In this article we explore multiple change operators, i.e., operators in which the epistemic input is a set of sentences instead of a single sentence. We propose two types of change: prioritized change, in which the input set is fully accepted, and symmetric change, where both the epistemic state and the epistemic input are equally treated. In both kinds of operators we propose a set of postulates and we present different constructions: kernel changes and partial meet changes.

When an agent can not recognize, immediately, the implausible part of new information received, she will usually first expand her belief state by the new information, and then she may encounter some belief conflicts, and find the implausible information based on her criteria to consolidate her belief state. This process indicates a new kind of non-prioritized multiple revision, called metabolic revision. I give some axiomatic postulates for metabolic revision and propose two functional constructions for it, (...) namely kernel metabolic revision and partial meet metabolic revision, with respect to which the representation theorems are proved. I also compare metabolic revision with some related works in the literature, including semi-revision, merging with integrity constraints, evaluation, and evaluative multiple revision. (shrink)

This paper summarizes and systematizes recent and ongoing work on non-prioritized belief change, i.e., belief revision in which the new information has no special priority due to its novelty.

We introduce a new operator, called rational evaluation, in belief change. The operator evaluates new information according to the agent’s core beliefs, and then exports the plausible part of the new information. It belongs to the decision module in belief change. We characterize rational evaluation by axiomatic postulates and propose two functional constructions for it, based on the well-known constructions of kernel sets and remainder sets, respectively. The main results of the paper are two representation theorems with respect to the (...) two functional constructions. We also compare and connect the evaluation operator with some related operators in belief revision, including contraction, set contraction, and prioritized multiple revision. (shrink)

Choice revision is a sort of non-prioritized multiple revision, in which the agent partially accepts the new information represented by a set of sentences. We investigate the construction of choice revision based on a new approach to belief change called descriptor revision. We prove that each of two variants of choice revision based on such construction is axiomatically characterized with a set of plausible postulates, assuming that the object language is finite. Furthermore, we (...) introduce an alternative modelling for choice revision, which is based on a type of relation on sets of sentences, named multiple believability relation. We show without assuming a finite language that choice revision constructed from such relations is axiomatically characterized with the same sets of postulates that we proposed for the choice revision based on descriptor revision, whenever the relations satisfy certain rationality conditions. (shrink)

Traditional accounts of belief change have been criticized for placing undue emphasis on the new belief provided as input. A recent proposal to address such issues is a framework for non-prioritized belief change based on default theories (Ghose and Goebel, 1998). A novel feature of this approach is the introduction of disbeliefs alongside beliefs which allows for a view of belief contraction as independently useful, instead of just being seen as an intermediate step in the process of belief (...) class='Hi'>revision. This approach is, however, restrictive in assuming a linear ordering of reliability on the received inputs. In this paper, we replace the linear ordering with a preference ranking on inputs from which a total preorder on inputs can be induced. This extension brings along with it the problem of dealing with inputs of equal rank. We provide a semantic solution to this problem which contains, as a special case, AGM belief change on closed theories. (shrink)

The AGM success postulates for belief expansions and revisions have been widely criticized. This has resulted in the development of a number of non-prioritized belief change theories that violate these postulates. It is shown that we must also discard the monotony postulate for belief expansions if we abandon the success postulates. Non-prioritized belief change theories should instead fulfill a weaker postulate, which we call Conditional Monotony.

Belief revision (BR) and truthlikeness (TL) emerged independently as two research programmes in formal methodology in the 1970s. A natural way of connecting BR and TL is to ask under what conditions the revision of a belief system by new input information leads the system towards the truth. It turns out that, for the AGM model of belief revision, the only safe case is the expansion of true beliefs by true input, but this is not very interesting (...) or realistic as a model of theory change in science. The new accounts of non-prioritized belief revision do not seem more promising in this respect, and the alternative BR account of updating by imaging leads to other problems. Still, positive results about increasing truthlikeness by belief revision may be sought by restricting attention to special kinds of theories. Another approach is to link truthlikeness to epistemic matters by an estimation function which calculates expected degrees of truthlikeness relative to evidence. Then we can study how the expected truthlikeness of a theory changes when probabilities are revised by conditionalization or imaging. Again, we can ask under what conditions such changes lead our best theories towards the truth. (shrink)

Since the early 1980s, logical theories of belief revision have offered formal methods for the transformation of knowledge bases or “corpora” of data and beliefs. Early models have dealt with unconditional acceptance and integration of potentially belief-contravening pieces of information into the existing corpus. More recently, models of “non-prioritized” revision were proposed that allow the agent rationally to refuse to accept the new information. This paper introduces a refined method for changing beliefs by specifying constraints on the (...) relative plausibility of propositions. Like the earlier belief revision models, the method proposed is a qualitative one, in the sense that no numbers are needed in order to specify the posterior plausibility of the new information. We use reference beliefs in order to determine the degree of entrenchment of the newly accepted piece of information. We provide two kinds of semantics for this idea, give a logical characterization of the new model, study its relation with other operations of belief revision and contraction, and discuss its intuitive strengths and weaknesses. (shrink)

The problem of merging multiple sources information is central in many information processing areas such as databases integrating problems, multiple criteria decision making, expert opinion pooling, etc. Recently, several approaches have been proposed to merge classical propositional bases, or sets of (non-prioritized) goals. These approaches are in general semantically defined. Like in belief revision, they use priorities, generally based on Dalal's distance, for merging the classical bases and return a new classical base as a result. An (...) immediate consequence of the generation of a classical base is the impossibility of iterating the fusion process in a coherent way w.r.t. priorities since the underlying ordering is lost. This paper presents a general approach for fusing prioritized bases, both semantically and syntactically, when priorities are represented in the possibilistic logic framework. Different classes of merging operators are considered including conjunctive, disjunctive, reinforcement and adaptive operators. We show that the approaches which have been recently proposed for merging classical propositional bases can be embedded in this setting. The result is then a prioritized base, and hence the process can be coherently iterated. Moreover, we also provide a syntactic counterpart for the fusion of classical bases. (shrink)

Five types of constructions are introduced for non-prioritized belief revision, i.e., belief revision in which the input sentence is not always accepted. These constructions include generalizations of entrenchment-based and sphere-based revision. Axiomatic characterizations are provided, and close interconnections are shown to hold between the different constructions.

Five types of constructions are introduced for non-prioritized belief revision, i.e., belief revision in which the input sentence is not always accepted. These constructions include generalizations of entrenchment-based and sphere-based revision. Axiomatic characterizations are provided, and close interconnections are shown to hold between the different constructions.

In this paper we propose an approach to multi-source belief revision where the trust or credibility assigned to informant agents can be revised. In our proposal, the credibility of each informant represented as a strict partial order among informant agents, will be maintained in a repository called credibility base. Upon arrival of new information concerning the credibility of its peers, an agent will be capable of revising this strict partial order, changing the trust assigned to its peers accordingly. Our (...) goal is to formalize a set of change operators over the credibility base: expansion, contraction, prioritized, and non-prioritized revision. These operators will provide the capability of dynamically modifying the credibility of informants considering the reliability of the information. This dynamics will reflect a new perception of trust assigned to the informant, or extend the set of informants by admitting the addition of new informant agents. (shrink)

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In this study, we examine the problem of belief revision, defined as deciding whic h of several initially-accepted sentences to disbelieve, when new information presents a l ogical inconsistency with the initial set. In the first three experiments, the initial sentence set included a conditional sentence, a non-conditional sentence, and an inferred conclusi on drawn from the first two. The new information contradicted the inferred conclusion. Results indicated that the conditional sentences were more readily abandoned than non-c onditional sentences, (...) even when either choice would lead to a consistent belief state, and that this preference was more pronounced when problems used natural language cover sto ries rather than symbols. The pattern of belief revision choices differed depending on whe ther the contradicted conclusion from the initial belief set had been a modus ponens or m odus tollens inference. Two additional experiments examined alternative model-theoretic definitions of minimal change to a belief state, using problems that contained multiple mo dels of the initial belief state and of the new information that provided the contradiction. The results indicated that people did not follow any of four formal definitions of minimal change on these problems. The new information and the contradiction it offered was not, for example, used to select a particular model of the initial belief state as a way of reconci ling the contradiction. The preferred revision was to retain only those initial sentences th at had the same, unambiguous truth value within and across both the initial and new info rmation sets. The study and results are presented in the context of certain logic-based for malizations of belief revision, syntactic and model-theoretic representations of belief stat es, and performance models of human deduction. Principles by which some types of sent ences might be more "entrenched" than others in the face of contradiction are also discuss ed from the perspective of induction and theory revision. (shrink)

The author reviews a contemporary cognitive psychology perspective on memory that views memory as being composed of multiple separate systems. Most researchers draw a fundamental distinction between declarative/explicit and non-declarative/implicit forms of memory. Declarative memory is responsible for the conscious recollection of facts and events - what is typically meant by the everyday and the common psychoanalytic use of the word ‘memory’. Non-declarative forms of memory, in contrast, are specialised processes that influence experience and behaviour without representing the past (...) in terms of any consciously accessible content. They operate outside of an individual's awareness, but are not repressed or otherwise dynamically unconscious. Using this theoretical framework, the question of how childhood relationship experiences are carried forward from the past to influence the present is examined. It is argued that incorporating a conceptualisation of non-declarative memory processing into psychoanalytic theory is essential. Non-declarative memory processes are capable of forming complex and sophisticated representations of the interpersonal world. These non-declarative memory processes exert a major impact on interpersonal experience and behaviour that needs to be analysed on its own terms and not mistakenly viewed as a form of resistance. (shrink)

Krister Segerberg proposed irrevocable belief revision, to be contrasted with standard belief revision, in a setting wherein belief of propositional formulas is modelled explicitly. This suggests that in standard belief revision is revocable: one should be able to unmake (‘revoke’) the fresh belief in the revision formula, given yet further information that contradicts it. In a dynamic epistemic logical setting for belief revision, for multiple agents, we investigate what the requirements are for revocable belief (...) revision. By this we not merely mean recovering belief in non-modal propositions, as in the recovery principle for belief contraction, but recovering belief in modal propositions: beliefs about beliefs. These requirements are almost never met, a surprising result. (shrink)

In the Western cultural imaginaries the monstrous is defined – following Aristotelian categorisations – by its excess, deficiency or displacement of organic matter. These characteristics come to the fore in the field of bioart: a current in contemporary art that involves the use of biological materials (various kinds of soma: cells, tissues, organisms), and scientific procedures, technologies, protocols, and tools. Bioartistic projects and objects not only challenge the conventional ideas of embodiment and bodily boundaries, but also explore the relation between (...) the living and non-living, organic and inorganic, human and nonhuman, as well as various thresholds of the living. -/- By looking at select bioartworks, this paper argues that the analysed projects offer a different ontology of life. More specifically, they expose life as uncontainable, that is, as a power of differentiation that traverses the divide between the living and non-living, organic and inorganic, human and nonhuman, and, ultimately, life and death. In this way, they draw attention to excess, processuality and multiplicity at the very core of life itself. Thus understood, life always already surpasses preconceived material and conceptual limits. -/- Finally, while taking Deleuzian feminisms and new materialism as its theoretical ground, the paper suggests that such a revision of the ontology of life may mobilise future conceptualisations of ethics that evade the anthropocentric logic dominant in the humanities and social sciences. (shrink)

We present a method for relevance sensitive non-monotonic inference from belief sequences which incorporates insights pertaining to prioritized inference and relevance sensitive, inconsistency tolerant belief revision. Our model uses a finite, logically open sequence of propositional formulas as a representation for beliefs and defines a notion of inference from maxiconsistent subsets of formulas guided by two orderings: a temporal sequencing and an ordering based on relevance relations between the putative conclusion and formulas in the sequence. The relevance relations (...) are ternary (using context as a parameter) as opposed to standard binary axiomatizations. The inference operation thus defined easily handles iterated revision by maintaining a revision history, blocks the derivation of inconsistent answers from a possibly inconsistent sequence and maintains the distinction between explicit and implicit beliefs. In doing so, it provides a finitely presented formalism and a plausible model of reasoning for automated agents. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility”Daniel W. Shuman (bio)Stephen Braude’s essay, “Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility,” discusses a number of important issues about the moral and legal responsibility of persons diagnosed with multiple personality disorder (MPD), known in DSM-IV as Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID). One issue that is fundamental to this debate, which Braude does not address, however, is the empirical reality underlying the debate. (...) Does MPD/DID exist? A prerequisite to a debate about the legal consequences of MPD/DID is legally sufficient proof of its existence and its behavioral consequences.Proof that MPD/DID exists, its impact on legal standards of responsibility, and that the defendant suffers from it, must come from expert testimony; it is not part of the common knowledge or experience of the typical judge or juror. Courts are, however, increasingly, unwilling to assume that because an expert has impressive qualifications, he or she will necessarily present scientifically valid evidence. Particularly in cases of psychiatric and psychological evidence, courts that once looked solely at the expert’s qualifications to determine the admissibility for expert scientific evidence, now understand that the expert’s qualifications are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the presentation of accurate expert testimony. Courts increasingly want to know how experts know what they claim to know and whether their methods of knowing meet the hallmarks of good science.Thus, from a legal standpoint, a prerequisite to admissibility of the evidence that serves as a basis for a discussion of the legal implications of MPD/DID is rigorous scientific proof of its existence. Proof of the existence of MPD/DID has not, however, been the subject of rigorous scientific research, but instead has consisted of non-falsifiable clinical experience where the risk of iatrogenesis (i.e., hypnosis and suggestion) is ever present. While these clinical observations and opinions may ultimately be proven valid by subsequent research, there is simply no way to know whether that is so in the absence of rigorous scientific research. If proof of the existence of MPD/DID is clinically but not scientifically grounded, legal rules based upon it are suspect. Moreover, claims of MPD/DID often arise in a legal context where there are significant benefits to be gained from receiving the diagnosis which heightens the importance of rigorous scientific scrutiny.Diagnostic validity and reliability matters in different ways in the forensic context than it does in the therapeutic context. These contextual differences [End Page 59] are reflected in disparate standards for scrutinizing each. There is no threshold requirement, for example, that a psychotherapist prove that a diagnostic category is valid or that a psychotherapeutic treatment used for a person suffering from it is generally recognized as safe and effective before using it; however, there is a threshold requirement of rigorous scientific scrutiny before admission of this information in evidence. If a therapist’s diagnostic hypothesis that there are two personality states influencing a patient’s behavior is not borne out, it can be revised in later sessions. Even if MPD/DID does not exist, treatment that assumes it does may nonetheless be effective because therapeutic outcome is more closely tied to the nature of the therapist-patient relationship than the content of therapy, or because multiple personality states is an effective therapeutic metaphor. Moreover, if the patient is not satisfied that the diagnosis or treatment rendered is helpful, the patient can leave therapy or seek another therapist.In contrast, judicial determinations are a one-shot determination which cannot be revisited in light of subsequently acquired knowledge. The defendant/patient is not free to change courts, or withdraw from the legal proceedings. Thus, it would be entirely appropriate for psychiatrists and psychologists to treat patients presenting symptoms of what they label MPD/DID and for courts to reject exculpatory evidence from psychiatrists and psychologists of that disorder.Related ArticlesFeature Article: Multiple Personality and Moral ResponsibilityCommentary: Commentary by ClarkCommentary: Commentary by ShumanDaniel W. Shuman Daniel W. Shuman, Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75235, USA.Copyright © 1996 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

This study examined how psychotherapists address hypothetical nonsexual multiple relationships dilemmas with Asian American clients and identified predictors of conservative decisions and the use of culture-based rationales. This survey of 787 Asian American and non-Asian American psychotherapists revealed that clinicians rely on mostly their personal policies and seldom focus on the clients' cultural backgrounds. Psychotherapists who consider their clients' Asian culture have more cultural knowledge and awareness, have been mental health providers longer, and are Asian American and female. Clinicians (...) who avoid multiple relationships tend to cite formal policies as justification and are less likely to consider clients' cultural worldviews, the therapeutic relationship, or their own values. The results are discussed in terms of specific revisions needed in the American Psychological Association Ethics Code, the benefits of more frequent consultation with colleagues and supervisors about ethical dilemmas, and recommendations for psychotherapists. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that at least in two phases of pharmaceutical research, especially while assessing the adequacy of the accumulated data and its interpretation, the influence of non-epistemic values is necessary. I examine a specific case from the domain of pharmaceutical research and demonstrate that there are multiple competing sets of values which may legitimately or illegitimately influence different phases of the inquiry. In such cases, the choice of the appropriate set of values—epistemic as well as non-epistemic—should (...) be made on the basis of the set’s viability to promote specific epistemic and social aims of the research, in the case at hand, rather than other competing aims. I put forth an account which addresses two philosophically significant and interrelated questions in the context of values in science debates: which aim should be prioritized when there are different stakeholders who try to achieve competing but, sometimes, conflicting goals; and what should be the criteria according to which the prioritization of a particular goal over other competing goals can be determined? I argue that both these questions can be addressed by invoking the principle of non-arbitrariness and the mere means principle and self-determination right. The philosophical import of raising and addressing these questions from an ethical perspective is that this approach leads to a better understanding of problems in today’s pharmaceutical research and guides us in efforts to alleviate these problems. (shrink)

This thesis proposes and presents two new models for belief representation and belief revision. The first model is the B-structures model which relies on a notion of partial language splitting and tolerates some amount of inconsistency while retaining classical logic. The model preserves an agent's ability to answer queries in a coherent way using Belnap's four-valued logic. Axioms analogous to the AGM axioms hold for this new model. The distinction between implicit and explicit beliefs is represented and psychologically plausible, (...) computationally tractable procedures for query answering and belief base revision are obtained. ;The second model presents a method for relevance sensitive non-monotonic inference from belief sequences which incorporates insights pertaining to prioritized inference and relevance sensitive, inconsistency tolerant belief revision. Our model uses a finite, logically open sequence of propositional formulas as a representation for beliefs and defines a notion of inference from maxiconsistent subsets of formulas guided by two orderings: a temporal sequencing and an ordering based on relevance relations between the conclusion and formulas in the sequence. The relevance relations are ternary as opposed to standard binary axiomatizations. The inference operation thus defined easily handles iterated revision by maintaining a revision history, blocks the derivation of inconsistent answers from a possibly inconsistent sequence and maintains the distinction between explicit and implicit beliefs. In doing so, it provides a finitely representable formalism and a plausible model of reasoning for automated agents. (shrink)

Many of the differences between empirical/psychological and conceptual/philosophical approaches to the mind can be resolved using a more precise language that is sensitive to both. Distinguishing identification from identity and identification as from identification with, and then defining the experiential concept of the per sonat, provides a walking bridge. Applying the new terminology to increasing degrees of dissociation, from non-pathological cases to multiple personality, shows how our psychologies can profit from philosophical analysis while our philosophies can revise themselves according (...) to empirical data. Redefining the psychological structures of persona, personality, and self in terms of an experientially more precise conceptual vocabulary, including the per sonat, avoids the pitfalls of the old approaches and provides insights into the nature of human consciousness that lead both to therapeutic results in psychotherapy and a long-overdue conceptual revision in the philosophy of personal identity. Among the practical conclusions is that for legal purposes MPD should not be considered as a multiple person phenomenon but, rather, as a phenomenon of one person who, simultaneously, is identified as many selves. Among the theoretical conclusions is that a person qua person consists not just in a biology and a psychology but also a philosophy. (shrink)

The paper presents the main ideas of Ultrafilter Logic (UL), as introduced by Veloso and others. A new proposal, Normality Logic (NL), is outlined for expanding the expressive power of UL. The system NL appears to offer a simpler solution to the problem of expressive power than the sorting strategy of Carnielli and Veloso. Interpretations of NL are discussed and an important point of contact to Hansson's notion of non-prioritized belief revision is observed.

The paper presents the main ideas of Ultrafilter Logic (UL), as introduced by Veloso and others. A new proposal, Normality Logic (NL), is outlined for expanding the expressive power of UL. The system NL appears to offer a simpler solution to the problem of expressive power than the sorting strategy of Carnielli and Veloso. Interpretations of NL are discussed and an important point of contact to Hansson's notion of non-prioritized belief revision is observed.

Descriptive accounts of the nature of explanation in neuroscience and the global goals of such explanation have recently proliferated in the philosophy of neuroscience and with them new understandings of the experimental practices of neuroscientists have emerged. In this paper, I consider two models of such practices; one that takes them to be reductive; another that takes them to be integrative. I investigate those areas of the neuroscience of learning and memory from which the examples used to substantiate these models (...) are culled, and argue that the multiplicity of experimental protocols used in these research areas presents specific challenges for both models. In my view, these challenges have been overlooked largely because philosophers have hitherto failed to pay sufficient attention to fundamental features of experimental practice. I demonstrate that when we do pay attention to such features, evidence for reduction and integrative unity in neuroscience is simply not borne out. I end by suggesting some new directions for the philosophy of neuroscience that pertain to taking a closer look at the nature of neuroscientific experiments. (shrink)

This paper presents a new correctness criterion for marked Danos-Reginer graphs (D-R graphs, for short) of Multiplicative Cyclic Linear Logic MCLL and Abrusci's non-commutative Linear Logic MNLL. As a corollary we obtain an affirmative answer to the open question whether a known quadratic-time algorithm for the correctness checking of proof nets for MCLL and MNLL can be improved to linear-time.

This paper presents a new correctness criterion for marked Danos-Reginer graphs of Multiplicative Cyclic Linear Logic MCLL and Abrusci's non-commutative Linear Logic MNLL. As a corollary we obtain an affirmative answer to the open question whether a known quadratic-time algorithm for the correctness checking of proof nets for MCLL and MNLL can be improved to linear-time.

This paper investigates simple syntactic methods for revising prioritized belief bases, that are semantically meaningful in the frameworks of possibility theory and of Spohn''s ordinal conditional functions. Here, revising prioritized belief bases amounts to conditioning a distribution function on interpretations. The input information leading to the revision of a knowledge base can be sure or uncertain. Different types of scales for priorities are allowed: finite vs. infinite, numerical vs. ordinal. Syntactic revision is envisaged here as a (...) process which transforms a prioritized belief bases into a new prioritized belief base, and thus allows a subsequent iteration. (shrink)

We introduce proof nets and sequent calculus for the multiplicative fragment of non-commutative logic, which is an extension of both linear logic and cyclic linear logic. The two main technical novelties are a third switching position for the non-commutative disjunction, and the structure of order variety.

The categoricity problem for a system of logic reveals an asymmetry between the model-theoretic and the proof-theoretic resources of that logic. In particular, it reveals prima facie that the proof-theoretic instruments are insufficient for matching the envisaged model-theory, when the latter is already available. Among the proposed solutions for solving this problem, some make use of new proof-theoretic instruments, some others introduce new model-theoretic constrains on the proof-systems, while others try to use instruments from both sides. On the proof-theoretical side, (...) two main approaches for solving the categoricity problem for propositional classical logic consist in the enforcement of the formal systems of this logic by introducing rules of inference of a new kind. A multiple-conclusions logic allows rules of inference with more than one conclusion, while a bilateralist system contains rules of inference formulated in terms of assertion and rejection. Both these approaches reveal interesting formal features of logical reasoning. This paper analyses some of the advantages and limitations of these two approaches as solutions for a full formalization of logic, i.e., for a categorical formalization. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The major approaches to belief revision and non monotonic reasoning proposed in the literature differ along a number of dimensions, including whether they are “syntax- based” or “semantic-based”, “foundational” or “coherentist”, “consistence-restoring” or “inconsistency-tolerant”. Our contribution towards clarifying the connections between these various approaches is threefold: •We show that the two main approaches to belief revision, the foundations and coherence theories, are mathematically equivalent, thus answering a question left open in [Gar90, Doy92], The distinction between syntax-based approaches (...) to revision and approaches based on (semantic) preferential structures falls along similar lines, and their expressive equivalence is a consequence of this result. •We formally clarify the connection between belief revision and non monotonic reasoning, in a particularly simple way which also throws light on the connection between consistence- restoring and reasoning-from-inconsistency approaches [BDP95]. •As a direct application of the above, we show that Poole's (syntax-based) system of default reasoning and Shoham's preferential semantic for non monotonic reasoning are also expressively equivalent, in that they can represent the same set of non monotonic consequence relations. (shrink)

In this article, we propose a belief revision approach for families of (non-classical) logics whose semantics are first-order axiomatisable. Given any such (non-classical) logic , the approach enables the definition of belief revision operators for , in terms of a belief revision operation satisfying the postulates for revision theory proposed by Alchourrrdenfors and Makinson (AGM revision, Alchourrukasiewicz's many-valued logic. In addition, we present a general methodology to translate algebraic logics into classical logic. For the examples (...) provided, we analyse in what circumstances the properties of the AGM revision are preserved and discuss the advantages of the approach from both theoretical and practical viewpoints. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The major approaches to belief revision and non monotonic reasoning proposed in the literature differ along a number of dimensions, including whether they are ?syntax- based? or ?semantic-based?, ?foundational? or ?coherentist?, ?consistence-restoring? or ?inconsistency-tolerant?. Our contribution towards clarifying the connections between these various approaches is threefold: ?We show that the two main approaches to belief revision, the foundations and coherence theories, are mathematically equivalent, thus answering a question left open in [Gar90, Doy92], The distinction between syntax-based approaches (...) to revision and approaches based on (semantic) preferential structures falls along similar lines, and their expressive equivalence is a consequence of this result. ?We formally clarify the connection between belief revision and non monotonic reasoning, in a particularly simple way which also throws light on the connection between consistence- restoring and reasoning-from-inconsistency approaches [BDP95]. ?As a direct application of the above, we show that Poole's (syntax-based) system of default reasoning and Shoham's preferential semantic for non monotonic reasoning are also expressively equivalent, in that they can represent the same set of non monotonic consequence relations. (shrink)

This paper develops co-ordinated multiple-domain supervenience relations to model determination and dependence relations between complex entities and their constituents by appealing to R-related pairs and by making use of associated isomorphisms. Supervenience relations are devised for order-sensitive and repetition-sensitive mereologies, for mereological systems that make room for many-many composition relations, as well as for hierarchical mereologies that incorporate compositional and hylomorphic structure. Finally, mappings are provided for theories that consider wholes to be prior to their parts.

(2003). Non-violence and the other A composite theory of multiplism, heterology and heteronomy drawn from jainism and gandhi. Angelaki: Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 3-22.

If we focus on current debates on how creatures revise or correct their beliefs, we can identify two opposing approaches that we propose to call “intellectualism” and “minimalism.” In this paper, we outline a new account of doxastic revision — “the first-order model”— that is neither as cognitively demanding as intellectualism nor as deflationary as minimalism. First-order doxastic revision, we argue, is a personal-level process in which a creature rejects some beliefs and accepts others based on reasons. However, (...) it does not involve second-order thinking or sophisticated semantic and epistemic concepts. Besides defending that there is conceptual space for this alternative, we explore the possibility of extending it to some non-human animals. Based on our interpretation of some empirical evidence, we conclude that there are initial reasons to think that some animals — i.e., great apes— might be able to correct their beliefs in the way that our first-order model suggests. (shrink)

It is part of Jaegwon. Kim’s life’s work that he has demonstrated that non-reductive physicalism is not an option in the philosophy of the mental. However, he also recognizes the problems of mentalism that cannot be solved by physicalism. This concerns above all phenomenal consciousness, which resists naturalization. In the philosophy of the mental, this addresses a very fundamental problem of what the place of the mental is in the physical world. It is Kim’s merit in the philosophy of the (...) mental to have shown non-reductive physicalism to be contradictory and qualitative experience to have shown its place as a phenomenon that cannot be explained physically. But Kim wants to be a physicalist and functionalist at the same time. For this he describes his position as “physicalism, or something near enough”. It is to Kim’s credit that he has presented non-reductive physicalism as a variation of British emergentism. But this raises a very fundamental problem, whether this is a valid research program of systematization of mental experience or whether it needs another research program. (shrink)

Peter Gärdenfors has proved (Philosophical Review, 1986) that the Ramsey rule and the methodologically conservative Preservation principle are incompatible given innocuous-looking background assumptions about belief revision. Gärdenfors gives up the Ramsey rule; I argue for preserving the Ramsey rule and interpret Gärdenfors's theorem as showing that no rational belief-reviser can avoid reasoning nonmonotonically. I argue against the Preservation principle and show that counterexamples to it always involve nonmonotonic reasoning. I then construct a new formal model of belief revision (...) that does accommodate nonmonotonic reasoning. (shrink)

Many different modes of definition have been proposed over time, but none of them allows for circular definitions, since, according to the prevalent view, the term defined would then be lacking a precise signification. I argue that although circular definitions may at times fail uniquely to pick out a concept or an object, sense still can be made of them by using a rule of revision in the style adopted by Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap in the theory of (...) truth. (shrink)

Historians and sociologists of science usually discuss multiple independent inventions or multiple independent discoveries in terms of priority disputes among the inventors. But what should we make of the multiple invention of a technology that not only gave rise to very few priority disputes, but never worked and was rejected by each inventor’s contemporaries as soon as it was made public? This paper examines seven such situations in the history of botany. I devote particular attention to the (...) inventors’ cultural and educational backgrounds, in particular, the scholastic education most of them shared, through which they would have become familiar with Llullian combinatorics and the mnemonic names used to distinguish syllogistic moods. I also examine their conceptions of the roles of nomenclature in botany, their assumptions about how memory works, their awareness of other similar efforts, and their contemporaries’ reactions to their proposals. Finally, I reflect on the impacts that a consideration of multiple independent inventions of failed technologies may have on current approaches to the history and sociology of science. (shrink)

The philosophical nature of the two versions of paraphrasing the Gorgias’ treatise On Non-Being — the skeptical version by Sextus Empiricus and the peripatetic version by an anonymous author — are discussed. The paper gives a comparative analysis of the arguments upheld by the informants enunciating Gorgias’ thoughts, demonstrates the range of philosophical problems, which Gorgias considered, judging by the reports of his speech, and shows how both versions add to and clarify each other in terms of philosophical issues. The (...) work provides insights as to how Gorgias modernizes and transforms the initial attitudes of Parmenides, shifting the reasoning plan: from how thought can be directed to an object and the qualities of this object to how thought can be directed to the non-existent. Accordingly, the problems of intentionality in the Gorgias’ teaching are considered as well as the privileged status of any of mental states, the nature of word or speech as an autonomous way to develop knowledge about external objects, the issue of meaning as a reference, and inter-subjectivity in cognition. A conclusion is reached that giving preference to one of the paraphrasing versions impoverishes our understanding of the Gorgias’ teaching considerably, while the joint analysis of both versions demonstrates the engagement of the sophistic issues raised by Gorgias, in the philosophical and, particularly, the epistemological paradigm of the ancient as well as modern philosophy. (shrink)