Muwāsāt encompasses the moral duty to provide aid to those in need, prioritising those closest to us while sharing what resources we can spare. However, should a person's legally protected values be at risk, assistance and solidarity become mandatory obligations. Islamic law recognises this social duty as fard al-kifāya, with muwāsāt as the justification for this sufficient obligation. On the other hand, muwāsāt is also included in the legal justification of in-kind obligations such as zakat and alimony. Muwāsāt actually has (...) a broad conceptual content that includes each individual in the society helping each other, sharing, and sharing what they have when necessary. The aim of muwāsāt is to keep social sensitivity towards those in need alive. Muwāsāt constitutes the wisdom of meeting the needs of the other party by sharing the resources available to each individual in the society when the legal values that Islam aims to protect are in danger. In this context, this study aims to evaluate the rights of those in need over those who have the means to meet their needs by considering the proposal in the context of the provisions. To prioritize the legal values of Islam and safeguard the sanctity of life, as well as protect bodily integrity and uphold the right to privacy, the principle of muwāsāt necessitates that all Muslims must uphold these responsibilities towards themselves, each other and the state. This study aims to investigate muwāsāt, which defines the duty to provide assistance to any individual who is cognisant of their plight, within their capacity, when their legal rights that must be safeguarded are threatened, in the framework of social accountability. In this context, it can be said that muwāsāt has a direct connection with the proposed obligations in Islamic law. Muwāsāt is included in the justification of fard al-kifāya obligations. However, the fact that the obligation of zakat, the obligation of fidya, and the responsibility of alimony are included in the legal justification of meeting the needs of the needy by those who are not dependent on anyone, shows us that muwāsāt is the basis of obligations involving cooperation. Similarly, the legal reason for banning interest is that it destroys the balance in society. In particular, the basis for the state to impose an upper limit on exorbitant prices is based on the principle that every individual has an equal right to meet basic needs. In other words, determining the profit margin in the prices of basic needs is a requirement of muwāsāt. The definition of the state’s obligation, along with individual responsibility in muwāsāt, aims to ensure that there is no individual in society whose basic needs are not met. Consequently, muwāsāt has an aspect that includes social responsibility and legal liability along with conscientious responsibility. This shows that Islam adopts the protection of life as the highest legal value. Muwāsāt is not limited to meeting basic needs, but also includes giving this support to a person when he needs moral support, sharing his pain by standing next to him, feeling him and internalizing his pain. For this reason, muwāsāt actually defines the moral stance that a Muslim should have. Based on this moral stance, it is safe to say that the most fundamental concern of Islam is to protect the material and spiritual integrity and human existence. This study aims to express, in the context of Islamic law, that the main purpose of Islam is to protect human beings in their material and spiritual integrity by examining and evaluating muwāsāt in its broad scope. (shrink)

The problem of personal problem in philosophy is mostly handled as an identity or a “self” problem. When handled with the identity problem, personal identity means the identification of a person in a certain time point with a person at another time point. When handled together with the “self” problem; however, personal identity is considered a part of a substantive and metaphysical investigation. Hume’s philosophy includes both aspects of the discussions of personal identity in an opposing manner. In the present (...) study, Hume’s thoughts on the problem of personal identity will be examined. Firstly, the meaning of the idea of the self in his epistemology based on perception will be dealt with. Then, identity will be searched. It will be claimed that the thing that formed the theses of Hume about self and identity is his skepticism; and that Hume reinforces his thoughts on metaphysics with this investigation. In addition, it will be defended that in order to better understand the personal identity, it is necessary to consider his views on the nature of belief. (shrink)

Although Robert Zemeckis’s film Beowulf is a re-writing of the Old English epic Beowulf with a shifting of perspective, certain details in the film can only be understood by referring to the poem. That is, a better understanding of the film is tied closely to an awareness of certain narrative elements in the epic. The emphasis on Beowulf in the poem shifts to the Mother in the film. This shift obviously leads to a recontextualization of the narrative elements of the (...) former text. In the epic, Grendel is left without a father; however, in the film, he is fathered by Hrothgar but this biological fathering does not lead to linguistic castration. In their case, things are reversed: rather than the infant being castrated by the Law/language, the biological father is led to a psychic regression due to the son. This appears to be a dramatization of the conflicts between the Other and the shared Other/the representative of the paternal metaphor: that is, Hrothgar. This time, the Other conquers the representative of the paternal metaphor and annuls his masculinity, which radically changes the way in which we evaluate the course of events in the film. These departures make more sense if they are analyzed against the background of Lacanian epistemology. This paper aims to explore the film’s departures from the poem by approaching it from a Lacanian perspective. (shrink)

The Zaydī-Muʿtazilī interaction, which dates back to the early periods, increased when The Būyid vizier al-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād invited Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār to Rayy and many Caspian Zaydī scholars studied with Qāḍī. Ibn Sharwīn, who is mentioned among the students of Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār and accepted as one of the Zaydī- Muʿtazilī scholars, is one of these names. The works of Ibn Sharwīn, who had writings in the field of kalām and fiqh, did not remain within the borders of the (...) Caspian and reached the Zaydīs of Yemen; one of these works is Ḥaqāʾiq al-ashyāʾ. Considering that, unlike other theological schools, there are not many works on the definitions of theological concepts in Muʿtazilī literature and -as far as is known- did not reach today, this treatise helps to understand better especially the terms in Zaydī- Muʿtazilī theology and the effects of Bahshamiyya on Zaydī thought. This work, edited and translated based on the only extant manuscript only manuscript found in Yemen and a previous publication, on the one hand, is important in understanding the point of view of Zaydī- Muʿtazilī thought on the disciplines of theology, jurisprudence, debate, history of Islamic sects, on the other hand, it is a helpful resource for understanding the terms used in the theory of aḥwāl, which is still an intricate issue. Ibn Sharwīn in his Ḥaqāʾiq al-ashyāʾ; explains over 150 terms in relation to cosmology such as substance, accident, line, surface, space; to ontology such as existing, non-existence, originated (muḥdath); to epistemology such as knowledge, creed, ignorance, doubt, skepticism, obligatory and acquired knowledge; to methodology such as evidence, madlūl, debate, and disputation; to fiqh such as sunnah, farḍ, mandūb, cause, command-prohibition, general-particular (ʿumūm-ḫuṣūṣ); to the history of sects such as ʿadliyya, compulsionists (mujbira) and qadarī; to divinity such as the oneness of God (tawhīd); to justice such as promise and threat (al-waʿd wa-l-waʿīd), good and evil, necessary and acquired, grace, compensation, repentance, major and minor sins; to the theory of al-aḥwāl such as attribute of the essence, determinant (muḳtaḍī), entail (muḳtaḍā), muṣaḥḥiḥ, cause. Describing ḥadd that corresponds to “definition” and ḥaḳīḳat that he used together with it as collectively exhaustive, mutually exclusive, Ibn Sharwīn defines knowledge, power, living (ḥayy), speech (kalām), speaker (mutakallim), permanent (bāqī) etc. in a way that is true for both God and human beings. While making these definitions, he draws on poems, linguistic usages and verses and divides the nouns into three parts at the end of his work, namely linguistic, religious and conventional (sharʿī and waḍʿī); in particular, he gives detailed information about metaphors and parts of truth. Another striking aspect of the work is the explanation of the meanings of the imperative mood which is included in the subjects of the Methodology of Fiqh. (shrink)

In Islamic theological writings, under the heading of sustenance, the focus is generally on issues such as who is the provider of sustenance, whether haram is considered sustenance, and whether Allah’s consent exists for haram sustenance. Another issue that can be found between the lines of the subject of sustenance is whether it is haram for a person to work for sustenance or not. In fact, the pursuit of means of livelihood in order to sustain one’s life is, according to (...) the general and predominant acceptance of Muslim scholars, permissible and, in cases of necessity, wajib. According to a record in Uṣūl al-niḥal, during the formative period of itizālī thought, there were Mu‘tazilite sufis (ṣūfiyyat al-Muʿtazila) such as Bishr b. al-Mu‘tamir’s disciple Abū Imrān Mūsā b. al-Raqqāshī, al-Naẓẓām’s apostate disciple Fadl al-Hadathī, and Husayn al-Kūfī, about whom no information is available. These names, who seem to have earned their livelihood through almsgiving, defended the forbiddenness (taḥrīm al-makāsib) of all kinds of endeavour for sustenance, contrary to the acceptance of Muslim thinkers. However, it should be noted that for them, the forbiddenness in making an effort for sustenance does not cover the definition of sustenance, which is ‘all the benefits’, but only the effort in obtaining sustenance through means such as trade and agriculture. It is interesting to find such an extreme tendency among the Mu‘tazilites, who came to the fore with their rationalist discourses. “How could a Mu‘tazilite defend tahrīm al-makāsib?”, the issue of abandonment of striving for sustenance (tark al-makāsib), from which the idea of tahrīm al-makāsib is thought to have evolved, is mentioned, and then the Mu‘tazilite sufis views on tahrīm al-makāsib are tried to be based mainly on Mu‘tazilite sources and the criticisms of Mu‘tazilite authors against them are included. It has been determined that Mu‘tazilite sufis justifications for defending tahrīm al-makāsib concentrate on three points: (i) the absence of a just order due to the absence of a just imam and the possibility of supporting the oppressors (rulers) intentionally or unintentionally, and as a result of this, some of them describe the land of Islam as dār al-kufr, (ii) again in relation to the issue of imamate, in an environment where there is no justice, i.e. legal/moral order, the halāl and harām are so intertwined that they cannot be separated from each other, and in order to protect oneself from harām, the things that are subject to sustenance can only be purified through charity and become halāl, and (iii) the fact that trust in Allah is obligatory and any effort to pursue sustenance is contrary to tawakkul. The Mu‘tazilite authors criticised the proponents of tahrīm al-makāsib on the grounds that it is permissible to trade while maintaining a rational and ethical attitude, that one’s intention and interest in trade are important, and that tawakkul cannot be built on the right ground. As a result, the proponents of tahrīm al-makāsib disappeared because they could not gain a foothold in the Mu‘tazilite intellectual climate due to their erroneous reasoning. (shrink)

Muʻtazilite thinkers put forward the first systematic ideas for the relationship of essence and attributes, one of the most fundamental and complicated issues of Islamic theology, and comprehensive explanations to the question of God’s names. Although almost all the thinkers agreed on uṣūl al-khamsa, they differed in their approach to the principle of unity (tawḥīd). ‘Abbād b. Sulaymān, who lived in the period when these approaches emerged, is a scholar who reveals his distinctive view of God’s names and attributes in (...) which heslightly differs from his contemporaries such as Abu al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf, Mu‘ammar b. ‘Abbād al-Sulamī and Ibrāhīm b. Sayyār al-Naẓẓām from the Basran Muʻtazila, by his extreme opinions on the Muʻtazilite principle of tawḥīd. He is one of thefour principle thinkers who presented original opinions in the early Basran Muʻtazila. Also he is the only known student of Hishâm al-Fuwaṭī and constitutes the last major circle of this tradition of knowledge that ended after him. This article aims to reveal the relationship between essence and attributes, the names and attributes of God in a holistic and systematic way in the thought of ‘Abbād b. Sulaymān. Unfortunately, his works have not survived to the present day and has not received the attention he deserves. Since his views were scattered in the classic books, our study was focused primarily on these classical sources. The modern literature was not ignored, either. The relevant records, analysis and criticism were re-contextualized. According to ‘Abbād b. Sulaymān, the view that “Allah is a thing” is the same with the view that “Allah is other (ghayr)”, he draws attention to a definite distinction between Allah and human beings. In his thought about the relationship between Allah and space, he rejects the idea that God could be related to space or anything spatial in order to refrain from an anthropomorphic conception of God. In the case of visibility (ru’ya) of Allah, he radically opposes the idea of “seeing Allah with the heart,” which was adopted by the majority of the Muʻtazila. He tries to solve the issue in his own terms by avoiding the terms essence (dhāt) and nafs in the relationship between God’s essence and His attributes. He reveals a unique classification of names and thus adopts the method of analogy. He does not accept essential attributes as the majority of the Mu’tazila did. On the other hand, he tacitly accepts that Allah’s names have their own meanings in a way that they are not merely words (aqvāl). By a true comparison or perfect analogy (fī ḥaqīqati’l-qıyās), while he rejects that God is ālim, qadīr etc., he tries to ground that human beings is ālim, qadīr etc. He does not admit that God is eternally samʻi and baṣīr. Without interpreting samʻi as His knowledge or baṣīr as His power, he accepts that each name has a distinctive functionality. He rejects the assumption that God knows conditionally. Regarding the issue of whether living beings are in the knowledge of Allah before they exist, it makes a dual distinction: “a direction that can be subject to the eternal knowledge” and “the direction in which it actually came to existence”. Because of his view of non-existent and creatures, Ibn al-Rāwandī and modern resources refer the view of the eternity of objects to him. However, when the relevant records are examined, it is seen that this claim is not valid. According to ‘Abbād, Allah is capable of creating possible things that he knows, although He does not create impossible things that he knows, even though He is capable of creating them potentially (bi-al-quwwa). Allah has not created evil, neither literally nor figuratively; so much so that He created only man, not faith and unbelief. It is not possible to talk about any good that he did not create. He defends the createdness of the Qur’an (Khalq al-Qur’ān) by saying that the Qur’ān was created of accidents. About God’s names, he states that God has the names indicating His relationship to the universe. He does not accept that in eternity He is a willing agent, creator etc. However, he also does not accept the otherwise. He emphasizes that creation is reserved only for Allah. On the other hand, according to him, Allah creates without secondary causes and thus does not create things for a specific purpose. Regarding the revealed attributes (or informative attributes, khabarī), he recites these expressions only when reading of the Quran.He states that these expressions should not be used for Allah under any circumstances. He avoids naming Allah as wakīl, kafīl, laṭīf, kā’in, fard and mutakallim as he says that the name wāḥid should be used only for praising Him. (shrink)

Aydınlanma üzerine konuşmaya niyet eden birinin ilk kabulü, onun Avrupa‘da çıkmış olan bir ―durum‖ olduğu üzerine olacaktır. ―Durum‖ dedik çünkü Aydınlanma, hem ideolojik, hem siyasal, hem toplumsal, hem kültüreldir ve bu nedenle toplum içinde yaşayan bütün pratikleri etkilemiş ve etkilenmiştir. Yani Aydınlanma, yalnızca bunlardan biri değildir; o, hem düşünsel hem de eylemsel bir süreç olarak ele alınabilir. Bu eylemsel süreç bir şekilde Avrupa‘da başarıya ulaşmıştır. Ancak Türk Aydınlanması Avrupa odaklı hareket ettiği halde, kısmen başarılı olsa da genel olarak Osmanlı Devleti‘nin (...) çöküşünü hızlandırdığı kabul edilmektedir. Bu durumun sebebini ortaya koymak için ele aldığımız çalışmamızın asıl hedefi, bu iki aydınlanma arasındaki pratiklerin benzerlik ve farklılıklarını ortaya koymaktır. (shrink)

Covid-19, yeni koronavirüs salgını, insanoğlunun karşısına birdenbire çıkmış ve insan bu felaket karşısında yaşamını devam ettirebilmek için belli birtakım kurallara bağlı olmak zorunda olduğunu görmüştür. Pandeminin getirdiği yeni kurallara bağlı olarak kullanmaya başladığımız maske de bu şartlardan biridir. Tarih boyunca somut olarak maske kullanımı insana uzak ya da yabancı bir durum değildir. Maskenin sözlük anlamlarına baktığımızda tozdan ya da kimyasallardan korunmak için kullanılan bir araç olduğunu gördüğümüz gibi, bir de soyut anlamda kendini ötekine farklı bir şekilde yansıtma veya aktarma durumu (...) olarak ele alınabileceğini görmekteyiz. Biz bu çalışmamızda maskenin soyut kullanımından hareketle günümüzde kullandığımız bir araç olarak maskenin, ortak yönleri olup olamayacağını değerlendirmeye çalıştık. Öte yandan içinden geçmekte olduğumuz bu salgın hastalıkların tarihte ilk kez bizim başımıza gelen bir şey olmadığını görmezsek ve bu süreci değerlendirmezsek, geçiş döneminden sonra pandeminin birey, toplum, ekonomi, siyaset ve devlet görüşleri üzerinde ne tür değişiklikler yapacağını kontrol etmezsek, salgın günün birinde bitecek olsa bile olumsuz sonuçlarla karşılaşmayacağımızı söyleyemeyiz. Çünkü salgın insanın sadece biyolojik yönünü etkileyen bir felaket değildir, aynı zamanda insanın diğer yönü olan psikoloji tarafını da doğrudan ve dolaylı olarak etkilemektedir. İnsan psişik yönü de olan bir varlık olduğu için bu yönün de ele alınarak incelenmesi gerekir. Pandemi koşullarında birtakım kurallara uymayı alışkanlık haline getiren insan şu ana kadar getirmiş olduğu tüm değerlerinden hızlı bir şekilde kopma eğilimi göstermeye veya bu duruma gönüllü olmaya başlamıştır. Kurallara uymayan insanlar ise sorumluluk almadıkları için bir ahlak varlığı olmaktan uzak hale gelmişlerdir. Çalışmamız söz konusu salgının, insanın günlük hayatında kullandığı somut ve soyut maske tanımlarından hareketle, değerlerine nasıl yabancılaştığını ve öte yandan ahlaki sorumluluklarını ne şekilde göz ardı ettiği üzerine eğilmeye çalışmıştır. (shrink)

İnsan “kendini bil”melidir. Çünkü insanın kendini bilmemesi yani eksikliğinin, aldatılırlığının ya da yanılabilirliğinin farkında olmaması onun temelde kendi benliğini, toplumsal rollerini, ahlaki ve siyasal varlık oluşunu yitirmesine sebep olacaktır. İnsan aklıyla ayakları yere basan ama kibriyle başını arşa kaldıran bir varlıktır. Eğer aklı onun kibirli başını eğdirmeyi başaramazsa kaçınılmaz olarak kibirli söz ve üslup, kibirli bakış ve görüş ortaya çıkacaktır. Kibir ile ortaya konulmuş her düşünce en temelde ahlaki sorunlar ortaya çıkaracağı gibi bir de, eksikliklerini kabul etmeyen dogmatik bir tutum (...) sergileyecektir. Kibir insana her yaptığının en doğru, en güzel, en kudretli olduğunu fısıldar durur. Bu fısıltı kişinin durup düşünmesine, aklın devreye girmesine izin vermedikçe de, hata yapılmaya devam edilir. Tüm bunlardan hareketle bu çalışmamızda günümüz felsefesinin temel bir sorunu olan, bir alanda uzmanlaşmış olma özgüveniyle birlikte kâinatın bilgisine bütünüyle sahip olunduğuna ilişkin bir düşünce geliştirmenin entelektüel dünyaya büyük bir darbe vuracağı, Yunus Emre’nin Risalet’ün Nushiye eserinin “Kibir Destanı” bölümünden hareketle ele alınacaktır. (shrink)

Bu çalışmanın amacı Martin Buber etiğinin özgünlüğünü keşfetmek ve geliştirmektir. Buber varlığı ilişki temelinde ele alarak Ben-O ve Ben-Sen ilişkisi olarak ayırmıştır. Ben-O ilişkisi insanın varlıkla sıradan tecrübesine karşılık gelirken, Ben-Sen ilişkisi insanın ötekiyle diyalog kurduğu anda ortaya çıkan daha derin bir ilişkidir. Ötekiyle ilişki; tüm etik değerlendirmeleri içinde barındıran, yaşamın dinamizmine uygun, insanlık tarihinin mitolojik ve etik dinamiklerini de içeren bir ilişkinin temellerini içermektedir. Ben-Sen ilişkisi yalnızca insanın insanlarla kurduğu bir ilişkiyi değil insanın canlı, cansız ve manevi tüm varlıklarla (...) kurduğu ilişkiyi açıklamaktadır. Ben-Sen ilişkisinin sadece insanın insanla olan ilişkiyi ele almaması etik üzerine yapılan çalışmalara yeni bir bakış sağlayacak niteliktedir. Buber’in etik anlayışı; diyalog etiği, ötekiyle ilişki etiği, durum etiği, antropolojik etik, varoluş etiği, meslek etiği, anarşist etik, postmodern etik gibi birçok etik anlayışla bağlantılıdır. Buber herhangi bir ahlaki norm ve etik koda bağlı olmayan, tarihsel, ontolojik ve ilişkiyi öncül kılan geniş çaplı içeriğe sahip bir etiğin temellerini ortaya koymaktadır. (shrink)

In this article, it has been aimed to examine Nietzsche’s main critique towards different understandings of morals in his era. With this criticism, it is aimed to integrally understand the opinions -which are articulated directly or metaphorically- towards morals which have been encountered. In here, while keeping in mind the difference between the concepts of immoralism and amoralism, Nietzsche’s views are interpreted. Being parallel to that aim mentioned above, it has been investigated if there is a thinking in Nietzsche which (...) can be seen as a kind of understanding of morals (maybe as the understanding of morals without morals) or not. And finally, it has been thought that if Nietzsche’s views on morals have any value for the 21st century and upcoming 22nd century human or not, whether there’s something left to learn for this human from his critiques or not. (shrink)