In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Levinas versus Levinas:Hebrew, Greek, and Linguistic JusticeOona EisenstadtI argue in this paper that Levinas's philosophical writings and his Jewish writings are not easily read as compatible. But I do not make the argument on what might seem to be the obvious grounds, namely, that the philosophical writings represent what Levinas calls the "Greek" while the Jewish writings represent what he calls the "Hebrew." On the contrary, my claim is (...) almost precisely the opposite. As Levinas uses the terms "Greek" and "Hebrew," each refers to a "sub-textual... way of thinking and speaking" (Richard Kearney, quoted in Cohen 1986, 18–19). The "Greek" is the ontological mode that seeks to describe the whole—this is essentially the mode I believe Levinas works the reader toward in the Jewish writings. The "Hebrew" is the dialogical mode that is never complete and preserves dissent—this is the mode he works the reader toward in the philosophical works. The first half of this paper contains a general discussion of the meaning of the two terms, the way in which Jacques Derrida brings out what is at stake in their use with the introduction of the more critically clarified terms "Jewgreek" and "Greekjew," and, finally, the beginning of my argument that Levinas is at odds with himself. The second half illustrates the argument with brief examinations of text: we look first at the "Hebrew" or "Jewgreekish" Levinas of the final chapter of Otherwise than Being, a Levinas in many ways comparable to Plato's dialogical Socrates; and second, at the "Greek" or "Greekjewish" Levinas of the Talmudic reading "The Pact," a Levinas who praises universality, universal translatability, mutuality, and reciprocality.As is well known, the juxtaposition Greek/Hebrew, as Levinas uses it, does the same work as several other juxtapositions he employs, including same/other, politics/ethics, said/saying, and totality/infinity. In each of these formulations, the first term refers to a way of thinking that pulls things [End Page 145] together into a larger order, and the second term to a rupture that operates as thought's origin and at the same time thought's challenge. On a first reading of Levinas, the reader has the impression that the juxtaposed elements stand in opposition to one another, but as one reads more one sees that this is only part of how he intends the juxtapositions to be understood; in particular, one sees that justice of any kind requires both elements. The reasons for this can be variously described. There are, for instance, the concrete organizational requirements of justice: a just society must, on the one hand, treat people as parts of ordered wholes (as citizens, as members of family groups or income groups, and so forth) and, on the other hand, allow those designations to be called into question by the rupturing ipseity of individuals. And there are, to introduce an example more pertinent to this paper, the concrete linguistic requirements of justice. A just discourse, or a good book, places its elements into a coherent order; this can be described by saying that it assumes or imposes a certain sameness by addressing its readers as a group, or that it stands as a said, but is most simply described by saying that the book speaks in Greek. However, it must also remain open to rupture by readers and writers who came before its having been written and readers and writers yet to come; this can be described as an other-in-the-same or a saying-in-the-said, but is most simply described, in Levinas's shorthand, as the incorporation or preservation of the Hebrew in the Greek.At the end of his first essay addressed to Levinas, "Violence and Metaphysics," Derrida plays, in a serious way, with the Greek/Hebrew distinction, and especially with the fact that the two sides depend on one another. This mutual dependence rests not only on the requirements of justice, but also, and first, on what seems to be a contradiction in Levinas's thinking. Levinas says (repeatedly, in almost all of his works) that it is the experience of rupture that calls us, in the first place, to totalize, which... (shrink)