We show that the both assertions “in every vector space B over a finite element field every subspace V ⊆ B has a complementary subspace S” and “for every family [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A] of disjoint odd sized sets there exists a subfamily ℱ={Fj:j ϵω} with a choice function” together imply the axiom of choice AC. We also show that AC is equivalent to the statement “in every vector space over ℚ every generating set includes a basis”.

This book studies the development of ideas on freedom, coercion and power in the history of economic thought. It focuses on the exchange of goods and services and on terms of exchange and examines the nature of choice, that is, the state of the will of economic actors making exchange decisions. In a social context, anyone's range of choice is restricted by the choices made by others. The first to raise the question of the will in this economic (...) context were the medieval scholastics, drawing on non-economic analytic models inherited from antiquity and mainly from Aristotle. From these origins, views on economic choice, coercion and power are recorded, as they gradually change over the centuries, until they manifest themselves in more contemporary disputes between different branches of institutional economics. (shrink)

In the setting of ZF, i.e., Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory without the Axiom of Choice , we study partitions of Russell-sets into sets each with exactly n elements , for some integer n. We show that if n is odd, then a Russell-set X has an n -ary partition if and only if |X | is divisible by n. Furthermore, we establish that it is relative consistent with ZF that there exists a Russell-set X such that |X | is (...) not divisible by any finite cardinal n > 1. (shrink)

There seems to be a view that intuitionists not only take the Axiom of Choice (AC) to be true, but also believe it a consequence of their fundamental posits. Widespread or not, this view is largely mistaken. This article offers a brief, yet comprehensive, overview of the status of AC in various intuitionistic and constructivist systems. The survey makes it clear that the Axiom of Choice fails to be a theorem in most contexts and is even (...) outright false in some important contexts. Of the systems surveyed, only intensional type theory renders AC a theorem, but the extent of AC in that theory does not include, for instance, real analysis. Only a small amount of extensionality is required in order for the obvious proof an intuitionist might offer for AC to break down. (shrink)

A weak form of intuitionistic set theory WST lacking the axiom of extensionality is introduced. While WST is too weak to support the derivation of the law of excluded middle from the axiom of choice, we show that bee.ng up WST with moderate extensionality principles or quotient sets enables the derivation to go through.

The principle of set theory known as the Axiom of Choice has been hailed as “probably the most interesting and, in spite of its late appearance, the most discussed axiom of mathematics, second only to Euclid's axiom of parallels which was introduced more than two thousand years ago” (Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel & Levy 1973, §II.4). The fulsomeness of this description might lead those unfamiliar with the axiom to expect it to be as startling as, say, the (...) Principle of the Constancy of the Velocity of Light or the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. But in fact the Axiom of Choice as it is usually stated appears humdrum, even self-evident. For it amounts to nothing more than the claim that, given any collection of mutually disjoint nonempty sets, it is possible to assemble a new set — a transversal or choice set — containing exactly one element from each member of the given collection. Nevertheless, this seemingly innocuous principle has far-reaching mathematical consequences — many indispensable, some startling — and has come to figure prominently in discussions on the foundations of mathematics. It (or its equivalents) have been employed in countless mathematical papers, and a number of monographs have been exclusively devoted to it. (shrink)

The present article deals with the power of the axiom of choice within the second-order predicate logic. We investigate the relationship between several variants of AC and some other statements, known as equivalent to AC within the set theory of Zermelo and Fraenkel with atoms, in Henkin models of the one-sorted second-order predicate logic with identity without operation variables. The construction of models follows the ideas of Fraenkel and Mostowski. It is e. g. shown that the well-ordering theorem (...) for unary predicates is independent from AC for binary predicates and from the trichotomy law for unary predicates. Moreover, we show that the AC for binary predicates follows neither from the trichotomy law for unary predicates nor from Zorn's lemma for unary predicates nor from the formalization of the axiom of choice for disjoint families of sets for binary predicates, and that the trichotomy law for unary predicates does not follow from AC for binary predicates. (shrink)

We construct peculiar Hilbert spaces from counterexamples to the axiom of choice. We identify the intrinsically effective Hamiltonians with those observables of quantum theory which may coexist with such spaces. Here a self adjoint operator is intrinsically effective if and only if the Schrödinger equation of its generated semigroup is soluble by means of eigenfunction series expansions.

It is shown that in ZF set theory the axiom of choice holds iff every non empty topological space has a maximal closed filter.

We combine a variety of constructive methods (including forcing, realizability, asymmetric interpretation), to obtain consistency results concerning combinatory logic with extensionality and (forms of) the axiom of choice.

The work of Roshdi Rashed has set a landmark in many senses, but perhaps the most striking one is his inexhaustible thrive to open new paths for the study of conceptual links between science and philosophy deeply rooted in the interaction of historic with systematic perspectives. In the present talk I will focus on how a framework that has its source in philosophy of logic, interacts with some new results on the foundations of mathematics. More precisely, the main objective of (...) my brief remarks is to discuss some claims of the late Hintikka who brought forward the idea that a game-theoretical interpretation of the Axiom of Choice yields its meaning “evident”. More precisely I will show that if we develop Per Martin-Löf’s demonstration of the axiom within a dialogical setting, the claim of Hintikka can be upheld. However, the dialogical demonstration, shows that, contrary to the expectations of Hintikka, the meaning that the game-theoretical setting provides to the Axiom is compatible with constructivist rather than with classical tenets. (shrink)

The method of morphisms is a well-known application of Dialectica categories to set theory. In a previous work, Valeria de Paiva and the author have asked how much of the Axiom of Choice is needed in order to carry out the referred applications of such method. In this paper, we show that, when considered in their full generality, those applications of Dialectica categories give rise to equivalents of either the Axiom of Choice or Partition Principle —which (...) is a consequence of $\textbf{AC}$ whose precise status of its relationship with$\textbf{AC}$ itself is an open problem for more than a hundred years. (shrink)

We show that the Axiom of Countable Choice is necessary and sufficient to prove that the existence of a Borel measure on a pseudometric space such that the measure of open balls is positive and finite implies separability of the space. In this way a negative answer to an open problem formulated in Górka (Am Math Mon 128:84–86, 2020) is given. Moreover, we study existence of maximal $$\delta $$ δ -separated sets in metric and pseudometric spaces from the (...) point of view the Axiom of Choice and its weaker forms. (shrink)

The principle of set theory known as the Axiom of Choice (AC) has been hailed as “probably the most interesting and, in spite of its late appearance, the most discussed axiom of mathematics, second only to Euclid’s axiom of parallels which was introduced more than two thousand years ago”1 It has been employed in countless mathematical papers, a number of monographs have been exclusively devoted to it, and it has long played a prominently role in discussions (...) on the foundations of mathematics. (shrink)

From 1908 to 1916, articles supporting the axiom of choice were scant. The situation changed in 1916, when Wacław Sierpiński published a series of articles reviving the debate. The posterity of the axiom of choice as we know it would be unimaginable without Sierpiński’s efforts.

We show that it is not possible to construct a Fraenkel-Mostowski model in which the axiom of choice for well-ordered families of sets and the axiom of choice for sets are both true, but the axiom of choice is false.

We study conditions for a topological space to be metrizable, properties of metrizable spaces, and the role the axiom of choice plays in these matters.

We study statements about countable and well-ordered unions and their relation to each other and to countable and well-ordered forms of the axiom of choice. Using WO as an abbreviation for “well-orderable”, here are two typical results: The assertion that every WO family of countable sets has a WO union does not imply that every countable family of WO sets has a WO union; the axiom of choice for WO families of WO sets does not imply (...) that the countable union of countable sets is WO. (shrink)

Kurt Gödel, mathematician and logician, was one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century. Gödel fled Nazi Germany, fearing for his Jewish wife and fed up with Nazi interference in the affairs of the mathematics institute at the University of Göttingen. In 1933 he settled at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, where he joined the group of world-famous mathematicians who made up its original faculty. His 1940 book, better known by its short title, The Consistency of (...) the Continuum Hypothesis, is a classic of modern mathematics. The continuum hypothesis, introduced by mathematician George Cantor in 1877, states that there is no set of numbers between the integers and real numbers. It was later included as the first of mathematician David Hilbert's twenty-three unsolved math problems, famously delivered as a manifesto to the field of mathematics at the International Congress of Mathematicians in Paris in 1900. In The Consistency of the Continuum Hypothesis Gödel set forth his proof for this problem. In 1999, Time magazine ranked him higher than fellow scientists Edwin Hubble, Enrico Fermi, John Maynard Keynes, James Watson, Francis Crick, and Jonas Salk. He is most renowned for his proof in 1931 of the 'incompleteness theorem,' in which he demonstrated that there are problems that cannot be solved by any set of rules or procedures. His proof wrought fruitful havoc in mathematics, logic, and beyond. (shrink)

In this paper we study some statements similar to the Partition Principle and the Trichotomy. We prove some relationships between these statements, the Axiom of Choice, and the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis. We also prove some independence results. MSC: 03E25, 03E50, 04A25, 04A50.

Takeuti introduced an infinitary proof system for determinate logic and showed that for transitive models of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Dependent Choice that contain all reals, the cut-elimination theorem is equivalent to the Axiom of Determinacy, and in particular contradicts the Axiom of Choice. We consider variants of Takeuti's theorem without assuming the failure of the Axiom of Choice. For instance, we show that if one removes atomic formulae of infinite (...) arity from the language of Takeuti's proof system, then cut elimination is equivalent to a determinacy hypothesis provable, e.g., in ZFC + “there are infinitely many Woodin cardinals.” A slight extension of the proof system admits cut elimination for countable sequents under the same assumptions. A simple modification of the proof system yields analogs of the results above for the Axiom of Real Determinacy and uncountably many Woodin cardinals. (shrink)

In the realm of metric spaces the role of choice principles is investigated.

In this paper, we present set theories based upon the paraconsistent logic Pac. We describe two different techniques to construct models of such set theories. The first of these is an adaptation of one used to construct classical models of positive comprehension. The properties of the models obtained in that way give rise to a natural paraconsistent set theory which is presented here. The status of the axiom of choice in that theory is also discussed. The second leads (...) to show that any classical universe of set theory (e.g. a model of ZF) can be extended to a paraconsistent one, via a term model construction using an adapted bisimulation technique. (shrink)

We investigate various ways of introducing axioms for randomness in set theory. The results show that these axioms, when added to ZF, imply the failure of AC. But the axiom of extensionality plays an essential role in the derivation, and a deeper analysis may ultimately show that randomness is incompatible with extensionality.

A new method is presented for constructing models of set theory, using a technique of forming pseudo-ultrapowers. In the presence of the axiom of choice, the traditional ultrapower construction has proven to be extremely powerful in set theory and model theory; if the axiom of choice is not assumed, the fundamental theorem of ultrapowers may fail, causing the ultrapower to lose almost all of its utility. The pseudo-ultrapower is designed so that the fundamental theorem holds even (...) if choice fails; this is arranged by means of an application of the omitting types theorem. The general theory of pseudo-ultrapowers is developed. Following that, we study supercompactness in the absence of choice, and we analyze pseudo-ultrapowers of models of the axiom of determinateness and various infinite exponent partition relations. Relationships between pseudo-ultrapowers and forcing are also discussed. (shrink)

The Nielsen‐Schreier theorem asserts that subgroups of free groups are free. In the first section we show that this theorem does not follow from the Linear Ordering Principle, thus strengthening the fact that it implies the Axiom of Choice for families of finite sets. In the second section, we show that a stronger variant of the Nielsen‐Schreier theorem implies the Axiom of Choice.

The early controversies surrounding the axiom of choice are well known, as are the many results that followed concerning its dependence from, and equivalence to, other mathematical propositions. This paper focuses not on the logical status of the axiom but rather on showing why it fails in certain categories.

We show that several theorems about Polish spaces, which depend on the axiom of choice ), have interesting corollaries that are theorems of the theory \, where \ is the axiom of dependent choices. Surprisingly it is natural to use the full \ to prove the existence of these proofs; in fact we do not even know the proofs in \. Let \ denote the axiom of determinacy. We show also, in the theory \\), a theorem (...) which strenghtens and generalizes the theorem of Drinfeld and Margulis about the unicity of Lebesgue’s measure. This generalization is false in \, but assuming the existence of large enough cardinals it is true in the model \,\in \rangle \). (shrink)

A generalization of the axioms of choice says that all the Skolem functions of a true first‐order sentence exist. This generalization can be implemented on the first‐order level by generalizing the rule of existential instantiation into a rule of functional instantiation. If this generalization is carried out in first‐order axiomatic set theory , it is seen that in any model of FAST, there are sentences S which are true but whose Skolem functions do not exist. Since this existence is (...) what the truth of S means in a combinational sense, in any model of FAST there are sentences which are set‐theoretical “true” but false in the normal sense of the word. This shows that the assumptions on which the axiom of choice rests cannot be fully implemented in FAST. The axiom choice is not a set‐theoretical principle. (shrink)

A generalization of the axioms of choice says that all the Skolem functions of a true first‐order sentence exist. This generalization can be implemented on the first‐order level by generalizing the rule of existential instantiation into a rule of functional instantiation. If this generalization is carried out in first‐order axiomatic set theory, it is seen that in any model of FAST, there are sentences S which are true but whose Skolem functions do not exist. Since this existence is what (...) the truth of S means in a combinational sense, in any model of FAST there are sentences which are set‐theoretical “true” but false in the normal sense of the word. This shows that the assumptions on which the axiom of choice rests cannot be fully implemented in FAST. The axiom choice is not a set‐theoretical principle. (shrink)

The present work is an attempt to break ground in mathematics proper, armed with the accepting view just described. Specifically, we shall examine various versions of antinomic set theory, in particular the axiom of choice, keeping the presentation as intuitive as possible, more in the manner of a nineteenth century paper than as a thoroughly formalized system. The reason for such a presentation is the conviction that at this point it should be the mathematics that eventually determines the (...) logic, rather than the other way around. (shrink)