In the following article we first present the growing trend of incorporating neuroscience into the law, and the growing acceptance of and trust in neuroscience’s mechanistic and reductionistic explanations of the human mind. We then present and discuss some studies that show how nudging peoples’ beliefs about matters related to human agency (such as free will, decision-making, or self-control) towards a more deterministic, mechanistic and/or reductionistic conception, exerts an influence on their very actions, mentality, and brain processes. We suggest that (...) the neuroscientific view of the human mind exerts an influence on the very cognitive phenomena neuroscience falsely believes to be studying objectively. This holds especially when we consider the systematic integration of neuroscience into the public domain, such as the law. For, such an integration acts as a reinforcement of the public’s and legal decision-makers’ endorsement of and trust in neuroscience’s view of human nature that further changes how people think and act. Such looping effects of neurolaw are probably inevitable. Accordingly, we should be aware of the scope of neuroscientific explanations and be careful not to overstate neuroscientific evidence and findings in legal contexts. (shrink)

In this paper I examine nonreductive materialism (physicalism). This is a position that Terry Horgan favors in his papers and is probably the most widely accepted position in the philosophy of mind in recent decades. In contrast to this, I will argue that nonreductive materialism is an unstable position and will suggest that we can show this using Horgan's own work on the concept of superdupervenience.

Thoughts may have a subject — they may concern a certain topic —without having an object in the sense of being directed upon a referent. It is argued that, once this distinction is acknowledged, a third position between Meinong and Russell can be established. There will then be objectless thoughts which need not be false in view of the non-existence of their purported referents. But there will also be object-dependent thoughts which have their referents necessarily. Neither logically proper names nor (...) non-existing objects need to be introduced if we allow for cases when we are mistaken about what kind of thoughts we are considering. This result is achieved via an analysis of fictional names and a free logic which includes a nonpredicating use of general terms in sentences imitating the logical form of predications. (shrink)

In this paper I describe basic features of traditional (British) emergentism and Popper’s emergentist theory of consciousness and compare them to the contemporary versions of emergentism present in connectionist approach in cognitive sciences. I argue that despite their similarities, the traditional form, as well as Popper’s theory belong to strong causal emergentism and yield radically different ontological consequences compared to the weaker, contemporary version present in cognitive science. Strong causal emergentism denies the causal closure of the physical domain and introduces (...) genuine new mental causal powers and genuine downward causation, while weak emergentism provides new insights in understanding the mechanisms and explanation that is compatible with physicalism. (shrink)

In his book Elements of Mind, Tim Crane gives us a very clear and interesting introduction to the main problems in the philosophy of mind. The central theme of his book is intentionality, but he also gives an account of the mind-body problem, consciousness, and perception, and then he suggests his own solutions to these problems. In this paper I will concentrate on a part in which he discusses the mind-body problem. My main aim will be to look at different (...) physicalistic positions in relation to the mental causation problem, particularly at emergentism as Crane’s favourite position. (shrink)

The main purpose of this book is to investigate, from the philosophical point of view, the concept of mind in some quickly developing fields of contemporary science, from physics and cosmology to biology and cognitive science. New scientific investigations have brought many empirical results that help to explain natural phenomena from quantum states to human thinking, yet the question of the nature of the mind itself is still open. In this book, the authors discuss several philosophical problems raised or reformulated (...) by recent scientific discoveries. The authors use an interdisciplinary and holistic approach that bridges the gap between scientific and humanistic pictures of the mind. (shrink)

Modern science is so much specialised that it seems utopic to try to follow it all at once. This new book is aimed at crossing the gap between specialists and a common understanding of 'modern science'. It would seem desirable that all educated people would know something from the humanities, literature, art but also the newest developments of natural sciences. One aim of this book is to point out the main messages of certain scientific fields, and what is really new (...) and beyond the average educational level, in order to broaden our horizons. Therefore, at the end of the chapters each scientific field possible future contributions and and ethical concerns, if any, are elaborated. (shrink)