La primera parte de este artículo expone la interpretación praxeológica del concepto noológico de “acto”. En la segunda, se muestra la crítica que Antonio González Fernández hace de esta. Su objeción consiste en que los actos no pueden ser considerados cosas reales, sino solo el surgir de estas. A partir de dicha observación a la noología, González Fernández no solo da surgimiento a su praxeología (también conocida como hiparqueología), sino que su sistema filosófico comienza a ser cuestionado por no explicar (...) qué son, en el mundo de los hechos, los actos, más allá de la suposición de que ellos están ahí a pesar de ser invisibles. En la tercera y última sección se presentan algunas hipótesis para procurar solucionar ciertas objeciones al concepto praxeológico de “acto”, tales como el anteriormente mencionado y las aparentes circularidades y posibles contradicciones que hay al interior del sistema praxeológico. (shrink)

The definition of the sophist as "image-maker" allows Plato to add to the novelties he presents in the _Sophist_ two topics he hadn't deepened in his previous dialogues: (a) a "definition" of being (247e) and (b) the influence this position will have on the relationship between image and truth. From a first definition of the image proposed by Theaetetus in 240a we deduce that, even if it is not true, it is "really" (_óntos_) an image, which does not coincide with (...) the devalued or secondary reality that Plato had always attributed to this notion, from which all truth was absent. This conclusion, indeed, astonishes Theaetetus, attached to the Platonic "orthodoxy". This astonishment is not present in the orthodox version of the text of the passage 240a-c of the _Sophist_, which inherits from a modification of the widespread text from 1851. Once the original version is restored, the definition of the fact of being proposed in 247e justifies the "really real" character of the image, which respects the condition required to everything that "possesses" being: the possibility of acting or being affected. Indeed, the image is "affected" by the model, that it tries to imitate, because the model "affects" it. The image, even if it is not true, is real. (shrink)

This chapter is a discussion of Class and Resemblance Nominalism. According to the traditional versions of these theories, properties are classes of particulars. Thus, the property of being red is the class of red particulars, and the property of being square is the class of square particulars. Several objections have been advanced against these theories, and one of the most powerful of such objections is the so-called Coextension Difficulty, according to which Class and Resemblance Nominalism have to wrongly identify distinct (...) but coextensive properties. After discussing the nature of Class and Resemblance Nominalism, some problems of these theories and how they can be deal with, the superiority of Class and Resemblance Nominalism over other theories of properties and the superiority of Resemblance Nominalism over Class Nominalism, I concentrate on the Coextension Difficulty. With respect to this I argue that Class and Resemblance Nominalism can be developed in such a way that they admit properties without identifying them with classes, and this allows them to avoid the Coextension Difficulty, since such versions of these theories are not forced to wrongly identify distinct but coextensive properties. Thus the Coextension Difficulty is not a lethal problem for Class and Resemblance Nominalism. (shrink)

In this paper I argue, contra Fraser MacBride, that conceptual analysis, and in particular the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity, can solve the Problem of Universals, whether understood as the One over Many or the as the Many over One. In this paper I show why the solutions needed to solve either version of the problem must be in terms of truthmakers, and that the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity is not sufficient to solve them.

En "Paraconsistencia y fundamentación de las matemáticas" se reformula un aspecto del programa formalista de Hilbert, problema clásico dentro del panorama de la filosofía de las matemáticas. Lo anterior se hace desde un enfoque no clásico de la lógica, particularmente desde LP de Priest. Finalizando el articulo se rescatan las virtudes de la reformulación de este problema clásico y se evalúa hasta qué punto puede ser posible hablar del programa formalista desde la luz de la aritmética inconsistente de Priest.

Ensayo de Antonio Rodríguez Huéscar sobre la obra del filósofo y ensayista español.

El presente artículo pretende describir el ethos, es decir, el hábito y la morada del historiador del arte, a partir de los elementos que vertebraron a la Historia Social del Arte: la reivindicación de los hechos, la consideración de las obras como el depósito de un intercambio social y la voluntad de ceñirse a los límites de lo históricamente descriptible. Distinguiéndose tanto de las preocupaciones específicas de la estética filosófica como de la reivindicación del pathos anacrónico propia de los recientes (...) programas de antropología de las imágenes, dicha historiografía, que en la generación de Haskell o Baxandall estuvo atravesada por un escepticismo general en relación con la teoría, se postulará, con la llegada de la New Art History, menos como un método que como el terreno sobre el que habría de lanzarse toda pregunta o todo concepto importado de la filosofía. (shrink)

Il arrive que la guerre froide soit pensée comme une victoire de Tocqueville sur Marx. Le dialogue imaginé dans ce livre montre que les idées de démocratie ou de mode de production capitaliste sont d’abord une alternative théorique pour penser la société contemporaine. La redéfinition possible de la démocratie sur le modèle de celle du communisme par Marx crée cependant un terrain où les positions théoriques et politiques peuvent s’affronter pour déterminer le cours de la révolution permanente de leur temps. (...) Tocqueville veut contrôler ce processus dans un sens libéral et Marx le révolutionner dans un sens communiste. D’un point de vue tocquevillien, la guerre froide est terminée parce que la démocratie est enfin séparée de la révolution. Elle est un ordre où règne la loi, et non un processus. La dialectique de la démocratie et du communisme, à la fois opposées et en continuité, montre cependant la fragilité théorique de cette thèse en faisant sentir la tendance de l’idée démocratique à s’idéologiser, que dénonçait aussi Tocqueville, et pose la question de sa capacité à maintenir sa puissance utopique. (shrink)

La Gastronomía y la Prensa están de moda en el siglo XXI. Consideramos que la temática del comer, en los Medios impresos, siempre tuvo atención informativa al ser una parcela empresarial que al mismo tiempo reportaba contenido publicitario. No olvidemos que la realidad de los mundialmente llamados “mass media” se basa, para su supervivencia, en la Publicidad. Ofrecemos un análisis del tratamiento periodístico del ámbito gastronómico en suplementos semanales de Prensa en España, a través de los más representativos, habiendo seleccionado (...) a los de mayor impacto. Las Tablas reflejan los datos dentro del rigor y la planificada sistemática científica. (shrink)

This article introduces the perspectivist interpretation of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality, characterized by two core theses. According to the results thesis, the three treatises of GM introduce three types of critical results, respectively: psychological claims about the value of morality for the interests of various character types; physiological claims about its value for the ‘progress of the species’; and medical claims about its value for health. According to the distinction thesis, the critical results of GM are descriptive, while (...) their reader-specific implications are normative. This interpretation illuminates the genealogical method of GM by answering four fundamental questions about its historical method, the history of morality that it reveals, the critical results of GM, and their intended therapeutic effects. Challenging the widespread assumption that the critical results of GM are evaluative claims, the perspectivist interpretation reveals the novelty of Nietzsche’s “new demand” for a critique of values not only relative to his predecessors’ approach to critique, but also to his own previous works. GM offers a critique that is grounded on factual claims, at once extramoral and external to morality, and internal to its readers’ evaluative perspectives, even those who remain beholden to moral values. Consequently, its authority and therapeutic efficacy are not threatened by discrepancies between it and its readers’ affective-evaluative preferences. (shrink)

Clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats genome editing has already reinvented the direction of genetic and stem cell research. For more complex diseases it allows scientists to simultaneously create multiple genetic changes to a single cell. Technologies for correcting multiple mutations in an in vivo system are already in development. On the surface, the advent and use of gene editing technologies is a powerful tool to reduce human suffering by eradicating complex disease that has a genetic etiology. Gene drives are (...) CRISPR mediated alterations to genes that allow them to be passed on to subsequent populations at rates that approach one hundred per cent transmission. Therefore, from an anticipatory biomedical ethics perspective, it is possible to conceive gene drive being used with CRISPR to permanently ameliorate aberrant genes from wild-type populations containing mutations. However, there are also a number of possible side effects that could develop as the result of combining gene editing and gene drive technologies in an effort to eradicate complex diseases. In this paper, we critically analyse the hypothesis that the combination of CRISPR and gene drive will have a deleterious effect on human populations from an ethical perspective by developing an anticipatory ethical analysis of the implications for the use of CRISPR together with gene drive in humans. (shrink)

In seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Eberhard behauptet Kant, Kritizismus sei die eigentliche Apologie von Leibniz. Diese Äußerung darf nicht einfach als sarkastisch abgetan werden. Kant kann dies insofern ernsthaft denken und behaupten, da für ihn die Transzendentalphilosophie die wesentliche philosophische Bedeutung des leibnizschen Gedankens aufhebt, liegt doch schon in Leibniz ein kritizistischer Kern, welcher wiedergewonnen werden kann. Man sieht hier nur einen Aspekt dieser historischen Transformation von Leibniz im kantischen Gedanken, und zwar: die explizite Behauptung Kants, das Konzept der prästabilierten Harmonie (...) werde in der Theorie der reflektierenden Urteilskraft und im Begriff der Zweckmäßigkeit kritisch aufgehoben. Dazu muss man jedoch vorher den Grundzug des kritischen Unterschieds zwischen Kant und der leibniz-wolffschen Philosophie durch eine Diskussion über die Bedeutung des Begriffs des Transzendentalen erläutern. (shrink)

In this paper I survey some recent developments in experimental philosophy and discuss their bearing on two leading theories in epistemology: Contextualism and Interest Relative Invariantism. In the first part of the paper, I survey some general issues of how experimental philosophy may be relevant to assessing contextualism and IRI. In the second part, I discuss and critique some of the recent experimental work.

This book deals with the topic that has been understudied of what Bioethics of Displacement is and what are their implications, subverting the anthropocentric moral view for the resulting loving, knowing and experiencing from the displaced ones, those who have lost their center and offering a case study from the Salvadorian humanitarian crises that will shed a new light on how political decision-making works.

Sophists were active participants in ancient discussions about being or what-is at the most general level. This chapter discusses the contributions of Gorgias, Protagoras, Xeniades, and Lycophron in the context of the Eleatic philosophers Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus. All of these figures share a serious commitment to ontological inquiry as well as a concern with the problems that arise when discussing being or what-is. They also share an approach to these problems that is at times paradoxical and self-undermining. -/- The (...) chapter begins with a brief discussion of Parmenides’ poem, a work that serves as an important backdrop for later ontology. It then covers Gorgias’ On Not-Being, a response to the Eleatics and a unique contribution in its own right. Gorgias’ work is then compared with that of Zeno and Melissus. Finally, the more limited evidence we have of Protagoras, Xeniades, and Lycophron’s ontological theorizing is discussed. (shrink)

I offer a close reading of the first part of Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego, arguing that contrary to widely held interpretation, one of Sartre's main goals in that text is to defend the view that consciousness does not necessitate self-awareness, that not all conscious states need be, ipso facto, states of self-awareness. In addition, I explain that this view about the conceptual relationship between consciousness and self-awareness has important methodological implications. One of the standard strategies for accounting for (...) the possibility of the type of capacity to have I* thoughts and attitudes is based on the assumption that being conscious necessarily entails being self-aware in at least a minimal sense, and then proceeds to explain how it I*-thoughts and attitudes are possible on the basis of those minimal states of self-awareness. Yet if Sartre's account of self-awareness is so much as plausible, this kind of strategy is bound to be incomplete. By helping itself to a notion of minimal self-awareness that is purportedly constitutive of consciousness, it fails to account for what is, by its own lights, the most fundamental form of self-awareness. (shrink)

Whether Nietzsche’s genealogical critique of morality is best understood as an internal or as an external critique remains a matter of controversy. On the internalist interpretation (Ridley, Owen, Merrick ), the genealogical enterprise takes as its starting point the perspective being criticized, gradually revealing it to be untenable ‘from within.’ On the externalist interpretation (Leiter, and arguably Geuss, Williams, and Janaway ), this constraint is lifted; the starting point of the critique need not be the perspective being criticized, but may (...) be that of someone who already suspects the latter to be untenable. According to a common objection to ‘external critique’ interpretations, the limited-scope objection, since an external critique to a value-system could only work on an audience whose members were predisposed to abandon that system of values, ‘external critique’ interpretations impose a severe limitation on the transformative potential of Nietzsche’s project. ‘Internal critique’ interpretations, by contrast, can seem hard to reconcile with the polemical character of On the Genealogy of Morality (which lends the book its subtitle, Eine Streitschrift) and with Nietzsche’s frequent remarks to the effect his works were addressing a particular, ‘higher,’ kind of individual. -/- The overarching goal in this paper is to call into question the usefulness of the ‘internal-external’ or ‘immanent-transcendent’ dichotomy for understanding Nietzsche’s genealogical critique. I argue that the apparent usefulness of the distinction between external and internal critiques when approaching Nietzsche’s works rests on the assumption that any critique of values must itself be grounded on values that function as evaluative-critical standards. If the assumption is right, then one of two things, either the values that are deployed as standards coincide with those that are the target of critique, in which case the critique is internal, or they are not (etc.). Thus the assumption is liable to render us forgetful of a third possibility, that of a critical strategy that does not work by deploying (internal or external) values as standards of critical assessment, but by revealing something about the nature of value, and more precisely about the origin of any individual’s commitments to their values. -/- On the view that I defend, one of the crucial steps of Nietzsche’s genealogical method is to bring his reader to realize that any individual’s commitment to their values is expressive of and rooted in their commitment to preserve their way of life. Realizing this does not require that the reader abandon their own values. But it does require that they acknowledge that were they committed to a relevantly different way of life, they would subscribe to different values. And this, in turn, suffices to bring about a transformation in their understanding of and relationship to those commitments through the further realization that it is ultimately always up to them to undertake the project of taking distance from and ‘re-evaluating’ those values. (shrink)

Since ancient Greece’s “megalopolis,” the concept of vast cities has loomed in the urban discourse. A century ago, English planner Patrick Geddes warned about a growing imbalance between traditional society and ever-larger conurbations, an anxiety that Lewis Mumford later invoked to predict that urban hubris would inevitably collapse of its own weight. In 1961, by contrast, the geographer Jean Gottman surveyed the interconnected agglomeration stretching from Washington, D.C. up the east coast of the United States to the cities of southern (...) New England, and more optimistically highlighted this new urban form’s governance potential. Today, the question is not whether urbanism will arrive at the scale that so concerned Geddes and Mumford yet engaged Gottman—it already has. Commentators and scholars increasingly recognize that vast polycentric urban regions are displacing cities and metropolitan areas as the locus of modern growth and development. Eleven distinct urban-centered megaregions, for example, concentrate the bulk of the population and economic activity in the United States, and similar clusters are coalescing globally, from Greater Tokyo, Beijing, and the Pearl River Delta, to the arc from São Paulo to Rio de Janeiro, to the European urban spine running from London to Milan. Grappling with the phenomenon’s legal-institutional dimensions—whether and how to formalize governance to match this scale—requires more than transposing the descriptive and normative discourse on metropolitanism. Crosscurrents around fragmentation, efficiency, inequality, and democratic legitimacy refract, but there are distinct arguments for fostering governance—and equally particular concerns to anticipate—with the rise of the megalopolis. (shrink)

La «démythologisation» est une herméneutique philosophique forgée par Hans Jonas au début de son itinéraire intellectuel, afin d'interpréter existentiellement les récits mythologiques ainsi que les textes théologiques et philosophiques de l’Antiquité tardive. Il s’agissait d’abord d’une méthodologie d’objectivation et subjectivation pour comprendre l’expérience existentielle de l’homme gnostique face à la divinité et l’être dans le monde. Dans la suite, Jonas a développé l’herméneutique de la démythologisation par l’objectivation et la subjectivation par rapport aux textes néotestamentaires. Le mot démythologisation (Entmythologisierung) est (...) utilisé par lui pour la première fois en 1930 dans une étude philosophique, «Sur la structure herméneutique du dogme», pour comprendre le problème existentiel de la liberté chrétienne. Quelques années plus tard, il a développé une phénoménologie herméneutique, également par l’objectivation et la subjectivation, afin de comprendre l’être vivant et la particularité de l’homme dans la nature. Entre-temps, Hans Jonas a aussi utilisé l’herméneutique de la démythologisation par l’objectivation et la subjectivation pour critiquer la philosophie de Martin Heidegger et la théologie de Rudolf Bultmann dans plusieurs articles philosophiques par rapport au gnosticisme, à la théologie et à la démythologisation bultmannienne, ainsi que pour rédiger Le Concept de Dieu après Auschwitz. (shrink)

Los distintos intentos por aclarar el concepto de justificación epistémica han dado lugar a los más intrincados debates en la epistemología analítica contemporánea. Da cuenta de ello la controversia entre el internismo y el externismo de la justificación, y las discusiones que han surgido allí entre el fiabilismo y la epistemología de la virtud. Estas disputas han tomado un nuevo aire tras el surgimiento de la tesis de la mente extendida propuesta por Clark y Chalmers (1998), que sugiere la posibilidad (...) de conocimiento extendido más allá de la mente o el cerebro individual del sujeto. El objetivo de este capítulo es mostrar y evaluar cómo un debate que en su origen fue epistemológico ha recibido influencia de una tesis metafísica, proveniente de la filosofía de la mente. En la primera parte de este capítulo identificaremos las principales corrientes que surgieron en el marco del debate sobre el internismo y el externismo de la justificación, esto es, grosso modo, el debate acerca de si la justificación de una creencia debe estar al alcance del sujeto (internismo) o si esa justificación se determina independientemente de tal alcance (externismo). Seguidamente, abordaremos este debate desde el punto de vista del fiabilismo y la epistemología de la virtud, y finalmente presentaremos las tesis de la mente extendida y la cognición distribuida para mostrar cómo estas tesis pueden ser influyentes en las discusiones epistemológicas entre posturas internistas y externistas. (shrink)

Injustices in legal contexts are widespread, yet we usually tend to think of them through a social lens. The study of epistemic injustices increases the resolution of this lens; it identifies how we wrong others as "knowers." In this paper, I propose that the tradition of phenomenology may be invoked to describe and identify instances of epistemic injustice in legal contexts. In order to justify this claim, I establish a phenomenological methodology predicated on the synthesis of two ideas: (1) the (...) phenomenological recognition of the Other, and (2) society's duty to endow its members with an epistemic sphere of action. (shrink)

Causation was an important topic of philosophical reflection during the Seventeenth Century. This reflection centred around certain particular problems about causation, one of which was the problem of causation between mind and body. The doctrine of the pre-established harmony is Leibniz's response to the problem of causation between mind and body. In this chapter I shall (a) explain the problem of mind-body causation; (b) explain Leibniz's pre-established harmony; and (c) assess his case for it.

The health emergency due to the COVID-19 pandemic revealed limitations in health systems worldwide, making it necessary to establish a bioethical framework that provides tools to drive health professionals’ decision-making amid scarce health resources. Bioethical models such as principlism, utilitarianism, and personalism seek to focus clinical decisions on respect for people’s rights and dignity, thus protecting the medical practice. Personalism provides a person-centered approach to respect for human dignity during health emergencies to avoid giving material meaning to the individual. Decision (...) criteria are required to face bioethical conflicts in clinical practice, reducing the legal, emotional, and ethical burden of decision-making in pandemic situations. (shrink)