds that it has resulted in a proliferation of repetitious and sometimes antiquated material. A sober evaluation of this volume, unfortunately, supports this thesis. Despite the subtitle, the bulk of the material in this book wasn't "modern" two centuries ago. Why should 196 pages of a 355 page text be devoted to such topics as "Logic and Psychology," "Types of Statements in Logical English," (...) "The Syllogism," "Translation into Logical English," and "Informal Fallacies"? Philosophic issues are often obscured by the unmanageable clutter of syllogistic form, squares of opposition, sorites, and other baggage. Moreover, why should an entire appendix be devoted to a "block diagram" of a machine which computes the logical relationship between any two sentences? Especially when it is known that no such machine is possible. There is material of genuine philosophical interest in this book and there is a rather desultory treatment of elementary symbolic logic by means of a confused set of natural deduction rules.—H. P. K. (shrink)

Andrzej Mostowski, whose previous book on Gödel's incompleteness theorem is widely acclaimed as a modern classic on the subject, now gives us a series of sixteen beautifully clear lectures on the development of logic and foundations of mathematics during the past thirty years. A very wide range of subjects is treated in this book, from the intuitionistic logic and the Gödel work on the incompleteness of arithmetic to the set-theoretical results of Cohen and the algebraic theory of direct and reduced (...) products. The notable thing about all this is that the book is everywhere readable by the non-expert. Anyone who has had an elementary course in mathematical logic and set theory can read this book with a great deal of profit. Moreover, the exposition sparkles with Mostowski's remarks, conjectures and speculations on the philosophy of mathematics and the future of foundational studies. There are very few rigorously proved theorems in the book—as this was not its purpose—but a bibliography of 244 pertinent items is furnished at the end of the book for those who would like to pursue the material to greater depth.—H. P. K. (shrink)

These ten essays by members of the Pennsylvania State University Philosophy Department are written in a sophisticated style, and range over problems in metaphysics, aesthetics, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. They bear out the authors' claim to be "united by nothing more than a sense of the importance and mission of a philosophy which assumes its total responsibilities" and an interest in the classical traditions of Western philosophy.--P. K. J.

The critical reader who possesses the patience requisite for wading through this linguistic morass can expect to be rewarded with a number of interesting insights and observations, primarily concerning phenomenological aspects of science and scientific method. Sikora's argument is informed by a Thomist philosophy of science-especially as exemplified in the writings of Jacques Maritain. His task is an analysis of the distinction and relation between physical science and its philosophy—an interesting and important problem. But unfortunately as in steamship cruises to (...) exotic and far away lands, so also in philosophy: getting there is half the fun.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This is a rather extensive revision of Hick's well-known work of 1957, and is certainly a welcome addition to the literature on this subject—especially in view of the recent resurgence of interest in epistemological problems in the philosophy of religion. Hick has added a good deal of new material, including a chapter dealing with the traditional Thomist view of religious faith as a propositional attitude, and an extensively revised section dealing with the author's theory of faith as "the interpretative element (...) within the religious person's claimed awareness of God." While Hick argues for a definite philosophical thesis he has illuminating things to say about matters of general epistemological concern. Especially worthy of mention are his exposition and critique of the views of William James and his discussion of issues raised by positivistic criteria of meaning. It might be mentioned that the logical problem Hick raises concerning Aquinas' description of the faith of demons can be dispelled by the simple device of holding that the demons see things that humans don't. Altogether, this is a highly recommended book, quite well suited, incidentally, for use in a one-semester course in philosophy of religion.—H. P. K. (shrink)