Belief in the divine origin of the universe began to wane most markedly in the nineteenth century, when scientific accounts of creation by natural law arose to challenge traditional religious doctrines. Most of the credit - or blame - for the victory of naturalism has generally gone to Charles Darwin and the biologists who formulated theories of organic evolution. Darwinism undoubtedly played the major role, but the supporting parts played by naturalistic cosmogonies should also be acknowledged. Chief among these was (...) the nebular hypothesis proposed by Pierre Simon Laplace in 1796, which explained the origin of the solar system as a natural development over extended periods of time. Ronald Numbers focuses on Laplace's theory as it affected American scientific thought. he first traces the history of Laplace's cosmogony chronologically, from its European inception to its demise about 1900. the last three chapters explore some of the theological and scientific consequences resulting from the acceptance of this cosmogony. Most significant was the change in the status of supernatural doctrine. When the nebular hypothesis lost credence at the end of the nineteenth century, those who had before tried to accommodate natural theory with supernatural doctrine no longer felt compelled to do so when faced with succeeding theories. The nebular hypothesis, it seems, had established natural law in the heavens. (shrink)

The significance of the complicated numbering of the propositions in the Tractatus has occasioned much speculation. Wittgenstein's own explanation has, following Stenius, been generally regarded as misleading. But an examination of the Prototractatus reveals that the numbering system was for Wittgenstein principally an aid in the composition of his work. It allowed him to mark out certain propositions which required further work or supplementation, without disturbing the basic structure of the treatise. But the reworking of the Prototractatus to form the (...) Tractatus considerably changed the original order in which the ideas were connected, and thus made it more difficult to understand the Tractatus. Several specific examples make it clear that it is essential to look back at the context of the Prototractatus in order to achieve a correct interpretation of many of the propositions in the Tractatus. (shrink)

It has been argued that the approximate number system (ANS) constitutes a problem for the grounded approach to cognition because it implies that some conceptual tasks are performed by non-perceptual systems. The ANS is considered non-perceptual mainly because it processes stimuli from different modalities. Jones (2015) has recently argued that this system has many features (such as being modular) which are characteristic of sensory systems. Additionally, he affirms that traditional sensory systems also process inputs from different (...) modalities. This suggests that the ANS is a perceptual system and therefore it is not problematic for the grounded view. In this paper, I defend the amodal approach to the ANS against these two arguments. In the first place, perceptual systems do not possess the properties attributed to the ANS and therefore these properties do not imply that the ANS is perceptual. In the second place, I will propose that a sensory system only needs to be dedicated to process modality-specific information, which is consistent with responding to inputs from different modalities. I argue that the cross-modal responses exhibited by traditional sensory systems are consistent with modality-specific information whereas some responses exhibited by the ANS are not. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This chapter examines the pioneering work of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) on various number systems, in particular binary, which he independently invented in the mid-to-late 1670s, and hexadecimal, which he invented in 1679. The chapter begins with the oft-debated question of who may have influenced Leibniz’s invention of binary, though as none of the proposed candidates is plausible I suggest a different hypothesis, that Leibniz initially developed binary notation as a tool to assist his investigations in mathematical problems (...) that were exercising him at the time, namely those concerning the divisibility of composite numbers, primality, and perfect numbers. The chapter then explores Leibniz’s development of binary, his little-known work on binary fractions and expansions, his use of binary as a symbol for creation in his philosophical-theology, and his response to the suggestion that there was a correlation between binary numeration and the hexagrams of the ancient Chinese divinatory text, the Yijing. The chapter then focuses on Leibniz’s work on other number systems, in particular his invention and exploration of hexadecimal as well as his work on duodecimal. The chapter concludes by revealing a hitherto unknown practical application of binary that Leibniz devised in the last year of his life. (shrink)

I argue that the human mind includes an innate domain-specific system for representing precise small numerical quantities. This theory contrasts with object-tracking theories and with domain-general theories that only make use of mental models. I argue that there is a good amount of evidence for innate representations of small numerical quantities and that such a domain-specific system has explanatory advantages when infants’ poor working memory is taken into account. I also show that the mental models approach requires previously unnoticed domain-specific (...) structure and consequently that there is no domain-general alternative to an innate domain-specific small number system. (shrink)

Wilfred Sieg and Dirk Schlimm. Dedekind's Analysis of Number: Systems and Axioms.

Number morphology (e.g., singular vs. plural) is a part of the grammar that captures numerical information. Some languages have morphological Number values, which express few (paucal), two (dual), three (trial) and sometimes (possibly) four (quadral). Interestingly, the limit of the attested morphological Number values matches the limit of non‐verbal numerical cognition. The latter is based on two systems, one estimating approximate numerosities and the other computing exact numerosities up to three or four. We compared the literature (...) on non‐verbal number systems with data on Number morphology from 218 languages. Our observations suggest that non‐verbal numerical cognition is reflected as a core part of language. (shrink)

Clarke and Beck argue that the approximate number system represents rational numbers, like 1/3 or 3.5. I think this claim is not supported by the evidence. Rather, I argue, ANS should be interpreted as representing natural numbers and ratios among them; and we should view the contents of these representations are genuinely approximate.

The approximate number system (ANS) enables organisms to represent the approximate number of items in an observed collection, quickly and independently of natural language. Recently, it has been proposed that the ANS goes beyond representing natural numbers by extracting and representing rational numbers (Clarke & Beck, 2021a). Prior work demonstrates that adults and children discriminate ratios in an approximate and ratio-dependent manner, consistent with the hallmarks of the ANS. Here, we use a well-known “connectedness illusion” to provide evidence (...) that these ratio-dependent ratio discriminations are (a) based on the perceived number of items in seen displays (and not just non-numerical confounds), (b) are not dependent on verbal working memory, or explicit counting routines, and (c) involve representations with a part-whole (or subset-superset) format, like a fraction, rather than a part-part format, like a ratio. These results vindicate key predictions of the hypothesis that the ANS represents rational numbers. (shrink)

Many commentators have dismissed Wittgenstein’s numbering system in the Tractatus as either incoherent or a joke. In this paper I offer a way to rehabilitate the system along the lines of Wittgenstein’s own instructions. Reading the Tractatus in this way not only offers a way to make sense of the numbering, but also offers a significant improvement in examining the meaning of the text.

Many commentators have dismissed Wittgenstein’s numbering system in the Tractatus as either incoherent or a joke. In this paper I offer a way to rehabilitate the system along the lines of Wittgenstein’s own instructions. Reading the Tractatus in this way not only offers a way to make sense of the numbering, but also offers a significant improvement in examining the meaning of the text.

Numbers are symbols manipulated in accord with the axioms of arithmetic. They sometimes represent discrete and continuous quantities, but they are often simply names. Brains, including insect brains, represent the rational numbers with a fixed-point data type, consisting of a significand and an exponent, thereby conveying both magnitude and precision.

It is known (see [1, 3.1.5]) that the order type of the nonstandard natural number system * N has the form ω + (ω * + ω) θ, where θ is a dense order type without first or last element and ω is the order type of N. Concerning this, Zakon [2] examined * N more closely and investigated the nonstandard real number system * R, as an ordered set, as an additive group and as a uniform space. (...) He raised five questions which remained unsolved. These questions are concerned with the cofinality and coinitiality of θ (which depend on the underlying nonstandard universe * U). In this paper, we shall treat nonstandard models where the cofinality and coinitiality of θ coincide with some appropriated cardinals. Using these nonstandard models, we shall give answers to three of these questions and partial answers to the other to questions in [2]. (shrink)

We agree with Clarke and Beck that the approximate number system represents rational numbers, and we demonstrate our support by highlighting the case of the empty set – the non-symbolic manifestation of zero. It is particularly interesting because of its perceptual and semantic uniqueness, and its exploration reveals fundamental new insights about how numerical information is represented.

All humans share a universal, evolutionarily ancient approximate number system (ANS) that estimates and combines the numbers of objects in sets with ratio-limited precision. Interindividual variability in the acuity of the ANS correlates with mathematical achievement, but the causes of this correlation have never been established. We acquired psychophysical measures of ANS acuity in child and adult members of an indigene group in the Amazon, the Mundurucú, who have a very restricted numerical lexicon and highly variable access to mathematics (...) education. By comparing Mundurucú subjects with and without access to schooling, we found that education significantly enhances the acuity with which sets of concrete objects are estimated. These results indicate that culture and education have an important effect on basic number perception. We hypothesize that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical thinking mutually enhance one another over the course of mathematics instruction. (shrink)

The Approximate Number System (ANS) is a system that allows us to distinguish between collections based on the number of items, though only if the ratio between numbers is high enough. One of the questions that has been raised is what the representations involved in this system represent. I point to two important constraints for any account: (a) it doesn’t involve numbers, and (b) it can account for the approximate nature of the ANS. Furthermore, I argue that representations (...) of pure magnitude with vehicles that have an imprecision in the value of the unit of measurement (further clarified through a formal model from measurement theory) fit both these requirements. (shrink)

This article accomplishes two goals. First, the paper clarifies Edmund Husserl’s investigation of the historical inception of the number system from his early works, Philosophy of Arithmetic and, “On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic)”. The article explores Husserl’s analysis of five historical developmental stages, which culminated in our ancestor’s ability to employ and enumerate with number signs. Second, the article reveals how Husserl’s conclusions about the history of the number system from his early works opens up a (...) fusion point with his investigations from his mature texts, The Crisis of the European Sciences and “The Origin of Geometry”. On the one hand, the essay shows that Husserl’s methodology was similar, as he sought in both his early and late writings to uncover the essence of the history of the formal sciences and was not executing mere intellectual history. On the other hand, the article discloses that Husserl’s insights from both time periods are strikingly analogous. Already in his early texts, Husserl saw that the sciences emerged from pre-theoretical experiences of the world and that the sciences are the result of a historical process, which involves the psychic activities of past individuals and the maintaining of discoveries over time by intersubjective communities. I conclude by showing how, in light of the analysis of this paper, we can rethink the evolution of Husserl’s philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, we give an axiomatization of the ordinal number system, in the style of Dedekind’s axiomatization of the natural number system. The latter is based on a structure $(N,0,s)$ consisting of a set N, a distinguished element $0\in N$ and a function $s\colon N\to N$. The structure in our axiomatization is a triple $(O,L,s)$, where O is a class, L is a class function defined on all s-closed ‘subsets’ of O, and s is a class function (...) $s\colon O\to O$. In fact, we develop the theory relative to a Grothendieck-style universe (minus the power set axiom), as a way of bringing the natural and the ordinal cases under one framework. We also establish a universal property for the ordinal number system, analogous to the well-known universal property for the natural number system. (shrink)

Nonsymbolic comparison tasks are commonly used to index the acuity of an individual's Approximate Number System (ANS), a cognitive mechanism believed to be involved in the development of number skills. Here we asked whether the time that an individual spends observing numerical stimuli influences the precision of the resultant ANS representations. Contrary to standard computational models of the ANS, we found that the longer the stimulus was displayed, the more precise was the resultant representation. We propose an adaptation (...) of the standard model, and suggest that this finding has significant methodological implications for numerical cognition research. (shrink)

The distinction between non-symbolic and symbolic number is poorly addressed by the authors despite being relevant in numerical cognition, and even more important in light of the proposal that the approximate number system represents rational numbers. Although evidence on non-symbolic number and ratios fits with ANS representations, the case for symbolic number and rational numbers is still open.

Young children with limited knowledge of formal mathematics can intuitively perform basic arithmetic‐like operations over nonsymbolic, approximate representations of quantity. However, the algorithmic rules that guide such nonsymbolic operations are not entirely clear. We asked whether nonsymbolic arithmetic operations have a function‐like structure, like symbolic arithmetic. Children (n = 74 4‐ to ‐8‐year‐olds in Experiment 1; n = 52 7‐ to 8‐year‐olds in Experiment 2) first solved two nonsymbolic arithmetic problems. We then showed children two unequal sets of objects, and (...) asked children which of the two derived solutions should be added to the smaller of the two sets to make them “about the same.” We hypothesized that, if nonsymbolic arithmetic follows similar function rules to symbolic arithmetic, then children should be able to use the solutions of nonsymbolic computations as inputs into another nonsymbolic problem. Contrary to this hypothesis, we found that children were unable to reliably do so, suggesting that these solutions may not operate as independent representations that can be used inputs into other nonsymbolic computations. These results suggest that nonsymbolic and symbolic arithmetic computations are algorithmically distinct, which may limit the extent to which children can leverage nonsymbolic arithmetic intuitions to acquire formal mathematics knowledge. (shrink)

Rips et al.'s arguments for rejecting basic number representations as a precursor of the natural number system are exclusively based on analog number coding. We argue that these arguments do not apply to place coding, a type of basic number representation that is not considered by Rips et al.

A transcription and translation of Hermann Hankel's 1867 Vorlesungen über die complexen Zahlen und ihre Functionen, I. Theil: Theorie der Complexen Zahlensysteme, a textbook on complex analysis that played an important role in the transition to modern mathematics in nineteenth century Germany.