En este trabajo se analiza la relación que guarda la filosofía del derecho de I. Kant y el pensamiento de K. Marx, sobre todo, en lo concerniente a la «Doctrina del Derecho» elaborada por I. Kant en la Metafísica de las Costumbres. Pretendemos mostrar que la exposición de la «Doctrina del Derecho» lejos de ser el fruto de un pensamiento burgués, como se ha venido considerando desde diversos ámbitos de la tradición marxista, no está tan distante de los problemas centrales (...) abordados por K. Marx en su trabajo sobre El Capital. De este modo localizamos los puntos en común en los que se cruzan ambos pensadores, intentando vislumbrar las posibilidades que esta conjunción filosófica puede aportar en el orden de la filosofía del derecho al presente y futuro de nuestras sociedades. Sobre todo, tratamos de mostrar cómo los problemas abordados en El Capital introducen una suerte de «a priori empírico», que el principio trascendental del derecho debe tener en cuenta para que no sea fagocitado o arrinconado frente al mundo real. (shrink)

En este trabajo se analiza la relación que guarda la filosofía del derecho de I. Kant y el pensamiento de K. Marx, sobre todo, en lo concerniente a la «Doctrina del Derecho» elaborada por I. Kant en la Metafísica de las Costumbres . Pretendemos mostrar que la exposición de la «Doctrina del Derecho» lejos de ser el fruto de un pensamiento burgués, como se ha venido considerando desde diversos ámbitos de la tradición marxista, no está tan distante de los problemas (...) centrales abordados por K. Marx en su trabajo sobre El Capital . De este modo localizamos los puntos en común en los que se cruzan ambos pensadores, intentando vislumbrar las posibilidades que esta conjunción filosófica puede aportar en el orden de la filosofía del derecho al presente y futuro de nuestras sociedades. Sobre todo, tratamos de mostrar cómo los problemas abordados en El Capital introducen una suerte de « a priori empírico », que el principio trascendental del derecho debe tener en cuenta para que no sea fagocitado o arrinconado frente al mundo real. (shrink)

América Latina es un concepto, una construcción intelectual que intenta dar cuenta de un grupo de estados nacionales, variable en su composición pero con un núcleo estable, las ex colonias españolas y portuguesas del continente americano. Hoy no hay en América Latina un programa de desarrollo nacional alternativo a la integración al mundo capitalista global. Las experiencias nacionales que la izquierda dirige no constituyen una imagen como la que representó Cuba en los años sesenta, ni desde el punto de vista (...) de los programas ni desde el liderazgo. Lo que se construyó en las décadas de los cincuentas y sesentas fue una conciencia de la relevancia de un proyecto continental que merecía ser respaldado por una teorización del conjunto, la construcción de un objeto de conocimiento al mismo tiempo que un actor político colectivo. Como quiera que sea, esta conciencia se desarrolló alrededor de las instituciones internacionales y nacionales residentes en Santiago de Chile y comenzó a desvanecerse junto con el proyecto de Allende y la Unidad Popular. (shrink)

La presente investigación hace una revisión de la producción académica publicada sobre educación religiosa escolar entre los años 1991-2020 en Hispanoamérica, donde la ERE ha estado presente en los sistemas educativos en estos países a partir de la primera evangelización desde la época de la colonia, cambiando de finalidades, métodos y formatos. Entender su lugar en la escuela actual requiere identificar los cambios históricos, de contexto y finalidad, y las distintas preocupaciones de sus actores educativos. La investigación hace una (...) revisión general de las publicaciones de la región, puntualizando en el caso colombiano, argentino, mexicano y uruguayo. La metodología usa un análisis de contenido que identifica tres niveles de análisis del texto: de superficie, analítico e interpretativo. Los hallazgos se clasificaron en cinco temáticas: 1) análisis jurídicos; 2) estudios historiográficos; 3) análisis sobre las nuevas realidades sociales y educativas; 4) análisis de los currículos y la práctica pedagógica del maestro; y, 5) fundamentación epistemológica de la ERE. La revisión permite concluir que el tipo de educación religiosa escolar de cada país en Hispanoamérica está determinado por la comprensión de laicidad que cada país tenga en su ordenamiento constitucional y por las complejas trayectorias históricas de las relaciones Iglesia – Estado en su consolidación como nación. Además, los documentos dan cuenta de diversidad de enfoques y preocupaciones por la necesidad –o no- de una educación religiosa fundamentada teológica y pedagógicamente, para un contexto religioso y cultural claramente diverso y plural en el cual se encuentran jóvenes y adolescentes que asisten a la escuela, algunos en búsqueda de identidad y sentido de vida. (shrink)

In Oscar Wilde’s famous novel, Dorian Gray is tempted by Henry Wotton to sell his soul in order to hold on to beauty and youth. Dorian succumbs and murders the portrait painter Basil Haliward, who stands between him and his goal. Though in the end vice is punished and virtue rewarded, the novel remains one of the most important expressions of fin de siècle decadence. It is in the preface to the expanded edition of The Picture of Dorian Gray (...) that Wilde coined the most famous expression of his aesthetic: “There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well-written or badly-written. That is all.” Like other Broadview Editions, this edition includes a wide range of materials from the period that help to set the text in context. In particular, the editor locates the text both in relation to elements in the mainstream culture of the day ; and in relation to the gay subculture. (shrink)

The Picture of Dorian Gray, the only novel by Oscar Wilde, was first published in 1890. A substantially revised and expanded edition was published in April 1891. For the new edition, Wilde revised the content of the novel's existing chapters, divided the final chapter into two chapters, and created six entirely new additional chapters. Whereas the original edition of the novel contains 13 chapters, the revised edition of the novel contains 20 chapters. The 1891 version was expanded from 13 (...) to 20 chapters, but also toned down, particularly in some of its overt homoerotic aspects. Also, chapters 3, 5, and 15 to 18 are entirely new in the 1891 version, and chapter 13 from the first edition is split in two. The novel tells of a young man named Dorian Gray, the subject of a painting by artist Basil Hallward. Dorian is selected for his remarkable physical beauty, and Basil becomes strongly infatuated with Dorian, believing that his beauty is responsible for a new mode of art. The Picture of Dorian Gray is considered one of the last works of classic gothic horror fiction with a strong Faustian theme. It deals with the artistic movement of the decadents, and homosexuality, both of which caused some controversy when the book was first published. However, in modern times, the book has been referred to as "one of the modern classics of Western literature. Oscar Wills Wilde was an Irish writer and poet. After writing in different forms throughout the 1880s, he became one of London's most popular playwrights in the early 1890s. Today he is remembered for his epigrams, his only novel, his plays and poetry, and the circumstances of his imprisonment and early death. (shrink)

I argue that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism and show that two leading hinge approaches (Coliva’s acceptance account and Pritchard’s nondoxastic account) are vulnerable to a form of incommensurability that leads to relativism. Building on both accounts, I introduce a new, minimally epistemic conception of hinges that avoids epistemic relativism and rationally resolves hinge disagreements. According to my proposed account, putative cases of epistemic incommensurability are rationally resolvable: hinges are propositions that are the objects (...) of our belief-like attitudes and are rationally revisable in virtue of our overarching commitment to avoid systematic deception in our epistemic practices. (shrink)

In Zoopolis, Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that intervention in nature to aid animals is sometimes permissible, and in some cases obligatory, to save them from the harms they commonly face. But they claim these interventions must have some limits, since they could otherwise disrupt the structure of the communities wild animals form, which should be respected as sovereign ones. These claims are based on the widespread assumption that ecosystemic processes ensure that animals have good lives in nature. However, this assumption (...) is, unfortunately, totally unrealistic. Most animals are r-strategists who die in pain shortly after coming into existence, and those who make it to maturity commonly suffer terrible harms too. In addition, most animals do not form the political communities Zoopolis describes. The situation of animals in the wild can therefore be considered analogous to one of humanitarian catastrophe, or to that of irretrievably failed states. It matches closely what a Hobbesian state of nature would be like. This means that intervention in nature to aid nonhuman animals should not be limited as Donaldson and Kymlicka argue. (shrink)

This paper discusses the predicament of Oscar Pistorius. He is a Paralympic gold medallist who wishes to participate in the Olympics in Beijing in 2008. Following a brief introductory section, the paper discusses the arguments that could be, and have been, deployed against his participation in the Olympics, should he make the qualifying time for his chosen event (400m). The next section discusses a more hypothetical argument based upon a specific understanding of the fair opportunity rule. According to this, (...) there may be a case for allowing Pistorius to compete even if he should fail to make the official qualifying time. The final part of the paper reviews the situation at the time of writing and offers some assessment of the strategy of the IAAF in responding to it. It is argued below that the proper focus for assessment of Pistorius's eligibility to compete should not be on whether his blades lead to his having an unfair advantage over his competitors, but instead should focus on whether what he does counts as running. (shrink)

Oscar Pistorius was born without fibulas and had both legs amputated below the knee when he was 11 months old. A business student at the University of Pretoria, Pistorius runs with the aid of carbon-fibre artificial limbs and is the double amputee world record holder in the 100, 200 and 400 metres events.1“I don’t see myself as disabled,” says Oscar, “There’s nothing I can’t do that able-bodied athletes can do.”2 But then the question is: do prosthetic limbs simply (...) level the ground for Pistorius—“Blade-runner”, compensating for his disability, or do they give him an unacceptable advantage? As Jeré Longman nicely put it: is he disabled, or too-abled?3Athletics’ world governing body, the International Association of Athletics Federations , shares the latter opinion, and assigned to German Professor Brüggemann the task of monitoring Oscar’s performances and analysing the information. According to his study, Pistorius’ limbs use 25% less energy than able-bodied athletes to run at the same speed.4 On the strength of these findings, on 14 January 2008 the IAAF ruled …. (shrink)

This essay focuses on two questions. On a general level: the relevance of postcolonial studies, after Twentieth century's second half, in the historical processes and the political cultures of the global South - concentrating on the exploration of the Argentinian position related to its Latin American regional context. More specifically, the article stresses the comparative perspective's importance to analyze the tension between postcolony/postdictatorship and the democratic transition. These questions are read within contemporary violent processes of primitive accumulation of capital, with (...) its specific death's technologies. (shrink)

In spite of the considerable literature nowadays existing on the issue of the moral exclusion of nonhuman animals, there is still work to be done concerning the characterization of the conceptual framework with which this question can be appraised. This paper intends to tackle this task. It starts by defining speciesism as the unjustified disadvantageous consideration or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. It then clarifies some common misunderstandings concerning what this means. Next, (...) it rejects the idea that there are different kinds of speciesism. Such an idea may result from confusion because there are (1) different ways in which speciesism can be defended; and (2) different speciesist positions, that is, different positions that assume speciesism among their premises. Depending on whether or not these views assume other criteria for moral consideration apart from speciesism, they can be combined or simple speciesist positions. But speciesism remains in all cases the same idea. Finally, the paper examines the concept of anthropocentrism, the disadvantageous treatment or consideration of those who are not members of the human species. This notion must be conceptually distinguished from speciesism and from misothery (aversion to nonhuman animals). Anthropocentrism is shown to be refuted because it either commits a petitio principia fallacy or it falls prey to two arguments: the argument from species overlap (widely but misleadingly known as “argument from marginal cases”) and the argument from relevance. This rebuttal identifies anthropocentrism as a speciesist view. (shrink)

With an Introduction and Notes by John M.L. Drew, University of Buckingham.

The argument from species overlap has been widely used in the literature on animal ethics and speciesism. However, there has been much confusion regarding what the argument proves and what it does not prove, and regarding the views it challenges. This article intends to clarify these confusions, and to show that the name most often used for this argument (‘the argument from marginal cases’) reflects and reinforces these misunderstandings. The article claims that the argument questions not only those defences of (...) anthropocentrism that appeal to capacities believed to be typically human, but also those that appeal to special relations between humans. This means the scope of the argument is far wider than has been thought thus far. Finally, the article claims that, even if the argument cannot prove by itself that we should not disregard the interests of nonhuman animals, it provides us with strong reasons to do so, since the argument does prove that no defence of anthropocentrism appealing to non-definitional and testable criteria succeeds. (shrink)

According to the Internal Aspects View, the value of different outcomesdepends solely on the internal features possessed by each outcome and theinternal relations between them. This paper defends the Internal AspectsView against Larry Temkin’s defence of the Essentially Comparative View,according to which the value of different outcomes depends on what isthe alternative outcome they are compared with. The paper discusses bothperson-affecting arguments and Spectrum Arguments. The paper doesnot defend a person-affecting view over an impersonal one, but it arguesthat although there (...) are intuitive person-affecting principles that entail anEssentially Comparative View, the intuitions that support these principlescan also be acommodated by other principles that are compatible with theInternal Aspects View. The paper also argues that the rejection of transitivityand the Internal Aspects View does not help us to solve the challengespresented by Spectrum Arguments. Despite this, the arguments presentedby Temkin do succeed in showing that, unfortunately, our intuitions arechaotic and inconsistent. The paper argues that this has metaethicalconsequences that will be unwelcome by a moral realist such as Temkin,since they challenge the idea that our intuitions may track a moral realityexisting independently of our preferences. (shrink)

One of the main problems of Lewis' approach to the conventionality of language is the so-called "probLem of the meaning without use". In this paper I consider the possible solutions to this problem and I conclude that in order to avoid this objection Lewis' proposal must be substantially modified.

Research indicates the essentiality of dignity as a vital component for quality of life, reconfirming the emphasis on dignity preservation in the international code of nursing ethics. Applying Noblit and Hare’s meta-ethnography, the aim of the study was to develop a theory model by synthesizing 10 qualitative articles from various cultural contexts, exploring nurse and allied healthcare professional perception/practice concerning dignity-preserving dementia care. “Advocating the person’s autonomy and integrity,” which involves “having compassion for the person,” “confirming the person’s worthiness and (...) sense of self,” and “creating a humane and purposeful environment,” was identified as a primary foundation for dignity-preserving dementia care. “Balancing individual choices among persons no longer able to make sound decisions, against the duty of making choices on behalf of the person,” which involves “persuasion” and/or “mild restraint,” was considered a crucial aspect in certain situations. “Sheltering human worth—remembering those who forget” was identified as a comprehensive motive and core value within dignity-preserving dementia care. (shrink)

An individual's health, genetic, or environmental-exposure data, placed in an online repository, creates a valuable shared resource that can accelerate biomedical research and even open opportunities for crowd-sourcing discoveries by members of the public. But these data become “immortalized” in ways that may create lasting risk as well as benefit. Once shared on the Internet, the data are difficult or impossible to redact, and identities may be revealed by a process called data linkage, in which online data sets are matched (...) to each other. Reidentification, the process of associating an individual's name with data that were considered deidentified, poses risks such as insurance or employment discrimination, social stigma, and breach of the promises often made in informed-consent documents. At the same time, re-ID poses risks to researchers and indeed to the future of science, should re-ID end up undermining the trust and participation of potential research participants. The ethical challenges of online data sharing are heightened as so-called big data becomes an increasingly important research tool and driver of new research structures. Big data is shifting research to include large numbers of researchers and institutions as well as large numbers of participants providing diverse types of data, so the participants’ consent relationship is no longer with a person or even a research institution. In addition, consent is further transformed because big data analysis often begins with descriptive inquiry and generation of a hypothesis, and the research questions cannot be clearly defined at the outset and may be unforeseeable over the long term. In this article, we consider how expanded data sharing poses new challenges, illustrated by genomics and the transition to new models of consent. We draw on the experiences of participants in an open data platform—the Personal Genome Project—to allow study participants to contribute their voices to inform ethical consent practices and protocol reviews for big-data research. (shrink)

The argument from relevance expresses an intuition that, although shared by many applied ethicists, has not been analyzed and systematized in the form of a clear argument thus far. This paper does this by introducing the concept of value relevance, which has been used before in economy but not in the philosophical literature. The paper explains how value relevance is different from moral relevance, and distinguishes between direct and indirect ways in which the latter can depend on the former. These (...) clarifications allow the argument to explain in detail how we can make two claims. The first one is that being a recipient of value should be the only criterion for full moral considerability. This follows if we accept that value relevance should determine, directly or indirectly, moral relevance. The second claim is that, given what the main theories of wellbeing imply regarding what entities can be recipients of value, sentience is both a sufficient and a necessary criterion for full moral considerability. The paper argues that this conclusion stands even if we hold views that consider other values different from sentience. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The technocratic dimension of government—its reliance upon knowledge claims, usually in scientific guise—is of great importance if we wish to understand modern power and governance. In Power Without Knowledge: A Critique of Technocracy, Jeffrey Friedman investigates the often-overlooked question of the relationship between technocratic knowledge/power and ideas. Friedman’s contribution to our understanding of technocracy can therefore be read as a contribution to governmentality studies, one that introduces the possibility of adding normative solutions to this critical tradition.

Insofar as development implies economic growth, the term 'sustainable development' appears to some as a contradiction in terms. However, such conclusions still lack a thorough examination of the conceptual structure of the two terms between which there is a purported contradiction. In order to address this issue, the present paper scrutinises some of the assumptions which underwrite the ideologies of sustainability and of development. It is argued that there are key assumptions which both ideas have in common, and that sustainable (...) development is thus perfectly coherent on a conceptual level. It is alternatives which retain either term that are embroiled in paradox. The paper then examines two concepts for criticising the ideology of economic growth in other terms: dépense and conviviality. It is argued that the latter is preferable to the former for the purpose of developing post-sustainable critiques of growth. (shrink)

OSCAR HORTA | : This paper examines the extent of the opposition between environmentalists and those concerned with wild-animal suffering and considers whether there are any points they may agree on. The paper starts by presenting the reasons to conclude that suffering and premature death prevail over positive well-being in nature. It then explains several ways to intervene in order to aid animals and prevent the harms they suffer, and claims that we should support them. In particular, the paper (...) argues in favour of carrying out more research to learn the best ways to intervene without causing more harm to other animals and to intervene first in areas significantly transformed by human action. It then examines what positions environmentalist views can have towards intervention in nature for the sake of animals. It claims that, while ecocentric and naturocentric views will strongly oppose intervention in certain circumstances, they should not do so in other cases in which the values they promote are not at stake or might be outweighed. The paper then argues that, contrary to what it might seem at first, biocentric views should strongly support intervention. It then discusses whether there may be certain practical issues about which those concerned with wild animal suffering and environmentalists may support the same approach, such as opposition to the greening of desert ecosystems. Finally, it claims that raising awareness about wild animal suffering seems to be the most urgent task now for those concerned about it. | : Le présent article examine l’étendue de l’opposition entre les environnementalistes et ceux qui se préoccupent de la souffrance des animaux sauvages, afin de déterminer s’il existe des points sur lesquels ils peuvent être en accord. L’article débute en présentant les raisons permettant de conclure que la souffrance et la mort prématurée l’emportent sur le bien-être positif dans la nature. Ensuite, il explique plusieurs façons d’intervenir afin d’aider les animaux et de prévenir les maux dont ils souffrent et plaide pour la mise en oeuvre de celles-ci. Plus précisément, l’article préconise un plus grand nombre de recherches afin de déterminer les meilleures façons d’intervenir sans causer davantage de maux à d’autres animaux ainsi que pour prioriser des interventions en des endroits que l’action humaine a significativement transformés. L’article examine par la suite les positions que les conceptions environnementalistes peuvent adopter quant aux interventions dans la nature pour le bien des animaux. L’article propose que, bien que des visions écocentriques et naturocentriques s’opposent vivement à l’intervention dans certaines circonstances, elles ne devraient cependant pas s’y opposer dans les cas où les valeurs qu’elles promeuvent n’entrent pas en jeu ou peuvent avoir moins de poids que d’autres facteurs. L’article soutient ensuite que, contrairement à ce que l’on pourrait penser à première vue, les théories biocentristes devraient fortement appuyer l’intervention. Il pose la question à savoir si certains problèmes pratiques peuvent faire l’objet d’une approche commune parmi les environnementalistes et ceux qui se soucient de la souffrance des animaux sauvages, par exemple s’opposer à l’écologisation des déserts. Enfin, l’article propose que la tâche la plus pressante pour ceux qui se préoccupent de la souffrance des animaux sauvages consiste à accroître la sensibilisation à ce problème. (shrink)

Many people think we should refrain from intervening in nature as much as possible. One of the main reasons for thinking this way is that the existence of nature is a net positive. However, population dynamics teaches us that most sentient animals who come into existence in nature die shortly thereafter, mostly in painful ways. Those who survive often suffer greatly due to natural causes. If sentient beings matter, this gives us reasons to intervene to prevent such harms. This counterintuitive (...) conclusion can be opposed by arguing that we should not care about nonhuman animals; that other values, such as the existence of certain ecosystemic relations or of untouched wild areas, count for more than the interests of sentient beings; or that intervention in nature cannot succeed. There are, however, strong reasons to reject these claims and to support significant intervention in nature for the sake of animals, despite our deep-rooted intuitions to the contrary. (shrink)

ABSTRACTColin Hay's constructivist institutionalism and Vivien A. Schmidt's discursive institutionalism are two recent attempts to theorize ideas as potential explanations of institutional change. This new attention to the causal role of ideas is welcome, but Hay and Schmidt do not take into consideration the constitutive and structural aspects of ideas. Instead they reduce ideas to properties of individual conscious minds, scanting the respects in which ideas are intersubjectively baked into the practices shared by individuals. This aspect of ideas—arguably, the institutional (...) side of ideas—is developed in post-structuralist thought, which therefore demands a place in ideational research. (shrink)

There are many circumstances in which vegans are treated or considered worse than nonvegans, both in the private and the public sphere, either due to the presence of a bias against them or for structural reasons. For instance, vegans sometimes suffer harassment, have issues at their workplace, or find little vegan food available. In many cases they are forced to contribute to, or to participate in, animal exploitation against their will when states render it illegitimate to oppose or refuse to (...) support some uses of animals. For the most part this remains socially invisible. Vegans, however, often recognize this as a form of discrimination against them. But they seldom campaign against it, as they regard it as a consequence of another and more important discrimination, i.e. speciesist discrimination against nonhuman animals. If this is correct, discrimination against vegans can be characterized as a form of second-order discrimination, that is, discrimination against those who oppose another form of discrimination. If speciesism really is unjustified and discriminatory, then discrimination against vegans will always be discriminatory and unjustified too. But even if our current attitudes towards animals were justified there would be strong reasons to claim that vegans do suffer several forms of private and public discrimination that are unjustified. (shrink)

Oscar Kenshur combines trenchant analyses of important early-modern texts with a powerful critique of postmodern theories of ideology. He thereby contributes both to our understanding of Enlightenment thought and to contemporary debates about cultural studies and critical theory. While striving to resolve "dilemmas" occasioned by conflicting intellectual and political commitments, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers often relied upon ideas originally used by their enemies to support very different claims. Thus, they engaged in what Kenshur calls "intellectual co-optation." In exploring the (...) ways in which Dryden, Bayle, Voltaire, Johnson, and others used this technique, Kenshur presents a historical landscape distinctly different from the one constructed by much contemporary theory. (shrink)

This article examines the principal arguments found in the work of Paulo Freire concerning policy and ethics in the field of higher education in Latin America. It critically analyzes the university reform in Latin America dominated by the thought and practice promoted by various international financial institutions beginning in the 1980s and then looks at the feasibility of an alternative Freirian view. The work of Paulo Freire celebrated the liberating role that public university education should play in the training of (...) citizens and professionals, that is with a critical and ethical conscience, committed to the needs of the locality, region and the world. All this is in clear opposition to what has happened to Latin American universities, influenced by neo-liberal reforms over the last decades. (shrink)

Humans often intervene in the wild for anthropocentric or environmental reasons. An example of such interventions is the reintroduction of wolves in places where they no longer live in order to create what has been called an “ecology of fear”, which is being currently discussed in places such as Scotland. In the first part of this paper I discuss the reasons for this measure and argue that they are not compatible with a nonspeciesist approach. Then, I claim that if we (...) abandon a speciesist viewpoint we should change completely the way in which we should intervene in nature. Rather than intervening for environmental or anthropocentric reasons, we should do it in order to reduce the harms that nonhuman animals suffer. This conflicts significantly with some fundamental environmental ideals whose defence is not compatible with the consideration of the interests of nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Se sostiene de manera habitual que los animales no pueden ser considerados personas, razón por la cual no es posible efectuar una demanda en su nombre. Este artículo examina tal idea. En él se analizan en primer lugar los distintos sentidos que el término "persona" tiene en el ámbito coloquial, metafísico, moral y jurídico, y se muestra que no hay una conexión necesaria entre estos. Asimismo, se desgranan y evalúan los distintos argumentos a favor del antropocentrismo moral, concluyéndose que ninguno (...) de ellos tiene éxito. Finalmente, se argumenta que si se continúa manteniendo la centralidad en el plano jurídico de la categoría de la personalidad, pero se excluye del alcance de esta a los animales de especies distintas a la nuestra, se incurrirá en una posición que carecerá de justificación moral. (shrink)