Reading Certainty offers incisive historical analysis of the foundational questions of the Christian tradition: how are we to read scripture, and how can we know we are saved? This collection of essays honors the work and thought Susan E. Schreiner by exploring the import of these questions across a wide range of time periods. With contributions from renowned scholars and from Schreiner's students from her more than three decades of teaching, each of the contributions highlights the nexus of certainty, perception, (...) authority, and exegesis that has defined her scholarly work. Intellectual historians, early modernists, and scholars of Christianity will all appreciate this testament to Schreiner's influence. Contributors include: Vincent Evener, Bruce Gordon, Ralph Keen, Mark Lambert, Kevin J. Madigan, Richard A. Muller, Willemien Otten, Daniel Owings, Elizabeth Palmer, Karen Park, Barbara Pitkin, Ronald K. Rittgers, William Schweiker, Jonathan Strom, and Matthew Vanderpoel. (shrink)

If S is a finite set, let |S| be the cardinality of S. We show that if $m \in \omega, A \subseteq \omega, B \subseteq \omega$ , and |{i: 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 m & x i ∈ A}| can be computed by an algorithm which, for all x 1 ,...,x 2 m , makes at most m queries to B, then A is recursive in the halting set K. If m = 1, we show that A is recursive.

To be intrinsically valuable means to be valuable for its own sake. Moral philosophy is often ethically anthropocentric, meaning that it locates intrinsic value within humans. This paper rejects ethical anthropocentrism and asks, in what ways might nonhumans be intrinsically valuable? The paper answers this question with a wide-ranging survey of theories of nonhuman intrinsic value. The survey includes both moral subjects and moral objects, and both natural and artificial nonhumans. Literatures from environmental ethics, philosophy of technology, philosophy of art, (...) moral psychology, and related fields are reviewed, and gaps in these literatures are identified. Although the gaps are significant and much work remains to be done, the survey nonetheless demonstrates that those who reject ethical anthropocentrism have considerable resources available to develop their moral views. Given the many very high-stakes issues involving both natural and artificial nonhumans, and the sensitivity of these issues to how nonhumans are intrinsically valued, this is a vital project to pursue. (shrink)

If and the function is partial recursive, it is easily seen that A is recursive. In this paper, we weaken this hypothesis in various ways (and similarly for ``min'' in place of ``max'') and investigate what effect this has on the complexity of A. We discover a sharp contrast between retraceable and co-retraceable sets, and we characterize sets which are the union of a recursive set and a co-r.e., retraceable set. Most of our proofs are noneffective. Several open questions are (...) raised. (shrink)

An ω-set is a subset of the recursive ordinals whose complement with respect to the recursive ordinals is unbounded and has order type ω. This concept has proved fruitful in the study of sets in relation to metarecursion theory. We prove that the metadegrees of the sets coincide with those of the meta-r.e. ω-sets. We then show that, given any set, a metacomplete set can be found which is weakly metarecursive in it. It then follows that weak relative metarecursiveness is (...) not a transitive relation on the sets, extending a result of G. Driscoll [2, Theorem 3.1]. Coincidentally, we discuss the notions of total and complete regularity. Finally, we solve Post's problem for the transitive closure of weak relative metarecursiveness. We recommend the reader look at pp. 324–328 of the fundamental article [6] of Kreisel and Sacks before proceeding. He will find there a proof of the following very basic fact: a subset of the integers is iff it is metarecursively enumerable (metafinite). (shrink)

A Cantor singleton is the unique nonrecursive member of some $\Pi^0_1$ class. In this paper we investigate the relationships between the following three notions: Cantor singletons, Cantor-Bendixson rank, and recursive join. Among other results, we show that the rank of $A\oplus B$ is at most the natural sum of the ranks of $A$ and $B$ , and that, if $B$ has the same rank as $A\o plus B$ , then $A$ is recursive in $B$.

Since around 2012, there has been a ‘deep learning revolution’ in artificial intelligence (AI) that has brought AI to the forefront of many sectors of human activity. As new AI technology has sprea...

An ω-set is a subset of the recursive ordinals whose complement with respect to the recursive ordinals is unbounded and has order type ω. This concept has proved fruitful in the study of sets in relation to metarecursion theory. We prove that the metadegrees of the sets coincide with those of the meta-r.e. ω-sets. We then show that, given any set, a metacomplete set can be found which is weakly metarecursive in it. It then follows that weak relative metarecursiveness is (...) not a transitive relation on the sets, extending a result of G. Driscoll [2, Theorem 3.1]. Coincidentally, we discuss the notions of total and complete regularity. Finally, we solve Post's problem for the transitive closure of weak relative metarecursiveness. We recommend the reader look at pp. 324–328 of the fundamental article [6] of Kreisel and Sacks before proceeding. He will find there a proof of the following very basic fact: a subset of the integers is iff it is metarecursively enumerable (metafinite). (shrink)

Recent work in AI ethics often calls for AI to advance human values and interests. The concept of “AI for people” is one notable example. Though commendable in some respects, this work falls short by excluding the moral significance of nonhumans. This paper calls for a shift in AI ethics to more inclusive paradigms such as “AI for the world” and “AI for the universe”. The paper outlines the case for more inclusive paradigms and presents implications for moral philosophy and (...) computer science work on AI ethics. (shrink)

We introduce the notion of "semi-r.e." for subsets of ω, a generalization of "semirecursive" and of "r.e.", and the notion of "weakly semirecursive", a generalization of "semi-r.e.". We show that A is weakly semirecursive iff, for any n numbers x 1 ,...,x n , knowing how many of these numbers belong to A is equivalent to knowing which of these numbers belong to A. It is shown that there exist weakly semirecursive sets that are neither semi-r.e. nor co-semi-r.e. On the (...) other hand, we exhibit nonzero Turing degrees in which every weakly semirecursive set is semirecursive. We characterize the notion "A is weakly semirecursive and recursive in K" in terms of recursive approximations to A. We also show that if a finite Boolean combination of r.e. sets is semirecursive then it must be r.e. or co-r.e. Several open questions are raised. (shrink)

A case is made for supposing that the total probability accounted for in a decision analysis is less than unity. This is done by constructing a measure on the set of all codes for computable functions in such a way that the measure of every effectively accountable subset is bounded by a number <1. The consistency of these measures with the Savage axioms for rational preference is established. Implications for applied decision theory are outlined.

We find the idea that infant crying arises from thermoregulation more consistent with a coregulatory account of its evolutionary history than it is with the informational account advocated in the target article.

In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.

Neither employer expectations of loyalty, nor good treatment of employees by employers, nor employee appreciation of employers, nor the duty of nonmaleficence, nor the intention to be loyal, nor the duty not to act disloyally provide a basis for a moral or ethical duty of employee loyalty. However, in addition to the law, a pledge to be loyal can obligate one to be loyal. But if the specific content of such a pledge is unstated, the conduct required by the pledge (...) may be indefinite. Moreover, the content and implications of loyalty are fluid, varying from context to context. Consequently, there is only a limited basis for the thesis that employees owe loyalty to their employers. (shrink)

This paper is about an overlooked aspect—the cognitive or epistemic aspect—of the moral demand we place on one another to be treated well. We care not only how people act towards us and what they say of us, but also what they believe of us. That we can feel hurt by what others believe of us suggests both that beliefs can wrong and that there is something we epistemically owe to each other. This proposal, however, surprises many theorists who claim (...) it lacks both intuitive and theoretical support. This paper argues that the proposal has intuitive support and is not at odds with much contemporary theorizing about what we owe to each other. (shrink)

A guide for making the future go better. Humanity’s written history spans only five thousand years. Our yet-unwritten future could last for millions more – or it could end tomorrow. Staggering numbers of people will lead lives of flourishing or misery or never live at all, depending on what we do today.

We are often urged to figure things out for ourselves rather than to rely on other people’s say-so, and thus be ‘epistemically autonomous’ in one sense of the term. But why? For almost any important question, there will be someone around you who is at least as well placed to answer it correctly. So why bother making up your own mind at all? I consider, and then reject, two ‘egoistic’ answers to this question according to which thinking for oneself is (...) beneficial for the autonomous agent herself. I go on to suggest that the reason we should (sometimes) think for ourselves is that doing so (sometimes) increases the collective reliability of the epistemic community to which we belong. In many cases, this will do nothing at all to increase our own chances of forming correct beliefs. So, at least in this respect, the rationale for being epistemically autonomous is entirely ‘altruistic’. (shrink)

God Owes Us Nothing reflects on the centuries-long debate in Christianity: how do we reconcile the existence of evil in the world with the goodness of an omnipotent God, and how does God's omnipotence relate to people's responsibility for their own salvation or damnation. Leszek Kolakowski approaches this paradox as both an exercise in theology and in revisionist Christian history based on philosophical analysis. Kolakowski's unorthodox interpretation of the history of modern Christianity provokes renewed discussion about the historical, intellectual, and (...) cultural omnipotence of neo-Augustinianism. "Several books a year wrestle with that hoary conundrum, but few so dazzlingly as the Polish philosopher's latest."--Carlin Romano, Washington Post Book World "Kolakowski's fascinating book and its debatable thesis raise intriguing historical and theological questions well worth pursuing."--Stephen J. Duffy, Theological Studies "Kolakowski's elegant meditation is a masterpiece of cultural and religious criticism."--Henry Carrigan, Cleveland Plain Dealer. (shrink)

_God Owes Us Nothing_ reflects on the centuries-long debate in Christianity: how do we reconcile the existence of evil in the world with the goodness of an omnipotent God, and how does God's omnipotence relate to people's responsibility for their own salvation or damnation. Leszek Kolakowski approaches this paradox as both an exercise in theology and in revisionist Christian history based on philosophical analysis. Kolakowski's unorthodox interpretation of the history of modern Christianity provokes renewed discussion about the historical, intellectual, and (...) cultural omnipotence of neo-Augustinianism. "Several books a year wrestle with that hoary conundrum, but few so dazzlingly as the Polish philosopher's latest."—Carlin Romano, _Washington Post Book World_ "Kolakowski's fascinating book and its debatable thesis raise intriguing historical and theological questions well worth pursuing."—Stephen J. Duffy, _Theological Studies_ "Kolakowski's elegant meditation is a masterpiece of cultural and religious criticism."—Henry Carrigan, _Cleveland Plain Dealer_. (shrink)

The suffering of war refugees is often regarded as a wrong-less harm. Although war refugees have been made worse off in severe ways, they have not been wronged, because no one intentionally caused their suffering. In military parlance, war refugees are collateral damage. As such, nothing is owed to them as a matter of justice, because their suffering is not the result of intentional wrongdoing; rather, it is the regrettable and unintended result of necessary and proportionate wartime actions. So, while (...) the warring national or extra-national groups might help war refugees, such aid is regarded as humanitarian, not as justice.I challenge the view that war refugees are harmed but not wronged when those harms directly result from necessary and proportionate wartime actions. War refugees are innocent bystanders, and so are an exception to the principle that permits defense by any necessary and proportionate means. Just as an individual may not kill or seriously harm an innocent bystander to save herself, so too national or extra-national groups may not create refugees to win a war. If such groups do create war refugees during the legitimate pursuit of military goals, they have wronged those refugees, and so owe them recompense. (shrink)

How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other. According to his contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong is thinking (...) about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. He shows how the special authority of conclusions about right and wrong arises from the value of being related to others in this way, and he shows how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification and criticism. Scanlon bases his contractualism on a broader account of reasons, value, and individual well-being that challenges standard views about these crucial notions. He argues that desires do not provide us with reasons, that states of affairs are not the primary bearers of value, and that well-being is not as important for rational decision-making as it is commonly held to be. Scanlon is a pluralist about both moral and non-moral values. He argues that, taking this plurality of values into account, contractualism allows for most of the variability in moral requirements that relativists have claimed, while still accounting for the full force of our judgments of right and wrong. (shrink)

Feminism is going to ruin your life--in the best way possible--because society screams numerous messages every moment about how women must look, act, and speak in order to earn their right to be seen and heard. The only thing any human needs to do in order to earn their right to exist, however, is to exist. Break free of the insidious narratives that hold you back from being your most authentic self.