The ability to conduct logical reasoning is a fundamental aspect of intelligent behavior, and thus an important problem along the way to human-level artificial intelligence. Traditionally, symbolic methods from the field of knowledge representation and reasoning have been used to equip agents with capabilities that resemble human reasoning qualities. More recently, however, there has been an increasing interest in applying alternative approaches based on machine learning rather than logic-based formalisms to tackle this kind of tasks. Here, we (...) make use of state-of-the-art methods for training deep neural networks to devise a novel model that is closely coupled to symbolic reasoning methods, and thus able to learn how to effectively perform basic ontology reasoning. This term describes an important and at the same time very natural kind of problem settings where the rules for conducting reasoning are specified alongside with the actual information. Many problems in practice may be viewed as such reasoning tasks, which is why the presented approach is applicable to a plethora of important real-world problems. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the suggested method, we present the outcomes of several experiments that have been conducted on both toy datasets as well as real-world data, which show that our model learned to perform precise reasoning on a number of diverse inference tasks that require comprehensive deductive proficiencies. Furthermore, it turned out that the suggested model suffers much less from different obstacles that prohibit symbolic reasoning. (shrink)

The ability to conduct logical reasoning is a fundamental aspect of intelligent behavior, and thus an important problem along the way to human-level artificial intelligence. Traditionally, symbolic methods from the field of knowledge representation and reasoning have been used to equip agents with capabilities that resemble human reasoning qualities. More recently, however, there has been an increasing interest in applying alternative approaches based on machine learning rather than logic-based formalisms to tackle this kind of tasks. Here, we (...) make use of state-of-the-art methods for training deep neural networks to devise a novel model that is closely coupled to symbolic reasoning methods, and thus able to learn how to effectively perform basic ontology reasoning. This term describes an important and at the same time very natural kind of problem settings where the rules for conducting reasoning are specified alongside with the actual information. Many problems in practice may be viewed as such reasoning tasks, which is why the presented approach is applicable to a plethora of important real-world problems. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the suggested method, we present the outcomes of several experiments that have been conducted on both toy datasets as well as real-world data, which show that our model learned to perform precise reasoning on a number of diverse inference tasks that require comprehensive deductive proficiencies. Furthermore, it turned out that the suggested model suffers much less from different obstacles that prohibit symbolic reasoning. (shrink)

This article argues against ontology as an intelligible project for social theory. Ontological questions have proliferated in social thought in the past decades mainly as a way of recasting traditional sociological questions about individuals/society and structure/agency. Far from being an advance in our understanding, however, this form of reasoning has frequently brought confusion. This is demonstrated with detailed reference to a contribution from an ongoing debate, centred on the issue whether social structures are causally efficacious. I argue that (...) the ontological project is mainly fuelled by a misconception of language and that, once this picture is exposed as incoherent, ontology loses its intelligibility. (shrink)

We present some ideas on logical process descriptions, using relations from the DIO (Drug Interaction Ontology) as examples and explaining how these relations can be naturally decomposed in terms of more basic structured logical process descriptions using terms from linear logic. In our view, the process descriptions are able to clarify the usual relational descriptions of DIO. In particular, we discuss the use of logical process descriptions in proving linear logical theorems. Among the types of reasoning supported by DIO (...) one can distinguish both (1) basic reasoning about general structures in reality and (2) the domain-specific reasoning of experts. We here propose a clarification of this important distinction between (realist) reasoning on the basis of an ontology and rule-based inferences on the basis of an expert’s view. (shrink)

Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons are non-mental facts. Section 6 (...) argues that reasons are mental states. Section 7 responds to objections. (shrink)

The paper gives ontologies in the Web Ontology Language (OWL) for Legal Case-based Reasoning (LCBR) systems, giving explicit, formal, and general specifications of a conceptualisation LCBR. Ontologies for different systems allows comparison and contrast between them. OWL ontologies are standardised, machine-readable formats that support automated processing with Semantic Web applications. Intermediate concepts, concepts between base-level concepts and higher level concepts, are central in LCBR. The main issues and their relevance to ontological reasoning and to LCBR are discussed. (...) Two LCBR systems (AS-CATO, which is based on CATO, and IBP) are analysed in terms of basic and intermediate concepts. Central components of the OWL ontologies for these systems are presented, pointing out differences and similarities. The main novelty of the paper is the ontological analysis and representation in OWL of LCBR systems. The paper also emphasises the important issues concerning the representation and reasoning of intermediate concepts. (shrink)

A critical survey of the fundamental philosophical issues in the logic and formal ontology of space, with special emphasis on the interplay between mereology (the theory of parthood relations), topology (broadly understood as a theory of qualitative spatial relations such as continuity and contiguity), and the theory of spatial location proper.

In this article I advocate a worldly account of normative reasons according to which there is an ontological gap between these and the premises of practical thought, i.e. motivating considerations. While motivating considerations are individuated fine-grainedly, normative reasons should be classified as coarse-grained entities, e.g. as states of affairs, in order to explain certain necessary truths about them and to make sense of how we count and weigh them. As I briefly sketch, acting for normative reasons is nonetheless possible (...) if the connection between normative reasons and motivating considerations is a competence-based correspondence. (shrink)

An application of Narrative Knowledge Representation Language (NKRL) techniques on (declassified) ‘terrorism in Southern Philippines’ documents has been carried out in the context of the IST Parmenides project. This paper describes some aspects of this work: it is our belief, in fact, that the Knowledge Representation techniques and the Intelligent Information Retrieval tools used in this experiment can be of some interest also in an ‘Ontological Modelling of Legal Events and Legal Reasoning’ context.

Reason and revelation are a topic that is debated by many parties to determine the position and superiority between reason and revelation. There are differences of opinion among thinkers regarding the position of reason and revelation. This debate has also attracted the attention of many Islamic thinkers, including Islamic philosophers. This paper explores the ontological capture of reason and revelation debate by two of the most prominent Sufi philosophers, Ibn ‘Arabī and Mullā Ṣadrā. This research employs a literature review (...) as a research methodology, with an emphasis on synthesis and integration. Through this research, it can be concluded that Ibn ‘Arabī’s and Mullā Ṣadrā’s ontological perspectives have deconstructed theological and epistemological disagreements between rationalists who place reason above revelation and their traditionalist opponents. Ibn ‘Arabī’s theory of creative imagination unveils the ontological order of reason and revelation, whereas Mullā Ṣadrā’s theories of tashkīk (gradation of being) and the union of the knower and the known during the production of knowledge (or to be more precise, the union of intellect and intelligible during intellection) consistently place reason and revelation not in opposing sides but rather in a single gradational existence. Both Ibn ‘Arabī and Mullā Ṣadrā have broken the theological and epistemological vicious cycle by introducing ontological interventions into the debate. Ibn ‘Arabī and Mullā Ṣadrā may or may not have intended to participate in the polemic; as a result, these outcomes were rarely mentioned in the historical context of the ideas. (shrink)

This article defends the idea that causal relations between reasons and actions are wholly irrelevant to the explanatory efficacy of reason-explanations. The analysis of reason-explanations provided in this article shows that the so-called “problem of explanatory force” is solved, not by putative causal relations between the reasons for which agents act and their actions, but rather by the intentions that agents necessarily have when they act for a reason. Additionally, the article provides a critique of the principal source of support (...) for the thesis that reason-explanations are causal explanations, namely, Davidson's argument in “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.” It is shown that Davidson's argument for this thesis rests crucially on two mistakes: his definition of intentional action and his ontological prejudice against intentions. (shrink)

When unmanned underwater vehicles perform tasks, the marine environment situation information perceived by their sensors is insufficient and cannot be shared; moreover, the reasoning efficiency of the situation information is not high. To deal with these problems, this paper proposes an ontology-based situation awareness information expression method, using the Bayesian network method to reason about situation information. First, the situation awareness information is determined in uncertain events when performing tasks in the marine environment. The core and application ontologies of (...) UUV situation awareness are also established. Subsequently, semantic rules are constructed, and uncertain events are identified through the corresponding semantic rules. The Jess inference engine is used to update the ontology model. Because the ontology cannot reason about uncertainty, it is transformed into the Bayesian network to reason about the impacts of uncertain events on tasks. Simulation experiments verify the effectiveness and accuracy of the situation awareness reasoning method that combines the ontology and the Bayesian network. (shrink)

Semantics may be said to be relevant to ontology in, at least, two ways: semantic considerations may pertain to meaning, or to justication of ontological statements. An ontological thesis may be given a semantic paraphrase, or only a semantic reason. The analysis of the doctrine of transcendental idealism provided by Ajdukiewicz illustrates the rst case. Its eect is a semantic paraphrase of the allegedly ontological idealistic thesis. In contradistinction to it, the exposition of the doctrine of reism (...) as contained in Kotarbinski's work may serve as an example of the second case. Ascribing a genuinely ontological meaning to the reistic thesis, the author adduces for it reasons of explicitly semantic nature. It is on this case that I shall concentrate in the present paper. The problem is a general one. It pertains to the whole class of so-called reductionistic ontological doctrines, which, as a rule, are being justied in a similar way. Generally speaking, it is a way that involves an inference from the nature of language to the nature of the world. Let us analyze that kind of argumentation on the example of the reistic thesis. (shrink)

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, EarlyView.

The ontological argument from reason aims to show that deliberative reasoning cannot be located in a naturalistic ontology, because such reasoning requires a unified, enduring self with libertarian free will. The most popular way of avoiding this argument is to claim that some version of naturalistic compatibilism suffices for human reason, because even in a world of event causation, some creatures may be responsive to reason. In this paper, I argue that the best versions of this approach (...) either smuggle in nonnaturalistic commitments or else cannot distinguish between compulsive rationality merely occurring in someone’s brain from reasoning an agent does. (shrink)

Causal cognition – how we perceive, represent and reason about causal events – are fundamental to the human mind, but it has rarely been approached in its cultural specificity. Here, we investigate this core concept among Wichi people, an indigenous group living in Chaco Forest. We focus on the Wichi, because their epistemological orientations and explanatory frameworks about ecosystem differ importantly from those documented among most Western majority-culture populations. We asked participants to reason about causes of events that involve the (...) hunhat lheley (inhabitants of the earth: humans, non-human animals, plants and spiritual beings) and other entities of their ecosystem (e.g., lagoon). We find a native ontological framework that encompasses three interacting organizing principles. This new evidence highlights ways in which native categories guide causal reasoning. Our research challenge long-held assumptions that dichotomies – nature-culture or natural-supernatural – are universal features of the human mind. (shrink)

The paper aims to reconstruct Heidegger’s historical-intentional assumptions in his ontological interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The paper presents young Heidegger’s project of the “metaphysical-teleological interpretation of consciousness.” The project indicates the direction of his further ontological interpretation of transcendentalism: Heidegger stands up to the traditional, well known neo-Kantian interpretation of the Critique, and offers a new conception of ontological knowledge and cognition. According to this conception, cognition is grounded in transcendental imagination where a threefold (...) synthesis takes place. Heidegger’s original temporal interpretation of transcendental schematism is also recalled to stress the significance of his new ontological approach to Kant’s theoretical philosophy. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to take issue with two aspects of Marilyn Adams's monumental work William Ockham . Part I deals with Ockham's ontology, arguing (i) that Adams does not sufficiently appreciate the use Ockham makes of the prinicple of ontological parsimony in his attempt to refute the thesis that there are extramental universals or common natures and (ii) that she sets an implausibly high standard of success for Ockham's project of showing that the only singular entities (...) are substances and qualities. Part II argues that Adams fails to provide a convincing defense of Ockham's 'anti-secularist' answer to the question of how Christian thinkers should react to prima facie conflicts between the deliverances of faith and the deliverances of reason. (shrink)

A common working assumption of theories of statutory interpretation is that the object of interpretation is uncontroversial. It is assumed that dispute only centers on the epistemics of interpretation. The assumption is unsound. Theories of statutory interpretation are importantly different from other sorts of theories. The subject matter of other sorts of theories can be identified uncontroversially. In the case of statutory interpretation, the object of interpretation is controversial. What counts as the object of interpretation therefore needs specification. Without the (...) required specification, criteria of evidence and warrant justifying an interpretation are not well-defined.An adequate theory of statutory interpreation must contain both epistemic and ontological components. It must provide criteria for treating information as evidence relevant to, and standards for, interpreting a statute. Providing such criteria in turn requires also giving an account of the object of interpretation — what a statute consists in. Practical reason theories fail to provide acceptable criteria and standards for interpreting a statute. These accounts therefore fail to supply an adequate epistemic components for a theory of statutory interpretation. As to the ontological component, things are less clear. I have argued in sections II and III that this component is partly a matter of substantive political theory. Although practical reason theorists fail to offer a substantive political theory for defining the proper object of interpretation, their accounts are in principle ontologically unobjectionable. At most, practical reason accounts are incomplete. Of course, practical reason accounts might still be defective for other reasons. They may invoke a defective substantive political theory. Or the constraints imposed on properties of a statute or relations between them may not in fact affectuate the goals set by the theory. Such failings would be normative, not metaphysical. Since practical reason accounts are epistemically inadequate and ontologically incomplete, legal theorists should find the accounts less attractive than they do, even putting aside the normative soundness of the accounts. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the theoretical commitments of autopoietic enactivism in relation to Errol E Harris’s dialectical holism in the interest of establishing a common metaphysical ground. This will be undertaken in three stages. First, it is argued that Harris’s reasoning provides a means of developing enactivist ontology beyond discussions limited to cognitive science and into domains of metaphysics that have traditionally been avoided by phenomenologists. Here, I maintain enactivist commitments are consistent with Harris’s (...) class='Hi'>reasoning from certain synthetic a priori first principles, to his derivation of a teleological anthropic principle, which asserts the necessity of consciousness within the cosmos. Second, it is proposed that Steven Rosen’s long-standing proposal for a topology of phenomenology may provide a common logical foundation for both Harris and enactivists regarding anthropic reasoning. Third, it is argued that a pragmatic approach to process ontology is the most rigorous way of responding to the realism/anti-realism concerns that inevitably follow. If successful, this work will update Harris’s arguments with contemporary scientific and philosophical terminology and extend enactivism from philosophy of mind, into a general phenomenological ontology. (shrink)

In this paper, I reconstruct the development and the complex character of Zilsel’s conception of scientific laws. This concept functions as a fil rouge for understanding Zilsel’s philosophy throughout different times (here, the focus is on his Viennese writings and how they pave the way to the more renown American ones) and across his many fields of work (from physics to politics). A good decade before Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle was going to mark the outbreak of indeterminism in quantum physics, Edgar (...) Zilsel started to develop a complex logical-philosophical theory in which statistical and causal laws were given an indeterministic foundation (Zilsel 1916). However, in developing his thoughts on the emergence of regularities from disorder, Zilsel arrives at a profound ambiguity with respect to the ontological or the epistemic nature of laws and order in the world: Whether this order is to be conceived of as an empirical finding or as the product of reason – this would have to remain unclear. This tension between rationalism and empiricism, as well as a tension between a realist and an anti-realist conception of lawfulness, can be identified in both Zilsel’s Viennese and American writings: a tension which touches the core of the “application problem” that would keep haunting Zilsel until his premature death. (shrink)

Kant's attack on metaphysics consists in large part in his attack on a principle that he names the Supreme Principle of Pure Reason. This principle, it is not often noticed, is the Principle of Sufficient Reason [PSR]. In interpreting this principle as such, I argue that Kant's attack on the PSR depends on Kant's claim that existence is not a first-order predicate. If existence isn't what Kant calls a real predicate, the PSR is false. While this constitutes a powerful Kantian (...) argument against dogmatic rationalism, it also poses a problem for Kant. For, as I argue, if the PSR is true, Kant's argument that existence isn't a first-order predicate is false. In this sense, Kant's attack on the PSR is begging the question vis-á-vis radical metaphysicians. Concluding the paper I suggest relying on Kant's 'is'/'ought' distinction in avoiding this circularity, thereby reinforcing the Kantian critique. (shrink)

Taking as a starting point the assertion of an ambiguity in the Lutheran tradition's assessment of reason, the essay argues that the Kantian unreserved confidence in reason is criticised in Bonhoeffer. Based upon a Christological understanding of reason, Bonhoeffer endorses a view of reason which is specifically Christian and yet maintains a universality. With a focus on Bonhoeffer's Ethik as the hermeneutical key to his theology, Bonhoeffer's notion is also discussed in light of contemporary Christian ethics. In this part it (...) is particularly the role of reason within a public discourse which is treated in the essay. Here it is argued that Bonhoeffer may be appropriated in attempting to outline a Christological ontology of reason holding essential implications for the sources and conditions of public discourse. (shrink)

The famous triad of ‘rational proofs’ of God’s existence may, if their underlying intuitions are taken at face value, be reversed to prove the contrary, namely the non-existence of God. The ontological argument, for example, proceeds from the notion of God as the ‘real most’ or ‘absolutely real’ being. However, the existence of an entity thus defined must be beyond doubt, for if distinguishing between ‘levels of reality’ makes any sense at all, ‘more real’ must also mean ‘more manifest’. (...) And since a being whose existence is beyond doubt is greater than that whose existence is in doubt, God, to fit the definition provided by St. Anselm, must be a being the existence of which cannot be doubted or, more strictly, the existence of which can only come to be doubted if He did not exist to dispel all doubts. Hence it follows that God does not exist, because it is an undeniable fact that His existence is subject to doubt. This paper is not, however, about theexistence of God, it is about the inherent dialectic of theological reason that seeks non-natural or supernatural explanations for natural phenomena. (shrink)

In this paper I make four claims. First, there is an apparent contradiction in Spinoza’s theory of justice. On the one hand, in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670), he argues that justice is entirely conventional and depends on the ruler’s decision. On the other hand, in the later and unpublished Tractatus Politicus (1677), he claims that man really is a social animal and that we can articulate ideal forms of justice on that basis. Second, to address this apparent inconsistency, we need (...) to look at Spinoza’s use of early modern scholastic metaphysics. Although he rejects scholastic natural law theory, he has adopted another concept from the scholastics that is crucial for his theory: the notion of a ‘being of reason’ (ens rationis). Third, if we consider justice as a kind of being of reason, then we can resolve the apparent contradiction in Spinoza’s approach. I shall argue that concepts of justice are imaginative ‘beings of reason.’ They are products of convention that are not derived from general features of the world but from a particular set of circumstances. Fourth, Spinoza’s social ontology of political concepts like justice has some distinct advantages for contemporary theory. This approach shows how we might be able to provide a framework to integrate politics and natural science without reducing one to the other. (shrink)

A startling amount of intelligent activity can be controlled without reasoning or thought. By tuning the perceptual system to task relevant properties a creature can cope with relatively sophisticated environments without concepts. There is a limit, however, to how far a creature without concepts can go. Rod Brooks, like many ecologically oriented scientists, argues that the vast majority of intelligent behaviour is concept-free. To evaluate this position I consider what special benefits accrue to concept-using creatures. Concepts are either necessary (...) for certain types of perception, learning, and control, or they make those processes computationally simpler. Once a creature has concepts its capacities are vastly multiplied. (shrink)

A discussion of epistemic reasons, theoretical rationality, and the relationship between them. Discusses the ontology of reasons and evidence, the relationship between reasons (motivating, normative, possessed, apparent, genuine, etc.) and rationality, the relationship between epistemic reasons and evidence, the relationship between rationality, justification, and knowledge, and many other related topics.

This article suggests that we are in the midst of a profound dimensional shift in our rational capacity to process reality, and seeks to articulate the implications of this evolutionary shift to global reason for our scientific enterprise. As we enter the 21st century it is unmistakably clear that we are in the midst of an unprecedented shift in the human condition - a global renaissance that affects every aspect of our cultural lives, our self-understanding, and, of course, our rational (...) enterprise. This evolutionary transformation, when seen through the expanded global lens, has been emerging through the ages on a global scale. In this brief reflection I suggest that this advance in our technology of mind is of an order of magnitude that is so radical and comprehensive that the very concept of a person, of what it means to be human, of our encounter with Reality and all our hermeneutical arts, including the sciences, are likewise taken to a higher global dimension. I suggest that the diverse voices included in this special edition are best situated in the context of this global awakening of reason, scientific knowing, and the holistic worldview. (shrink)

Alienation, as a theme, deeply pervaded both the work and life of Max Weber, one of the pillars of modern sociology. In this excellent new book, Andrew M. Koch analyzes the genesis of the conecpt of alienation and then, in a brilliant and imaginative turn, works to recreate the context in which Weber understood alienation in both the intellectual and lived sense.

Adorno’s lectures on ontology and dialectics from 1960–61 comprise his most sustained and systematic analysis of Heidegger’s philosophy. They also represent a continuation of a project that he shared with Walter Benjamin – ‘to demolish Heidegger’. Following the publication of the latter’s magnum opus Being and Time, and long before his notorious endorsement of Nazism at Freiburg University, both Adorno and Benjamin had already rejected Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. After his return to Germany from his exile in the United States, Adorno (...) became Heidegger’s principal intellectual adversary, engaging more intensively with his work than with that of any other contemporary philosopher. Adorno regarded Heidegger as an extremely limited thinker and for that reason all the more dangerous. In these lectures, he highlights Heidegger’s increasing fixation with the concept of ontology to show that the doctrine of being can only truly be understood through a process of dialectical thinking. Rather than exploiting overt political denunciation, Adorno deftly highlights the connections between Heidegger’s philosophy and his political views and, in doing so, offers an alternative plea for enlightenment and rationality. These seminal lectures, in which Adorno dissects the thought of one of the most influential twentieth-century philosophers, will appeal to students and scholars in philosophy and critical theory and throughout the humanities and social sciences. (shrink)