Friedrich Nietzsche was Less Well-Read in the history of philosophy than were many of his peers in the pantheon, whether Hegel before him or Heidegger after, but he was not for that reason any less hesitant to pronounce judgment on the worth of the other great philosophers: Plato was “boring”; Descartes was “superficial”; Hobbes, Hume, and Locke signify “a debasement and lowering of the concept of ‘philosophy’ for more than a century”; Kant was an “idiot” and a “catastrophic spider,” (...) etc.1 Against this overarching trend of negativity, his uncharacteristically positive response to one thinker, a thinker who initially appears to us as quite different from him, is all the more surprising. In the summer of .. (shrink)

In this paper I clarify a major affinity between Nietzsche and Spinoza that has been neglected in the literature—but that Nietzsche was aware of—namely a tendency to what I call etiology. Etiologies provide second- order explanations of some opponents’ first-order views, but not in order to decide first-order matters. The example I take up here is Nietzsche’s and Spinoza’s rejections of free will—and especially their etiologies concerning how we wrongly come to think that we may (...) boast of such a capacity. In working through the former (i.e., their rejections of free will) in order to make my central metaphilosophical point regarding the latter (i.e., their accounts of why we generally affirm that we have free will), I shed important new light on Nietzsche’s relation to Spinoza. I also further our understanding of what role such second-order accounts play within each of their larger projects on their own terms. (shrink)

This chapter considers Nietzsche's and Spinoza's views on freedom – a theme of central interest to both thinkers. It draws from Yonover in order to provide an outline of their rejections of one conception of freedom: freedom of the will. The chapter also considers their positive visions of a very different kind of freedom, which rather consists in self‐determination. Nietzsche's naturalism surely plays a major role in his rejection of freedom of the will, too. Nietzsche and (...) Spinoza praise a comparable kind of freedom characterized especially by the primary elements. Spinoza writes in the first appendix of the Ethics that at least one portion of the foremost “prejudice” to undermine is the idea that God “directs all things to some certain end”. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper explores similarities between the sacrilegious revaluations Nietzsche and Spinoza undertook with regards to Christianity and Judaism respectively. In both cases, these revaluations involve a devaluation of an ancestral religious tradition, followed by the infusion of alternative values posited through forms of secular salvation linked to immanent conceptions of eternity. Given the importance of the structural and phenomenological similarities the paper analyses, it is argued that if Nietzsche thought of himself as the Anti-Christ, there is a (...) convincing case to think of Spinoza as the Anti-Moses. And because both the Anti-Christ and the Anti-Moses not only devaluated their respective religious traditions, but also suggested forms of beatitude based on a valorizing notion of eternity, their efforts are profoundly religious. Accordingly, Nietzsche and Spinoza are not only arguably the greatest Christian and Jewish heretics, but also the prophets of innovative forms of secular and immanent... (shrink)

Im dreizehnten Aphorismus von Jenseits von Gut und Böse distanziert sich Nietzshe von Spinozas Begriff der Selbsterhaltung. Hierfür gibt Nietzsche zwei Gründe an: Zum einen hält er den Selbsterhaltungstrieb, als Prinzip genommen, für überflüssig und setzt ihm den Willen zur Macht als fundamentaleres, die Selbsterhaltung bereits in sich begriefendes Prinzip entgegen. Zum anderen sei besagter Trieb zudem noch eine "Inconsequenz", sofern Spinozas antiteleologisches System durch den teleologischen Gedanken der Selbsterhaltung unterminiert werde. Die Abhandlung macht Adolf Trendelenburgs Aufsatz Ueber (...) class='Hi'>Spinoza's Grundgedanken und dessen Erfolg als mutmaßliche Quelle für Nietzsches Diktum "Inconsequenz Spinoza's" ausfinding und umreißt kurz Trendelenburgs diesbezügliche Argumentation. Im Anschluss daran wird die Frage diskutiert, ob Nietzsche's Kritik an Spinoza ihre berechtigung hat, oder ob sie selbst inkonsequent ist.In the thirteenth aphorism of Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche refuses Spinoza's concept of self-preservation. Nietzsche gives two reasons: First, he considers self-preservation a superfluous principle while the will to power is a more fundamental one. Secondly, Nietzsche calls the self-preservation an "inconsistency" since it would ruin Spinoza's anti-teleological system by infiltrating it with a teleological concept. The article detects Adolf Trendelburg's treatise Ueber Spinoza's Grundgedanken und desen Erfolog as most likely to be the source of Nietzsche's words "Spinoza's inconsistency" and summarize Trendelenburg's argumentation against Spinoza. Afterwards it is discussed whether Nietzsche's criticism at Spinoza is accurate or inconsistent itself. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se pretende pensar nuestra época y nuestra suerte, es decir, la Modernidad, a partir de dos de sus más grandes pensadores, a saber: Spinoza y Nietzsche. En tal sentido, se presenta la tesis de la voluntad de poder como la mejor formulación para pensar la metafísica de la Modernidad y, por otro lado, el pensamiento del límite marcado por los afectos como posibilidad para pensarse a sí mismo y a la totalidad.

Este artículo propone una interpretación estética de la relación entre los sistemas filosóficos de Spinoza y Nietzsche a partir una base ontológica común. Aunque sea difícil defender una lectura de Spinoza por parte de Nietzsche, si nos dirigimos a la mediación desde el pensamiento indio entre los pilares de sus respectivos sistemas, podremos fundar una relación entre la voluntad de poder y el _conatus _spinozista. El propósito de esta investigación es doble: por un lado, proponer una (...) interpretación estética de la filosofía de Spinoza desde su sistema de los afectos; y, a partir de ahí, apuntar al fundamento afectivo de esta estética desde la voluntad de poder nietzscheana. (shrink)

Against much of the philosophical tradition, Spinoza and Nietzsche defend an understanding of freedom opposed to free will and formulated as an ethical ideal consisting in a transition from a smaller to a greater power of acting. Starting from a shared commitment to necessity and radical immanence, they present freedom as a passage to a greater power of self-determination and self-expression of the body. Nevertheless, the continuities between their power ontologies and their respective commitments to a life of (...) knowledge break down in their discussion of the various possible manifestations of power. I will argue that Nietzsche's distinctive formulation of power as struggle between wills to power enables him to formulate the question of the qualitative dimension of empowerment in a way that is foreign to Spinoza's rational determinism. While acknowledging the profound similarities, I will argue that we must see Nietzsche's discussion of affirmation as the culmination of his disagreement with his predecessor on the topic of freedom and empowerment. (shrink)

You were one of the noblest, the most genuine people, who have ever walked this earth. And though both friend and foe know this, I don't think it unwarranted to verbally bear witness to it before your grave. For we know the world, we know Spinoza's fate. For the world could lay shadows around Nietzsche's memory as well. And therefore I conclude with the words: Peace to your ashes! Holy be thy name to all those to come!1The only (...) historical person Peter Gast puts in relation to his much-revered master in these closing words of the funeral oration he delivered in front of Friedrich Nietzsche's open grave in Röcken on August 28, 1900, is Baruch de Spinoza.2 His intentions are clear: Nietzsche is to avoid the fate of .. (shrink)

Although the literature on Nietzsche is now voluminous one area where there has surprisingly been very little research concerns Nietzsche on the passions. This essay aims to correct this neglect. My focus is on illuminating Nietzsche on the passions in relation to his primary teaching on self-cultivation. To illuminate his position, I focus attention on examining his relation to Stoic teaching on the passions. If for Nietzsche the Christian mind-set involves a disturbing pathological excess of feeling, (...) the Stoic way of living results for him in a petrified of life devoid of movement and growth. After a consideration of his relation to Stoic teaching I then examine his relation to Spinoza on the emotions or affects. Whilst I acknowledge the affinities between the two thinkers and their criticisms of Stoic teaching, I maintain that it is an error to seek to construe Nietzsche and Spinoza as having an identical teaching on the passions. In the final section of the essay, I provide an appreciation of Nietzsche’s recommendation that instead of demonising the passions in the manner of the Christian psyche and its legacy, or extirpating our passions as recommended by the Stoics, we need to learn how to transform them into joys or delights. (shrink)

A primera vista, puede parecer que la obra de Baruch Spinoza tiene poco que ver con los planteos nietzscheanos: nos encontramos frente a un autor abocado centralmente a la Teología, cuya gran tesis ontológica postula una sola sustancia que consta de una infinidad de atributos, estableciéndose de ese modo una identidad entre Dios y Naturaleza que lo ha situado en la tradición como un autor panteístay monádico. Sin embargo, es posible encontrar entre ellos muchísimas similitudes, tanto en su concepción (...) metafísica como en los planteamientos éticos, que para Nietzsche se convierten en estéticos por la reconceptualización que del arte hace este pensador. Tal vez sea posible arriesgar incluso, sin miedo a ir demasiado lejos, que Spinoza constituye el antecedente más cercano al pensamiento nietzscheano. (shrink)

Afin de clarifier la réalité elle-même, Nietzsche rapporte généalogiquement le « conatus » spinoziste à une volonté de statisme à laquelle il oppose la dynamique expansive de la volonté de puissance. Pourtant, on peut montrer que Nietzsche rejette moins la conservation qu’il ne la réinterprète dans l’ordre d’une grandeur à produire, indissociable du tragique.

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 46 Heft: 1 Seiten: 28-57.

Affectivity and Philosophy After Spinoza and Nietzsche investigates a much neglected philosophical connection between two of the most controversial figures in the history of philosophy, namely Benedict Spinoza and Friedrich Nietzsche. It is claimed that these thinkers break with the classical image of philosophy as looking beyond affectivity for a knowledge of the world that can allow us to attain surety of judgement, virtue and happiness, and instead insist that the task of philosophy is not to (...) judge what is right or wrong, but understand how it is that we come to make such judgements. As Spinoza famously remarks, we do not desire something because it is good; we rather call something good because we desire it. Philosophy for Spinoza and Nietzsche thus traces the affective genesis of our desires to help us compose our relations in the world in the most joyful manner possible. The crucial orientating role of affective experience thus joins these two disparate thinkers in a single and rare task: to make knowledge the most powerful affect. (shrink)

This paper investigates Nietzsche’s reception of Spinoza in order to develop our understanding of the complex relations between their respective philosophies starting from their shared commitment to ontologies of power. The first three sections of this essay contain a diachronic analysis of Nietzsche’s engagement with Spinoza and a discussion of the major themes in play. The last section consists in an evaluation of Nietzsche’s explicit and implicit criticisms that helps us gain a sense of the (...) coherence running through them, as well of the core similarities and differences between two philosophies steeped in immanence and naturalism. Even if Nietzsche’s criticisms do not always do justice to Spinoza’s thinking, they nevertheless offer invaluable clues to guide our comparative project. (shrink)

Provides a comparative study in the history of modern philosophy focused on Spinoza and Nietzsche's recourse to physiology. Proposes Nietzsche and Spinoza's appeal to physiology as the key to solving fundamental philosophical problems. Taps into the heart of the growing interest in the Spinoza-Nietzsche connection through detailed discussions of substance metaphysics and the ontology of power, as well as their ethical and political positions.

Although the differences between Spinoza and Nietzsche are crucial, there are several aspects on which one can trace a relevant set of similarities between the two authors. The refutation of teleology, transcendence and free will, together with the consequent embracement of fatality, the pursuit of joy, and the particular emphasis on affectivity are just a few of the resemblances that can be drawn between Spinoza and Nietzsche. This paper is focused only on the last aspect mentioned (...) above. Both Spinoza and Nietzsche developed an account of immanent pursuit of joy, which can be derived from a particular understanding of affects. The two philosophers tried to create a peculiar bridge between knowledge and affectivity, which meant a significant departure from their previous philosophical tradition, and which gave them an idiosyncratic place in the entire picture of modern thought. (shrink)

In 1881 Nietzsche discovered that he had a precursor: Spinoza. In a letter to Franz Overbeck postmarked July 30—the eve of the experience of the eternal recurrence—he enumerated the points of doctrine that he believed he shared with Spinoza, including the denial of free will, a moral world order, and evil, and he also mentioned the task of "making knowledge the most powerful affect [die Erkenntniß zum mächtigsten Affekt zu machen]". A note of the same year reads, (...) "Spinoza: We are only determined in our actions by desires and affects. Knowledge must be an affect in order to be a motive. I say: it must be a passion to be a motive". Nietzsche's first published reference to the "passion of... (shrink)

The free spirit is central to Spinoza, Hegel, and Nietzsche. Each of them sees it as linked to the recognition of necessity. They also see freedom in relation to the Totality: God or nature for Spinoza, absolute spirit for Hegel, and for Nietzsche the will to power operating within the eternal recurrence of the same. For all three—especially for Nietzsche who might seem to hold the opposite—the free condition is won through strenuous self-discipline. Further, all (...) three deal with the notion of Being. For Spinoza, the notion of Being as the starting-point is equivalent to substance; for Hegel, Being is empty reference to Totality that affords primordial distance for individual human beings; for Nietzsche, Being is irrelevant emptiness. But it is only Hegel who establishes a ground for individual self-determinationthrough the emptiness of the human reference toward Totality. (shrink)

This book examines the longstanding debate between philosophical optimism and pessimism in the history of philosophy, focusing on Aristotle, Maimonides, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Camus. Philosophical optimists maintain that the world is optimally arranged and is accordingly valuable, and that the existence of human beings is preferable over their nonexistence. Philosophical pessimists, by contrast, hold that the world is in a woeful condition and ultimately valueless, and that human nonexistence would have been preferable over our existence. Schopenhauer criticizes (...) the optimism he locates in the Hebrew Bible and in Spinoza for being unable to square the presumed perfection of the world and its parts, including human life, with the suffering and misfortunes observable in them, and for leading to egoism and thereby to cruelty. Nietzsche, in turn, criticizes Schopenhauer's overtly pessimistic view, inter alia, for furtively positing a perfect state for one to aspire to, thus being latently optimistic. Similarly, Camus charges Nietzsche, who announces his rejection of both optimism and pessimism, with deifying the world and oneself, thereby reverting to optimism. Interestingly, Aristotle countenances an optimistic theory, later adopted and developed by Maimonides, that is arguably capable of facing Schopenhauer's challenge. Aristotelian optimism accounts for the perfection of the world in terms of a hierarchy of value between its parts, with human beings ranked relatively low, and recommends an attitude congruent with that ranking. (shrink)

The free spirit is central to Spinoza, Hegel, and Nietzsche. Each of them sees it as linked to the recognition of necessity. They also see freedom in relation to the Totality: God or nature for Spinoza, absolute spirit for Hegel, and for Nietzsche the will to power operating within the eternal recurrence of the same. For all three—especially for Nietzsche who might seem to hold the opposite—the free condition is won through strenuous self-discipline. Further, all (...) three deal with the notion of Being. For Spinoza, the notion of Being as the starting-point is equivalent to substance; for Hegel, Being is empty reference to Totality that affords primordial distance for individual human beings; for Nietzsche, Being is irrelevant emptiness. But it is only Hegel who establishes a ground for individual self-determinationthrough the emptiness of the human reference toward Totality. (shrink)

André Comte-Sponville livre ici vingt-six études d’histoire de la philosophie, portant principalement sur les traditions tragique et matérialiste, depuis l’Ecclésiaste jusqu’à Marcel Conche, en passant par Montaigne, Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, Spinoza, La Mettrie, Jean-Marie Guyau, Nietzsche et Alain. La préface propose une longue analyse de la notion de tragique. L’auteur y prend au sérieux ce que la littérature et la vie nous apprennent : que le tragique a à voir avec le malheur, mais réel plutôt que possible (par (...) différence avec le «suspense») et nécessaire plutôt que contingent (par différence avec le drame). Loin d’être l’affirmation joyeuse de tout, comme le voulait Nietzsche, le tragique est plutôt la prise en compte inconsolée de ce qu’il y a de catastrophique dans la condition humaine : la mort, la solitude, l’insatisfaction – trois formes de la finitude, qui ne sont tragiques que par la conscience, en l’homme, d’un infini au moins pensable. La conclusion, elle aussi fort développée, montre que le matérialisme, s’il est rigoureux, se doit d’être une pensée tragique, c’est-à-dire aporétique, déceptive, inconsolée. Et qu’une sagesse qui se sait insuffisante et insatisfaite (une sagesse tragique) vaut mieux, de ce point de vue, que la suffisance d’une sagesse prétendument satisfaite. Cela amène à prendre quelque distance avec Epicure, Spinoza, Nietzsche et Marx. Et à se trouver plus proche de Lucrèce, de Montaigne ou du dernier Althusser. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 46 Heft: 1 Seiten: 314-323.

Dans cet ouvrage, Niamkey-Koffi, après avoir affronté l'idée de système, en écho chez Spinoza, se consacre à la constitution de contenus de vérité soumis à l'exigence fragmentaire. Celle-ci fut le souci primordial de Nietzsche. La notion de système philosophique engage dans un mouvement critique qui démasque la volonté de vérité dissimulée dans l'idéologie et les mensonges du système comme instrument de la socialisation totalitaire. Mais une telle démarche critique, tributaire d'une morale de l'ambivalence, ne saurait reconduire la dialectique (...) des dichotomies et des exclusions (vrai ou faux), nécessitant chez Hegel l'intervention d'un troisième terme, mais opte pour le maintien de la tension entre les termes opposés en vue de la production du choc révolutionnaire. (shrink)

This article evaluates the significance of the personal liberation that Santayana offers in relation to previous proposals in Western modern philosophy. These include the ideas of liberation present in the philosophies of Spinoza, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. I argue that Santayana endorses Spinoza’s project, as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche did, of a philosophic redemption as an alternative to an established religion. Yet, he also follows Schopenhauer in rectifying Spinoza’s attempt of recapturing the philosophic truth of Christianity, a (...) project undertaken in Medieval times for Judaism and Islam, but not for Christianity. The result is an explicit philosophic reconstruction of the esoteric truth of Christianity. This, I argue, is the content of the lay religion and the deliverance it provides that Santayana sees as genuine philosophy and that is exemplified by the work of his hero and master, Spinoza. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the Spinozian topic of understanding human actions and its interpretation by Nietzsche in The Gay Science 333. Nietzsche doesn’t read directly Spinoza’s work but rather the volume of Kuno Fischer’s History of Modern Philosophy dedicated to the XVIIth century philosopher; this can be confirmed by the way in which the text is quoted. Even if Nietzsche reduces greatly the power of understanding to one of its aspect translating intelligere as erkennen, it (...) is necessary to emphasize that the aphorism presents a novelty that can enrich the study of the relationship between these two philosophers. Nietzsche identifies conscious thought with the “last scenes of reconciliation” between different drives of a previous unconscious process. Even if the point of departure of this survey is the centrality of affects in both thinkers, it will also identify a precise limit which distances Spinoza’s understanding of the affects from the centrality of drives in Nietzsche’s philosophical project. (shrink)