During the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, the public has often expressed great appreciation toward medical personnel who were often shown in the media expressing strong emotions about the situation. To examine whether the perception of people on a physician is in fact influenced by whether the physician treats patients with COVID-19 and the emotions they expressed in response to the situation, 454 participants were recruited in May 2020. Participants saw facial expressions of anger, sadness, happiness, and neutrality which supposedly were (...) shown by physicians who were presented as working either in COVID-19 wards or in an internal medicine ward. Participants rated how competent, empathetic, caring, and likable each physician was, to what degree they would wish to be treated by each physician, and what salary each physician deserved. Physicians treating patients with COVID-19 were seen more positively and as deserving higher pay; they appeared more competent, caring, likable, and were more likely to be chosen as a caregiver compared to physicians not treating patients with COVID-19. The expressed emotions of physicians had a strong impact on how they were perceived, yet this effect was largely unrelated to whether they treated patients with COVID-19 or not such that happy physicians seemed more empathetic, caring, and likable than the physicians who showed negative emotions. Positive regard toward physicians treating patients with COVID-19 was associated with the fact that they were seen as saving lives and not due to the risk imposed by their work. (shrink)

There have been several previous studies on measuring the semantic similarity between words whose concepts are represented as points in a multi-dimensional vector space acquired from text data such as electronic dictionaries or text corpora. A central problem in these studies is how to select orthonormal basis vectors for the space which represents attributes of the words. We propose a method of building the space by combining two representative methods, one using singular value decomposition and the other using (...) the contents of a thesaurus. The proposed method was evaluated both for the purposes of similar word retrieval and for document retrieval. The evaluations showed that the proposed combination is more effective than either of the original methods alone for both of these tasks. (shrink)

It is a commonplace in the philosophy of physics that any local physical theory can be represented using arbitrary coordinates, simply by using tensor calculus. On the other hand, the physics literature often claims that spinors \emph{as such} cannot be represented in coordinates in a curved space-time. These commonplaces are inconsistent. What general covariance means for theories with fermions, such as electrons, is thus unclear. In fact both commonplaces are wrong. Though it is not widely known, Ogievetsky and Polubarinov constructed (...) spinors in coordinates in 1965, enhancing the unity of physics and helping to spawn particle physicists' concept of nonlinear group representations. Roughly and locally, these spinors resemble the orthonormal basis or "tetrad" formalism in the symmetric gauge, but they are conceptually self-sufficient and more economical. The typical tetrad formalism is de-Ockhamized, with six extra field components and six compensating gauge symmetries to cancel them out. The Ogievetsky-Polubarinov formalism, by contrast, is Ockhamized, with most of the fluff removed. As developed nonperturbatively by Bilyalov, it admits any coordinates at a point, but "time" must be listed first. Here "time" is defined in terms of an eigenvalue problem involving the metric components and the matrix $diag$, the product of which must have no negative eigenvalues in order to yield a real symmetric square root that is a function of the metric. Thus even formal general covariance requires reconsideration; the atlas of admissible coordinate charts should be sensitive to the types and \emph{values} of the fields involved. Apart from coordinate order and the usual spinorial two-valuedness, Ogievetsky-Polubarinov spinors form, with the metric, a nonlinear geometric object, for which important results on Lie and covariant differentiation are recalled. Such spinors avoid a spurious absolute object in the Anderson-Friedman analysis of substantive general covariance. They also permit the gauge-invariant localization of the infinite-component gravitational energy in General Relativity. Density-weighted spinors exploit the conformal invariance of the massless Dirac equation to show that the volume element is absent. Thus instead of an arbitrary nonsingular matrix with 16 components, 6 of which are gauged away by a new local $O$ gauge group and one of which is irrelevant due to conformal covariance, one can, and presumably should, use density-weighted Ogievetsky-Polubarinov spinors coupled to the 9-component symmetric square root of the part of the metric that fixes null cones. Thus $\frac{7}{16}$ of the orthonormal basis is eliminated as surplus structure. Greater unity between spinors and tensors and the like is achieved, such as regarding conservation laws. Regarding the conventionality of simultaneity, an unusually wide range of $\epsilon$ values is admissible, but some extreme values are inadmissible. Standard simultaneity uniquely makes the spinor transformation law linear and independent of the metric, because transformations among the standard Cartesian coordinate systems fall within the conformal group, for which the spinor transformation law is linear. The surprising mildness of the restrictions on coordinate order as applied to the Schwarzschild solution is exhibited. (shrink)

It is a commonplace in the philosophy of physics that any local physical theory can be represented using arbitrary coordinates, simply by using tensor calculus. On the other hand, the physics literature often claims that spinors \emph{as such} cannot be represented in coordinates in a curved space-time. These commonplaces are inconsistent. What general covariance means for theories with fermions, such as electrons, is thus unclear. In fact both commonplaces are wrong. Though it is not widely known, Ogievetsky and Polubarinov constructed (...) spinors in coordinates in 1965, enhancing the unity of physics and helping to spawn particle physicists' concept of nonlinear group representations. Roughly and locally, these spinors resemble the orthonormal basis or "tetrad" formalism in the symmetric gauge, but they are conceptually self-sufficient and more economical. The typical tetrad formalism is de-Ockhamized, with six extra field components and six compensating gauge symmetries to cancel them out. The Ogievetsky-Polubarinov formalism, by contrast, is Ockhamized, with most of the fluff removed. As developed nonperturbatively by Bilyalov, it admits any coordinates at a point, but "time" must be listed first. Here "time" is defined in terms of an eigenvalue problem involving the metric components and the matrix $diag$, the product of which must have no negative eigenvalues in order to yield a real symmetric square root that is a function of the metric. Thus even formal general covariance requires reconsideration; the atlas of admissible coordinate charts should be sensitive to the types and \emph{values} of the fields involved. Apart from coordinate order and the usual spinorial two-valuedness, Ogievetsky-Polubarinov spinors form, with the metric, a nonlinear geometric object, for which important results on Lie and covariant differentiation are recalled. Such spinors avoid a spurious absolute object in the Anderson-Friedman analysis of substantive general covariance. They also permit the gauge-invariant localization of the infinite-component gravitational energy in General Relativity. Density-weighted spinors exploit the conformal invariance of the massless Dirac equation to show that the volume element is absent. Thus instead of an arbitrary nonsingular matrix with 16 components, 6 of which are gauged away by a new local $O$ gauge group and one of which is irrelevant due to conformal covariance, one can, and presumably should, use density-weighted Ogievetsky-Polubarinov spinors coupled to the 9-component symmetric square root of the part of the metric that fixes null cones. Thus $\frac{7}{16}$ of the orthonormal basis is eliminated as surplus structure. Greater unity between spinors and tensors and the like is achieved, such as regarding conservation laws. Regarding the conventionality of simultaneity, an unusually wide range of $\epsilon$ values is admissible, but some extreme values are inadmissible. Standard simultaneity uniquely makes the spinor transformation law linear and independent of the metric, because transformations among the standard Cartesian coordinate systems fall within the conformal group, for which the spinor transformation law is linear. The surprising mildness of the restrictions on coordinate order as applied to the Schwarzschild solution is exhibited. (shrink)

It is a commonplace in the philosophy of physics that any local physical theory can be represented using arbitrary coordinates, simply by using tensor calculus. On the other hand, the physics literature often claims that spinors \emph{as such} cannot be represented in coordinates in a curved space-time. These commonplaces are inconsistent. What general covariance means for theories with fermions, such as electrons, is thus unclear. In fact both commonplaces are wrong. Though it is not widely known, Ogievetsky and Polubarinov constructed (...) spinors in coordinates in 1965, enhancing the unity of physics and helping to spawn particle physicists' concept of nonlinear group representations. Roughly and locally, these spinors resemble the orthonormal basis or "tetrad" formalism in the symmetric gauge, but they are conceptually self-sufficient and more economical. The typical tetrad formalism is de-Ockhamized, with six extra field components and six compensating gauge symmetries to cancel them out. The Ogievetsky-Polubarinov formalism, by contrast, is Ockhamized, with most of the fluff removed. As developed nonperturbatively by Bilyalov, it admits any coordinates at a point, but "time" must be listed first. Here "time" is defined in terms of an eigenvalue problem involving the metric components and the matrix $diag$, the product of which must have no negative eigenvalues in order to yield a real symmetric square root that is a function of the metric. Thus even formal general covariance requires reconsideration; the atlas of admissible coordinate charts should be sensitive to the types and \emph{values} of the fields involved. Apart from coordinate order and the usual spinorial two-valuedness, Ogievetsky-Polubarinov spinors form, with the metric, a nonlinear geometric object, for which important results on Lie and covariant differentiation are recalled. Such spinors avoid a spurious absolute object in the Anderson-Friedman analysis of substantive general covariance. They also permit the gauge-invariant localization of the infinite-component gravitational energy in General Relativity. Density-weighted spinors exploit the conformal invariance of the massless Dirac equation to show that the volume element is absent. Thus instead of an arbitrary nonsingular matrix with 16 components, 6 of which are gauged away by a new local $O$ gauge group and one of which is irrelevant due to conformal covariance, one can, and presumably should, use density-weighted Ogievetsky-Polubarinov spinors coupled to the 9-component symmetric square root of the part of the metric that fixes null cones. Thus $\frac{7}{16}$ of the orthonormal basis is eliminated as surplus structure. Greater unity between spinors and tensors and the like is achieved, such as regarding conservation laws. Regarding the conventionality of simultaneity, an unusually wide range of $\epsilon$ values is admissible, but some extreme values are inadmissible. Standard simultaneity uniquely makes the spinor transformation law linear and independent of the metric, because transformations among the standard Cartesian coordinate systems fall within the conformal group, for which the spinor transformation law is linear. The surprising mildness of the restrictions on coordinate order as applied to the Schwarzschild solution is exhibited. (shrink)

In its original form Dirac's equations have been expressed by use of the γ-matrices γμ, μ=0, 1, 2, 3. They are elements of the matrix algebra M 4 (ℂ). As emphasized by Hestenes several times, the γ-matrices are merely a (faithful) matrix representation of an orthonormal basis of the orthogonal spaceℝ 1,3, generating the real Clifford algebra Cl 1,3 . This orthonormal basis is also denoted by γμ, μ=0, 1, 2, 3. The use of the matrix (...) algebra M 4 (ℂ) to represent Cl 1,3 has some unsatisfactory aspects. The γ-matrices contain imaginary numbers as entries whereas Cl 1,3 is real. Moreover, as a matrix algebra Cl 1,3 is M 2 (ℍ) but only a part of M 4 (ℂ). For that reason we investigate in this paper several forms of Dirac's equations in terms of M 2 (ℍ) instead of M 4 (ℂ). In Section1 we survey Dirac's equations describing the interaction of matter with electromagnetic, electroweak, and strong fields. Section2 deals with electromagnetic/weak interactions employing M 2 (ℍ). Finally, in Section3 we deal with Dirac's equations for strong interactions between quarks. In contrast to su(2) ⊕ u(1), the Lie algebra su(3) is not isomorphic to any subalgebra of Cl 1,3 . Therefore we do not give a description of strong interactions by use of M 2 (ℍ). Instead of such an approach we describe these interactions using the space of quadruples of bivector fields in Cl 1,3 . The thus obtained description has remarkable formal resemblance to the original Dirac equations using wave functions with values in the linear spaceℂ 4. (shrink)

Using Type-2 theory of effectivity, we define computability notions on the spaces of Lebesgue-integrable functions on the real line that are based on two natural approaches to integrability from measure theory. We show that Fourier transform and convolution on these spaces are computable operators with respect to these representations. By means of the orthonormal basis of Hermite functions in L2, we show the existence of a linear complexity bound for the Fourier transform.

Using Type‐2 theory of effectivity, we define computability notions on the spaces of Lebesgue‐integrable functions on the real line that are based on two natural approaches to integrability from measure theory. We show that Fourier transform and convolution on these spaces are computable operators with respect to these representations. By means of the orthonormal basis of Hermite functions in L2, we show the existence of a linear complexity bound for the Fourier transform. (© 2004 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & (...) Co. KGaA, Weinheim). (shrink)

The constructive functional calculus for a sequence of commuting selfadjoint operators on a separable Hilbert space is shown to be independent of the orthonormal basis used in its construction. The proof requires a constructive criterion for the absolute continuity of two positive measures in terms of test functions.

It is a commonplace in the foundations of physics, attributed to Kretschmann, that any local physical theory can be represented using arbitrary coordinates, simply by using tensor calculus. On the other hand, the physics and mathematics literature often claims that spinors \emph{as such} cannot be represented in coordinates in a curved space-time. These commonplaces are inconsistent. What general covariance means for theories with fermions is thus unclear. In fact both commonplaces are wrong. Though it is not widely known, Ogievetsky and (...) Polubarinov constructed spinors in coordinates in 1965, enhancing the unity of physics and helping to spawn particle physicists' concept of nonlinear group representations. Roughly and locally, OP spinors resemble the orthonormal basis or tetrad formalism in the symmetric gauge, but they are conceptually self-sufficient and more economical. The typical tetrad formalism is thus de-Ockhamized, with six extra field components and six compensating gauge symmetries to cancel them out. As developed nonperturbatively by Bilyalov, OP spinors admit any coordinates at a point, but `time' must be listed first; `time' is defined in terms of an eigenvalue problem involving the metric components and the matrix $diag$, the product of which must have no negative eigenvalues. Thus even formal general covariance requires reconsideration; the atlas of admissible coordinate charts should be sensitive to the types and \emph{values} of the fields involved. Apart from coordinate order and the usual spinorial two-valuedness, Ogievetsky-Polubarinov spinors form, with the metric, a nonlinear geometric object. Important results on Lie and covariant differentiation are recalled and applied. The rather mild consequences of the coordinate order restriction are explored in two examples: the question of the conventionality of simultaneity in Special Relativity, and the Schwarzschild solution in General Relativity. (shrink)

We relate notions of complementarity in three layers of quantum mechanics: (i) von Neumann algebras, (ii) Hilbert spaces, and (iii) orthomodular lattices. Taking a more general categorical perspective of which the above are instances, we consider dagger monoidal kernel categories for (ii), so that (i) become (sub)endohomsets and (iii) become subobject lattices. By developing a ‘point-free’ definition of copyability we link (i) commutative von Neumann subalgebras, (ii) classical structures, and (iii) Boolean subalgebras.

It is an old idea, lately out of fashion but now experiencing a revival, that quantum mechanics may best be understood, not as a physical theory with a problematic probabilistic interpretation, but as something closer to a probability calculus per se. However, from this angle, the rather special C *-algebraic apparatus of quantum probability theory stands in need of further motivation. One would like to find additional principles, having clear physical and/or probabilistic content, on the basis of which this (...) apparatus can be reconstructed. In this paper, I explore one route to such a derivation of finite-dimensional quantum mechanics, by means of a set of strong, but probabilistically intelligible, axioms. Stated very informally, these require that systems appear completely classical as restricted to a single measurement, that different measurements, and likewise different pure states, be equivalent (up to the action of a compact group of symmetries), and that every state be the marginal of a bipartite non-signaling state perfectly correlating two measurements. This much yields a mathematical representation of (basic, discrete) measurements as orthonormal subsets of, and states, by vectors in, an ordered real Hilbert space – in the quantum case, the space of Hermitian operators, with its usual tracial inner product. One final postulate (a simple minimization principle, still in need of a clear interpretation) forces the positive cone of this space to be homogeneous and self-dual and hence, to be the state space of a formally real Jordan algebra. From here, the route to the standard framework of finite-dimensional quantum mechanics is quite short. (shrink)

In special application scenarios, such as portable anesthesia depth monitoring, portable emotional state recognition and portable sleep monitoring, electroencephalogram (EEG) signal acquisition equipment is required to be convenient and easy to use. It is difficult to remove electrooculogram (EOG) artifacts when the number of EEG acquisition channels is small, especially when the number of observed signals is less than that of the source signals, and the overcomplete problem will arise. The independent component analysis (ICA) algorithm commonly used for artifact removal (...) requires the number of basis vectors to be smaller than the dimension of the input data due to a set of standard orthonormal bases learned during the convergence process, so it cannot be used to solve the overcomplete problem. The empirical mode decomposition method decomposes the signal into several independent intrinsic mode functions so that the number of observed signals is more than that of the source signals, solving the overcomplete problem. However, when using this method to solve overcompleteness, the modal aliasing problem will arise, which is caused by abnormal events such as sharp signals, impulse interference, and noise. Aiming at the above problems, we propose a novel EEG artifact removal method based on discrete wavelet transform, complete empirical mode decomposition for adaptive noise (CEEMDAN) and ICA in this paper. First, the input signals are transformed by discrete wavelet (DWT), and then CEEMDAN is used to solve the overcomplete and mode aliasing problems, meeting the a priori conditions of the ICA algorithm. Finally, the components belonging to EOG artifacts are removed according to the sample entropy value of each independent component. Experiments show that this method can effectively remove EOG artifacts while solving the overcomplete and modal aliasing problems. (shrink)

Introduction -- Evidence from children -- Evidence form infants and non-human animals -- Evidence from neuroimaging and neuropsychology -- Evidence from adults -- The cognitive basis of mindreading -- Elaborating and applying the theory.

In this chapter, I argue for the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is the basis of epistemic justification. More precisely, I argue for the thesis of phenomenal mentalism, according to which epistemic facts about which doxastic attitudes one has justification to hold are determined by non-epistemic facts about one’s phenomenally individuated mental states. I begin by providing intuitive motivations for phenomenal mentalism and then proceed to sketch a more theoretical line of argument according to which phenomenal mentalism provides the best (...) explanation of the independently motivated thesis of access internalism. The result is a theory of epistemic justification that brings intuition and theory into reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

Many epistemologists agree with the intuition that “there is no exit from the circle of one’s beliefs”. I shall construe this vague intuition as the claim that justification supervenes on the totality of one’s beliefs: two agents with identical beliefs will be indistinguishable with respect to which of their beliefs are justified and to what degree. My central purpose in this paper is to undermine the supervenience thesis. To this end I shall consider the role(s) of the concept of justification.

If the central problem in philosophical ethics is determining and defining the scope of moral value, our normative ethical theories must be able to explain on what basis and to what extent entities have value. The scientific foundation of contemporary biosemiotic theory grounds a theory of moral value capable of addressing this problem. Namely, it suggests that what is morally relevant is semiosis. Within this framework, semiosis is a morally relevant and natural property of all living things thereby offering (...) us an ecological, as opposed to merely environmental, ethic. A consequence of this semiotic theory is that living things are accorded inherent moral value based on their natural relational properties—their ability to signify. This consequence establishes a hierarchy of inherent moral value based on the scope of signification: the larger the Umwelten, the greater the value. This paper argues that a robust semiotic moral theory can take into account a much wider scope of inherent value.. These consequences have positive ramifications for environmental ethics in their recognition of the natural ecological networks in which each organism is bound. This presentation of a biosemiotic model of value offers a justificatory strategy for our contemporary moral intuitions concerning our semiotic/moral relationships with living things while also productively pushing our normative ethical boundaries. (shrink)

There may be circumstances in which it is morally justifiable intentionally to kill a person who is morally innocent, threatens no one, rationally wishes not to die, and does not consent to be killed. Although the killing would wrong the victim, it might be justified by the necessity of averting some disaster that would otherwise occur. In other instances of permissible killing, however, the justification appeals to more than consequences. It may appeal to the claim that the person to be (...) killed has acted in such a way that to kill him would neither wrong him nor violate his rights, even if he has not consented to be killed or to be subjected to the risk of being killed. In these cases, I will say that the person is liable to be killed. Although I borrow the notion of liability from legal theory, and although much of what I say will be informed by the literature on liability in both tort law and criminal law, my concern in this article is with moral rather than legal liability. (shrink)

I argue that if intentions are what Grice, and most contemporary action theorists, take them to be, they are inessential for acts of speaker meaning. More specifically, my primary aim is to show that the consensus view of speaker meaning is in deep tension with certain plausible, and widely accepted, cognitive constraints on rational intention pertaining to an agent’s assessment of her prospects of achieving her goal. My secondary aim is to offer an initial case for thinking that the best (...) way to resolve this tension is to give up the claim that meaning is fundamentally a matter of intention. In pursuing this strategy, we will see some of the potential benefits of Bratman’s (1987) work on intentions, plans, and practical reasoning for the theory of meaning, including some interesting consequences of his rejection of the so-called ‘Simple View’ on which we intentionally do only those things that we specifically intend to do. Moreover, our discussion will help to illustrate how some familiar tools from decision theory might find new use in discussions of meaning and communication. (shrink)

When philosophers consider what moral status human beings have, they tend to find themselves either supporting the idea that not all human beings are rightholders or adopting what Peter Singer calls a 'speciesist' position, where speciesism is defined as morally favoring a particular species—in this case, human beings—over others without sufficient justification. In this paper, I develop what I call the 'genetic basis for moral agency' account of rightholding, and I propose that this account can allow all human beings (...) to be rightholders without being speciesist. While my aim is to set out this account clearly rather than to defend it, I explain how this account is different from a potentiality account and I argue that it is preferable to an actual moral agency account of human moral status. (shrink)

I examine the standard view of dignity in Western literature and Metz’s African community view of dignity as a capacity for communal harmonious living. I argue that moral dignity is not just having a capacity for harmonious communal living, but the moral use of such capacity for the promotion of love, friendship, positive identity and active solidarity, which involves normatively prescriptive and evaluative elements. Thus, a plausible African communal conception of moral dignity, which is founded on a moral conception of (...) personhood and community, involves a combination of capacity and agency that is conceptually tied to communal responsibility and respect for self and others. This indicates that human capacities do not have an inherent moral worth. Capacities are instrumentally good and their worth depends on how they are used to promote the moral good of communal well-being, on which individual well-being or dignity depends. This view captures the various use-senses of dignity, addresses many of the problems with many of the analyses of dignity in the literature, and also indicates its relevance. (shrink)

Any inquiry into the meaning and implications of the prolongation of the human lifespan requires an investigation of its metaphysical basis and its ethical outcomes. This chapter explains a series of metaphysical and ethical claims about lifespan extension. It highlights a number of arguments that are typically put forward against these claims, and shows the ways in which they are mistaken. Two such claims given in the chapter are: (1) aging and life stages are neither wholly constituted by biological (...) givens, nor wholly understandable in terms of biological parameters; instead, aging and life stages are, in crucial ways, socially constructed; and (2) death is bad, and other things being equal, a longer life is a better life. (shrink)

Excerpt from The Esthetic Basis of Greek Art of the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B. C The bibliography of my subject is very nearly negligible. One debt (outside of Greek archaeology altogether) is, however, a heavy one; and I wish to acknowledge great obligation to the keen and serious dialectic which distinguishes Geoffrey Scott's of Humanism. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of (...) an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

“Basic equality” is the thesis that all (or nearly all) human beings are equal in moral status. Widespread interpersonal differences among humans make the task of justifying basic equality notoriously difficult. One strategy for circumventing this difficulty is to identify some morally significant binary (“all-or-nothing”) property that all humans have. This strategy seems promising: if the basis of equality is binary, then those who have it have it equally. However, skeptics have argued against this strategy on the grounds that (...) a proper defense of basic equality requires that we identify a morally significant property that can vary among humans but does not in fact vary. This paper examines various ways in which this skeptical argument can be motivated and concludes that they all fail. (shrink)

Reproduction of the original: Life's Basis and Life's Ideal by Rudolf Eucken.

Persuasive and humane, this classic of philosophy offers Schopenhauer's fullest examination of ethical themes, articulating a descriptive form of ethics that contradicts the rationally based prescriptive theories. Starting with his polemic against Kant's ethics of duty, Schopenhauer argues that compassion forms the basis of morality, and he outlines a perspective on ethics in which passion and desire correspond to different moral characters, behaviors, and worldviews. He further defines his metaphysics of morals, employing Kant’s transcendental idealism to illustrate both the (...) interconnectiveness of being and the affinity of his ethics to Eastern thought. (shrink)

Epistemological disjunctivists such as Duncan Pritchard claim that in paradigmatic cases of knowledge the rational support for the known propositions is both factive and reflectively accessible. This position faces some problems, including the basis problem – how can our knowledge be based on such strong reasons that seem to leave no room for non-knowledge and therefore presuppose knowledge? – and the access problem – can disjunctivists avoid the implausible claim that we can achieve knowledge through inference from our introspective (...) awareness of those reasons? I argue that disjunctivists cannot solve both of these problems at the same time by posing the dilemma question whether we can have factive and reflectively accessible reasons without knowledge. While I focus on Pritchard throughout most of the paper, I argue in the last section that other anti-skeptical versions of disjunctivism face the same dilemma. (shrink)

This paper considers on what basis justice may require that people be treated as equals. It begins with an examination of the argument that people are to be treated as equals because they are equals, and suggests reasons for thinking that such an argument is unlikely to succeed. The remainder of the paper considers, and tries to make plausible, the argument that justice requires people be treated as equals because they are individuals. Thus the paper offers some support for (...) the view that the proper foundation of egalitarianism is individualism. (shrink)