Reseña conjunta de los tres libros sobre religión publicados por Javier Sádaba en 2016.

Este artículo tiene por objetivo analizar la relación y la recepción que cuatro filósofos de la generación de la democracia: Tomás Pollán, Javier Sádaba, Manuel Fraijó y Jesús Mosterín han mantenido y realizado respectivamente, con y sobre, el pensamiento español contemporáneo que les antecedió.

This paper is a response to H. Siegel’s “Arguing with Arguments” from a rhetorical perspective on argumentation. First I address Siegel’s concept of ‘argument in its abstract propositional sense’ and attempt to show that it is not at all an obvious object that should unquestionably be the privileged focus of argumentation theory. I then defend C. W. Tindale’s rhetorical perspective on argumentation against some of Siegel’s misreadings and also some of his legitimate disagreements regarding the relations between _persuasion_ and _rational_ (...) _justification_ and the way we should understand the source of argumentative normativity. (shrink)

El sacrificio humano es una imagen frecuente en las religiones antiguas, concretamente en la griega, y su estudio ha levantado numerosos enfrentamientos entre corrientes historiográficas distintas. Uno de los casos más sobresalientes es del culto a Zeus en el Monte Liceo, que aquí analizamos. Las fuentes literarias reflejan la creencia de los griegos en estos sacrificios humanos, así que podemos decir que los sacrificios fueron reales porque fueron usados para construir paisaje y, por lo tanto, realidad.

The heroic figure is a human fiction of the wholly singular. In the hero, discourses about ideals and exemplariness, extra-ordinariness and exceptionalness, agonality, transgressivity, or good and evil become condensed into a single individual. Thus, the hero is the opposite of the masses. As it is argued in this article, the answer to the question of what distinguishes a hero lies in the supererogatory moment, the reference to the hero’s quality of more than can be expected: the heroic figure does (...) more than he or she has to, more than duty requires of an ordinary person, and this is the reason they are heroized. However, this also points to a dialectic moment of the heroic in which the opposition between the hero and the many seems to be suspended. Following Niklas Luhmann, the hero represents the paradox of conformity through deviance, because through the example of their abnormality they produce in others a desire to imitate them. In the end, there is a collective appeal of the heroic that affects even the conceptual complement of the hero: the crowd which is characterized by the disappearance of the individual within it. Inspired by Luhmann’s sociological reflections on the heroic as well as Elias Canetti’s anthropological perspectives on the phenomena of the crowd, this article traces the rhetoric of the hero along its path from the singular to the plural. Against the backdrop of the analysis of the heroic in revolutionary Iran, a generalizable typology is proposed that distinguishes between the hero, the collective of heroes, the heroic collective, and collective heroism. This order reflects a progression that is analogous to the conjunction of the one and the many, moving qualitatively from the distinct figure of the hero to the indistinguishable masses. (shrink)

There is a shared feeling among those familiar with pragmatism that, if applied in practice, the teachings of Peirce, James, Dewey, and their heirs could prove extraordinarily helpful in our current uncertain times—times of persistent moral disagreements and almost irreparable social conflicts. But to what extent is this feeling justified? What is the nature of these infelicitous circumstances? And, what makes pragmatism such a suitable approach? In this article, I claim that the main reason behind the ineffectiveness with which we (...) have traditionally addressed our differences is the uncritical acceptance and enactment of a pernicious dichotomy between objectivism and subjectivism. As I argue, it is pragmatist philosophers who most clearly understood the urgency to find an alternative to these extreme positions and who most successfully accomplished this task; it is to them, I claim, we must now turn if we are to more effectively address our disagreements and conflicts. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics is a method of intersubjective argumentation conceived to test the validity of moral norms on the basis of their universalizability. As some scholars have argued, Habermas’s proposal is problematic in that the process of argumentation is always affected by the circumstances of inequality and unfairness that pervade communal life and, therefore, it cannot be as inclusive and egalitarian as it needs to be in order to function effectively. In this paper, I argue that the solutions proposed (...) by these scholars, namely, the improvement of social conditions and the pluralization of the process of argumentation, cannot by themselves resolve the practical limitation Habermas’s method presents. As an alternative, I adopt Philip Kitcher’s approach to ethics according to which the establishment of moral norms is oriented not to the resolution of disagreements but to the restitution of healthy relationships among individuals. On the basis of this alternative conception, I propose the addition to Habermas’s principle of universalization of a supplemental criterion of moral justification—one that makes the validity of norms dependent upon their potential to foster altruism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Phenomenology of Superstition or a Phenomenological Superstition?Elena Ibáñez-Guerra (bio)KeywordsBehaviorism, constructionism, intentionality, operant behaviorWhen the editors of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology asked me to make some brief comments on two articles for the special issue edited by Pérez-Álvarez and Sass, I was delighted to accept, thinking that the task would be a straightforward one, and that I could easily meet the agreed deadline. But nothing could be further from (...) the truth. The articles were of such density and their content of such profundity that it took months of interpretation and study, and of bringing my own knowledge up to date, before I was in a position to understand the concepts, adjust my beliefs, and make some comments. I could certainly have delivered some kind of eulogy about the brilliance of their content; I might have countered with my own article. However, what seemed most coherent to me was to meet their arguments head on and deal with what I consider to be their principal weaknesses, leaving the bouquets for the end.The articles set out, as I understand them and within the clinical context, to relate phenomenology, in its most traditional form, with the most current form of Skinnerian behaviorism, situating themselves in a contextualism that is, at the same time, close to and removed from the most radical type of social constructionism.But let us begin by looking more closely at “Phenomenology and Behaviorism.” It is novel for me, though Professor Pérez-Álvarez had already proposed it several years ago (Pérez-Álvarez 1992), to view operant behavior as intentionality, or at least as involving final causality according to the Aristotelian classification. It is a surprising contention, not least because, as I recall, Skinner lived in a time and a context (historical reason) in which the basic goal of psychology was to convert itself into a natural science, comparable in all respects to physics, which it took as a model, focusing therefore on efficient causality (also according to Aristotle’s terminology), so that behavior was considered as the immediate consequence of a stimulus, and the stimulus–response association became the cornerstone of the discipline. It is true that the operant behavior concept refers to the functional relationship between behavior and reinforcement, but it is no less true that Skinner’s definition of reinforcement is totally empirical—“all that which increases or decreases the probability”—meaning that reinforcement can be considered neither as a motive nor as a reason for behavior, unless it be in the eyes of the observer. [End Page 251]Furthermore, even though Yela (1987) refers to Ortega y Gasset’s formula “I am myself and my circumstances” as a Skinnerian approach, the truth is that Yela himself argues that it is precisely the self that constitutes personality, such that I have a personality because I am me, and not vice versa, as Skinner would appear to argue. In this regard, Ortega’s celebrated formula has generally been interpreted, from the most personalist perspectives, as “the circumstances are myself”—to highlight the denial of the psychological subject by radical behaviorism (Mischel’s [1968] criticism of the concept of personality is relevant here). On top of this, Skinner’s rejection of all that was not directly observable, or at least, that could not be operationalized, calls into question the admissibility of anything called final cause or intentionality of behavior. In his philosophy, all the indications are that contingencies are what determine behavior; and that there would be no room for a structural causality, as Althusser would argue, or of a reciprocal determinism, in Bandura’s terms, or even of an interaction between subject and environment, as modern interactionists would maintain. “I am myself and my circumstances” seems in Skinner to become “the circumstances are me”, and indeed, the reinforcement history – which in the article in question is considered as something akin to the Sartrian idea of “life project” – is for Skinner nothing more than a continuous association of events. In my view, Ortega’s perspectivism would perhaps be closer to the sociology of the American action theorists, Merton, Parsons, etc., than to Skinnerian behaviorism, since “action”—as the action theorists... (shrink)

La información masiva sobre los casos Garzón se ha caracterizado por la confusión, no siempre desinteresada, de los tres supuestos objeto de las querellas. Esto, a juicio del autor, obliga a individualizarlos cuidadosamente y a hacer lo mismo con las vicisitudes de cada una de las causas.

El sacrificio humano es una imagen frecuente en las religiones antiguas, concretamente en la griega, y su estudio ha levantado numerosos enfrentamientos entre corrientes historiográficas distintas. Uno de los casos más sobresalientes es del culto a Zeus en el Monte Liceo, que aquí analizamos. Las fuentes literarias reflejan la creencia de los griegos en estos sacrificios humanos, así que podemos decir que los sacrificios fueron reales porque fueron usados para construir paisaje y, por lo tanto, realidad.

The present article offers a reflection upon the welfare systems of states which attract large numbers of immigrants and must therefore take responsibility for awarding equal rights to immigrants and avoiding their becoming new marginalised groups. To this end, a brief description is given of the evolution of the profile of immigrants, which leads to a consideration of future demand on the basis of the resources offered by the states accepting immigrants and of the new population profiles, paying special attention (...) to the variables determined by family composition , cultural aspects and the legal-administrative situation. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage important reflète le dynamisme actuel en Espagne de la recherche en histoire des femmes, tout en vérifiant la diversité théorique, méthodologique et thématique de ce courant historiographique. Afin de faciliter la présentation nous regroupons par thèmes les 24 travaux inclus dans cette vaste publication. En premier lieu, distinguons les contributions orientées vers l’analyse théorique. Mª Isabel del Val Valdivieso dans « A modo de introducción. La historiografía en los albores del...

The philosophical and philological study of Aristotle fragments and lost works has fallen somewhat into the background since the 1960’s. This is regrettable considering the different and innovative directions the study of Aristotle has taken in the last decades. This collection of new peer-reviewed essays applies the latest developments and trends of analysis, criticism, and methodology to the study of Aristotle’s fragments. The individual essays use the fragments as tools of interpretation, shed new light on different areas of Aristotle philosophy, (...) and lay bridges between Aristotle’s lost and extant works. The first part shows how Aristotle frames parts of his own understanding of Philosophy in his published, 'popular' work. The second part deals with issues of philosophical interpretation in Aristotle’s extant works which can be illuminated by fragments of his lost works. The philosophical issues treated in this section range from Theology to Natural Science, Psychology, Politics, and Poetics. As a whole, the book articulates a new approach to Aristotle’s lost works, by providing a reassessment and new methodological explorations of the fragments. (shrink)