Vers 1360, la carrière de Nicole Oresme connut un tournant capital, largement ignoré jusqu'à présent : après plus de vingt-cinq ans en Faculté des arts, il se fit théologien. Se munissant d'un doctorat de théologie, il accomplit les étapes successives du cursus. Il faut s'en surprendre : la cohérence de son parcours de philosophe de la nature aurait pu le conduire aux mêmes choix que Jean Buridan qui s'était lui-même refusé l'accès aux Facultés supérieures et était demeuré à la (...) Faculté des arts de Paris. Ce tournant se manifeste dans un manuscrit, unique le Vat. Lat. 986, épais dossier issu, d'une circonstance universitaire précise, la résompte d'Oresme. Une introduction détaillée en donne la composition. Dans ce manuscrit, Alain Boureau pense avoir découvert le texte de dix longues questions sur les Sentences, inédites et même inconnues, dont la transcription et la traduction constituent les deux premiers tomes de cette série. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Sammlung von Aufsätzen einiger der weltbesten Spezialisten der antiken griechischen Philosophie konzentriert sich auf die philosophischen Texte, die während der hellenistischen und kaiserlichen Zeit Pythagoras und den Pythagoreern zugeschrieben wurden. Ihre unbekannten Verfasser behaupten, die Positionen der ursprünglichen pythagoreischen Schule zur Metaphysik, Theologie, Zahlenphilosophie, Physik, Logik, politischen Philosophie, Ethik und zur richtigen Lebensweise zu vermitteln. Die kühnsten unter ihnen präsentieren sich als die Quellen, aus denen Platon und Aristoteles die Inspiration für den Timaios und die Kategorien geschöpft haben. (...) Da sie von den meisten antiken Denkern als maßgebend angesehen wurden, führte dies zu einer Renaissance der platonischen und pythagoreischen Tradition. (shrink)

As Aristotle classically defined it, continuity is the property of being infinitely divisible into ever-divisible parts. How has this conception been affected by the process of mathematization of motion during the 14th century? This paper focuses on Nicole Oresme, who extensively commented on Aristotle’s Physics, but also made decisive contributions to the mathematics of motion. Oresme’s attitude about continuity seems ambivalent: on the one hand, he never really departs from Aristotle’s conception, but on the other hand, he uses (...) it in a completely new way in his mathematics, particularly in his Questions on Euclidean geometry, a tantamount way to an atomization of motion. If the fluxus theory of natural motion involves that continuity is an essential property of real motion, defined as a res successiva, the ontological and mathematical structure of this continuity implies that continuum is in some way “composed” of an infinite number of indivisibles. In fact, Oresme’s analysis opened the path to a completely new kind of mathematical continuity. (shrink)

According to Nicole Oresme (c. 1320–1382), human beings, unlike all other animals, consist of two substances: a thinking substance and a sensing substance. This paper presents and explores the arguments Oresme uses to arrive at this position, which is unusual in medieval philosophical psychology and which at least superficially – though their methods are completely different – resembles what Descartes concluded about the nature of the human soul and body two and a half centuries later. The paper also (...) considers some moments of ambivalence in Oresme’s presentation, as well as unresolved difficulties, several of which have theological as well as philosophical implications. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Frühmittelalterliche Studien Jahrgang: 48 Heft: 1 Seiten: 277-294.

In this contribution, I analyze a text by Oresme which gives a rather original explanation of the process of throwing a javelin and, more generally, of the actions of people who seem to have a kind of natural ability to succeed in their actions (De Configurationibus II, 37). In highlighting some sources that appear to have been present on the author’s mind although they were hitherto neglected in Oresmian studies, I would like to show that his presentation of this (...) specific kind of motion is deeply rooted in the scholastic theological tradition and that this tradition makes this chapter seem much less strange than it might seem at first glance. (shrink)

The pantheon of classical liberal thinkers must honor the memory of one brilliant mathematician, scientist, and debunker of superstitious beliefs, the sound-money advocate Nicole Oresme. Although his opposition to the recoinage practices of the French monarchy was not unprecedented in the fourteenth century, Oresme must be credited with anticipating the “rational expectations” in economics when he distinguished quite forcefully between “preannounced debasement” and “secret debasement” and their effects on the distribution of wealth. Oresme explains that the king (...) should not practice secret debasement, and can appear as a pioneer for modern ideas on monetary surprises. (shrink)

This paper is the written version of my contribution to the International Conference «30 years Logica modernorum» held in Amsterdam in November 1997 in honor of the late prof. Lambertus M. de Rijk. Research on Oresme’s modi rerum theory was in the first stage, while now we can read the critical edition of Oresme’s Physics commentary, where modi are introduced and widely used. In this paper I shall consider Oresme’s polemical use of modi rerum, trying to set (...) it in the larger context of both his ontology and his epistemology. Oresme’s challenge to either a realist or terminist ontology by means of modi rerum conceals probably an attack to William of Ockham; Oresme refers explicitly to Ockham concerning exclusive propositions, but I think that on many other occasions the polemical target of Oresme’s criticism can be reasonably identified in William of Ockham or in some unnamed followers of the Venerabilis Inceptor. Some hints are reserved also to the possible sources of Oresme’s modi rerum. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Millennium Jahrgang: 13 Heft: 1 Seiten: 53-56.

Curiously, in the late twentieth century, even agnostic cosmologists like Stephen Hawking—who is often compared with Einstein—pose metascientific questions concerning a Creator and the cosmos, which science per se is unable to answer. Modern science of the brain, e.g. Roger Penrose's Shadows of the Mind, is only beginning to explore the relationship between the brain and the mind-the physiological and the epistemic. Galileo thought that God's two books-Nature and the Word-cannot be in conflict, since both have a common author: God. (...) This entails, inter alia, that science and faith are to two roads to the Creator-God. David Granby recalls that once upon a time, science and religion were perceived as complementary enterprises, with each scientific advance confirming the grandeur of a Superior Intelligence-God. Are we then at the threshold of a new era of fruitful dialogue between science and religion, one that is mediated by philosophy in the classical sense? In this paper I explore this question in greater detail. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Contributions to science, natural philosophy, and mathematics Attitude towards nature.

Bruno Latour’s work, today becoming increasingly influential in philosophical circles, represents a clear challenge to prevailing philosophical accounts of the relation between human subjectivity and the natural world. The ‘political ecology’ which Latour sets out in works such as We Have Never Been Modern and more extensively in The Politics of Nature is a call to arms to rethink concepts of nature taken for granted ever since the time of Kant. Yet despite its apparent novelty, and despite its apparent break (...) with post-Kantian continental philosophy, Latour’s thinking often unwittingly reworks philosophical moves made within that tradition, even during Kant’s lifetime, specifically in the movement known as Naturphilosophie. Bringing to light the elective affinities between Latour’s ideas and those of Naturphilosophie, this article suggests that the former unconsciously rehearses key tenets of the latter, in particular the claims made by Schelling against Kant. Moreover, Latour will be seen to succumb to the problems which a subsequent developer of Naturphilosophie—Hegel—would identify in Schelling’s own conception of nature. Finally, whilst Latour offers an apparently compelling alternative to notions of subject and object, free-will and mechanism, along with the conceptual separation of humans from the natural world, his thought often fails to achieve the genuine critique that would be adequate to comprehending these oppositions, and to explaining the ecological crisis in which both humans and nonhumans are caught up. (shrink)