These three Ciceronian references, each used only once, have given rise to a most confusing variety of interpretations. In this article I hope to show, as far as the evidence will allow, who these poets were and what sort of poetry Cicero probably had in mind. οί νєώτєροι.
Thi s w or k i s pa r t o f a r e visio n i n p r o g r es s r e visitin g o f mode r n Antidiscrimination L a w tha t th e author s h a v e bee n ca r r yin g ou t o v e r th e las t f iftee n y ears . Th e f irs t pa r t e (...) xamine s t e xt s by a U S politica l philosophe r an d t w o l e ga l scholar s (I . M . Y oung , C . A. MacKinno n an d K . Crensh a w) , tha t h a v e inspire d a propose d concep t o f discriminatio n and a n understandin g o f intersectionalit y base d o n th e ackn o wledgemen t o f system s o f oppres- sion . Th e secon d pa r t focuse s o n th e ana l ysi s o f th e concep t o f multipl e o r intersectional discriminatio n propose d by th e Spanis h l e ga l doctrin e sta r tin g fro m th e l e ga l cas e o f “La Nena” , a w oma n ma r rie d by th e Gips y ritua l tha t w a s denie d he r wid o w ’ s bene f its . F rom th e ab o v e , th e pape r conclude s wit h a serie s o f proposals , amon g w hic h thos e relate d to th e nee d t o a v oi d tha t th e intersectionalit y discours e disag g r e gate s g rou p politica l identity int o ind i vidualit y , reinforce s th e s e x-gende r system , o r strengthen s a n e xcess i v e ly judge- base d Antidiscriminatio n L a w. (shrink)
We use recent interventionist theories of causation to develop a compatibilist account of causal sourcehood, which provides a response to Manipulation Arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. Our account explains the difference between manipulation and determinism, against the claim of Manipulation Arguments that there is no relevant difference. Interventionism allows us to see that causal determinism does not mean that variables outside of the agent causally explain her actions better than variables within the agent, whereas the causal (...) source of a manipulated agent’s actions instead lies outside of the agent in the intentions of the manipulator. As a result, determined agents can have free will and be morally responsible in a way that manipulated agents cannot, contrary to what Manipulation Arguments conclude. In this way, our account demonstrates not only how Manipulation Arguments fail but also how compatibilism can be strengthened by means of a plausible account of causal sourcehood. (shrink)
Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experiments, but certain limitations are inherent in experimental methods. Accordingly, we have designed the Free-Will Intuitions Scale to empirically measure folk intuitions relevant to free-will debates using a different method. This method reveals what folk intuitions are like prior to participants' being put in forced-choice experiments. Our results suggest that a central debate in the experimental philosophy of free will—the “natural” compatibilism debate—is mistaken in assuming that folk intuitions (...) are exclusively either compatibilist or incompatibilist. They also identify a number of important new issues in the empirical study of free-will intuitions. (shrink)
The association of Berdiaev's name with the phenomenon of perestroika seems strange at first glance and even illogical. But perestroika, which is proceeding—or, more precisely, is trying to proceed—under the sign of an intellectual renaissance, has naturally aroused interest in the names of Russian philosophers who have undeservedly been forgotten. One of these is N.A. Berdiaev . He was a Russian patriot and was profoundly concerned with Russia's fate. Living in a critical period, Berdiaev reflected a great deal over the (...) past, present, and future of his Motherland, advanced the idea of its transformation, and even used the term "perestroika" in doing so. His thoughts concerning Russia's political renewal are profound, and some of them are applicable to the present life of our society. (shrink)
Do we have free will? Understanding free will as the ability to act freely, and free actions as exercises of this ability, I maintain that the default answer to this question is “yes.” I maintain that free actions are a natural kind, by relying on the influential idea that kinds are homeostatic property clusters. The resulting position builds on the view that agents are a natural kind and yields an attractive alternative to recent revisionist accounts of free action. My view (...) also overcomes difficulties confronted by previous views according to which free actions might be a natural kind. On my view, free actions exist and we often act freely, as long as we possess various features that are related in the right sorts of ways to each other and to the world. In turn, we acquire and retain the concept as long as most of us possess enough of those features. (shrink)
Incompatibilists often claim that we experience our agency as incompatible with determinism, while compatibilists challenge this claim. We report a series of experiments that focus on whether the experience of having an ability to do otherwise is taken to be at odds with determinism. We found that participants in our studies described their experience as incompatibilist whether the decision was (i) present-focused or retrospective, (ii) imagined or actual, (iii) morally salient or morally neutral. The only case in which participants did (...) not give incompatibilist judgments was when the question was explicitly about whether one’s ignorance of the future was compatible with determinism. This lends empirical support to claims made by incompatibilists about the experience of agency, while also showing that compatibilist accounts of ability are inadequate to the reported phenomenology. Our results also inform recent debates about the presuppositions of deliberation. (shrink)
Kavramlar doğru anlamlandırılmadığı takdirde meselelerin anlaşılması noktasında yanlış sonuçlara varmanın kaçınılmaz olduğu bir hakikattir. Fıtrat kavramı bu manada insanın neliği bağlamında başat kavram olarak her daim farklı değerlendirmelere konu olmuştur. İnsanın, gerek kendisini var eden Allah ile olan ilişkisi gerekse hemcinsleriyle ve içerisinde yaşadığı âlemle ilişkisi çerçevesinde bu kavramın anlam alanının tespiti yine ait olduğu dünya üzerinden yapıldığı zaman konu hakkında doğru sonuçların elde edilmesine imkân tanıyacaktır. Kur’ân ve hadislerde yerini bulan fıtrat kavramının anlam alanına yönelik çalışmaların bu alanlarda derinlemesine (...) tahlili noktasında söz konusu metinleri, kendi iç bütünlükleri ve birbirleriyle olan ilişkileri bağlamında meseleyi ele alması, en sağlıklı yol olacaktır. Bu çalışmada kavramın önce sözlük anlamı, türevleri üzerinden ele alınmış daha sonra Kur’ân ve hadislerde geçtiği durumları, belirtilen usûl üzerinden değerlendirmeye tâbi tutulmuştur. Sonuç olarak luğavî anlamı da dikkate alınarak fıtrat kavramı ile Kur’ân’da insanın Allah’la ilişkisine, hadislerde ise insanın doğasındaki sâfiyete ve insanlarla olan ilişkisinde dikkat gerektiren yönüne vurgu yapıldığı ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. (shrink)
This collection provides a selection of the most essential contributions to the contemporary free will debate. Among the issues discussed and debated are skepticism and naturalism, alternate possibilities, the consequence argument, libertarian metaphysics, illusionism and revisionism, optimism and pessimism, neuroscience and free will, and experimental philosophy.
Öz Çalışmanın konusu irfanî geleneğin on beşinci yüzyıldaki önemli temsilcilerinden ve aynı zamanda İbnü’l-Arabî’nin takipçilerinden biri olan İbn Türke’nin varlık mertebelerine dair görüşleridir. Konu, İbn Türke’nin varlık ve varlığın mertebeleri ile ilgili düşüncelerinden hareketle hazırlanmıştır. Birincil kaynakların esas alındığı bu çalışmada, İbn Türke ve Ekberî geleneğin önemli temsilcilerinin eserlerine müracaat edilmiştir. Çalışmanın amacı, felsefe ve kelâmın yanı sıra tasavvuf felsefesinin en önemli konularından biri olan varlık düşüncesi ve varlık mertebelerini İbn Türke’nin görüşleri çerçevesinde ele alarak âlemdeki varoluşun hakikatinin ne olduğu, (...) insanoğlunun özünün nereden geldiği gibi temel sorulara cevap olabilecek özgün bir çalışma ortaya koymaktır. Bu çalışmayla; varlığın bir ve tek hakikat olduğu, Hak’tan feyz ederek görünür âlemde ortaya çıkan her şeyin O’nun isim ve sıfatlarının tecellisi olduğu, her ne kadar Hak’tan ayrıymış gibi görünse de aslında Hakk’a doğru sonsuz bir dönüş içerisinde olduğu, dolayısıyla tek varlıktan kaynaklı çok sayıda varlığın esasen yokluğa mahkûm olduğu ve asıl varlığın Allah olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. (shrink)
Монография представляет собой исследование философских взглядов одного из представителей второй половины XIX века, мыслителя, публициста, литературного критика, переводчика, издателя, Н. Н. Страхова.
Монография представляет собой исследование философских взглядов одного из представителей второй половины XIX века, мыслителя, публициста, литературного критика, переводчика, издателя, Н. Н. Страхова.
According to familiar accounts, Rousseau held that humans are actuated by two distinct kinds of self love: amour de soi, a benign concern for one's self-preservation and well-being; and amour-propre, a malign concern to stand above other people, delighting in their despite. I argue that although amour-propre can (and often does) assume this malign form, this is not intrinsic to its character. The first and best rank among men that amour-propre directs us to claim for ourselves is that of occupying (...) 'man's estate'. This does not require, indeed it precludes, subjection of others. Amour-propre does not need suppression or circumscription if we are to live good lives; it rather requires direction to its proper end, not a delusive one. (shrink)
Skeptical theists are seeking for some reasonable solutions to the evidential problem of evil. One of the most fundamental responses of skeptical theism is that the concept of “gratuitous evil”, which cannot be a proof of the absence of God. Therefore, it is not the existence of God that skeptical theism suspects. Instead, skeptical theism contemplates whether the evil in the world really has a “gratuitous” basis. This paper focuses on Peter van Inwagen's “no-minimum claim”. No-minimum claim” stands in opposition (...) to the views that assume that God minimizes the evils that exist in the world in order to achieve justice. “No-minimum claim” acknowledges that these evils still have enormous amounts to people. Thus “no-minimum claim” suggests that the evils experienced in the world are incompatible with the “best of all possible worlds” views or the other explanations of classical theodicy. According to the “no minimum claim”, the reason why the amount of evil in the world still seems so high may be God’s deliberate calculations in effecting the distribution of these evils. In order to reach these calculations, it is not necessary for the amount of evil that God allowed to reflect on the world to be perfectly manifested at the minimum level. The purpose of this paper is to consider the skeptical theism approach within the framework of Peter van Inwagen's “no-minimum claim” and to limit his arguments to an alternative approach to skeptic theism. Our claim is that such view coincides with skeptical theism, but the “no- minimum claim” still has some ambiguities at the point of the limits of evil. From this, we can conclude that the “no minimum claim” has received many objections in the skeptical theism literature and these objections are justified at certain points. (shrink)
Libertarians claim that our experience of free choice is indeterministic. They think that, when we choose, our choice feels open in a way that would require indeterminism for the experience to be accurate. This claim then functions as a step in an argument in favour of libertarianism, the view that freedom requires indeterminism and we are free. Since, all else being equal, we should take experience at face value, libertarians argue, we should endorse libertarianism. Compatibilists, who think that freedom is (...) consistent with determinism, respond to this argument in a number of ways, none of which is adequate. This paper defends a stronger compatibilist response. Compatibilists should concede, at least for argument's sake, that our experience of freedom is in a sense libertarian. Yet they should also insist that our experience is in another sense compatibilist. Thus, even if libertarian descriptions of experience are phenomenologically apt, there is still a sense in which the experience might be veridical,.. (shrink)
In his later work, Metafizicheskie predpolozheniia poznaniia. Opyt preodoleniia Kanta i kantianstva [Metaphysical Presuppositions of Knowledge. An Attempt to Overcome Kant and Kantianism], Evgeny N. Trubetskoy tried to overcome the Kantian tradition in philosophy in order to advance his conception of all-unity and the philosophy of absolute and unconditional consciousness. Despite insisting on the distinction between the “historical Kant” and Neo-Kantianism, in reality Trubetskoy was strongly dependent on the Neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant’s philosophy, which meant that his fight against Kantian (...) philosophy was really fought against a conception of Kant he unconsciously adopted from the Neo-Kantians. Evidence of this can be seen in his interpretation of the theory of knowledge and its tasks, his thesis concerning the antimetaphysical direction of Kantian philosophy, and his insistence on the presence of the transcendental method in Kant’s philosophy. (shrink)
Recent empirical evidence indicates that people tend to believe that they possess indeterminist free will, and people’s experience of choosing and deciding is that they possess such freedom. Some also maintain that people’s belief in indeterminist free will has its source in their experience of choosing and deciding. Yet there seem to be good reasons to resist endorsing. Despite this, I maintain that belief in indeterminist free will really does have its source in experience. I explain how this is so (...) by appeal to the phenomenon of prospection, which is the mental simulation of future possibilities for the purpose of guiding action. Crucially, prospection can be experienced. And because of the way in which prospection models choice, it is easy for agents to experience and to believe that their choice is indeterministic. Yet this belief is not justified; the experience of prospection, and hence of free will as being indeterminist, is actually consistent with determinism. (shrink)
Many philosophers think not only that we are free to act otherwise than we do, but also that we experience being free in this way. Terry Horgan argues that such experience is compatibilist: it is accurate even if determinism is true. According to Horgan, when people judge their experience as incompatibilist, they misinterpret it. While Horgan's position is attractive, it incurs significant theoretical costs. I sketch an alternative way to be a compatibilist about experiences of free agency that avoids these (...) costs. In brief, I assume that experiences of freedom have a sort of phenomenal content that is inaccurate if determinism is true, just as many incompatibilists claim. Still, I argue that these experiences also have another sort of phenomenal content that is normally accurate, even assuming determinism. (shrink)
In his book on Karl Barth Professor T. F. Torrance spoke at one point of ‘the great watershed of modern theology’. ‘There are,’ he wrote, 1 ‘two basic issues here. On the one hand, it is the very substance of the Christian faith that is at stake, and on the other hand, it is the fundamental nature of scientific method, in its critical and methodological renunciation of prior understanding, that is at stake. This is the great watershed of modern theology: (...) either we take the one way or the other – there is no third alter native… one must go either in the direction taken by Barth or in the direction taken by Bultmann.’. (shrink)
In recent years the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein have received much attention from philosophers in general and especially from philosophers interested in religion; and there is no doubt that Wittgenstein's legacy of thought is both highly suggestive and highly problematical. It seems likely, however, that the vogue which Wittgenstein now enjoys owes not a little to his peculiar place in the development of modern philosophy and, in particular, of that empiricist tradition in philosophy which stems from what has been called (...) the revolution in philosophy in the early decades of the present century. (shrink)