Consider a firm as an organization that needs to efficiently coordinate several specialized departments in an uncertain environment. Decision making involves collective planning sessions and decentralized operational processes. In this setting this paper explores the role of economic modeling through an experimental game. Results support the idea that economic modeling favors higher performance. Economic modeling facilitates the emergence of common knowledge and the decomposition of a group decision problem into individual decision problems that are meaningfully interrelated.

Notion polémique, l'idéalisme est assimilé à une posture intellectuelle oublieuse de son ancrage naturel et social. Dénoncée chez Nietzsche et Marx, elle est centrale chez Hegel. Explicitement assumée, revendiquée même, elle désigne l'orientation spéculative d'une pensée toujours en mouvement. "Toute vraie philosophie est un idéalisme", déclare Hegel. C'est cette notion, paradoxalement peu étudiée, qui sert de fil conducteur à Olivier Tinland dans sa reconstruction de la charpente conceptuelle de l'hégélianisme. Tout un pan de la philosophie allemande, dans la diversité (...) de ses orientations, sert de toile de fond à cet exposé de la démarche spécifique de Hegel, aboutissant à une forme élargie et particulièrement sophistiquée d'idéalisme. Un grand ouvrage de philosophie. (shrink)

Can one refute Berkeleyan phenomenalism by arguing that sensory objects seem mind-independent, and that, according to Berkeley, experience is to be taken at face value? Relying on Mackie’s recent discussion of the issue, I argue, first, that phenomenalism cannot be straightforwardly refuted by relying on perceptual or bodily experience of mind-independence together with the truthfulness of experience. However, I maintain, second that phenomenalism can be indirectly refuted by appealing to the bodily experience of resistance. Such experience presents us with the (...) causal activity of the resisting physical object. If experience is truthful, as the phenomenalist has it, physical objects are causally active. But then their effects no longer depend on our perceiving them, on pain of overdetermination. (shrink)

Reporting and investigating research misconduct can lead to disciplinary proceedings being initiated, and ultimately to disciplinary sanctions being imposed on convicted scientists. The conversion of research misconduct findings into disciplinary sanctions is poorly understood. This article analyses all the disciplinary decisions handed down on appeal by the Conseil national de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche (CNESER) between 1991 and 2023, concerning breaches of research integrity by academics and doctoral students ( n = 333). Three findings are highlighted. Firstly, the (...) article describes how the CNESER sanctioned research misconduct even before the notion of research integrity became part of French law, by monitoring scientists’ compliance with “deontological rules”. Secondly, we show that assessing disciplinary fault involves evaluating a much broader set of circumstances than the mere existence of research misconduct, which can explain why the latter do not result in disciplinary sanctions or lighter sanctions. Thirdly, the research highlights situations where research misconduct is intertwined with other allegations, blurring the relative importance of these motives in the awarding of disciplinary sanctions. The article concludes with a call for greater accessibility to the disciplinary decisions handed down by universities in the first instance, as a key next step in gaining a better understanding of the disciplinary response to research misconduct. (shrink)

Tout au long des années 80, Derrida a exploré le thème de l’invention et étudié en particulier sa conception cartésienne. Derrida récuse avec force cette dernière pour montrer qu’elle dissimule une conception théologico-politique du sujet, accomplissant sur le plan politique la thèse métaphysique du logocentrisme. Mais, à partir de Psychè. Inventions de l’autre, cette vision est infléchie pour développer la signification positive de ce qu’il finit par appeler « l’invention du même » qui constitue l’un des courants majeurs de l’invention (...) techno-scientifique au sens moderne. Solidaire d’une certaine « politique de la recherche », Descartes voit l’une de ses inventions, la « langue universelle », être pour la première fois « contresignée » par Derrida. Cette reconnaissance ne doit pas toutefois cacher un désaccord où se révèle l’originalité de la pensée derridienne de l’invention : résolument anticartésienne, elle propose une inventio qui, en tant qu’elle confond avec le jeu même de la « différance », s’exclut de la cogitatio. Événement immanent à la res extensa qui, pour cette raison, ne saurait être entièrement rationalisé et qui, c’est significatif, en même temps qu’il s’ouvre à la chance, renvoie à une autre conception de l’être-ensemble. L’invention porte dans son excès, selon Derrida, l’annonce d’un temps nouveau. (shrink)

Dans cette these publiee en 1989, Olivier Chedin propose une lecture originale de la troisieme Critique de Kant, qui retrace la genese transcendantale des facultes theoriques dans le jugement esthetique. Il s'agit avant tout d'eclaircir le rapport d'un pouvoir theorique de representation avec une faculte esthetique de juger: d'exhiber, dans l'exercice du jugement de gout, l'inauguration d'un pouvoir de connaitre. On comprendra alors comment le sentiment esthetique surgit d'une harmonie originaire des facultes. Mais la Critique du jugement, qui opere (...) d'abord une critique du sentiment, propose aussi une critique de la liberte pure: du beau, je suis en effet seul juge, sans loi ni imperatif, en face d'une promesse de bonheur qui fait, en moi-meme, acte de liberte. Sensible a l'apparition d'une presence ou s'inaugure l'exercice d'un pouvoir de representation, l'auteur applique enfin la these kantienne a l'elucidation des oeuvres d'art - tant celles de l'art classique que celles de l'art non-figuratif le plus contemporain -, suggerant que l'esthetique de Kant n'aurait peut-etre pas trouve en son temps l'art qu'elle meritait? (shrink)

This study examines to what extent different types of CEOs in family firms influence external and internal stakeholder-related CSP as compared to CEOs in nonfamily firms. Linking family CEO and nonfamily CEO with CSR outcomes, we provide evidence that family CEOs are positively associated with both external and internal CSR, whereas nonfamily CEOs within family firms tend to be negatively associated with both external and internal CSR. We show that the incumbent CEO’s age moderates the above relationships, indicating the existence (...) of shifting family priorities and suggesting a tendency toward CSR conformity as the salience of succession concerns increases. (shrink)

A l'aune de la philosophie marginalisant le goût et la cuisine, Jean-Jacques Rousseau parait occuper une place à part et novatrice. Tout en condamnant l'hybris des facéties gastronomiques, il valorise le goût par son lien étroit avec les besoins, avec l'amour de soi, sens utile à juguler les faux désirs et déjouer l'amour-propre. Toutefois, dans l'Emile, ce sens tend à souffrir de la préséance de l'appétit, notion essentielle car utile en société à reconditionner la faim, réorganiser les besoins jusqu'aux moyens (...) de les satisfaire, afin de récréer, par le truchement de la dépense physique, la mesure du plaisir faisant défaut à l'homme civil. En outre, jusqu'à quel point ce schéma de subjectivation par l'appétit est-il compatible avec le dessein politique? (shrink)

The main purpose of the present chapter is to argue in favor of the claim that, contrary to what is usually and tacitly assumed, organization is not necessary for organicism. To this purpose, I first set up the stage by providing a working characterization of organicism that involves two free parameters, whose variations allow for covering the rich and diverse conceptual landscape of organicism, past and present. In particular, I contend that organization is usually construed as a “mean to an (...) end” notion, or as a tool put at the service of vindicating organicism’s twofold defining assumption, namely, that organisms are determinative entities in their own right, to the effect that (organismic) biology is epistemologically autonomous from physico-chemistry. After a short detour devoted to show that organicism generally collapses on a spectrum of variants of emergentism, I take inspiration from a recent account of emergence called “transformational emergence” to put forward a transformational version of organicism. For such a version meets organicism’s defining standards in a way that is free of any commitment to organization, arguing for its very conceptual soundness finally allows for legitimizing the claim that organicism doesn’t really need organization. (shrink)

Of all the things we do and say, most will never be repeated or reproduced. Once in a while, however, an idea or a practice generates a chain of transmission that covers more distance through space and time than any individual person ever could. What makes such transmission chains possible? For two centuries, the dominant view was that humans owe their cultural prosperity to their powers of imitation. In this view, modern cultures exist because the people who carry them are (...) gifted at remembering, storing and reproducing information. How Traditions Live and Die proposes an alternative to this standard view. What makes traditions live is not a general-purpose imitation capacity. Cultural transmission is partial, selective, often unfaithful. Some traditions live on in spite of this, because they tap into widespread and basic cognitive preferences. These attractive traditions spread, not by being better retained or more accurately transferred, but because they are transmitted over and over. This theory is used to shed light on various puzzles of cultural change and to explain the special relation that links the human species to its cultures. Morin combines recent work in cognitive anthropology with new advances in quantitative cultural history, to map and predict the diffusion of traditions. This book is both an introduction and an accessible alternative to contemporary theories of cultural evolution. (shrink)

The rise of blockchain as a techno-solution in the development sector underscores the critical imbalances of data power under ‘computational capitalism’. This article will consider the political economy of techno-solutionist and blockchain discourses in the developing world, using as its object of study blockchain projects in Pacific Island nations. Backed by US State Department soft power initiatives such as Tech Camp, these projects inculcate tech-driven notions of economic and political development, or ICT4D, while opening up new terrains for data accumulation (...) and platform control. Blockchain developers in search of proof of concept have found the development sector a fecund space for tech experimentation as they leverage a desire for tech-development and exploit regulatory weakness. The material implications of blockchain projects and discourse have been to create governance solutions which bypass the developing world state as a largely corrupting intermediary. In the Pacific, this has meant blockchain supply-chain management systems, proprietary financial innovation in humanitarian relief and an Asian Development Bank project to manage indigenous Fijian lands exclusively on the blockchain. In all these instances, discourses of solutionism, innovation and data empowerment have been deployed in aid of blockchain cartographies of control. (shrink)

La philosophie de l'éducation n'est pas une doctrine mais un questionnement qui remet radicalement en cause tout ce que nous croyons savoir en ce domaine. Elle s'interroge donc également sur le sens et les limites des sciences de l'éducation. Dans cet ouvrage, le lecteur trouvera une réflexion sur l'éducation, du point de vue de sa finalité et de ses institutions, ainsi qu'une interrogation sur les valeurs transmises par la pédagogie. Enfin, s'il se demande quel est le critère d'une éducation réussie, (...) le philosophe lui répondra qu'on n'en finit jamais de devenir un homme. (shrink)

Samuel Johnson claimed to have refuted Berkeley by kicking a stone. It is generally thought that Johnson misses the point of Berkeley's immaterialism for a rather obvious reason: Berkeley never denied that the stone feels solid, but only that the stone could exist independently of any mind. I argue that Johnson was on the right track. On my interpretation, Johnson’s idea is that because the stone feels to resist our effort, the stone seems to have causal powers. But if appearances (...) are to be taken at face value, as Berkeley insists, then the stone has causal powers. I argue that such causal powers threaten not only Berkeley’s view that only minds are active, but also, and more fundamentally, his central claim that sensible things depend on perception. (shrink)

Comment penser le phénomène en évitant dans sa description tout présupposé logique et ontologique? Devançant la phénoménologie inaugurée par Husserl, Mach et Avenarius, les fondateurs de l'empiriocriticisme, formulent une critique radicale des préjugés de la raison connaissante. C'est aussi le phénomène dans sa pureté alogique qui guide les thèses des philosophes de l'immanence, Schuppe et Schubert-Soldern, contemporains de l'empiriocriticisme : ainsi le phénoménisme est paradoxalement à la fois positiviste et solipsiste.

Willard van Orman Quine (1908-2000), philosophe et logicien américain, a conduit la philosophie analytique à sa première révolution conceptuelle en critiquant l'empirisme logique du Cercle de Vienne et de son maître Carnap en particulier. En débarrassant cet empirisme des «deux dogmes» indéfendables qui le soutiennent, Quine l'ébranle en profondeur : la signification des énoncés ayant trait au monde s'avère largement indéterminée, le savoir comme tel perd ses fondements et l'on court le risque d'un scepticisme dangereux. Pour saisir comment une connaissance (...) solide du monde peut pourtant se monnayer en des théories verbalisées partageables, Quine réinvente le réalisme. Il veut construire, par des voies radicalement nouvelles et contre-intuitives, un empirisme «sans les dogmes» qui s'inscrive toutefois dans le champ logico-linguistique qu'il est en train de bouleverser. Ce sont les thèses centrales de son oeuvre et les polémiques dont elles furent l'objet que le présent ouvrage expose : l'indétermination de la traduction, l'inscrutabilité de la référence, le holisme sémantique, la relativité de l'ontologie, la naturalisation de l'épistémologie. La philosophie dite postanalytique et notamment ses déploiements néopragmatistes trouvent dans cette oeuvre leur date de naissance et leurs racines. Quine, dont les thèses paradoxales ont dérouté la philosophie analytique, est une figure dominante de cette tradition qui est au coeur de l'actualité philosophique contemporaine. (shrink)

On entend par survenance moral la thèse selon laquelle, nécessairement, si deux entités sont parfaitement similaires en ce qui concerne toutes leurs propriétés non-morales, elles sont parfaitement similaires en ce qui concerne leurs propriétés morales. En dépit de son apparente simplicité, cette définition pose de nombreux problèmes. Ainsi, alors que la survenance morale est souvent présentée comme l’une des rares thèses faisant consensus en philosophie, il s’avère à y regarder de près que son interprétation varie grandement selon les philosophes. Trois (...) questions, en particulier, demandent à être éclaircies, sur lesquelles nous nous concentrerons ici : 1. On fait souvent appel à la survenance dans le but d’expliquer les propriétés morales. Mais à strictement parler, la survenance ne revêt par elle-même aucun caractère explicatif : quelle relation la survenance morale entretient-elle avec la relation de fondation ou d’explication morale ? 2. On tient la survenance morale pour une thèse consensuelle, mais on s’accorde peu sur la base de survenance des valeurs morales6. D’aucuns la restreignent à des propriétés naturelles ; d’autres y incluent des propriétés non-naturelles, pour peu qu’elles ne soient pas normatives ; d’autres encore y incluent des propriétés normatives, pour peu qu’elles ne soient pas morales ; d’autres enfin y incluent les principes moraux eux-mêmes. Que recouvre exactement la base de survenance des propriétés morales ? La survenance est une thèse modale (« nécessairement... »). Mais quelle modalité entre-t-elle ici en jeu ? La nécessité qui sous-tend la survenance morale est-elle métaphysique, conceptuelle, normative...? (shrink)

In this paper, after presenting three challenges that any knowledge-based demarcation between science and non-science should meet, namely, the skeptical, triviality, and mimicry challenges, I show how a recent contender in epistemology, viz., presuppositional epistemic contextualism, allows these challenges to be met, hence pointing toward a novel solution to the perennial demarcation problem. Conceiving of scientific knowledge from the vantage point of contextualism forces us to consider science as being first and foremost a distinctive epistemological context, which has the peculiarity (...) of coming with a very high degree of stringency for the truth conditions of putative knowledge attributions. The fact that science imposes particularly stringent norms on knowledge is measured by the extension of the set of counterpossibilities that science is (i) in the business of eliminating on the basis of available evidence and (ii) ready to take seriously (insofar as they are consistent with the scientific community’s pragmatic presuppositions at a given time and place). (shrink)

La question de la liberté est à la fois fondamentale et posée en des termes qui la rendent insoluble : comment penser une action libre si l'on admet que les phénomènes sont soumis à la causalité? En analysant l'émergence du concept de libre arbitre, Olivier Boulnois propose une autre généalogie de la morale.00Sous un problème en apparence évident (la liberté de la volonté, née de l'idée de responsabilité, et la difficulté de penser cette liberté dans un monde régi par (...) des rapports de cause à effet), l'auteur débusque une série de questions correspondant aux différents sens de la liberté : la liberté à l'égard d'une contrainte n'est pas la liberté à l'égard des causes extérieures ou internes ; elle peut viser la liberté d'agir, mais aussi la liberté de choisir entre plusieurs options et la liberté de vouloir ou de ne pas vouloir. Les approches classiques et modernes (celles d'Aristote, d'Augustin, de Descartes ou de Leibniz) sont confrontées aux pensées critiques des XlXe-XXe siècles (de Nietzsche à Freud et Wittgenstein). D'une liberté à l'autre, les questions ne sont pas les mêmes - ainsi, Aristote élabore une théorie cohérente de l'action sans poser la question de la liberté.00Il fallait faire apparaître l'± impensé? des théories du libre arbitre pour poser correctement la question, et espérer la résoudre. (shrink)

The eighteenth century, having inherited a pessimism from classical anthropology that its own ideology of progress had to absorb, seemed to have invented le mal de vivre. Clues to this condition are suggested by the etymology of the term vacuus: vacuousness of existence (“Everywhere I find a terrifying emptiness,” asserted the hero of a novel around 1769), and “a vague disquiet which permeates everything and finds nothing to calm it,” according to the definition of Jacques the Fatalist. Le mal de (...) vivre was indeed an invention because, despite a terminology that was inspired by the theory of humors (“hysterical vapors” among women; “hypochondriac melancholy” for men), the philosophers and doctors of the Enlightenment already had envisaged the fatality of an anatomical “limit” for the etiology of “afflictions of the soul.” In this way, according to the Eléments de Physiologie (Elements of Physiology) of Diderot, the agitation of the imagination actually represented the degree of irritability, or of erethism, of the nervous system: “the dreams of young people in a state of innocence come from the extremities of the fibres (meaning the nervous fibres) which are the original carriers of obscure desires, vague disquiet, a melancholy whose cause they do not understand.” If we believe the article on “delight” (jouissance) in the Encyclopaedia, a “vague and melancholy disquiet,” which is linked in particular with the physiological changes occurring at puberty, constitutes a general and “normal” state of sensation, all “delight” implying by this definition the absence of disquiet in comparison with its external object. Reduced to its vibratile intensities, the “perceiving body” that is deprived of its totalizing metaphor becomes pulverized and fragmented into so many “desiring monads.” Like Condillac's statue, it destabilizes itself through the fields of force of the phenomenal world, completely obedient to the energy economy of other bodies that define its external frontier, left to the contradictory universal laws of attraction and repulsion that govern them: “Here below, each part, through a higher impulse, combines toward the central harmony of a whole. We collide with one another and are thrown backward and forward by the force maintaining a general equilibrium and order, in which we participate mechanically.”. (shrink)

La frappe de la monnaie et le timbrage des amphores relèvent d’une même technique, celle du sceau, qui est la marque d’une autorité publique. Cette étude analyse les rapprochements entre la composition des types monétaires et celle des emblèmes sur les timbres. Elle relève les nombreux exemples d’emploi de la même image. Elle étudie la signification juridique du scellement, qui a pour effet d’indiquer l’objet dokimon, agréé par la cité. Elle compare les modes de contrôle de la monnaie et des (...) amphores. Enfin, elle met en évidence les coïncidences chronologiques entre l’apparition des timbres et la réforme monétaire de 390 ainsi que le passage des timbres anciens aux timbres récents et le passage du groupe IV et au groupe V, vers 335. La prise de Thasos par Philippe V en 202 pourrait aussi marquer l’histoire des timbres et des monnaies. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est double. Il s’agit d'abord d'introduire des données inédites concernant un jeu de langage du serbo-croate : le šatrovački qui, à l'image du verlan connu en France, inverse les syllabes. Je présenterai aussi le chemin qui a été parcouru lors de la confection du corpus. Dans un deuxième temps, un aspect particulier du corpus, l'épenthèse de schwa, fera l'objet d'une exploitation théorique.Le premier objectif sera l’occasion de développer quelques points intéressants parmi lesquels la question non (...) anodine du choix des informateurs, connexe à la marginalité des données considérées, et la question de l’influence du cadre théorique sur la collecte de données. Ce faisant, on verra en quoi réside l’intérêt d’un tel corpus. En outre, une description ainsi qu’une proposition d'explication des processus morpho-phonologiques en jeu seront fournies. On verra notamment que le comportement des bases monosyllabiques CVC est un argument fort en faveur de l’hypothèse des noyaux vides finaux, hypothèse fondée indépendamment. (shrink)

This book presents the framework for a new, comprehensive approach to cognitive science. The proposed paradigm, enaction, offers an alternative to cognitive science's classical, first-generation Computational Theory of Mind. _Enaction_, first articulated by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in _The Embodied Mind_, breaks from CTM's formalisms of information processing and symbolic representations to view cognition as grounded in the sensorimotor dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment. A living organism enacts the world it lives in; its embodied (...) action in the world constitutes its perception and thereby grounds its cognition. _Enaction_ offers a range of perspectives on this exciting new approach to embodied cognitive science. Some chapters offer manifestos for the enaction paradigm; others address specific areas of research, including artificial intelligence, developmental psychology, neuroscience, language, phenomenology, and culture and cognition. Three themes emerge as testimony to the originality and specificity of enaction as a paradigm: the relation between first-person lived experience and third-person natural science; the ambition to provide an encompassing framework applicable at levels from the cell to society; and the difficulties of reflexivity. Taken together, the chapters offer nothing less than the framework for a far-reaching renewal of cognitive science. Contributors: Renaud Barbaras, Didier Bottineau, Giovanna Colombetti, Diego Cosmelli, Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo. Andreas K. Engel, Olivier Gapenne, Véronique Havelange, Edwin Hutchins, Michel Le Van Quyen, Rafael E. Núñez, Marieke Rohde, Benny Shanon, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Adam Sheya, Linda B. Smith, John Stewart, Evan Thompson. (shrink)

The first edited collection to offer a systematic introduction to African phenomenology.

This paper defends hedonic intentionalism, the view that all pleasures, including bodily pleasures, are directed towards objects distinct from themselves. Brentano is the leading proponent of this view. My goal here is to disentangle his significant proposals from the more disputable ones so as to arrive at a hopefully promising version of hedonic intentionalism. I mainly focus on bodily pleasures, which constitute the main troublemakers for hedonic intentionalism. Section 1 introduces the problem raised by bodily pleasures for hedonic intentionalism and (...) some of the main reactions to it. Sections 2 and 3 rebut two main approaches equating bodily pleasures with non- intentional episodes. More precisely, section 2 argues that bodily pleasures cannot be purely non-intentional self-conscious feelings, by relying on Brentano’s objection to Hamilton’s theory of pleasure. Section 3 argues that bodily pleasures cannot be non-intentional sensory qualities by relying on Brentano’s objections to Stumpf’s theory of pleasure. Section 4 develops a brentanian view of the intentionality of bodily pleasures by claiming bodily pleasures are directed at a sui generis class of sensory qualities. Section 5 presents an objection to Brentano’s later theory of pleasure according to which all sensory pleasures are directed at sensing acts. (shrink)

The main contention of this article is that current approaches to ontological emergence are not comprehensive, in that they share a common bias that make them blind to some conceptual space available to emergence. In this article, I devise an alternative perspective on ontological emergence called ‘flat emergence’, which is free of such a bias. The motivation is twofold: not only does flat emergence constitute another viable way to fulfill the initial emergentist promise, but it also allows for making sense (...) of some emergence ascriptions that traditional accounts are unable to accommodate. (shrink)

Contemporary pain literature increasingly acknowledges the need of a multidimensional approach to pain, which accounts for its complex biological, psychological and social components. This is reflected in the recently revised definition of the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) and some contemporary philosophical positions. This paper addresses the need to offer a theoretical approach that integrates the biopsychosocial and qualitative multidimensionality of pain by developing the “social grounding view of pain”. My focus is on seeking a multidimensional philosophical (...) approach that accounts not only for its complex biological and psychological aspects but also and specifically does justice to its social dimension. I draw from some of the most recent multidimensional theoretical and methodological approaches that attempt to account for the social component of pain, including enactivism and interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), to propose the advancement of the social grounding view, which has a particular focus on socially shared linguistic concepts in relation to the meaning and modulation of pain. More specifically, the social grounding view is based on the argument that the meaning of the experience of pain is determined in part by socially shareable linguistic concepts habitually associated with pain. I test this view against empirical cases drawn from pain neuroscience education (PNE) and try to demonstrate how the modification of the linguistic concepts of pain could be used effectively to modulate its experience. (shrink)

The main contention of the present paper is that current approaches to ontological emergence are not comprehensive, in that they share a common bias that make them blind to some conceptual space available to ontological emergence and, accordingly, to some clear-cut empirical cases of such an emergence. The bias in question is twofold. It consists in considering whatever emerges to be both systematically simultaneous with, as well as belonging to a higher level with respect to, what it emerges from. What (...) I aim at showing in this paper is that putting aside such a twofold postulate allows for devising and exploring the prospects of an alternative perspective on ontological emergence, referred to as “flat emergence”. More particularly, I argue that sketching a theory of such an emergence is relevant in two respects: one conceptual, the other empirical. Not only does flat emergence constitute another viable way to fulfill the initial emergentist promise, but it also allows for making sense of some emergence ascriptions that synchronic and/or hierarchical accounts are unable to accommodate. Traduzione dall'inglese a cura di Erica Onnis. (shrink)