O artigo de Goodman “The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals” teve um papel central no debate relativo a análise adequada dos condicionais contrafactuais. A seguir examinarei o artigo de Goodman em detalhe e discutirei algumas objeções e sugestões de Parry em seu artigo “A Reexamination of the Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals”. Restringirei minha discussão ao “problema das condições relevantes”, assim denominado por Goodman, que é o tema principal das críticas de Parry e que considero ser o problema principal para a abordagem (...) de Goodman. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007 / 1808-1711.2011v15n3p383. (shrink)
In this critical study I try to highlight some of the most important issues discussed in Chateaubriand’s excellent book. In particular, I discuss in some detail Chateaubriand’s criticism of one of the icons of analytic philosophy, namely, Quine, as well as some of his own valuable contributions to philosophy in this book – for example, his refutation of the various forms of the slingshot argument and his characterization of logical truth.
ABSTRACT: In its strongest unqualified form, the principle of wholistic reference is that in any given discourse, each proposition refers to the whole universe of that discourse, regardless of how limited the referents of its non-logical or content terms. According to this principle every proposition of number theory, even an equation such as "5 + 7 = 12", refers not only to the individual numbers that it happens to mention but to the whole universe of numbers. This principle, its history, (...) and its relevance to some of OswaldoChateaubriand's work are discussed in my 2004 paper "The Principle of Wholistic Reference" in Essays on Chateaubriand's "Logical Forms". In Chateaubriand's réplica (reply), which is printed with my paper, he raised several important additional issues including the three I focus on in this tréplica (reply to his reply): truth-values, universes of discourse, and formal ontology. This paper is self-contained: it is not necessary to have read the above-mentioned works. The principle of wholistic reference (PWR) was first put forth by George Boole in 1847 when he espoused a monistic fixed-universe viewpoint similar to the one Frege and Russell espoused throughout their careers. Later, Boole elaborated PWR in 1854 from the pluralistic multiple-universes perspective. (shrink)
En este trabajo se examinan las concepciones de OswaldoChateaubriand acerca de la naturaleza del lenguaje, así como las relaciones de éste con la lógica y la ontología. En primer lugar, se aborda la tematización del lenguaje como actividad humana. A continuación, se analiza la elucidación que propone Chateaubriand acerca del significado en términos de uso o condiciones sociales de identidad. En tercer lugar, se indaga la fundamentación del lenguaje y del significado en propiedades ontológicas. Finalmente, se (...) plantean observaciones acerca de algunas tesis de Chateaubriand, tales como la distinción entre significado y sentido o el carácter innato de algunos conceptos.In this paper we examine Chateaubriand’s views on language and on its general relation to logic and ontology. We first discuss his account of language as a human activity. Secondly, we analyze Chateaubriand’s explanation of meaning as use or as social identity conditions. Thirdly, we spell out the ontological foundation of language and meaning on ontological properties. Finally, we make observations on some aspects of Chateaubriand’s tenets such as the distinction between meaning and sense and the innateness of some concepts. (shrink)
This is the report on the XVI BRAZILIAN LOGIC CONFERENCE (EBL 2011) held in Petrópolis, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil between May 9–13, 2011 published in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic Volume 18, Number 1, March 2012. -/- The 16th Brazilian Logic Conference (EBL 2011) was held in Petro ́polis, from May 9th to 13th, 2011, at the Laboratório Nacional de Computação o Científica (LNCC). It was the sixteenth in a series of conferences that started in 1977 with the aim of (...) congregating logicians from Brazil and abroad, furthering interest in logic and its applications, stimulating cooperation, and contributing to the development of this branch of science. EBL 2011 included more than one-hundred and fifty participants, all of them belonging to prominent research institutes from Brazil and abroad, especially Latin America. The conference was sponsored by the Academia Brasileira de Ciências (ABC), the As- sociation for Symbolic Logic (ASL), Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Sciences (CLE), Laboratório Nacional de Computação o Científica (LNCC), Pontif ́ıcia Universidade Cato ́lica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC- Rio), Sociedade Brasileira de Lógica (SBL), and Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). Funding was provided by Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cient ́ıfico e Tecnolo ́ gico (CNPq), Fundac ̧a ̃o de Amparo `a Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP), Fundação Euclides da Cunha (FEC), and Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). The members of the Scientific Committee were: Mário Folhadela Benevides (COPPE- UFRJ), Fa ́bio Bertato (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Jean-Yves Béziau (UFRJ), Ricardo Bianconi (USP), Juliana Bueno-Soler (UFABC), Xavier Caicedo (Universidad de Los An- des), Walter Carnielli (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), OswaldoChateaubriandFilho (PUC-Rio), Marcelo Esteban Coniglio (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Newton da Costa (UFSC, President), Antonio Carlos da Rocha Costa (UFRG), Alexandre Costa-Leite (UnB), I ́tala M. Loffredo D’Ottaviano (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Marcelo Finger (USP), Edward Hermann Haeusler (PUC-Rio), Décio Krause (UFSC), João Marcos (UFRN), Ana Teresa de Castro Martins (UFC), Maria da Paz Nunes de Medeiros (UFRN), Francisco Miraglia (USP), Luiz Car- los Pereira (PUC-Rio and UFRJ), Elaine Pimentel (UFMG), and Samuel Gomes da Silva (UFBA). The members of the Organizing Committee were: Anderson de Araujo (UNICAMP), Walter Carnielli (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), OswaldoChateaubriandFilho (PUC-Rio, Co- chair), Marcelo Correa (UFF), Renata de Freitas (UFF), Edward Hermann Haeusler (PUC- RJ), Hugo Nobrega (COPPE-UFRJ), Luiz Carlos Pereira (PUC-Rio e IFCS/UFRJ), Leandro Suguitani (UNICAMP), Rafael Testa (UNICAMP), Leonardo Bruno Vana (UFF), and Petrucio Viana (UFF, Co-chair). (shrink)
The standard view of logical form is that logical forms are synthetic structures which are the forms of sentences and of other linguistic entities. This is often associated with a more general linguistic view of logic which is articulated in different ways by various authors. This paper contains a critical discussion of such linguistic approaches to logical form, with special emphasis on Quine’s formulation of a logical grammar in Philosophy of Logic. An account of logical forms as higher-order properties, which (...) essentially builds on Frege’s analysis of quantification as higher-order predication, is suggested at the end. (shrink)
Ontology played a very large role in Quine’s philosophy and was one of his major preoccupations from the early 30’s to the end of his life. His work on ontology provided a basic framework for most of the discussions of ontology in analytic philosophy in the second half of the Twentieth Century. There are three main themes that Quine developed in his work. The first is ontological commitment: What are the existential commitments of a theory? The second is ontological reduction: (...) How can an ontology be reduced to another? And what is the most economical ontology that can be obtained for certain given purposes? The third is criteria of identity: When are entities of some kind the same or different? In this paper I discuss Quine’s development of these three themes and some of the problems that were aised in connection with his work. (shrink)
In this paper I present an abstract theory of senses, thoughts, and truth, inspired by ideas of Frege. "Inspired" because for the most part I shall not pretend to interpret Frege in a literal sense, but, rather, develop some of his ideas in ways that seem to me to preserve important aspects of them. Senses are characterized as identifying properties; i.e., roughly, as properties that apply, in virtue of their logical structure, to exactly one thing, if they apply to anything (...) at all. When Frege's analysis of sentences in terms of function and arguments is combined with his analysis of quantification as higher-order predication, all sentences (formal and informal) can be analyzed in various ways as a function (predicate) applied to one or more arguments. This allows for an abstract characterization of thoughts as senses that combine other senses in a uniform way, and whose truth derives from their instantiation by corresponding items of reality. (shrink)
Classical logic is often characterized through certain laws such as bi-valence and sharpness of concepts, among others. My view is that its most fundamental feature is a commitment to an objective conception of truth, which goes together with a realistic metaphysical view. Truth is objective in that it derives from the nature of reality, and is not dependent on beliefs, theories, practices, and the like. Classical logic is a theory of logical properties, logical truths, and logical states of affairs.
Goodman’s paper “The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals” played a central role in the debate concerning the proper analysis of counterfactual conditionals. In what follows I examine Goodman’s paper in detail and discuss objections and suggestions by Parry in his “Reexamination of the Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals”. I restrict my discussion to what Goodman termed “the problem of relevant conditions”, which is the main subject of Parry’s criticism, and which I also consider to be the central issue for Goodman’s approach.
I present the realist conception of logic supported by OswaldoChateaubriand which integrates ontological and epistemological aspects, opposing it to mathematical and linguistic conceptions. I give special attention to the peculiarities of his hierarchy of types in which some properties accumulate and others have a multiple degree. I explain such deviations of the traditional conception, showing the underlying purpose in each of these peculiarities. I compare the ideas of Chateaubriand to the similar ideas of Frege, Tarski and (...) Gödel. I suggest a view of the logical properties in terms of the Aristotelian notion of focal meaning and I give a formal expression to the type of the entities in the hierarchy proposed by Chateaubriand. (shrink)
In this paper on OswaldoChateaubriand’s book Logical Forms I, I am mostly concerned with the critical task of indicating some shortcomings and stressing my disagreements with the distinguished scholar. The most important shortcoming of the book is Chateaubriand’s unfamiliarity with Husserl’s views on logic and semantics, some of which anticipate views propounded by the former – e.g., the distinction between logical law and logical necessity-, whereas others are more subtle than Chateaubriand’s views – e.g., Husserl’s (...) views on the referent of statements. One of the most important contributions of Chateaubriand’s book is his analysis and rejection of all forms of the so-called “slingshot argument”. On the other hand, I disagree with Chateaubriand’s rendering of some of Frege’s views, though some of these are very common among Fregean scholars. Finally, I assess Chateaubriand’s criticism of Kripke’s views as well as those of Tarski. I tend to agree with his criticism of Kripke, but disagree with his assessment of Tarskian semantics. (shrink)
In this short paper I am concerned with basically two especially important issues in OswaldoChateaubriand’s Logical Forms II; namely, the dispute between first- and higher-order logic and his conception of logical truth and related notions, like logical property, logical state of affairs and logical falsehood. The first issue was also present in the first volume of the book, but the last is privative of the second volume. The extraordinary significance of both issues for philosophy is emphasized and, (...) though there is a basic agreement with Chateaubriand’s views, some critical remarks are interspersed.Neste pequeno artigo considero basicamente duas questões particularmente importantes em Logical Forms II de OswaldoChateaubriand; a saber, a disputa entre a lógica de primeira e de segunda ordem e sua concepção de verdade lógica e noções relacionadas, como as de propriedade lógica, estado de coisas lógico e falsidade lógica. A primeira questão também estava presente no primeiro volume do livro, mas a última apenas aparece no segundo volume. Enfatizo o significado extraordinário de ambas as questões para a filosofia e, embora haja uma concordância básica com as visões de Chateaubriand, algumas observações críticas são inseridas. (shrink)
O presente texto procura mostrar que o discurso cético, mais especificamente o discuso cético pirrônico, se lido a partir de seu "tempo lógico", revela a presença de dificuldades semelhantes às que se podem encontrar nas filosofias dogmáticas. Para isso, analisam-se algumas passagens de Sexto Empírico e de Oswaldo Porchat, bem como a noção de suspensão de juízo (epokhé).
Many authors, including OswaldoChateaubriand, maintain that “properties” should be structured in logical grades, where the least abstract quantities comprise the lowest ranks of a hierarchy that embraces more abstract and mathematized qualities only at higher levels. But applied mathematicians warns that no quantities can be expected to possess crisp, real world extensions unless they have already been processed with a fair amount of set theoretic machinery beforehand.Muitos autores, incluindo OswaldoChateaubriand, sustentam que "propriedades" deveriam ser (...) estruturadas em uma gradação lógica, onde as quantidades menos abstratas ficariam num nível mais baixo de uma hierarquia que abarca qualidades mais matematizadas e abstratas somente em níveis mais elevados. Mas matemáticos aplicados advertem que não se pode esperar de nenhuma quantidade que elas possuam extensões precisas, como do mundo real, a menos que já tenham sido tratados de antemão com uma boa dose de maquinaria conjuntista. (shrink)
Current versions of nominalism in the philosophy of mathematics face a significant problem to understand mathematical knowledge. They are unable to characterize mathematical knowledge as knowledge of the objects mathematical theories are taken to be about. OswaldoChateaubriand’s insightful reformulation of Platonism (Chateaubriand 2005) avoids this problem by advancing a broader conception of knowledge as justified truth beyond a reasonable doubt, and by introducing a suitable characterization of logical form in which the relevant mathematical facts play an (...) important role in the truth of the corresponding mathematical propositions. In this paper, I contrast Chateaubriand’s proposal with an agnostic form of nominalism that is able to accommodate mathematical knowledge without the commitment to mathematical facts. (shrink)
The aim of this paper is to defend Ockham’s razor against the objection recently made by OswaldoChateaubriand that we do not know how to decide which entities are necessary and which are not. The main thesis defended is that this distinction can be adequately explained in terms of the notion of ontological reducibility. It is argued that Oswaldo’s objections against this approach are not conclusive.
En este artículo proponemos que el examen del concepto de demostración de OswaldoChateaubriand en los capítulos 19, 20 y 21 de la Parte II de Logical Forms incluye aspectos retóricos y dialécticos .In this paper we argue that OswaldoChateaubriand’s conception of proof, in chapters 19, 20, and 21 of Part II of Logical Forms, incorporates rhetorical aspects , and dialectical aspects.
Sumário: 1. O conceito de revolução, Amélia de Jesus Oliveira; 2. Mudanças de concepção de mundo, Artur Bezzi Günther; 3. Habilidade e causalidade: uma proposta confiabilista para casos típicos de conhecimento, Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos; 4. El realismo interno de Putnam y sus implicaciones en la filosofía de la ciencia y para el realismo científico, Marcos Antonio da Silva; 5.O papel da observação na atividade científica segundo Peirce, Max Rogério Vicentini; 6.Fact and Value entanglement: a collapse of objective reality?, (...) class='Hi'>Oswaldo Melo Souza Filho; 7.Realismo interno e o paradoxo de Putnam, Renato Mendes Rocha; 8.Uma informação, dois formatos, dois destinos, Cícero Antônio Cavalcante Barroso; 9.O Mentiroso e as intuições acerca da noção de verdade na perspectiva de Saul Kripke, Ederson Safra Melo; 10.A conceptual difficulty with some definitions of behavior, Filipe Lazzeri; 11.A faceta epistêmica do problema da referência, Saulo Moraes de Assis; 12.Princípios metafísicos do método newtoniano, Bruno Camilo de Oliveira; 13.A resposta aristotélica para a aporia do regresso ao infinito nas demonstrações, Daniel Lourenço; 14.O uso da doutrina da ponderação aplicado ao principialismo, Cinthia Berwanger Pereira; 15.A fenomenologia da vida interior em Hannah Arendt, Elizabete Olinda Guerra; 16.Por que achar que o direito é formado por ordens é um fracasso?, ria Alice da Silva; 17 Por que ainda há poucas mulheres na filosofia? Uma versão modificada do modelo das “vozes diferentes”, Tânia A. Kuhnen; 18.Algumas considerações sobre Substância, Forma e Matéria na Metafísica de Aristóteles, Gabriel Geller Xavier. (shrink)
This study described and analysed the circumstances surrounding a fatal car accident involving personnel of a multinational corporation in a developing country. For some companies, road accidents are the leading cause of work-related fatalities in developing countries. This reality highlights the ethical dilemmas encountered in a global workplace. Questions as to how a company addresses safety concerns outside the standard work environment, the ethics of operating in a risky environment and the requirements for international consistency in compensation standards for loss (...) of life were addressed. The authors argued that multinational companies should localize health and safety practices to address the important asymmetries between different regions of the world regarding social, cultural and infrastructural issues. Furthermore, the authors analysed the leadership role that should be played by multinational companies to help and support national governments to reduce traffic fatalities in developing countries. From this perspective, the article represents a contribution for the body of knowledge dealing with the business–society relations. The authors used an action research approach to address these issues, both in response to the particular incident and to contribute to the body of research in this field. (shrink)
Seismic interpretation is dependent on the quality and resolution of seismic data. Unfortunately, seismic amplitude data are often insufficient for detailed sequence stratigraphy interpretation. We reviewed a method to derive high-resolution seismic attributes based upon complex continuous wavelet transform pseudodeconvolution and phase-residue techniques. The PD method is based upon an assumption of a blocky earth model that allowed us to increase the frequency content of seismic data that, for our data, better matched the well log control. The phase-residue technique allowed (...) us to extract information not only from thin layers but also from interference patterns such as unconformities from the seismic amplitude data. Using data from a West Texas carbonate environment, we found out how PD can be used not only to improve the seismic well ties but also to provide sharper sequence terminations. Using data from an Anadarko Basin clastic environment, we discovered how phase residues delineate incised valleys seen on the well logs that are difficult to see on vertical slices through the original seismic amplitude. (shrink)
The aim of this paper is to frame briefly Chateaubriand’s conception of logical forms in the distinction between logic and language as calculus and logic as universal language, devised by Jean van Heijenoort and later generalized by Jaakko Hintikka. The most important reasons to connect Chateaubriand’s conception with this distinction are perhaps Chateaubriand’s criticism of the linguistic approach to logical forms and the role Chateaubriand assigns to symbolism in his own account.O propósito deste artigo é localizar (...) brevemente a concepção de forma lógica de Chateaubriand com relação à distinção entre lógica e linguagem como cálculo e lógica como linguagem universal, introduzida por Jean van Heijenoort e depois generalizada por Jaako Hintikka. Talvez a razão mais importante para conectar a concepção de Chateaubriand com esta distinção sejam suas críticas ao tratamento linguístico das formas lógicas, e o papel que Chateaubriand atribui ao simbolismo em seu próprio tratamento. (shrink)
In this paper, Chateaubriand’s account of the productivity of language is put to an historical perspective. Its philosophical significance is assessed. It is shown how it could be expanded to accommodate recent findings of professional linguists.O presente artigo analisa o tratamento da produtividade da linguagem oferecido por Chateaubriand de uma perspectiva histórica. Seu significado filosófico é avaliado. Também se mostra que este tratamento poderia ser expandido de forma a incluir descobertas recentes de lingüistas profissionais.
This article discusses the notion of rationality and agency in Fernando Broncano's Racionalidad, Acción y Opacidad (2017). In this book, contradicting the apriorist normative theses or simple naturalistic descriptivism, Broncano argues that rationality is something that is directly associated with our ordinary practices of evaluating the judgments, actions and decisions of others. “Rationality” should be considered as a term we use as an intellectual qualifier or as a virtue we bestow on people who can make theoretical and practical decisions autonomously. (...) Thus, rationality would not be an a priori condition for someone to become a person or a capacity to eliminate the turbulence of human cognitive and moral precariousness, but a form of involvement in the world that positively qualifies the organism that relates thought and action, judgment and choice in the search for lucidity in an uncertain world. With this, rationality and agency would be products of the social interdependence that one has in relation to the other, since we learn it and teach it in the context of natural life. This article is organized in three sections: in the first section I make a very brief presentation of one of the aspects of the problem that has motivated the philosophical discussion on rationality and agency; in the second section, I present my understanding of the themes developed in Racionalidad, Acción y Opacidad, their internal structure and, of course, their central thesis; in the third section, I specifically discuss the theme that the normativity of rationality arises from our dialectical encounter with other people and make personal considerations on the value and scope of the arguments constructed in this book. (shrink)
In this paper I discuss Chateaubriand’s notion of senses. His notions retains the spirit of the original Fregean notion, but differ from it in some fundamental ways. I compare both notions, especially concerning the issue of indirect reference, and also concerning their explanatory power in epistemic matters. Finally, I raise some worries concerning the semantic role played by Chateaubriand’s senses, as well as the notion of judgment that his notion of thoughts seems to imply.Neste artigo, discuto a noção (...) de sentido de Chateaubriand. Sua noção retém o espírito da noção Fregeana original, mas difere da mesma em alguns aspectos fundamentais. Eu comparo ambas as noções, especialmente no que diz respeito à questão da referência indireta, e também no que concerne ao seu poder explicativo em questões epistêmicas. Por fim, levanto algumas preocupações sobre o papel semântico desempenhado pelos sentidos de Chateaubriand, bem como a forma dos juízos que a sua noção de pensamento implica. (shrink)
Chateaubriand’s view of truth as identification is based on the assumption that there is a close parallelism between sentences and definite descriptions with regard to their connection with reality. The paper aims to show that this parallelism does not actually obtain.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss Chateaubriand’s criticism of the so-called slingshot arguments, particularly of those versions proposed by Church and by Gödel . I concentrate on two critical points made by Chateaubriand, and argue that they are not decisive against these versions of the slingshot. I also discuss Chateaubriand’s hybrid theory of definite descriptions and argue that, despite its intrinsic interest, it cannot avoid the conclusion of the slingshot.
In Logical Forms Part II, Chateaubriand begins the Chapter on “Propositional Logic” by considering the reading of the ‘conditional’ by ‘implies’; in fact he states that:There is a confusion, as a matter of fact, and it runs deep, but it is a confusion in propositional logic itself, and the mathematician’s reading is a rather sensible one.After a careful, erudite analysis of various philosophical viewpoints of logic, Chateaubriand comes to the conclusion that:Pure propositional logic, as just characterized, belongs to (...) ontological logic, and it does not include a theory of deduction as a human activity. This is a part of epistemological logic, and is more closely connected to the applications of pure propositional logic.An implicit assumption in Chateaubriand’s reasoning appears to be that propositions have a timeless status. I will present arguments for the opposite viewpoint which leads to an analysis of Propositional Logic not covered under Chateaubriand’s monograph and perhaps resolves some conflicts therein; much as the conflict between the Intuitionist and Classical Mathematician on whether every function on the Reals is continuous is resolved by the realization that they are talking about different “entities”.Em Logical Forms II, Chateaubriand inicia o capítulo “Lógica Proposi-cional” considerando a leitura do ‘condicional’ como ‘implica’. De fato, ele diz o seguinte:Na verdade, existe uma confusão, e ela é profunda, mas é uma confusão na lógica proposicional ela mesma, e a leitura de um matemático é bastante sensível.Depois de uma análise cuidadosa e erudita dos vários pontos de vista filosóficos da lógica , Chateaubriand chega à conclusão que:A lógica proposicional pura, tal como aqui caracterizada, pertence à lógica ontológica, e não inclui uma teoria da dedução como atividade humana. Isto é parte da lógica epistemológica, e é mais intimamente conectada às aplicações da lógica proposicional.Uma premissa implícita no raciocínio de Chateaubriand parece ser a de que proposições têm um estatuto atemporal. Eu argumentarei em favor da visão oposta, que leva a uma análise da Lógica Proposicional não abordada no texto de Chateaubriand e que talvez resolva alguns conflitos. Muito do conflito entre Intuicionistas e Matemáticos Clássicos sobre se toda função sobre os números reais é contínua é resolvido pela compreensão de que eles estão falando de “entidades” diferentes. (shrink)
O objetivo do presente artigo é, com base em contribuições retiradas da filosofia de Nietzsche, refletir sobre questões éticas de atualidade, concernindo o sentido do progresso tecnológico e o futuro da natureza humana.The aim of this article is to consider, on the basis of some theoretical views in Nietzsche's philosophy, ethical questions of the present time concerning the sense of the technological progress and the future of the human nature.