Uniformism about the epistemology of modality is the view that there is only one basic route to modal knowledge; non-uniformism is the view that there are several. Non-uniformism is becoming an increasingly popular stance, but how can it be defended? I prise apart two ways of understanding the uniformism/non-uniformism conflict that are mixed up in the literature. I argue that once separated, it is evident that they lead up to two different non-uniformist theses that need (...) to be argued for in very different ways. In particular, one construal allows only for a weak thesis about the actual lay of the current theoretical land in modal epistemology, while the other allows for a strong thesis that can be defended without reliance on claims about the alleged goodness or badness of individual accounts of modal justification. I argue that philosophers inclined towards non-uniformism ought to go for the strong, rather than the weak, thesis. (shrink)

Philosophers often make exotic-sounding modal claims, such as: “A timeless world is impossible”, “The laws of physics could have been different from what they are”, “There could have been an additional phenomenal colour”. Otherwise popular empiricist modal epistemologies in the contemporary literature cannot account for whatever epistemic justification we might have for making such modal claims. Those who do not, as a result of this, endorse scepticism with respect to their epistemic status typically suggest that they can be justified but (...) have yet to develop some distinct, workable theory of how. That is, they endorse a form of non-uniformism about the epistemology of modality, according to which claims about philosophically interesting modal matters need to be justified differently from e.g. everyday or scientific modal claims, but they fail to provide any more detail. This article aims to fill this gap by outlining how such a non-uniformist view could be spelled out and what story about philosophically interesting modal justification it could contain. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the temporal connective prima (‘before’) is a comparative adverb. The argument is based on a number of grammatical facts from Italian, showing that there is an asymmetry between prima and dopo (‘after’). On the ground of their divergent behaviour, I suggest that dopo has a different grammatical status from prima. I propose a semantic treatment for prima that is based on an independently motivated analysis of comparatives which can be traced back to Seuren (in: (...) Kiefer and Ruwet (eds.) Generative grammar in Europe, 1973). Dopo is analyzed instead as an atomic two-place predicate which contributes a binary relation over events to the sentence meaning. The different semantic treatments of the two connectives provide an explanation for the grammatical asymmetries considered at the outset; interestingly, they also shed some light on other asymmetries between prima and dopo, which are known to hold for the English temporal connectives before and after as well: these asymmetries are related to the veridicality properties, the distribution of NPIs, and the logical properties of these connectives first described in Anscombe (Philos Rev 73:3–24, 1964). (shrink)

The brain is a very complex structure. Over the past several decades, many studies have aimed to understand how various non-uniform variables relate to each other. The current study compared the whole-brain network organization and global spatial distribution of cell densities in the monkey brain. Wide comparisons between 27 graph theoretical measures and cell densities revealed that only participation coefficients (PCs) significantly correlated with cell densities. Interestingly, PCs did not show a significant correlation with spatial coordinates. Furthermore, the significance of (...) the correlation between cell densities and spatial coordinates disappeared only with the removal of the visual module, while the significance of the correlation between cell densities and PCs disappeared with the removal of any one module. Taken together, these results suggested the presence of a combinatorial effect of modular architectures in the network organization related to the non-uniformity of cell densities additional to the spatially monotonic change. (shrink)

It has already been discussed extensively in the literature that wh-elements in Chinese (as in Japanese and Korean) can have non-interrogative interpretations, i.e., they are the socalled “wh-indeterminates” à la Kuroda 1965 (see Huang 1982, Cheng 1991, Li 1992, Lin 1998 among others). (1a-c) illustrate the typical examples.

It is only when mixing two or more pure substances along a reversible path that the entropy of the mixing can be made physically manifest. It is not, in this case, a mere mathematical artifact. This mixing requires a process of successive stages. In any finite number of stages, the external manifestation of the entropy change, as a definite and measurable quantity of heat, isa fully continuous function of the relevant variables. It is only at an infinite and unattainable limit (...) thata non-uniform convergence occurs. And this occurs when considered in terms of the number of stages together with a distinguishability parameter appropriate to the particular device which is used to achieve reversibility. These considerations, which are of technological interest to chemical engineers, resolve a paradox derived in chemical theory called Gibbs'' Paradox. (shrink)

The empty set of course contains no computable point. On the other hand, surprising results due to Zaslavskiĭ, Tseĭtin, Kreisel, and Lacombe have asserted the existence of non-empty co-r. e. closed sets devoid of computable points: sets which are even “large” in the sense of positive Lebesgue measure.This leads us to investigate for various classes of computable real subsets whether they always contain a computable point.

Imagine cells that live in a high‐gradient magnetic field (HGMF). Through what mechanisms do the cells sense a non‐uniform magnetic field and how such a field changes the cell fate? We show that magnetic forces generated by HGMFs can be comparable to intracellular forces and therefore may be capable of altering the functionality of an individual cell and tissues in unprecedented ways. We identify the cellular effectors of such fields and propose novel routes in cell biology predicting new biological effects (...) such as magnetic control of cell‐to‐cell communication and vesicle transport, magnetic control of intracellular ROS levels, magnetically induced differentiation of stem cells, magnetically assisted cell division, or prevention of cells from dividing. On the basis of experimental facts and theoretical modeling we reveal timescales of cellular responses to high‐gradient magnetic fields and suggest an explicit dependence of the cell response time on the magnitude of the magnetic field gradient. (shrink)

La présente étude a pour objet l’étude des concepts d’uniforme et de non-uniforme dans la physique du Timée. Comme le montre un examen des passages du corpus hippocratique où ces concepts apparaissent avant Platon, ces concepts désignent à la fois des propriétés sensibles et une formalisation de l’expérience perceptive susceptible d’une interprétation géométrique. Platon trouve ainsi dans ces schèmes de la pratique médicale un élément médiateur idéal au sein d’une physique qui a pour projet de reconstituer l’ensemble de l’expérience perceptive (...) à partir d’une construction géométrique des éléments premiers. (shrink)

The important roles of prediction and prior experience are well established in music research and fit well with Clark's concept of unified perception, cognition, and action arising from hierarchical, bidirectional predictive processing. However, in order to fully account for human musical intelligence, Clark needs to further consider the powerful and variable role of affect in relation to prediction error.

. This paper follows the journey of two small fluid units throughout the nineteenth century in Anglo-American medicine and pharmacy, explaining how the non-uniform “drop” survived while the standardized minim became obsolete. I emphasize two roles these units needed to fulfill: that of a physical measuring device, and that of a rhetorical communication device. First, I discuss the challenges unique to measuring small amounts of fluid, outlining how the modern medicine dropper developed out of an effort to resolve problems with (...) the “minimometer,” which measured minims. Second, I explain how drops, utilized in “the open drop method” of administering general anesthesia, effectively communicated a gradual process and epistemically valuable heuristic to the audience of practitioners, whose attention to individual medical outcomes was important for verifying the proper dosage. The standardized minim was never able to achieve success as the drop’s intended replacement; the non-uniform drop better served the relevant epistemic goals within the practical contexts for which these units were designed. The surprising historical trajectory of drops should cause us to question the common equivocation of “standardization” with “progress” in the history and philosophy of measurement. This study also exemplifies how examining non-standard measurement practices can be instructive for better understanding the role and function of standardization within epistemology of measurement. (shrink)

We propose a fast and reliable corner detector that can detect corners under non-uniform illumination and fuzzy mineshaft images effectively. First, we presented an inner mask that used only four pixels to determine the flat and corner regions of an image, which could eliminate unnecessary computation of flat regions, thus reducing computing cost. Second, we separated the corner regions into background and foreground and computed the separate corner threshold to settle non-uniform illumination. Third, we proposed a fast corner-detection algorithm to (...) compute the nucleus continuous contributive segment based on the corner state. Finally, we proposed two effective methods to remove the false corners. Experimental results showed that our approach has a better detection quality and is less time consuming than three other algorithms on an artificial image, a noisy image, and non-uniform images and could meet the real-time requirement of mineshaft applications. (shrink)

This paper concerns periodic solutions of a class of equations that model gene regulatory networks. Unlike the vast majority of previous studies, it is not assumed that all decay rates are identical. To handle this more general situation, we rely on monotonicity properties of these systems. Under an alternative assumption, it is shown that a classical fixed point theorem for monotone, concave operators can be applied to these systems. The required assumption is expressed in geometrical terms as an alignment condition (...) on so-called focal points . As an application, we show the existence and uniqueness of a stable periodic orbit for negative feedback loop systems in dimension 3 or more, and of a unique stable equilibrium point in dimension 2. This extends a theorem of Snoussi, which showed the existence of these orbits only. (shrink)

In this paper, a proof-theoretic method to prove uniform Lyndon interpolation for non-normal modal logics is introduced and applied to show that the logics E\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {E}$$\end{document}, M\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {M}$$\end{document}, MC\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {MC}$$\end{document}, EN\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {EN}$$\end{document}, MN\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {MN}$$\end{document} have that (...) property. In particular, these logics have uniform interpolation. Although for some of them the latter is known, the fact that they have uniform Lyndon interpolation is new. Also, the proof-theoretic proofs of these facts are new, as well as the constructive way to explicitly compute the interpolants that they provide. It is also shown that the non-normal modal logics EC\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {EC}$$\end{document} and ECN\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {ECN}$$\end{document} do not have Craig interpolation, and whence no uniform interpolation. (shrink)

Cognitivists and non-cognitivists in contemporary meta-ethics tend to assume that moral judgments are semantically uniform. That is, they share the assumption that either all moral judgments express beliefs, or they all express non-beliefs. But what if some moral judgments express beliefs and others do not? Then moral judgments are not semantically uniform and the question “Cognitivist or non-cognitivist?” poses a false dilemma. I will question the assumption that moral judgments are semantically uniform. First, I will explain what I mean by (...) the assumption (section 2). I will call this assumption SUM, the semantic uniformity of moral judgments. Second, I will provide some examples in order to illustrate that SUM cannot be taken for granted (section 3). Third, I will try to understand, using ideas from Wittgenstein, why SUM has nevertheless so often been taken for granted (section 4). Fourth, I will discuss some authors in contemporary meta-ethics who have noted the false dilemma between cognitivism and non-cognitivism and evaluate the solutions they propose for overcoming it (section 5). Fifth, I will indicate, again with some help from Wittgenstein, how meta-ethical research about moral judgments is possible without the assumption that morality is semantically uniform (section 6). (shrink)

We investigate in detail the electromagnetic fields of a uniformly accelerated charge, in order to ascertain whether such a charge does ‘emit’ radiation, especially in view of the Poynting flow computed at large distances and taken as an evidence of radiation emitted by the charge. In this context, certain important aspects of the fields need to be taken into account. First and foremost is the fact that in the case of a uniformly accelerated charge, one cannot ignore the velocity fields. (...) This then leads to other equally vital points. The net field energy turns out to be exactly the same as that of a non-accelerated charge having a uniform velocity equal to the instantaneous velocity of the uniformly accelerated charge. Further, the Poynting vector, seen with respect to the ’present’ location of the uniformly accelerated charge, during the deceleration phase, possesses everywhere a radial component pointing inward toward the charge, becoming nil when the charge becomes momentarily stationary, and during the acceleration phase, points away from the charge position. Last, but not least, when the leading spherical front of the relativistically beamed Poynting flux, advances forward at a large time t to a far-off distance \, the charge too is not lagging far behind. In fact, these relativistically beamed fields, increasingly resemble fields of a charge moving in an inertial frame with a uniform velocity \, with a convective flow of fields in that frame along with the movement of the charge. There is no other Poynting flow in the far-zones that could be termed as radiation emitted by the charge which, in turn, is fully consistent with the absence of radiation reaction and is also fully conversant with the strong principle of equivalence. (shrink)

Non-uniformed combat morally infringes on civilians’ fundamental right to immunity and exacts an impermissible form of unofficial conscription that is morally prohibited even if the civilians knowingly consent to it. It is often argued that revolutionary groups burdened by resource disparities relative to the state or who claim alternative sources of political legitimacy (such as national self-determination or the constitution of a political collective) are justified in using unconventional tactics such as non-uniformed combat. Neither those reasons nor the provision of (...) public goods, however, are sufficient to justify such rights violations and this form of conscription, and it calls into question the suitability of current international legal protections for the non-uniformed. (shrink)

Unlike standard modal logics, many dynamic epistemic logics are not closed under uniform substitution. A distinction therefore arises between the logic and its substitution core, the set of formulas all of whose substitution instances are valid. The classic example of a non-uniform dynamic epistemic logic is Public Announcement Logic (PAL), and a well-known open problem is to axiomatize the substitution core of PAL. In this paper we solve this problem for PAL over the class of all relational models with infinitely (...) many agents, PAL-K_omega, as well as standard extensions thereof, e.g., PAL-T_omega, PAL-S4_omega, and PAL-S5_omega. We introduce a new Uniform Public Announcement Logic (UPAL), prove completeness of a deductive system with respect to UPAL semantics, and show that this system axiomatizes the substitution core of PAL. (shrink)

This paper defines the form of prior knowledge that is required for sound inferences by analogy and single-instance generalizations, in both logical and probabilistic reasoning. In the logical case, the first order determination rule defined in Davies (1985) is shown to solve both the justification and non-redundancy problems for analogical inference. The statistical analogue of determination that is put forward is termed 'uniformity'. Based on the semantics of determination and uniformity, a third notion of "relevance" is defined, both logically and (...) probabilistically. The statistical relevance of one function in determining another is put forward as a way of defining the value of information: The statistical relevance of a function F to a function G is the absolute value of the change in one's information about the value of G afforded by specifying the value of F. This theory provides normative justifications for conclusions projected by analogy from one case to another, and for generalization from an instance to a rule. The soundness of such conclusions, in either the logical or the probabilistic case, can be identified with the extent to which the corresponding criteria (determination and uniformity) actually hold for the features being related. (shrink)

Unlike standard modal logics, many dynamic epistemic logics are not closed under uniform substitution. A distinction therefore arises between the logic and its substitu- tion core, the set of formulas all of whose substitution instances are valid. The classic example of a non-uniform dynamic epistemic logic is Public Announcement Logic (PAL), and a well-known open problem is to axiomatize the substitution core of PAL. In this paper we solve this problem for PAL over the class of all relational models with (...) infinitely many agents, PAL-Kω , as well as standard extensions thereof, e.g., PAL-Tω , PAL-S4ω, and PAL-S5ω. We introduce a new Uniform Public Announcement Logic (UPAL), prove completeness of a deductive system with respect to UPAL semantics, and show that this system axiomatizes the substitution core of PAL. (shrink)

We prove uniformly computable versions of the Implicit Function Theorem in its differentiable and non-differentiable forms. We show that the resulting operators are not computable if information about some of the partial derivatives of the implicitly defining function is omitted. Finally, as a corollary, we obtain a uniformly computable Inverse Function Theorem, first proven by M. Ziegler.

Our paper addresses the following question: Is there a general characterization, for all predicates P that take both declarative and interrogative complements , of the meaning of the P-interrogative clause construction in terms of the meaning of the P-declarative clause construction? On our account, if P is a responsive predicate and Q a question embedded under P, then the meaning of ‘P + Q’ is, informally, “to be in the relation expressed by P to some potential complete answer to Q”. (...) We show that this rule allows us to derive veridical and non-veridical readings of embedded questions, depending on whether the embedding verb is veridical or not, and provide novel empirical evidence supporting the generalization. We then enrich our basic proposal to account for the presuppositions induced by the embedding verbs, as well as for the generation of intermediate exhaustive readings of embedded questions. (shrink)

In [U. Kohlenbach, Some logical metatheorems with applications in functional analysis, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 357 89–128], the second author obtained metatheorems for the extraction of effective bounds from classical, prima facie non-constructive proofs in functional analysis. These metatheorems for the first time cover general classes of structures like arbitrary metric, hyperbolic, CAT and normed linear spaces and guarantee the independence of the bounds from parameters ranging over metrically bounded spaces. Recently ]), the authors obtained generalizations of these metatheorems which (...) allow one to prove similar uniformities even for unbounded spaces as long as certain local boundedness conditions are satisfied. The use of classical logic imposes some severe restrictions on the formulas and proofs for which the extraction can be carried out. In this paper we consider similar metatheorems for semi-intuitionistic proofs, i.e. proofs in an intuitionistic setting enriched with certain non-constructive principles. Contrary to the classical case, there are practically no restrictions on the logical complexity of theorems for which bounds can be extracted. Again, our metatheorems guarantee very general uniformities, even in cases where the existence of uniform bounds is not obtainable by straightforward functional analytic means. Already in the purely intuitionistic case, where the existence of effective bounds is implicit, the metatheorems allow one to derive uniformities that may not be obvious at all from a given constructive proof. Finally, we illustrate our main metatheorem by an example from metric fixed point theory. (shrink)

We consider the relation between the uniform interpolation property and the elimination of non-standard quantifiers (the bisimulation quantifiers) in the context of the ?-calculus. In particular, we isolate classes of frames where the correspondence between these two properties is nicely smooth.

In situations where we ignore everything but the space of possibilities, we ought to suspend judgment—that is, remain agnostic—about which of these possibilities is the case. This means that we cannot sum our degrees of belief in different possibilities, something that has been formalized as an axiom of non-additivity. Consistent with this way of representing our ignorance, I defend a doxastic norm that recommends that we should nevertheless follow a certain additivity of possibilities: even if we cannot sum degrees of (...) belief in different possibilities, we should be more confident in larger groups of possibilities. It is thus shown that, in the type of situation considered (in so-called ‘classical ignorance’, i.e. “behind a thin veil of ignorance”), it is epistemically rational for advocates of suspending judgment to endorse this comparative confidence; while on the other hand it is shown that, even in classical ignorance, no stronger belief—such as a precise uniform probability distribution—is warranted. (shrink)

Self-referential sentences have played a key role in Tarski's proof [9] of the non-definibility of arithmetic truth within arithmetic and Gödel's proof [2] of the incompleteness of Peano Arithmetic. In this article we consider some new methods of achieving self-reference in a uniform manner.

This note deals with the prepositional uniformity principlep-UP: p x N A (p, x) x N p A (p, x) ( species of all propositions) in intuitionistic mathematics.p-UP is implied by WC and KS. But there are interestingp-UP-cases which require weak KS resp. WC only. UP for number species follows fromp-UP by extended bar-induction (ranging over propositions) and suitable weak continuity. As corollaries we have the disjunction property and the existential definability w.r.t. concrete objects. Other consequences are: there is no (...) non-trivial countable partition of;id is the only injective function from to; there are no many-place injective prepositional functions; card () is incomparable with the cardinality of all metric spaces containing at least three elements. (shrink)

Michael Gill has argued that contemporary metaethics proceeds on the assumption that morality is uniform. I apply Gill’s diagnosis to the debate between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. I argue, on the basis of examples, that there is good reason to question the assumption that morality is semantically uniform. I describe the assumption as a symptom of what Wittgenstein has called the philosopher’s “craving for generality‘. I discuss several recent metaethical positions in which the question “Cognitivism or non-cognitivism?‘ appears as a false (...) dilemma. I conclude that these positions are still subject to the craving for generality. I defend a more radically Wittgensteinian approach to metaethics, in which the idea of family resemblances and an emphasis on differences between moral judgments are particularly important If morality is not necessarily to be thought of as semantically uniform, at least one important consequence follows. An omnipresent way of arguing in metaethics, namely arguing for cognitivism by arguing against non-cognitivism, becomes unavailable to the metaethicist. (shrink)

The question of whether it is possible to philosophize outside the categories of rationalist philosophy is not limited to methodology. It has ideological overtones. Namely, the rationalism that has developed in philosophy in modern times, after Descartes, is inevitably supplemented by mechanics. The world is seen as a machine, the living is reduced to mechanisms. Rationalism becomes a machine of mentality. Taking it as a model of normal thinking, giving it a universal value, we thereby impose Western way of thinking (...) on other cultures with a different mentality. The question, therefore, is not about the method of scientific knowledge but about the power realized through the transformation of mentality. Scientific knowledge conquers space. Philosophy produces a transformation of mentality. New rationalism, according to G. Bachelard, is in dialectical relation with the usual realism of the natural Sciences. In this process, there is the implementation of new schemes developed in the complex interaction of “ratio” and experiment. Modern science is the collective creation of a new reality. This is the reality of the “picture of the world.” There is another view of science, rationalism and modern philosophy. According to him, rationalism is dualism, atomism and social individualism. These features reveal the anti-traditional and anti-metaphysical spirit of modern Western civilization. The traditional approach is non-duality, unity provided by metaphysical principles. The new rationalism in science is characterized by the belief in the infinite progress of knowledge. But knowledge itself, from the point of view of tradition, is devoid of great value. Philosophy uses categories of ancient Greek philosophy or German classical philosophy, but they cannot be considered universal. They corresponded not only to the time and place, the conditions in which they arose, but also to the characteristic mentality of the peoples and individuals who created them. They are not suitable for understanding the metaphysical doctrines of traditional cultures. The language of traditional cultures is symbolic and synthetic in contrast to the analytical language of Western science and philosophy. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Alexandrian physicians Erasistratus of Iulis and Herophilus of Chalcedon adopted an Aristotelian analysis of the composition of organic bodies into three levels, namely elements, uniform and non-uniform parts. They asserted that it was not the task of the doctor to analyse the body at the level of elements, that the uniform parts, being perceptible, should be taken to be most basic in the context of medicine and that the inquiry into the elements be left to (...) philosophers. The paper explores the possible motivations behind this restriction, and considers more generally its connections to the Peripatetic background. (shrink)

The subject of Labelled Non-Classical Logics is the development and investigation of a framework for the modular and uniform presentation and implementation of non-classical logics, in particular modal and relevance logics. Logics are presented as labelled deduction systems, which are proved to be sound and complete with respect to the corresponding Kripke-style semantics. We investigate the proof theory of our systems, and show them to possess structural properties such as normalization and the subformula property, which we exploit not only to (...) establish advantages and limitations of our approach with respect to related ones, but also to give, by means of a substructural analysis, a new proof-theoretic method for investigating decidability and complexity of (some of) the logics we consider. All of our deduction systems have been implemented in the generic theorem prover Isabelle, thus providing a simple and natural environment for interactive proof development. Labelled Non-Classical Logics is essential reading for researchers and practitioners interested in the theory and applications of non-classical logics. (shrink)

Trying to overcome Dugundji’s result on uncharacterisability of modal logics by finite logical matrices, Kearns and Ivlev proposed, independently, a characterisation of some modal systems by means of four-valued multivalued truth-functions , as an alternative to Kripke semantics. This constitutes an antecedent of the non-deterministic matrices introduced by Avron and Lev . In this paper we propose a reconstruction of Kearns’s and Ivlev’s results in a uniform way, obtaining an extension to another modal systems. The first part of the paper (...) is devoted to four-valued Nmatrices, including Kearns’s and Ivlev’s. Besides proving with full details Kearns’s results for T, S4 and S5, we also obtain a characterisation of the system B by four-valued Nmatrices with level valuations. Concerning Ivlev’s results, two new modal systems are introduced and char.. (shrink)

Discrepancies between the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the adult and pediatric diagnostic guidelines for brain death (BD) (the “Guidelines”) have motivated proposals to revise the UDDA. A revision proposed by Lewis, Bonnie and Pope (the RUDDA), has received particular attention, the three novelties of which would be: (1) to specify the Guidelines as the legally recognized “medical standard,” (2) to exclude hypothalamic function from the category of “brain function,” and (3) to authorize physicians to conduct an apnea (...) test without consent and even over a proxy’s objection. One hundred seven experts in medicine, bioethics, philosophy, and law, spanning a wide variety of perspectives, have come together in agreement that while the UDDA needs revision, the RUDDA is not the way to do it. Specifically, (1) the Guidelines have a non-negligible risk of false-positive error, (2) hypothalamic function is more relevant to the organism as a whole than any brainstem reflex, and (3) the apnea test carries a risk of precipitating BD in a non-BD patient, provides no benefit to the patient, does not reliably accomplish its intended purpose, and is not even absolutely necessary for diagnosing BD according to the internal logic of the Guidelines; it should at the very least require informed consent, as do many procedures that are much more beneficial and less risky. Finally, objections to a neurologic criterion of death are not based only on religious belief or ignorance. People have a right to not have a concept of death that experts vigorously debate imposed upon them against their judgment and conscience; any revision of the UDDA should therefore contain an opt-out clause for those who accept only a circulatory-respiratory criterion. (shrink)

We discuss the intertwined topics of Fulling non‐uniqueness and the Unruh effect. The Fulling quantization, which is in some sense the natural one for an observer uniformly accelerated through Minkowski spacetime to adopt, is often heralded as a quantization of the Klein‐Gordon field which is both physically relevant and unitarily inequivalent to the standard Minkowski quantization. We argue that the Fulling and Minkowski quantizations do not constitute a satisfactory example of physically relevant, unitarily inequivalent quantizations, and indicate what it would (...) take to settle the open question of whether a satisfactory example exists. A popular gloss on the Unruh effect has it that an observer uniformly accelerated through the Minkowski vacuum experiences a thermal flux of Rindler quanta. Taking the Unruh effect, so glossed, to establish that the notion of particle must be relativized to a reference frame, some would use it to demote the particle concept from fundamental status. We explain why technical results do not support the popular gloss and why the attempted demotion of the particle concept is both unsuccessful and unnecessary. Fulling non‐uniqueness and the Unruh effect merit attention despite these negative verdicts because they provide excellent vehicles for illustrating key concepts of quantum field theory and for probing foundational issues of considerable philosophical interest. (shrink)