Previous studies suggest a relationship between second-language learning and voice recognition processes, but the nature of such relation remains poorly understood. The present study investigates whether phoneme learning relates to voice recognition. A group of bilinguals that varied in their discrimination of a second-language phoneme contrast participated in this study. We assessed participants’ voice recognition skills in their native language at the behavioral and brain electrophysiological levels during a voice-avatar learning paradigm. Second-language phoneme discrimination positively correlated with behavioral and brain (...) measures of voice recognition. At the electrophysiological level, correlations were present at two time windows and are interpreted within the dual-process model of recognition memory. The results are relevant to understanding the processes involved in language learning as they show a common variability for second-language phoneme and voice recognition processes. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza, por un lado, el examen de las pasiones que Kant realiza en la Antropología de 1798 y en los cursos sobre esta materia, en los que la pasión y el cultivo de la razón práctica mantienen una ambigua relación, hasta el punto de pensar que quizás ninguna cultura moral pueda suprimir enteramente la perversión que consiste en proyectar los enunciados del egoísmo como punto de vista universal. Por otro lado, examina la asociación que la antropología kantiana establece (...) entre el discurso pasional y la imposición de una autoridad inapelable de la razón es confrontada con el estudio de la metapsicología de Freud acerca de las manifestaciones del super-yo. De esa manera, se pretende enfocar especialmente la capacidad de la libertad práctica para anularse a sí misma, la capacidad de la pasión para suplantar a la razón como facultad que emite mandatos y, finalmente, los efectos perniciosos que el modo de razonar de la pasión tiene sobre la aplicación y extensión del derecho en una comunidad humana. (shrink)

This paper argues for the normative significance of attention. Attention plays an important role when describing an individual’s mind and agency, and in explaining many central facts about that individual. In addition, many in the public want answers and guidance with regard to normative questions about attention. Given that attention is both descriptively central and the public cares about normative guidance with regard to it, attention should be central also in normative philosophy. We need an ethics of attention: a field (...) of study of which normative pressures, if any, govern attention. Like the ethics of belief, the ethics of attention will connect those normative questions to issues regarding the nature of attention, i.e. to what is subject to such normative pressures. Philosophers should develop an ethics of attention that helps to provide normative guidance and that is commensurate in its richness to the descriptive significance of attention. The second half of the paper sketches a framework that may help us to get started at developing the ethics of attention. (shrink)

The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first (...) aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism. (shrink)

Animal Suffering and Public Relations conducts an ethical assessment of public relations, mainly persuasive communication and lobbying, as deployed by some of the main businesses involved in the animal industrial complex - the industries participating in the systematic and institutionalized exploitation of animals. Society has been experiencing a growing ethical concern regarding humans' (ab)use of other animals. This is a trend first promoted by the development of animal ethics - which claims any sentient being, because of sentience, deserves moral consideration (...) - and more recently by other approaches from the social sciences, including critical animal studies. In this volume, we aim to start an entirely unaddressed discussion within the field of public relations: the need to problematize the ethics of persuasion when nonhuman animal suffering is involved, particularly the impact of persuasion and lobbying on compassion towards other animals in the cases of food, experimentation, entertainment and environment management. The books provides an interdisciplinary, theoretical discussion illustrated with international case studies from experts in strategic communication, public relations, lobbying and advocacy, animal ethics, philosophy of law, political philosophy and social psychology. This unique book merges the fields of critical public relations, animal ethics and critical animal studies and will be of direct appeal to a wide range of researchers, academics and doctoral students across related fields. (shrink)

The outsourcing of clinical trials to Latin America by the transnational innovative pharmaceutical industry began about twenty years ago. Using archival information and field work in Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru, the authors discuss the regulatory contexts and the ethical dimensions of human experimentation in the region. More than 80% of all clinical trials in the region take place in these countries, and the European Medicines Agency has defined them as priority countries in Latin America. The authors raise (...) questions about the quality of data obtained from the trials and the violation of human rights during their implementation. Their findings are presented in this volume, the first in-depth analysis of clinical trials in the region.. (shrink)

This paper aims to inspect the political potential of Kant’s grounding of hope and its content breaks down in three parts. First, I give an account of Kant’s approach to right and hope as a rule for our judgments and actions, shedding light over the shift that Kant’s notion of the Highest Good undergoes from a theological framework to a political one, which makes of individuals the main feature of action. Second, I focus on the intergenerational exercise of imagination inasmuch (...) as it foreshadows the material and symbolic needs of the forthcoming generations, highlighting the key role it plays for addressing the political agency of hope. Moreover, I focus on the capacity of this kind of imagination to resist against the devices and (mis-)informative tendencies that lead human imagination to collapse as the headquarters of critical mental activity. Third, I address the epistemic framework that seems more adequate to continue drawing to hope as a promising tool to build up subjects conscious of the shortcomings of the world and the society they are embedded in. Finally, I display some concluding remarks about the interaction between material structures and culture of emotions as a key issue stemming from this enquiry of Kant’s conceptual legacy about hope. (shrink)

Eva Schmidt argues that facts about incoherent beliefs can be non-evidential epistemic reasons to suspend judgment. In this commentary, I argue that incoherence-based reasons to suspend are epistemically superfluous: if the subjects in Schmidt’s cases ought to suspend judgment, then they should do so merely on the basis of their evidential reasons. This suggests a more general strategy to reduce the apparent normativity of coherence to the normativity of evidence. I conclude with some remarks on the independent interest that reasons-first (...) epistemology might have within an evidentialist framework. (shrink)

How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and in ethics. Yet its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. Responsibility for Rationality is the first book that connects recent debates on responsibility and on rationality in a unifying dialectic. It achieves four main goals: first, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility (...) for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality; second, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by defending a hybrid view; third, it provides novel support to recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by arguing that epistemic reasons and other ‘right-kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons; fourth, it sets the foundations and the research agenda for an ‘ethics of mind’, including an illustration of how to approach applied issues in epistemology within the presented framework. After spelling out connections between responsibility and rationality (part I), the book engages in debates in normative epistemology (part II) and brings them to bear on the broader field of an ethics of mind (part III). -/- Full draft of current version available on request, comments welcome! (shrink)

This book compares and contrasts publicly espoused security concepts in the Nordic region, and explores the notion of societal security. Outside observers often assume that Nordic countries take similar approaches to the security and safety of their citizens. This book challenges that assumption and traces the evolution of 'societal security', and its broadly equivalent concepts, in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. The notion of societal security is deconstructed and analysed in terms of its different meanings and implications for each country, (...) through both country- and issue-focused studies. Each chapter traces the evolution of key security concepts and related practices, allowing for a comparison of similarities and differences between these four countries. Using discourses and practices as evidence, this is the first book to explore how different Nordic nations have conceptualised domestic security over time. The findings will be valuable to scholars from across the geographical and theoretical spectrum, while highlighting how Nordic security discourses and practices may deviate from traditional assumptions about Nordic values. This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, Nordic politics and International Relations. (shrink)

Across the European research area and beyond, efforts are being mobilized to align research and innovation processes and products with societal values and needs, and to create mechanisms for inclusive priority setting and knowledge production. A central concern is how to foster a culture of “Responsible Research and Innovation” (RRI) among scientists and engineers. This paper focuses on RRI teaching at higher education institutions. On the basis of interviews and reviews of academic and policy documents, it highlights the generic aspects (...) of teaching aimed at invoking a sense of care and societal obligation, and provides a set of exemplary cases of RRI-related teaching. It argues that the Aristotelian concept of phronesis can capture core properties of the objectives of RRI-related teaching activities. Teaching should nurture the students’ capacity in terms of practical wisdom, practical ethics, or administrative ability in order to enable them to act virtuously and responsibly in contexts which are often characterized by uncertainty, contention, and controversy. (shrink)

In the traditional understanding, human dignity is often portrayed as a «final», «inherent», and «absolute» value. If human dignity as the core of the status of a human being did indeed have thos characteristics, this would yield a severe limitation for obligations that stem from the moral status of non-human animals, plants, eco systems and other entities discussed in environmental ethics; for obligations that arise from human dignity standardly take priority over the duties toward entities with non-human moral status. Yet, (...) many theorists of human dignity nowadays have given up the traditional picture in favour of a more «contingent» understanding of human dignity that abandons one or more of its traditional characteristics.In this paper, I argue that to the contrary, we have good reasons to think that the three characteristics of human dignity just mentioned can indeed be attributed to a value that deserves the name «human dignity». In a first part, I argue for a specific understanding of the three value characteristics under consideration. After these preliminaries, I show in a second part that given such an understanding, we have ample evidence that we can indeed say that human dignity is an inherent, absolute and final value; and also that these three characteristics are properties of a single value. (shrink)

The combination of increased availability of large amounts of fine-grained human behavioral data and advances in machine learning is presiding over a growing reliance on algorithms to address complex societal problems. Algorithmic decision-making processes might lead to more objective and thus potentially fairer decisions than those made by humans who may be influenced by greed, prejudice, fatigue, or hunger. However, algorithmic decision-making has been criticized for its potential to enhance discrimination, information and power asymmetry, and opacity. In this paper, we (...) provide an overview of available technical solutions to enhance fairness, accountability, and transparency in algorithmic decision-making. We also highlight the criticality and urgency to engage multi-disciplinary teams of researchers, practitioners, policy-makers, and citizens to co-develop, deploy, and evaluate in the real-world algorithmic decision-making processes designed to maximize fairness and transparency. In doing so, we describe the Open Algortihms project as a step towards realizing the vision of a world where data and algorithms are used as lenses and levers in support of democracy and development. (shrink)

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...) make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate. (shrink)

El primer día que llegué a mi trabajo, una prisión, no sabía qué me iba a encontrar. Pensaba que tras los muros, las rejas y aquella enorme alambrad habría criminales y monstruos dispuestos a cualquier cosa. Sin embargo, cuando atravesé la puerta me encontré jardines, magníficos dibujos en la pared y personas al otro lado. Sí, personas comos las que te encuentras en tu vida diaria. No llevaban pendientes, ni tatuajes, ni un cuchillo en la mano. Me saludaban cordialmente y (...) se dirigían a mí de usted. (shrink)

In developing a theory of consciousness, one of the main problems has to do with determining what distinguishes conscious states from non-conscious ones—the delimitation problem. This paper explores the possibility of solving this problem in terms of self-awareness. That self-awareness is essential to understanding the nature of our conscious experience is perhaps the most widely discussed hypothesis in the study of consciousness throughout the history of philosophy. Its plausibility hinges on how the notion of self-awareness is unpacked. The idea that (...) consciousness involves self-awareness has been understood in two different ways: either as awareness of oneself—the subject of experience—or as awareness of the conscious episode itself. In this paper I argue (i) that every experience concerns the subject in a very specific way, involving what I will call ‘perspectival de se representation’, and (ii) that there is no need to appeal to the experience itself in order to characterize the awareness within that experience. The view I articulate explains the subjective nature of experience without over-intellectualizing it, accommodates the phenomenology of experience, and dispels any doubt about the need to find the self in introspection. (shrink)

What is attention? How does attention shape consciousness? In an approach that engages with foundational topics in the philosophy of mind, the theory of action, psychology, and the neurosciences this book provides a unified and comprehensive answer to both questions. Sebastian Watzl shows that attention is a central structural feature of the mind. The first half of the book provides an account of the nature of attention. Attention is prioritizing, it consists in regulating priority structures. Attention is not another (...) element of the mind, but constituted by structures that organize, integrate, and coordinate the parts of our mind. Attention thus integrates the perceptual and intellectual, the cognitive and motivational, and the epistemic and practical. The second half of the book concerns the relationship between attention and consciousness. Watzl argues that attentional structure shapes consciousness into what is central and what is peripheral. The center-periphery structure of consciousness cannot be reduced to the structure of how the world appears to the subject. What it is like for us thus goes beyond the way the world appears to us. On this basis, a new view of consciousness is offered. In each conscious experience we actively take a stance on the world we appear to encounter. It is in this sense that our conscious experience is our subjective perspective. (shrink)

It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. (...) I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness : a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects. (shrink)

Sowohl in der analytischen Philosophie als auch im verwandten Projekt einer erneuerten Praxisphilosophie gewinnt sinnkritisches Philosophieren derzeit eine neue Dringlichkeit. Beide begreifen die menschliche, vernünftige Praxis als primäre Quelle von Sinn und als privilegierten Gegenstand philosophischer Analyse. Der Band vereint Beiträge zu zentralen Aspekten sinnkritischer, praxisformanalytischer Philosophie: von der Frage nach dem Sinn religiöser Rede und Praxis über das Problem der Struktur und die Form menschlichen Handelns bis hin zu Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Wissen und Wahrnehmung. Beiträge u. a. von (...) Robert Brandom, James Conant, Christoph Demmerling, Thomas Rentsch, Sebastian Rödl, Hans Julius Schneider, Henning Tegtmeyer und Holm Tetens. (shrink)

As critical research has revealed, climate change scepticism and inaction are not about science but ideas, and specifically the ideas that conform our worldview. Drawing on key theoretical approaches to climate change denial from the social sciences and humanities, this paper discusses the ideological dimension and, more especially, the anthropocentric denial underlying our failure to respond to climate change. We argue that the speciesist anthropocentrism inherent in the current dominant ethics is what prevents humanity from reacting to the main human-induced (...) drivers of global warming. Encouraged to do so by current mainstream ethics, humans overpopulate the planet, grow at the expense of other species, and indulge in cruel, unhealthy and unsustainable practices. We counterpose this ethics against the egalitarian, non-speciesist approach of the animal ethics movement, positing that it represents the next radical reflexive movement and could be used to break the climate deadlock. Animal ethics allows links with inegalitarianism and privilege that may help address climate contrarianism and climate inaction much more effectively. (shrink)

The concept of "life" has always been part of the basic philosophical topoi. In Greek antiquity, the question of what constitutes a "good" or "successful" life was regarded as a fundamental question of philosophy. As a result, early philosophers engaged in practice-oriented philosophizing which regarded philosophy as a form of life. In Modern philosophy, the term "life" became a technical term in different philosophical traditions such as the philosophy of life, philosophy of existence, and phenomenology. This volume brings together contributions (...) in German and French that explore the concept of "life" historically and systematically, focusing on metaphysical, anthropological, and ethical issues. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Don't Laugh at “Slow” Sailing: Average Versus Instantaneous Motion Motion Relative to What? – Galilean Relativity But There are No Fixed Reference Frames – Special Relativity General Relativity – Can it Really Matter?

Lässt sich der Einsatz militärischer Gewalt zum Schutz der Menschenrechte innerhalb fremder Staaten rechtfertigen? Die Arbeit beleuchtet die Frage nach der Rechtfertigung humanitärer Interventionen. Dazu werden Interventionsargumente in der Geschichte des politischen Denkens ausgehend von Wurzeln in Antike und Mittelalter über die Kriegsethik der spanischen Spätscholastik, das politische Denken der Neuzeit bis zur Kritik jeglicher Form von Interventionen vor dem Hintergrund der Dominanz des Souveränitätsprinzips im politischen Denken des 18. Jahrhunderts rekonstruiert. Vor diesem Hintergrund argumentiert der Autor dafür, dass die (...) Souveränität der Staaten nicht unabhängig vom Schutz der grundlegenden Menschenrechte ihrer Bürger gedacht werden kann. Staaten haben eine primäre Verantwortung für den Schutz ihrer Bürger, die, wenn der einzelne Staat sie nicht erfüllt, als sekundäre Verantwortung auch der Staatengemeinschaft als Schutzverantwortung (responsibility to protect) zukommt und militärische Interventionen im Falle massiver Menschenrechtsverletzungen als letztes Mittel erlaubt. (shrink)

Für Aristoteles ist das Kontinuum ein potentiell Unendliches. Dieser Unendlichkeitsbegriff, den er neben dem prozessualen und aktualen einführte, wurde im Laufe der Philosophiegeschichte nicht mehr berücksichtigt. So verwenden ihn u.a. weder Kant noch Weyl in ihren Kontinuumsbetrachtungen, obwohl ihr Kontinuumsverständnis ihn geradezu nahelegt. - In dieser Arbeit werden zum einen die ontologischen Kontinuumslehren des Aristoteles und späterer Philosophen und Mathematiker behandelt, zum anderen erfährt die von Aristoteles im 6. Buch der «Physik» vorgelegte strukturelle Kontinuumsuntersuchung eine eingehende Würdigung.

Resumen Proponer una ontología de lo político implica preguntarse por la relación que se establece entre ontología e historia. Si ambos términos se presentan como opuestos y excluyentes entre sí, entonces tendríamos que aceptar la posibilidad de que lo político pueda concebirse con plena autonomía de un contexto histórico determinado. Aquí, por el contrario, se trata de pensar una ontología de lo político que mantenga con la historia una relación distinta o, en otras palabras, una ontología política materialista. Para abordar (...) esta problemática partimos de la obra de Nicos Poulantzas, para dar cuenta con ella de las dificultades que enfrentaba un marxismo en crisis a la hora de pensar la autonomía de la política. El posmarxismo enfrenta estos dilemas y elabora algunas respuestas sobre la relación entre ontología e historia. Para exponer lo que muchos de estos desarrollos comparten, recurrimos a la interpretación de Oliver Marchart sobre lo que él denomina el pensamiento político posfundacional (Cf. Lefort, Badiou, Laclau, Rancière). Luego recurrimos a los postulados de Gilles Deleuze, porque con ellos podemos desplazar de otra forma la tradicional antinomia entre ontología e historia. Entonces, asumiendo que el Ser de lo político es un ser que siempre se dice de la diferencia, nos abocamos a analizar críticamente las teorizaciones de Ernesto Laclau sobre la política y su forma hegemónica. Finalmente, la relación que propone Benjamín Arditi entre espectro y populismo permite pensar nuevas relaciones entre la ontología y la historia, lo político y la diferencia, dinamizando los conceptos. (shrink)