Ethicism is the most comprehensively defended answer to the question regarding whether ethical properties determine aesthetic properties in artworks. According to ethicism, aesthetically relevant ethical flaws in artworks count as aesthetic flaws and aesthetically relevant ethical merits count as aesthetic merits. In this paper, I argue that ethicism’s most significant argument, the Merited Response Argument suffers from an ambiguity that makes it either unsound or uninteresting. Specifically, the notion of an artwork’s ‘prescribing’ a response, central to MRA, is ambiguous between (...) merely attempting to elicit a response from appreciators as appropriate to a work, and endorsing a response as appropriate to relevant parts of the actual world. While the first sense of ‘prescribe’ does the aesthetic work, the second does the ethical. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider a few actual cases of mnemonic strategies among older subjects (older than 65). The cases are taken from an ethnographic study, examining how elderly adults cope with cognitive decline. We believe that these cases illustrate that the process of remembering in many cases involve a complex distributed web of processes involving both internal or intracranial and external sources. Our cases illustrate that the nature of distributed remembering is shaped by and subordinated to the dynamic characteristics (...) of the on-going activity and to our minds suggest that research on memory and distributed cognition should focus on the process of remembering through detailed descriptions and analysis of naturally occurring situations. (shrink)

Bioethics education has remarkably grown across the globe in the last few decades. The data of the UNESCO Global Ethics Observatory proves that bioethics education is a global phenomenon with various bioethics institutions, teaching programs, and academicians. However, this situation does not mean that bioethics education has reached a stable and flawless level. Especially, the effectiveness of bioethics programs or their quality assessment is a major area that should be analyzed through more academic works. For filling that gap, this article (...) aims to formulate a general framework to address the quality standards and indicators in bioethics education. The article adapts Donabedian’s three approaches—structure, process, and outcome— as three levels to measure quality in bioethics education. The proposed model considers the indicators the ultimate quantifiable points by creating a sequential classification as the three levels, main categories, standards, and indicators, which means that it applies an inductive approach following a path from the indicators to the standards, from the standards to the main categories, and from the main categories to the levels in order to reach a conclusion about the effectiveness of each level. (shrink)

Kendall Walton argues that photographs are transparent; we literally see the things depicted in them, not just the depictions. This intriguing claim has endured numerous criticisms from those I call the ‘egocentrists’, according to whom seeing—literal seeing—requires the conveyance of egocentric information; to count as seeing something, a visual experience of that thing must impart some information, however spare, about its position relative to the viewer. Since photographs fail to convey such information, the egocentrists claim, Walton’s transparency thesis fails. This (...) paper considers several ways this egocentric condition on seeing has been developed and shows that none of them is persuasive. Seeing, I argue, does not require the conveyance of egocentric information. As such, and barring other problems, Walton’s transparency thesis stands. The paper closes with a speculative discussion of the kinds of empirical and action-guiding considerations that motivate egocentrism. (shrink)

According to what I call the Merit Principle, roughly, works of art that attempt to elicit unmerited responses fail on their own terms and are thereby aesthetically flawed. A horror film, for instance, that attempts to elicit fear towards something that is not scary is to that extent aesthetically flawed. The Merit Principle is not only intuitive, it is also endorsed in some form by Aristotle, David Hume, and numerous contemporary figures. In this paper, I show how the principle leads (...) to a novel paradox when applied to an undertheorized class of artworks I call ‘seductive works’. These artworks necessarily invite an unmerited response in order to invite a (merited) repudiation of that response. Thus, according to the Merit Principle, they are necessarily aesthetically flawed, which is counter-intuitive. I consider a number of unsuccessful solutions to the paradox that aim to preserve the Merit Principle, before rejecting that principle as it stands. I discuss what is challenging about seductive artworks, before briefly defending a new principle that appeals to a general way that a work’s aesthetic value is conditioned by the constraints under which it operates. This principle not only resolves the paradox, but explains the competing intuitions that give rise to it. (shrink)

This paper proves normalisation theorems for intuitionist and classical negative free logic, without and with the $\invertediota$ operator for definite descriptions. Rules specific to free logic give rise to new kinds of maximal formulas additional to those familiar from standard intuitionist and classical logic. When $\invertediota$ is added it must be ensured that reduction procedures involving replacements of parameters by terms do not introduce new maximal formulas of higher degree than the ones removed. The problem is solved by a rule (...) that permits restricting these terms in the rules for $\forall$, $\exists$ and $\invertediota$ to parameters or constants. A restricted subformula property for deductions in systems without $\invertediota$ is considered. It is improved upon by an alternative formalisation of free logic building on an idea of Ja\'skowski's. In the classical system the rules for $\invertediota$ require treatment known from normalisation for classical logic with $\lor$ or $\exists$. The philosophical significance of the results is also indicated. (shrink)

In a recent, thought-provoking paper Adam Elga argues against unsharp – e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable – probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like Levi's, Gärdenfors and Sahlin's, and Kyburg's, though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected utility against Elga's objection.

According to the Harm Principle, roughly, the state may coerce a person only if it can thereby prevent harm to others. Clearly, this principle depends crucially on what we understand by harm. Thus, if any sort of negative effect on a person may count as a harm, the Harm Principle will fail to sufficiently protect individual liberty. Therefore, a more subtle concept of harm is needed. I consider various possible conceptions and argue that none gives rise to a plausible version (...) of the Harm Principle. Whether we focus on welfare, quantities of welfare or qualities of welfare, we do not arrive at a plausible version of this principle. Instead, the concept of harm may be moralized. I consider various ways this may be done as well as possible rationales for the resulting versions of the Harm Principle. Again, no plausible version of the principle turns up. I also consider the prospect of including the Harm Principle in a decision-procedure rather than in a criterion of rightness. Finally, in light of my negative appraisal, I briefly discuss why this principle has seemed so appealing to liberals. (shrink)

According to impersonal moralities, welfare is good, period. Therefore, it is good that welfare is realised, whether by the benefiting of individuals who already exist or by the bringing of new...

In this article we critically review the neural mechanisms of moral cognition that have recently been studied via electroencephalography (EEG). Such studies promise to shed new light on traditional moral questions by helping us to understand how effective moral cognition is embodied in the brain. It has been argued that conflicting normative ethical theories require different cognitive features and can, accordingly, in a broadly conceived naturalistic attempt, be associated with different brain processes that are rooted in different brain networks and (...) regions. This potentially morally relevant brain activity has been empirically investigated through EEG-based studies on moral cognition. From neuroscientific evidence gathered in these studies, a variety of normative conclusions have been drawn and bioethical applications have been suggested. We discuss methodological and theoretical merits and demerits of the attempt to use EEG techniques in a morally significant way, point to legal challenges and policy implications, indicate the potential to reveal biomarkers of psychopathological conditions, and consider issues that might inform future bioethical work. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that coming into existence can benefit (or harm) aperson. My argument incorporates the comparative claim that existence canbe better (or worse) for a person than never existing. Since these claimsare highly controversial, I consider and reject a number of objectionswhich threaten them. These objections raise various semantic, logical,metaphysical and value-theoretical issues. I then suggest that there is animportant sense in which it can harm (or benefit) a person not to comeinto existence. Again, I consider and (...) reject some objections. Finally, Ibriefly consider what the conclusions reached in this paper imply for ourmoral obligations to possible future people. (shrink)

Mobile health devices pose novel questions at the intersection of philosophy and technology. Many such applications not only collect sensitive data, but also aim at persuading users to change their lifestyle for the better. A major concern is that persuasion is paternalistic as it intentionally aims at changing the agent’s actions, chipping away at their autonomy. This worry roots in the philosophical conviction that perhaps the most salient feature of living autonomous lives is displayed via agency as opposed to patiency—our (...) lives go well in virtue of what we do, rather than what happens to us. Being persuaded by a device telling us how to conduct our lives seemingly renders the agent passive, an inert recipient of technological commands. This agential bias, however, has led to a marginalization of patiential characteristics that are just as much part of our lives as are agential characteristics. To appreciate the inherent interlocking of acting and being acted upon, it is vital to acknowledge that agency and patiency are correlates, not mutually exclusive opposites. Furthermore, it is unclear whether an action can only count as agential so long as its causes are internal. Drawing on the extended mind and extended will framework, I argue that mHealth applications merely serve as volitional aids to the agent’s internal cognition. Autonomously set goals can be achieved more effectively via technology. To be persuaded by an mHealth device does not mainly—let alone exclusively—emphasize patiency; on the contrary, it can be an effective tool for technologically enhancing agency. (shrink)

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, EarlyView.

Teknoloji olgusu, bir taraftan toplumun ihtiyaçlarını karşılamakta diğer taraftan da toplumda bir kültür deformasyonuna neden olmaktadır. Teknolojinin; televizyon, cep telefonu, bilgisayar gibi cihazlar aracılığıyla toplumda değişim ve dönüşümlere neden olduğu görülmektedir. Son zamanlarda özellikle genç nüfus arasında, sosyal medyanın etkisi söz konusu olmakta ve bu durum kültürel bir deformasyona neden olmaktadır. Toplumun temeli olan ailede dayanışma ilişkilerinin giderek zayıflamasında, yeni neslin iletişim dilinde meydana gelen bozulmalarda, toplumun tek boyutlu bir insan haline dönüşmesinde, gelenek ve göreneklerde meydana gelen değişimlerde teknolojinin izleri (...) görülmektedir. Sürekli bir değişim ve dönüşüme maruz kalan toplumsal yapı; son zamanlarda gelişen teknolojinin etkisinde kalarak teknolojik kültüre doğru evrilmektedir. Teknolojik cihazların kullanılmasıyla şekillenen teknolojik kültür, toplumun risk toplumuna dönüşmesinde aktif rol oynamaktadır. Her şeyin simülasyon haline geldiği risk toplumunda, gerçeklik ve doğruluk ortadan kalmakta ve herkes bir risk çemberinin içine girmeye başlamaktadır. Özel hayatın hiçbir gizliliğinin kalmadığı teknoloji çağında, teknolojinin risklerinden çocukları ve gençleri koruma da ayrı bir önemi gerektirmektedir. Özellikle çocukların ve gençlerin teknolojik cihazlara olan bağlılıkları, onların sosyo-kültürel yaşamını olumsuz yönde etkilemektedir. Bu çalışmamızda da hayatımızda önemli bir yere sahip olan televizyon, cep telefonu, bilgisayar gibi teknolojik cihazların, kültürel deformasyonda ve toplumsal değerlerin yitirilmesinde nasıl bir etkiye sahip olduğu anlaşılmaya çalışılmıştır. (shrink)

Sosyal bilimlerde sosyo-kültürel ve etno-sosyolojik araştırmalar geniş bir yer tutar. Bir grubun sosyo-kültürel ve etno-sosyolojik değişkenler özelinde kendisini nasıl tanımladığı araştırılan bir husustur. Türkiye’nin farklı bölgelerinde yaşayan alt kültür grupları bu değişkenler bağlamında incelenmiştir. Bu çalışma Türkiye’de yaygın bir şekilde yaşayan gruplardan biri olan Karakeçililerden, Siverek Karakeçilerini incelemiştir. Siverek Karakeçilileri; etnografik bir alan araştırmasıyla, kendi yaşam alanlarına katılım sağlanarak elde edilen verilerle incelenmiştir. Veriler MAXQDA nitel veri analiz programı aracılığıyla değerlendirmiştir. Mehmet Eröz 1982’de aynı grubu aynı alanda incelemiştir. Makalede; Eröz’ün (...) tespitleri ile araştırmacının tespitleri karşılaştırmalı bir şekilde ele alınmıştır. Böylelikle iki çalışma arasındaki uzun süre zarfı göz önüne alınarak, Siverek Karakeçililerinin yaşadığı değişim ve dönüşüm değerlendirilmiştir. Çalışma bu yönüyle özgünlük arz etmektedir. (shrink)

Kentler, ikincil ilişkilerin meydana geldiği, işbölümünün ve uzmanlaşmanın arttığı mekânlardır. Giderek daha çekici hale gelen kentler, insanlar tarafından tercih edilen mekânlar olmaya başlamış ve kentleşme olgusunu ortaya çıkarmıştır. Kent nüfusunun artması olarak ifade edilen kentleşme kentlileşmeyi, kentlileşme de toplumsal ve kültürel değişimleri beraberinde getirmiştir. Kentleşme, konut sorununu da görünür kılmakta ve konut sorununun çözümü gelir gruplarına göre değişiklik arz etmektedir. Alt gelir grubunda olan insanlar bu konut sorununu gecekondu denilen yapılarla çözmeye çalışmış ancak gecekondular devlet hazinesine yapılmış yapılar olması dolayısıyla (...) devlet tarafından kentsel dönüşümü gerçekleştirmek amacıyla engellenmek istenmiştir. Bu durumda devlet hem gecekondulaşmayı engellemek hem de dar gelirli yoksul ailelerin konut ihtiyacını gidermek amacıyla Toplu Konutlar İdaresi’ni kurmuştur. Bu kapsamda yapılan konutlardan zaman içinde çeşitli gelir grubunda yer alan insanlar faydalanmaya başlamıştır. TOKİ konutlarında yaşamanın sosyo-kültürel yapı üzerindeki etkilerinin anlaşılmaya çalışıldığı bu çalışma, Isparta’nın Akkent Mahallesi’ndeki TOKİ konutlarında yapılmıştır. Çeşitli gelir gruplarının yaşamını sürdürdüğü TOKİ konutlarında memnuniyet durumu, TOKİ konutlarında yaşanan sorunlar, dayanışma ilişkileri de anlaşılmaya çalışılmıştır. Akkent Mahallesi’ndeki TOKİ konutlarında yaşamanın sosyo-kültürel yapı üzerinde çeşitli etkilere sahip olduğu görülmektedir. Farklı kültürlere ve farklı gelirlere sahip olan insanların Akkent Mahallesi’ndeki TOKİ konutlarında bir araya gelmiş olmaları birtakım sorunları da beraberinde getirmiştir. Özellikle kırsal kesimden gelen ve apartman kültürüne alışık olmayan insanların binadaki diğer insanlarla uyum sorunu yaşadıkları görülmektedir. (shrink)

This contribution traces the parallel development of two distinct approaches to peasant agroecological education: the peasant-to-peasant horizontal method that disseminated across Mesoamerica and the Caribbean beginning in the 1970s, and the political-agroecological training schools of combined consciousness-building and skill-formation that have been at the heart of the educational processes of member organizations of La Via Campesina since the 1990s. Applying a theoretical framework that incorporates territorial struggle, agroecology and popular education, we examine spatial and organizational aspects of each of these (...) models for peasant education and movement-building. Recognizing that the models, their respective contexts, and the dialectical relationships therein have been in constant evolution, we share findings on the movement-place as a territorial system with socio-historical subjectivity, that is, peasant movements as territorially-embedded, collective historical actors. This leads to some conclusions in moving past educational theory that has centered upon individual subjects, and approaching a conception of territory as a subject of learning processes. (shrink)

The words in the Quran can have different meanings depending on the verse and its context. However, giving different meanings to any word of Quran in tafsirs and translation make it difficult to understand the verses and may cause confusion. One of the words that we think causes such a problem is fuâd. In this study, it is aimed to reach the meaning of the word by examining the usage of the word fuâd in the verses. For this purpose, the (...) lexical meaning of the word was researched and the relevant verses were examined in context. It was preferred descriptive method in the study in which dictionaries and classical tafsirs were used as sources. It is concluded that the word fûad, which means mostly heart, brain and mind in the sources, basically refers to a sense, ability or function. It is reasoned that this word contains meanings such as perception, comprehension, thinking, understanding, and intuition. However, in the verses, it is possible that the organ to which the aforementioned abilities belong is meant through metaphor. This is the reason for confusion that makes it difficult to understand. Because, although the functions such as perception, thinking, reasoning that we present as the meaning of fuâd are known as the task of the brain, the Quran has shown the heart as their place. (shrink)

The production of easy-read and plain language is a challenging task, requiring well-educated experts to write context-dependent simplifications of texts. Therefore, the domain of easy-read and plain language is currently restricted to the bare minimum of necessary information. Thus, even though there is a tendency to broaden the domain of easy-read and plain language, the inaccessibility of a significant amount of textual information excludes the target audience from partaking or entertainment and restricts their ability to live life autonomously. Large language (...) models can solve a vast variety of natural language tasks, including the simplification of standard language texts to easy-read or plain language. Moreover, with the rise of generative models like GPT, easy-read and plain language may be applicable to all kinds of natural language texts, making formerly inaccessible information accessible to marginalized groups like, a.o., non-native speakers, and people with mental disabilities. In this paper, we argue for the feasibility of text simplification and generation in that context, outline the ethical dimensions, and discuss the implications for researchers in the field of ethics and computer science. (shrink)

A handful of scholars have connected objectification (treating people like objects) to personification (treating objects like people). The recurring idea is that personification may entail objectification and therefore share in the latter's ethical difficulties. This idea is defended by various feminist philosophers. They focus on how the connection manifests in the male, heterosexual consumption of pornography, grounding a constitutive ethical criticism of this pornography. In this paper, I schematize the only two arguments for this connection, showing why each fails. I (...) revise one of the arguments to overcome my objection before showing, most significantly, that any argument with the same form must fail. I conclude by suggesting that thinking about the ethics of the imagination offers a promising alternative approach that preserves the spirit of these failed arguments. (shrink)

Roughly, according to conditional egalitarianism, equality is non-instrumentally valuable, but only if it benefits at least one individual. Some political theorists have argued that conditional egalitarianism has the important virtue that it allows egalitarians to avoid the so-called objection. However, in the present article I argue that conditional egalitarianism does not offer the egalitarian a plausible escape route from this objection. First, I explain the levelling down objection and suggest some particular concerns from which it derives its force. Then I (...) provide a more precise definition of conditional egalitarianism. Finally, I give two arguments against this principle. According to the first, it violates the transitivity of the betterness relation (or more specifically, ). According to the second, there is no plausible explanation of why equality must benefit at least one individual in order to be non-instrumentally valuable. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn light of the large recent inflow of refugees to the EU and the Commission’s efforts to relocate them, I raise the question of what a fair distribution of refugees between EU countries would look like. More specifically, I consider what concerns such a distributive scheme should be sensitive to. First, I put forward some arguments for why states are obligated to admit refugees and outline how I believe the EU should respond to the refugee crisis. This involves, among other (...) things, resettling a proportion of refugees from countries neighbouring Syria in the EU. Second, I consider how the intake into the EU should be distributed between member states, that is, the shares different countries can be expected to admit. I discuss the relevance of a number of different factors that may be claimed to affect such shares, including population size, GDP, number of refugees admitted so far, unemployment rate, country-specific costs and cultural ‘closeness’. Third, I consider whether the distributive scheme should be restricted to reflect specific states’ responsibility for creating refugees in the first place, levels of racism and xenophobia, and whether other states are required to pick up the slack if some refuse to admit their fair share. (shrink)

This paper discusses what the so-called Priority View implies regarding possible people. It is argued that this view is plausible when applied to fixed populations, but that, when applied to the issue of possible people, it faces certain difficulties. If it is claimed that possible people fall within the scope of the Priority View, we are led to the repugnant conclusion at a faster pace than we are by, e.g., utilitarianism. And if it is claimed that possible people do not (...) fall within the scope of the Priority View, we shall have to combine this view with a different view in order to avoid certain counter-intuitive judgements. Such a combined view, however, leads to intransitivities. At the end of the paper, I discuss what these conclusions imply regarding both the Priority View and our moral obligations to possible people. (shrink)

It is suggested that the Harm Principle can be viewedas the moral basis on which genetically modified (GM) food iscurrently regulated. It is then argued (a) that the concept ofharm cannot be specified in such a manner as to render the HarmPrinciple a plausible political principle, so this principlecannot be used to justify existing regulation; and (b) that evenif the Harm Principle were a plausible political principle, itcould not be used alone in the regulation of GM food, since itdoes not (...) express a concern for the expected benefits of suchfood. (shrink)

In our lives, we aim to achieve welfare for ourselves, that is, to live good lives. But we also have another, more impartial perspective, where we aim to balance our concern for our own welfare against a concern for the welfare of others. This is a perspective of justice. Nils Holtug examines these two perspectives and the relations between them.

Nass’ and Reeves’ media equation paradigm within human–computer interaction challenges long-held assumptions about how users approach computers. Given a rudimentary set of cues present in the system’s design, users are said to unconsciously treat computers as genuine interactants—extending rules of politeness, biases and human interactive conventions to machines. Since the results have wide-ranging implications for HCI research methods, interface design and user experiences, researchers are hard-pressed to experimentally verify the paradigm. This paper focuses on the methodology of attributing the necessary (...) social cues to the agent, a core aspect of the experimental design of studies dealing with the media equation. A typology of experimental anthropomorphisms is developed, allowing an assessment of how the differing axiomatic assumptions affect the relevance of the results for an evaluation of the paradigm. The paper concludes with a series of arguments in favour of one particular anthropomorphism type for researching the media equation. (shrink)

ABSTRACTEvaluative aesthetic discourse communicates that the speaker has had first-hand experience of what is talked about. If you call a book bewitching, it will be assumed that you have read the book. If you say that a building is beautiful, it will be assumed that you have had some visual experience with it. According to an influential view, this is because knowledge is a norm for assertion, and aesthetic knowledge requires first-hand experience. This paper criticizes this view and argues for (...) an alternative view, according to which aesthetic discourse expresses affective states of mind, analogously to how assertions express beliefs. It is because these affective states require first-hand experience that aesthetic discourse communicates that such acquaintance is at hand. The paper furthermore argues that the lack of an experience requirement for aesthetic belief ascriptions constitutes a problem for the kind of expressivist who claims that evaluative belief states are covert non-cognitive states. (shrink)

Some habits are vital to who we are in that they shape both our self-perception and how we are seen by others. This is so, I argue, because there is a constitutive link between what I shall call ‘identity-shaping habits’ and narrative agency. Identity-shaping habits are paradigmatically acquired and performed by persons. The ontology of personhood involves both synchronic and diachronic dimensions which are structurally analogous to the synchronic acquisition and the diachronic performance of habits, and makes persons distinctly suitable (...) to being shaped by habits. Since habits differ vastly in their scope, I develop a conceptualization that carves out defining features of identity-shaping habits. Such habits, I venture, fundamentally alter a person’s embodiment such that the alterations to their psychological and physiological make-up vitally inform their persistence—if not metaphysically, then at least practically by crucially shaping one’s narrative agency. (shrink)

We are pleased to print here the winning entry for the 1995 European Business Ethics Essay Competition, which was sponsored jointly by the Foundation for Business Responsibilities and London Business School and to which entry was open to students for the MBA or equivalent management degree at any institution in Europe. The author, Mr Nils Elmark, subsequently gained his MSc degree in Public Relations at the Department of Marketing, University of Stirling, and is now with Marks and Brands, St. Kirkstrade (...) 3, DK‐1073 Copenhagen, Denmark. (shrink)

It is widely held within contemporary metaethics that there is a lack of linguistic support for evaluative expressivism. On the contrary, it seems that the predictions that expressivists make about evaluative discourse are not borne out. An instance of this is the so-called problem of missing Moorean infelicity. Expressivists maintain that evaluative statements express non-cognitive states of mind in a similar manner to how ordinary descriptive language expresses beliefs. Conjoining an ordinary assertion that p with the denial of being in (...) the corresponding belief state famously gives rise to Moorean infelicity:?? It’s raining but I don’t believe that it’s raining. If expressivists are right, then conjoining evaluative statements with the denial of being in the relevant non-cognitive state of mind should give rise to similar infelicity. However, as several theorists have pointed out, this does not seem to be the case. Statements like the following are not infelicitous: Murder is wrong but I don’t disapprove of it. In this paper, I argue that evaluative statements express the kind of states that are attributed by ‘find’-constructions in English and that these states are non-cognitive in nature. This addresses the problem of missing Moorean infelicity and, more generally, goes to show that there are linguistic facts which support expressivism about evaluative discourse. (shrink)

Interessen for og fascinationen af middelalderen er for tiden så stor, at Umberto Eco i Slagmark nr. 5 ligefrem kan opstille ti forskellige "middelaldre", der rumsterer i den bølge, som ikke mindst hans egen "Rosens navn" er en vigtig del af.

This chapter contains sections titled: Genes, Identity and Ethics Identity‐affecting Genetic Interventions Identity‐preserving Genetic Interventions Justice References and Further Reading.