Although synthetic biology is a promising discipline, it also raises serious ethical questions that must be addressed in order to prevent unwanted consequences and to ensure that its progress leads toward the good of all. Questions arise about the role of this discipline in a possible redefinition of the concept of life and its creation. With regard to the products of synthetic biology, the moral status that they should be given as well as the ethically correct way to behave towards (...) them are not clear. Moreover, risks that could result from a misuse of this technology or from an accidental release of synthetic organisms into the environment cannot be ignored; concerns about biosecurity and biosafety appear. Here we discuss these and other questions from a personalist ontological framework, which defends human life as an essential value and proposes a set of principles to ensure the safeguarding of this and other values that are based on it. (shrink)

Although synthetic biology is a promising discipline, it also raises serious ethical questions that must be addressed in order to prevent unwanted consequences and to ensure that its progress leads toward the good of all. Questions arise about the role of this discipline in a possible redefinition of the concept of life and its creation. With regard to the products of synthetic biology, the moral status that they should be given as well as the ethically correct way to behave towards (...) them are not clear. Moreover, risks that could result from a misuse of this technology or from an accidental release of synthetic organisms into the environment cannot be ignored; concerns about biosecurity and biosafety appear. Here we discuss these and other questions from a personalist ontological framework, which defends human life as an essential value and proposes a set of principles to ensure the safeguarding of this and other values that are based on it. (shrink)

My paper highlights one Personalist aspect of St. Anselm's Platonic perspective, namely the ontological priority and interpenetration of persons. The paper first discusses Anselm's metaphysical Platonism, then charts the Anselmian path towards God, through participation in the divine attributes. It then focuses on images of persons, and their degree of being. I argue that, at least for certain human relationships marked by strong love or friendship, Anselm regards the image of the person as mediating the being of the person (...) imaged. (shrink)

This work looks at the ontology of personalism in his major fiction and opens a door to a fresh understanding of Dostoevsky's version of the origin of human evil. In his philosophical novels, Dostoevski's view of original conflict and inevitable evil goes far beyond Augustine, Pelagius, and Luther. The authors are the first to build a case for viewing Dostoevsky as a philosophical personalist whose approach to nature provides insight to ecologists. They offer a radically new analysis of the themes (...) of suffering, incarnation, and atonement that will appeal to both psychologists and students of religion and theology. The section on atonement and its relation to the classical theory of tragedy breaks new ground. (shrink)

Ethical Personalism proposes to reflect on the person from at least three levels: ontology, epistemology, and ethics. Articulating the ontological and inalienable value of the human person, i.e., her dignity, from various philosophical and religious angles and traditions, the contributors show not just what it means to be a human person, but also what it takes to live accordingly. Hence, beyond the purely theoretical elaboration on ethical personalism that reposes the crucial debates between relativism and realism on the one (...) hand, and consequentialism and deontology on the other, this volume offers a range of insights useful for addressing concrete and practical matters that we, as humans, are confronted by in our everyday life. Ethical Personalism unequivocally affirms the necessity of (re)placing the person in the centre of our project of society, economic plans, political settings, and environment policies. (shrink)

The article is concerned with personalistic philosophy of the USA developed throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century. Although, in the narrow sense, USA Personalism is mostly associated with B.P. Bowne and his followers, the characteristic frame of personalistic philosophizing can be found in the views of such philosophers as: transcendentalists (R.W. Emerson, A. Alcott, W. Whitman), St. Louis Hegelians (W.T. Harris, H.C. Brokmeyer), number of Harvard philosophers (J. Royce, W.E. Hocking), and also G. Howison. Greatly influenced by theistic worldviews, German (...) idealism and pursuit of combining idealism with practical relevance, personalists in the USA have expressed their ideas in two main lines of thought. First, in the philosophy of religion they try to build idealistic philosophical systems based on Theism. Second, in the social philosophy personalists try to clarify special place of the person in human society. At the turn of nineteenth century personalist discussion on the ontological status of human personality became important event in the philosophical life of USA. The problem has been set between two possibilities: either person has no substantiality beyond God or its substantiality is independent from Him. Further development of Personalism in the USA doesn’t achieve comparable significance and by the end of XX century it quit its existence as independent philosophical movement. (shrink)

This article is a review of the recently published book Max Scheler’s Acting Persons, edited by Stephen Schneck. It considers some issues regarding the relation between Scheler’s phenomenological personalism and his later metaphysics by way of a discussion of the articles contained in this volume. The review explores the various and varied discussions of the relation between Scheler’s phenomenological notions of person and spirit. It suggests that Scheler’s turn from a phenomenological anthropology to metaphysics has its roots not only in (...) this notion of spirit, which is distinguished both from Husserl’s absolute consciousness and from Heidegger’sDasein, but also in the ontology of values that is embedded in Scheler’s phenomenological axiology. (shrink)

Neuroethics is a new and rapidly expanding field in the academy and clinical practice. However, there is no comprehensive treatment of it from a specifically Catholic perspective. Nevertheless, the Catholic tradition contains possible criteria for a systematic approach to neuroethics. The personalist philosophical tradition, specifically modern ontological personalism, provides a framework for organizing and articulating those aspects of personhood that are most relevant to neuroscience and neuroethics.

The paper is devoted to Nikolay Lossky who was one of the leading Russian philosophers of the first half of the twentieth century. We demonstrate the interrelationship between three aspects of Lossky’s philosophy: realism in the theory of knowledge, hierarchical personalism, and supra-naturalistic concept of evolution. We pay attention to the contemporary relevance of Lossky, and we discuss and critique his ideas in light of those of other philosophers. Lossky acknowledges that the subject interacts with being itself and that knowledge (...) is not a shadow or copy of being. His ontology is based on intuitivism and epistemological optimism. Its main categories are God, as the super-systematic principle, and monads. In Lossky’s metaphysics, the idea of abstract ideal principles of being is quite harmoniously combined with personalism. Lossky’s ontology has strong ethical underpinnings. He considers that values are rooted in being and that the evolution of the world is directed by God towards the good. Lossky elaborates a supra-naturalistic concept of evolution. He extrapolates principles of teleological determination, which are fundamental to human existence, on the underlying levels of the world as a whole. Many trends of modern thought are in tune with Lossky’s philosophy, including a return to metaphysics, panpsychism, Platonism, and the desire to unite the religious worldview with new scientific discoveries. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the differences between the Idealist personalism present in Britain and America, and the Realist personalism, proper to all the different branches of European or Continental Personalism: dialogic, communitarian, phenomenological, classical ontological, and modern ontological. After making clear that not all the British personalists are idealists, but mainly those linked to personal idealism, we will discuss whether we can speak of personalism in a similar sense as idealistic and realistic personalism. Secondly, (...) we will analyze four points in order to compare the peculiar traits of personalism in these philosophies: the phenomenality of matter; the problem of experience; metaphysics and person; and corporeality, personality, and person. Special attention is paid to A. S. Pringle-Pattison and Borden Parker Bowne, as the leaders of idealistic personalism in Britain and the United States. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the differences between the Idealist personalism present in Britain and America, and the Realist personalism, proper to all the different branches of European or Continental Personalism: dialogic, communitarian, phenomenological, classical ontological, and modern ontological. After making clear that not all the British personalists are idealists, but mainly those linked to personal idealism, we will discuss whether we can speak of personalism in a similar sense as idealistic and realistic personalism. Secondly, (...) we will analyze four points in order to compare the peculiar traits of personalism in these philosophies: the phenomenality of matter; the problem of experience; metaphysics and person; and corporeality, personality, and person. Special attention is paid to A. S. Pringle-Pattison and Borden Parker Bowne, as the leaders of idealistic personalism in Britain and the United States. (shrink)

Christian Smith’s To Flourish or Destruct is a thorough, sustained, and impassioned argument for what the author calls ‘critical realist personalism’. This is an ontologically based theory of the p...

Dietrich von Hildebrand’s treatise, The Nature of Love, is set in relation to the theological personalism of the Cappadocian fathers of the Church, and to my own earlier work done in this tradition. Several points of divergence are explored, especially points concerning von Hildebrand’s claim that love exists as a response to the beauty of the beloved person. God’s love for human beings does not always seem to fit the paradigm of value-response; His love seems rather to be creative of (...) beauty in us rather than to respond to already existing beauty. But at the same time, the deep kinship of von Hildebrand’s personalism with that of the Cappadocian fathers is stressed; he is at one with them in affirming the heart as distinct from the intellect, in affirming love as the supreme act of the person, and in affirming the place of beauty in the existence of persons. (shrink)

Dietrich von Hildebrand’s treatise The Nature of Love is set in relation to the theological personalism of the Cappadocian fathers of the Church, and to my own earlier work done in this tradition. Several points of divergence are explored, especially points concerning von Hildebrand’s claim that love exists as a response to the beauty of the beloved person. God’s love for human beings does not always seem to fit the paradigm of value-response; His love seems to be creative of beauty (...) in us rather than to respond to already existing beauty. But at the same time, the deep kinship of von Hildebrand’s personalism with that of the Cappadocian fathers is stressed; he is at one with them in affirming the heart as distinct from the intellect, in affirming love as the supreme act of the person, and in affirming the place of beauty in the existence of persons. (shrink)

Dietrich von Hildebrand’s treatise The Nature of Love is set in relation to the theological personalism of the Cappadocian fathers of the Church, and to my own earlier work done in this tradition. Several points of divergence are explored, especially points concerning von Hildebrand’s claim that love exists as a response to the beauty of the beloved person. God’s love for human beings does not always seem to fit the paradigm of value-response; His love seems to be creative of beauty (...) in us rather than to respond to already existing beauty. But at the same time, the deep kinship of von Hildebrand’s personalism with that of the Cappadocian fathers is stressed; he is at one with them in affirming the heart as distinct from the intellect, in affirming love as the supreme act of the person, and in affirming the place of beauty in the existence of persons. (shrink)

The article discusses the ecological aspects of John Milbank’s thought in the context of the growing climate crisis. For this purpose, the concept of integral ecology is interpreted in the spirit of Milbank’s integralism, which rejects the notion of “pure nature” as a manifestation of secularism and calls for theological grounding of the environmental discourse. This perspective allows us to see the limitations of the modern way of thinking, caught up in the metaphors of “conquest of nature” and “return to (...) nature.” As an alternative, the concept of “kenotic anthropocentrism” is proposed, which sees man as a rational, social, creative and religious animal, that somehow transcends his own nature, being called to union with God. On the one hand, such an approach proclaims the ontological superiority of man over other creatures, and on the other, it reminds us of his role as the guardian—and not the owner—of the Earth. Thus, it differs significantly from Clive Hamilton’s “modest anthropocentrism,” whose call to care for the environment is ultimately based on arbitrary freedom and the imperative of self-preservation. Milbank’s position is closer to Bruno Latour’s anthropocentrism emphasizing the role of man as a political representative of silent earthlings—rivers, mountains and animals. However, Milbank advocates a strong ontological hierarchy rejected by Latour, which makes him less sensitive to the material dimension of climate change. Moreover, Milbank’s militant anti-secularism may be an obstacle to a much needed broader discussion of the ecological crisis, even if his critique of modernity is hard to ignore. (shrink)

In his recent paper, Page (International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 85, 297–317, 2019) raised the question of what, if anything, is it that distinguishes an account of a personal God, i.e., an account to which classical theists are committed, from an account of God as a person, i.e., an account of deity to which personal theists are committed. Page himself proposed ‘a criterial approach’ to understanding what is for God to be a person, according to which God is a (...) person iff God meets some criteria of personhood, for example, having self-consciousness and being rational. In the paper, first, I argue that the criterial approach doesn’t allow us to draw a clear distinction between classical theism and theistic personalism. Then I provide my own proposal how this distinction could be made, according to which classical theism and theistic personalism are instantiated by two different ontological models. The classical theist thinks of deity as a self-sustaining (substance-like) virtue that is the efficient and final cause of all beings that are different from it, whereas the theistic personalism understands deity as an underlying subject for some properties which exist independently of it. (shrink)

The thick-esse /thin-essence view asserts that esse—the act of existing—constitutes all of the ontological positivity, perfection, and intelligibility of a being, while essence is simply an internal limitation or mode of the esse of a being. In this paper I explain why Fr. W. Norris Clarke’s Thomistic personalism relies on the thick-esse /thin-essence view; acknowledge three objections to the thick-esse /thin-essence view; reply to these objections; and provide a positive argument for the thick-esse /thin-essence view. I conclude that Clarke’s (...) reliance on a thick-esse /thin-essence view does not militate against his Thomistic personalism; on the contrary, it militates in its favor. In order to reach this conclusion, though, I make it clear that the details of Clarke’s thick-esse /thin-essence view must be modified to fall in line with the details of William E. Carlo’s thick-esse /thin-essence view. (shrink)

As the title suggests, the book is an attempt to analyse and interpret the phenomenon of culture from the perspective of personalism. The tools chosen by the author for an interpretation of culture are the principles of the Christian anthropology and ontology. The main thesis of the book is that culture is an essentially personal phenomenon, to the point that it well may define what it means to be human person. The ability to create, to transform a basic elements, a (...) row matter into an expression of our inner personal existence, our feelings, reason and most of all of our personal intentions and values is an exclusively human characteristic, and there is no other similar in the world of living beings. Culture, art and civilization are an important expressions of our human existence, and of our freedom as the only creatures, which transcend determinism of Nature and natural processes. As the author writes, culture is a faithful companion of our human history. It appeared with us, and is the inseparable attribute of our life. We are ontologically joined with the phenomenon of culture, so that a mystery of our existence is in some sense a mystery of our internal and external culture, and our value, as a concrete human individuals or as a society is a consequence of the quality of our culture. (shrink)

I deal with the issue of the environmental crisis from the perspective of a phenomenologically embedded qualitative social ontology. The first point I make is that our environment is a «personal world», and not a «naturalistic world»: a world that is experienced in the «personalistic attitude» and as such is an ontologically qualitative world, in which both natural and social entities are given to us as essentially constituted by value-qualities and meanings, and not as merely material things. The second point (...) I argue for is that our environment is also a «common-surrounding world» whose personal collectives are its essential correlate: «common-surrounding world» and personal collectives existentially depend on one another, and human persons, both individual and collective, are responsible for the existence of their environment and its entities. I apply the tools of phenomenological eidetics to the ideas of «personal world» and «common-surrounding world», and inquire into the ontologically qualitative implications that they have for our environment and its crisis. (shrink)

The paper concentrates on two main theoretical problems connected with the idea of ‘person’, namely, ‘freedom’ and the ‘reality of evil’. Will be considered both Russian and Italian thinkers. After a presentation of Berdyaev’s philosophy of person and its critics (Vasilii Zenkovsky), alternative theological approaches to personality (Bulgakov, Lossky) will be considered. The last part of the paper deals with the heritage of Dostoevsky and Berdyaev in Italy, focusing on the ‘ontology of freedom’ proposed by Luigi Pareyson. The final remarks (...) try highlight communion as the necessary horizon for freedom and personality. (shrink)

The paper deals with the philosophical problems of human heart ant its moral dimension in philosophy. It focuses on the philosophy of the Russian philosopher B. P. Vysheslavtsev, called also "a philosopher od heart." His conception of heart and its role in the life of humans is seen as the source of the human spiritual life as a whole. "The heart is not only a physiological organ, but also an ontological origin beyond all rationality, in which the real autonomy (...) of a person lies.". (shrink)

This article concerns two of the last great metaphysical thinkers: Austin Farrer and Alfred North Whitehead. It also concerns a fundamental cosmological question: does the world point inexorably to God? Often, attempts to formulate and answer this question still stand firm on the Aristotelian categories of scholastic theology. Confronting these head-on, Farrer and Whitehead offered an antidote to Aristotle’s outdated metaphysics. They re-conceived being in active terms. This deployment of action-concepts was designed to overcome the logical and ontological inertia (...) of divine Ipseity and so heal the breach between God and Creation. By exploring the ways Farrer and Whitehead addressed these matters, I hope to remind readers of a fertile alternative to realist/anti-realist conflicts currently dominating philosophical theology. (shrink)

It was at the turn of the the twentieth century when Francis Bradley’s metaphysics perme­ated with the spirit of German Idealism was one of the strongest trends of English aca­demic philosophy. But after the “neopositivist Brexit” launched by Russell, Moore and some other analytical thinkers it became mainly a subject for historians of idealism. An attempt is undertaken in the paper to reveal both the historical and actual significance of Bradley’s doctrine of degrees of reality along with an estimation of (...) his critics’ argu­ments and the author’s own criticisms of his “ontology of the Absolute”. Bradley’s ideal­ism is fit unto the framework of comparative ontology, in the first place by its juxtaposi­tion with mostly congenial “absolutism” of Advaita-Vedānta. The author suggests also his own version of differing and quantifying reality, in the shape of individual landscapes of reality in the context of their comparison with personal valuables. (shrink)

As the title suggests, the book is an attempt to analyse and interpret the phenomenon of culture from the perspective of personalism. The tools chosen by the author for an interpretation of culture are the principles of the Christian anthropology and ontology. The main thesis of the book is that culture is an essentially personal phenomenon, to the point that it well may define what it means to be human person. The ability to create, to transform a basic elements, a (...) row matter into an expression of our inner personal existence, our feelings, reason and most of all of our personal intentions and values is an exclusively human characteristic, and there is no other similar in the world of living beings. Culture, art and civilization are an important expressions of our human existence, and of our freedom as the only creatures, which transcend determinism of Nature and natural processes. As the author writes, culture is a faithful companion of our human history. It appeared with us, and is the inseparable attribute of our life. We are ontologically joined with the phenomenon of culture, so that a mystery of our existence is in some sense a mystery of our internal and external culture, and our value, as a concrete human individuals or as a society is a consequence of the quality of our culture. (shrink)

The present article examines the theology of John Zizioulas with a view to understanding its coherence and viability for ecclesiology. Instead of treating his trinitarian theology, or his historical claims, I focus upon the basic themes of his personalistic ontology, especially the relationship between the ‘hypostasis’ and its ‘nature.’ I argue that Zizioulas's central concept of freedom rests upon an equivocation: he affirms both that freedom and being are identical, and that they are mutually exclusive. In conversation with the philosophy (...) of Levinas, I further argue that Zizioulas's proposal, as an ontology of communion, falls prey to the same reduction of being to thought that forms the central tenet of Western conceptions of subjectivity. In conclusion, I argue that both of these problems trade on a basic inability to account for grace as the fundamental reality of communion. Throughout my basic concern is to inquire into just what function the category of ‘being’ has in Zizioulas's theology, and to point out its surprising obscurity. (shrink)

A review of U. Mäki (ed.). Fact and Fiction in Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. pp. xvi 384. ISBN 0521 00957. As people interested mainly in theory, methodologists and philos...

The paper begins with a more carefully stated version of ontologically neutral (ON) logic, originally introduced in (Hailperin, 1997). A non-infinitistic semantics which includes a definition of potential infinite validity follows. It is shown, without appeal to the actual infinite, that this notion provides a necessary and sufficient condition for provability in ON logic.

Ontology ; Knowledge, Theory of ; Personalism.