(2004). Normativity, Justification,and (MacIntyrean) Practices: Some Thoughts on Methodologyfor the Philosophy of Sport. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 15-33.

ABSTRACT:The transition from modern to postmodern society leads to changing expectations about the purpose and responsibility of leadership. Habermas’s social theory provides a useful analytical tool for understanding current societal transition processes and exploring their implications for the responsibility of business vis-à-vis society. We argue that integrative responsible leadership, in particular, can contribute to the reconciliation of business with societal goals. Integrative responsible leadership understood in a Habermasian way is not only a strategic endeavor but also a communicative endeavor. An (...) essential part of integrative responsible leadership in light of the current societal transformation processes is the facilitation of discourses about a shared base of norms and values. This is exemplified alongside current societal developments like the European migration crisis or the emerging nationalist and fundamentalist movements in some countries. We specify how and when leadership should resort to communicative action and discuss the implications for leadership. (shrink)

This book focuses on the normative questions raised by the postulation and declaration of a global ethic. Its scope covers the questions “why do we need a global ethic?”, “what kind of global ethic do we need and what sort of normative justification does it imply?” The book considers the imperative of global ethic to be plausible because it demands consistency in the application of the rule or standard of moral behavior.

In the research ethics literature, there is strong disagreement about the ethical acceptability of placebo-controlled trials, particularly when a tested therapy aims to alleviate a condition for which standard treatment exists. Recently, this disagreement has given rise to debate over the moral appropriateness of the principle of clinical equipoise for medical research. Underlying these debates are two fundamentally different visions of the moral obligations that investigators owe their subjects.Some commentators and ethics documents claim that physicians, whether acting as care givers (...) or researchers, have the same duty of beneficence towards their patients and subjects: namely, that they must provide optimal medical care. In discussing placebo surgery in research on refractory Parkinson's disease, Peter Clark succinctly states this view: “The researcher has an ethical responsibility to act in the best interest of subjects.”. (shrink)

In the research ethics literature, there is strong disagreement about the ethical acceptability of placebo-controlled trials, particularly when a tested therapy aims to alleviate a condition for which standard treatment exists. Recently, this disagreement has given rise to debate over the moral appropriateness of the principle of clinical equipoise for medical research. Underlying these debates are two fundamentally different visions of the moral obligations that investigators owe their subjects.Some commentators and ethics documents claim that physicians, whether acting as care givers (...) or researchers, have the same duty of beneficence towards their patients and subjects: namely, that they must provide optimal medical care. In discussing placebo surgery in research on refractory Parkinson's disease, Peter Clark succinctly states this view: “The researcher has an ethical responsibility to act in the best interest of subjects.”. (shrink)

(2006). The Normative Justification of Traditional Chinese Authoritarianism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 379-397.

Most proponents of conscientious objection accommodation in medicine acknowledge that not all conscientious beliefs can justify refusing service to a patient. Accordingly, they admit that constraints must be placed on the practice of conscientious objection. I argue that one such constraint must be an assessment of the reasonability of the conscientious claim in question, and that this requires normative justification of the claim. Some advocates of conscientious object protest that, since conscientious claims are a manifestation of personal beliefs, (...) they cannot be subject to this kind of public justification. In order to preserve an element of constraint without requiring normative justification of conscientious beliefs, they shift the justificatory burden from the belief motivating the conscientious claim to the condition of the patient being refused service. This generally involves a claim along the lines that conscientious refusals should be permitted to the extent that they do not cause unwarranted harm to the patient. I argue that explaining what would constitute warranted harm requires an explanation of what it is about the conscientious claim that makes the harm warranted. ‘Warranted’ is a normative operator, and providing this explanation is the same as providing normative justification for the conscientious claim. This shows that resorting to facts about the patient’s condition does not avoid the problem of providing normative justification, and that the onus remains on advocates of conscientious objection to provide normative justification for the practice in the context of medical care. (shrink)

What really makes the concepts of obligation or permission so important for practical philosophy? What if we could find a better concept, one that, despite the simplicity, could show itself as intuitive and rich as possible? Could justifications be used in common language and practice as a sign of ethical judgment and as a strong motive for action? In most scenarios, for example, it really doesn’t matter if a given action is obliged, permitted or forbidden, one may perform the action (...) as long as a justification for doing it is present. In this sense, the notion of justification seems to be more basic and powerful than other concepts used in the philosophical discourse. The existence of formal systems based on the epistemological side of justification, created by Artemov, led us primarily to think that justification could make the formal discourse much more accurate for ethics than the ones using deontological concepts. In the semantical and syntactical aspects, almost all of Artemov’s systems directly proved to be fruitful for ethical purposes. We also developed combinations between the standard deontic logic and logics of justification, resulting in what whe called the Logics of Normative Justification. These systems were able to change the object of the justification formulas and shed some light in ethics as a whole, normative and metaethics. Metaethics were a forgotten subject in formal ethics. We were also able to deal with some known problems in deontic logic, like the famous Ross’s paradox and the expressiveness of prima facie and all-things-considered obligations. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Benjamin Zolf, in his recent paper ‘No conscientious objection without normative justification: Against conscientious objection in medicine’, attempts to establish that in order to rule out arbitrary conscientious objections, a reasonability constraint is necessary. This, he contends, requires normative justification, and the subjective beliefs that ground conscientious objections cannot easily be judged by normative criteria. Zolf shows that the alternative of using extrinsic criteria, such as requiring that unjustified harm must not be caused, are likewise (...) grounded on normative criteria. He concludes that conscientious objection is therefore untenable. Here, I present an alternative account, based on the value we are willing to place on conscientious objection as an expression of freedom of conscience and religion. Using an extrinsic criterion such as harm, we can make a judgement of what degree of harm should be tolerated as the cost of permitting conscientious objection. A normative criterion for judging individual claims is therefore not required. (shrink)

In Righting Health Policy, MacDougall argues that bioethics has not developed the tools best suited for justifying health law and policy. Using Kant’s practical philosophy as an example, he explores the promise of political philosophy for making normatively justified recommendations about health law and policy.

The following paper considers the extent to which discourse ethics can adequately respond to Habermas' own call for normative justification for the expectation of tolerance. It concludes that discourse ethics is able to lend its services to the flagging fortunes of the idea of toleration, not by seeking to underscore this idea with rationally compelling argumentation,but by offering insights into the possibilities opened up to a life which accepts this principle.

It is certainly possible to overestimate the practical importance of arguments for the normative legitimacy of global capitalism. But normative arguments continue to circulate in the social world, and it would be foolish to think that they do so without significant social effects. As long as ideological defenses of capitalism continue to be produced, there will be a need for ideology critiques.

The study distinguishes between three normative approaches that view diversity in the judiciary as a desirable ideal, outlines their expected empirical implications for judicial decision-making, and tests the implications against data from the Israeli Supreme Court. The “reflecting” approach suggests that diversifying the courts is important mainly as a means of strengthening the public’s confidence in them and does not impact judicial decisions. The “representing” approach asserts that judges serve as representatives of their social sectors. Thus, they tend to (...) rule in favor of their group’s interest only in cases that are relevant to their in-group. The “social background theory” is based on the premise that people of different backgrounds develop distinct worldviews. Hence, social attributes are expected to influence judicial decisions across a wide range of socio-legal issues. The empirical investigation centers on the role of gender and religiosity in judging on five carefully selected socio-legal issues: petitions against the Great Rabbinical Court’s rulings, constitutional disputes in all legal procedures, social welfare cases, and criminal appeals in sex offenses and in drug offenses. The results lend support to social background theory with regard to gender and are consistent with the representing approach with respect to religiosity. I further discuss the limitations and policy implications of the findings. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 16 Heft: 1 Seiten: 41-64.

This paper contributes to debates regarding the normative justification of basic income (BI) via a critical reevaluation of Philippe Van Parijs’ ‘real-libertarian’ theory. Van Parijs’ work constitutes the most ambitious attempt within the literature to ground a justification of BI within a systematic normative framework. In this paper I argue that key elements of his framework should form part of any progressive justification of BI. Specifically, his linking of the principle of ‘real freedom for all’ (...) with the policy mechanism of the ‘highest sustainable basic income.’ I take issue with Van Parijs’ treatment of compensation for unequal internal endowments based on the criterion of ‘undominated diversity’ and I reject the ‘external resources’ approach to justifying the funding of a substantial BI, including Van Parijs’ ‘jobs as assets’ argument. I introduce the concept of ‘total social productivity’ as a means of understanding the production and reproduction of society in a manner that anchors the justification of BI in a commitment to a ‘deep form of social reciprocity.’ Finally, I suggest that BI be framed as a ‘pragmatic-utopian reform.’. (shrink)

Normative explanations of why things are wrong, good, or unfair are ubiquitous in ordinary practice and normative theory. This paper argues that normative explanation is subject to a justification condition: a correct complete explanation of why a normative fact holds must identify features that would go at least some way towards justifying certain actions or attitudes. I first explain and motivate the condition I propose. I then support it by arguing that it fits well with (...) various theories of normative reasons, makes good sense of certain legitimate moves in ordinary normative explanatory discourse, and helps to make sense of our judgments about explanatory priority in certain cases of normative explanation. This last argument also helps to highlight respects in which normative explanation won’t be worryingly discontinuous with explanations in other domains even though these other explanations aren’t subject to the justification condition. Thus the paper aims not only to do some constructive theorizing about the relatively neglected topic of normative explanation but also to cast light on the broader question of how normative explanation may be similar to and different from explanations in other domains. (shrink)

It seems uncontroversial that perceptual experiences provide us with some “normative support” for beliefs or judgments about our surroundings. Provided that the normative force of perceptual justification is something that manifests itself in consciousness or something we commonly experience, what are its phenomenal features? To put it differently: What is it to experience the normative force of perceptual justification? In the first section I will briefly comment on the demand of a unified theory of perceptual (...) experiences, viz. a theory which is capable of integrating relevant epistemological and phenomenological aspects of perceptual experiences. In section two I will argue for a way of connecting the epistemological problem and the phenomenological problem by appealing to a compare-and-contrast strategy. Eventually, in section three, I will try to draw some lessons for our understanding of the normative force of perceptual justification. (shrink)

In this collection of essays, the first translation into English of the ground-breaking 'Normativität und Macht' (Suhrkamp 2015), Rainer Forst presents a new approach to critical theory. Each essay reflects on the basic principles that guide our normative thinking. Forst's argument goes beyond 'ideal' and 'realist' theories and shows how closely the concepts of normativity and power are interrelated, and how power rests on the capacity to influence, determine, and possibly restrict the space of justifications for others. By combining (...) insights from the disciplines of philosophy, history, and the social sciences, Forst revaluates theories of justice, as well as of power, and provides the tools for a critical theory of relations of justification. Translated from German. (shrink)

The paper critically examines recent work on justifications and excuses in epistemology. I start with a discussion of Gerken’s claim that the “excuse maneuver” is ad hoc. Recent work from Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn provides resources to advance the debate. Focusing in particular on a key insight in Williamson’s view, I then consider an additional worry for the so-called excuse maneuver. I call it the “excuses are not enough” objection. Dealing with this objection generates pressure in two directions: one (...) is to show that excuses are a positive enough normative standing to help certain externalists with important cases; the other is to do so in a way that does not lead back to Gerken’s objection. I show how a Williamson-inspired framework is flexible enough to deal with both sources of pressure. Perhaps surprisingly, I draw on recent virtue epistemology. (shrink)

What features does a norm have to have such that we really ought to follow it? This paper argues that norms are authoritative when they are justified in a particular sense. However, this brand of justification is not any of those with which we are currently familiar. The authority of norms is not a matter of moral, epistemic or prudential justification. It depends instead on what I call "justification simpliciter." The concept of justification simpliciter is defined (...) and defended in this paper. (shrink)

According to the author there is no doubt that one has to distinguish between the justification and the application of norms. Problems are seen only to arise if one asks what exactly the distinction is and which consequences have to be drawn from it. Recently, Klaus Günther, in particular, has searched for this distinction and connected it with far‐reaching conclusions concerning the theory of norms, arguments, and morals. His theses are the object of the author's considerations.

The author introduces a normative conception of coherence, derived from a pragmatic interpretation of the application of norms to concrete cases. A distinction is made between the justification of a norm and its application. In the case of moral norms, justification and application can be analysed as two different discursive procedures which give rise to different aspects of the principle of impartiality. Impartial justification requires a procedure by which all interests concerned are taken into account whereas (...) impartial application requires a procedure where all features of a situation are considered. The complete description of a concrete case makes necessary a coherent interpretation of all the valid norms which are prima facie applicable. This requirement of an ideal coherent system of norms is restricted to interpretive “paradigms” in the case of legal norms, because it is necessary to produce singular judgments under the restrictive conditions of scarce time and incomplete knowledge. (shrink)

Say that two goals are normatively coincident just in case one cannot aim for one goal without automatically aiming for the other. While knowledge and justification are distinct epistemic goals, with distinct achievement conditions, this paper begins from the suggestion that they are nevertheless normatively coincident—aiming for knowledge and aiming for justification are one and the same activity. A number of surprising consequences follow from this—both specific consequences about how we can ascribe knowledge and justification in lottery (...) cases and more general consequences about the nature of justification and the relationship between justification and evidential probability. Many of these consequences turn out to be at variance with conventional, prevailing views. (shrink)

Aspects of the world are normative in as much as they or their existence constitute reasons for persons, i.e. grounds which make certain beliefs, moods, emotions, intentions or actions appropriate or inappropriate. Our capacities to perceive and understand how things are, and what response is appropriate to them, and our ability to respond appropriately, make us into persons, i.e. creatures with the ability to direct their own life in accordance with their appreciation of themselves and their environment, and of (...) the reasons with which, given how they are, the world presents them. An explanation of normativity would explain the various puzzling aspects of this complex phenomenon. In particular it would explain how it is that aspects of the world can constitute reasons for cognitive, emotive, and volitional responses; how it is that we can come to realise that certain cognitive, emotional or volitional responses are appropriate in various circumstances, and inappropriate in others; and how it is that we can respond appropriately. This paper explores an aspect of the last of these questions. (shrink)

Pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms tell us to observe these norms as the best means to attaining the things we value. I argue that such justifications do not work, because they harbour an irresolvable tension: their non-alethic character intrinsically conflicts with the truth-aiming character of the epistemic norms they are justifying. We should abandon, then, either epistemic norms or pragmatic justifications of these norms. I therefore argue that we should abandon pragmatic justifications.

Epistemology is sometimes said to be a normative discipline, but what this characterization means is often left unclear. This paper distinguishes two kinds of normativity and thereby provides a new way of understanding attributions of normativity. Associated with this distinction are two kinds of epistemological reflection. These are shown to be parallel to two kinds of ethical reflection. In the light of what emerges in showing these points, the paper clarifies the requirements for naturalizing epistemology, the place normativity might (...) have, given certain kinds of naturalization, and the sense in which knowledge and justification may be viewed as normative. (shrink)

The thesis that meaning is normative has come under much scrutiny of late. However, there are aspects of the view that have received comparatively little critical attention which centre on meaning’s capacity to guide and justify linguistic action. Call such a view ‘justification normativity’. I outline Zalabardo’s account of JN and his corresponding argument against reductive-naturalistic meaning-factualism and argue that the argument presents a genuine challenge to account for the guiding role of meaning in linguistic action. I then (...) present a proposal regarding how this challenge may be met. This proposal is then compared to recent work by Ginsborg, who has outlined an alternative view of the normativity of meaning that explicitly rejects the idea that meanings guide and justify linguistic use. I outline how Ginsborg utilises this notion of normativity in order to provide a positive account of what it is to mean something by an expression which is intended to serve as a r.. (shrink)

This paper advances our understanding of the norms of assertion in two ways. First, I evaluate recent studies claiming to discredit an important earlier finding which supports the hypothesis that assertion has a factive norm. In particular, I evaluate whether it was due to stimuli mentioning that a speaker’s evidence was fallible. Second, I evaluate the hypothesis that assertion has a truth-insensitive standard of justification. In particular, I evaluate the claim that switching an assertion from true to false, while (...) holding all else objectively constant, is irrelevant to attributions of justification. Two pre-registered experiments provide decisive evidence against each claim. In the first experiment, switching from mentioning to not mentioning fallibility made no difference to assertability attributions, thereby disproving the criticism concerning fallibility. By contrast, switching an assertion from true to false decreased the rate of assertability attribution from over 90% to less than 20%, thereby replicating and vindicating the original finding supporting a factive norm. In the second experiment, switching an assertion from true to false decreased the rate of justification attribution from over 80 to 10%, thereby undermining the hypothesis that assertion’s standard of justification is truth-insensitive. The second experiment also demonstrates that perspective-taking influences attributions of justification, and it provides initial evidence that the standard of justification for assertion is stricter than the standard for belief. (shrink)

La théorie de l'argumentation montre que le raisonnement pratique s'exerce selon deux modalités : la justification de la validité d'une norme générale et la justification de la pertinence de l'application d'une norme générale au cas d'espèce. Le jugement d'application est le produit d'une argumentation commandée par une exigence d'impartialité. Cette exigence se traduit dans le principe procédural selon lequel on ne peut établir qu'une norme peut légitimement s'appliquer dans une situation que si ont été prises en considération toutes (...) les caractéristiques de la situation qui sont relevantes en regard d'une interprétation cohérente de toutes les normes applicables. Un tel critère de validité s'impose tant au jugement moral en situation qu'au jugement juridique. (shrink)

Selon une thèse populaire en épistémologie contemporaine, une croyance est justifiée si, et seulement si, elle est une connaissance. Les défenseurs de cette thèse soutiennent également que la connaissance est la norme fondamentale de la croyance et que la conformité à cette norme est à la fois nécessaire et suffisante pour la justification. Je conteste l’affirmation selon laquelle la simple conformité à une norme suffit à justifier une croyance. La justification exige la conformité pour des raisons suffisantes et (...) «invaincues». Une conséquence de ceci est le rejet de la thèse selon laquelle la conformité à la norme de la croyance est nécessaire et suffisante pour la justification épistémique. (shrink)

This study investigates the role that moral identity, religiosity, and the institutionalization of ethics play in determining the extent of justification of norm violating behavior among business practitioners. Moral justification is where a person, rather than assuming responsibility for an outcome, attempts to legitimize ethically questionable behavior. Results of the study indicate that both the internalization and symbolization dimensions of moral identity as well as intrinsic religiosity and the explicit institutionalization of ethics within the organization are significant determinants (...) of the moral justification of unethical behaviors. (shrink)

In a recent exchange, John Worrall and Larry Laudan have debated the merits of the model of rational scientific change proposed by Laudan in his book Science and Values. On the model advocated by Laudan, rational change may take place at the level of scientific theory and methodology, as well as at the level of the epistemic aims of science. Moreover, the rationality of a change which occurs at any one of these three levels may be dependent on considerations at (...) the remaining levels. Yet, in spite of the avowedly anti-relativistic motivation of Laudan's model, Worrall criticizes Laudan for irrevocably relativizing scientific rationality to historically variant methodological standards. (shrink)

In this article, I look at the role of appeals to the emotions in criminal law defences. A position commonly held is that appeals to the emotions can excuse but cannot justify. However, we should be careful that this view does not rest on too simple and non-cognitive a view of the emotions. I contrast a simple picture, according to which action from emotion involves loss of rational control, with the more Aristotelian picture recently offered by RA Duff. I then (...) look at John Gardner’s theory of excuses, which seeks to avoid the non-cognitive account of action from emotion as loss of rational control, but nevertheless denies that reference to the emotions can even partially justify. I argue that what is at issue between Gardner and Duff is what Gardner calls the ‘no-difference’ thesis, namely that the reasons that count in favour of an emotion count also in favour of action done from that emotion. I conclude that Gardner has not yet explained why we should reject the no-difference thesis. (shrink)

De Vries and Müller-Salo begin with an interpretation of my view on the need for adequate secular reasons in supporting coercion in politics—specifically, in law-making and establishing public policies. Most laws and public policies are coercive. A public policy, for instance, may be established by a governmental or quasi-governmental institution such as a public university, and it may be enforced using sanctions that include fines and possible imprisonment. Even temporary policies established by agencies of government as opposed to legislative bodies (...) may have the authority to impose serious penalties for non-compliance. Müller-Salo and De Vries consider various problems my approach raises and conclude by offering a principle weaker than my principle of secular rationale but aimed at making a similar contribution to formulating an ethics of citizenship—a set of standards applicable both to individual citizens and to government officials. (shrink)

Introduction Dans ses Prolegomena zur reinen Logik ( Logische Untersuchungen, 1900), Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) offre une analyse et un exemple assez mémorables de ce qu’est une norme (pour ceux qui n’y sont pas familiers, la traduction française du passage le plus significatif est reproduite dans l’Appendice 1 de cet essai). Dire « un guerrier doit être courageux » revient à dire : « Un guerrier courageux est bon. » À l’évidence, ceci transforme une norme en jugement de valeur. Husserl exprime (...) cette équivalence directement, c’est-à-dire qu’il ne décrit ni n’analyse la manière dont les normes sont constituées et justifiées. Je n’ai pas répertorié d’analyse réfléchie sur ce sujet dans le reste de ses publications et, s’il existe semblable analyse dans son Nachlass , je n’en ai pas connaissance . Le présent compte rendu n’est, en aucun cas, une interprétation des textes de Husserl mais une brève tentative visant à élaborer une phénoménologie constitutive dans la manière du Husserl de la maturité. Dans la première section ci-dessous, je tente de développer l’exemple de Husserl de façon dynamique. Dans la deuxième, je prends un référent purement possible de ses propositions comme indice relatif aux composantes de la situation où se constituent des cas de ce type. Dans la troisième section, j’examine brièvement la manière dont les normes peuvent être justifiées. La conduite à adopter lors d’un. (shrink)

I critically discuss two claims which Hannah Ginsborg makes on behalf of her account of meaning in terms of ‘primitive normativity’: first, that it avoids the sceptical regress articulated by Kripke's Wittgenstein; second, that it makes sense of the thought—central to Kripke's Wittgenstein—that ‘meaning is normative’, in a way which shows this thought not only to be immune from recent criticisms but also to undermine reductively naturalistic theories of content. In the course of the discussion, I consider and attempt (...) to shed light on a number of issues: the structure of the sceptical regress; the content of the thought that ‘meaning is normative’, and its force against reductive theories; the connection between meaning and justification; and the notion of ‘primitive normativity’. (shrink)

Volume 16, Issue 1, April 2020, Page 110-115.

The aim of this paper is to show the main thesis concerning the theory of cognition of the eminent neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert, as presented in his work “Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis”. On the one hand, Rickert finds out that thinking is fated to “clash with nothingness”, thus creating a temptation to reject all rigours and to yield to complete discretion. On the other hand, he attributes axiological status to nothingness which subjects thinking to a particular kind of “ought”. In his (...) view, the cognizing subject is faced with an axiological choice: either discretion or truth and argues that it is worth opting for truth. His argumentation could be an interesting point of reference for contemporary culture gradually moving away from the type of thinking rooted in objectively existing principles. (shrink)

Although CSR scholarship has highlighted how tensions in CSR implementation are negotiated, little is known about its normative and moral dimension at a micro-level. Drawing upon the economies of worth framework, we explore how spirituality influences the negotiation of CSR tensions at an individual level, and what types of justification work they engage in when experiencing tensions. Our analysis of semi-structured interview data from individuals who described themselves as Buddhist and were in charge of CSR implementations for their (...) organizations shows that spirituality influences how they compromise among competing moral values by identifying two forms of justification work: compartmentalizing work and contextualizing work, which help spiritual practitioners minimize moral dissonance. (shrink)