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Nicole Dular
Notre Dame of Maryland University
  1. One Too Many: Hermeneutical Excess as Hermeneutical Injustice.Nicole Dular - 2023 - Hypatia 38 (2):423-438.
    Hermeneutical injustice, as a species of epistemic injustice, is when members of marginalized groups are unable to make their experiences communicatively intelligible due to a deficiency in collective hermeneutical resources, where this deficiency is traditionally interpreted as a lack of concepts. Against this understanding, this paper argues that even if adequate concepts that describe marginalized groups’ experiences are available within the collective hermeneutical resources, hermeneutical injustice can persist. This paper offers an analysis of how this can happen by introducing the (...)
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  2.  87
    Mansplaining as Epistemic Injustice.Nicole Dular - 2021 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 7 (1).
    “Mansplaining” is by now part of the common cultural vernacular. Yet, academic analyses of it—specifically, philosophical ones—are missing. This paper sets out to address just that problem. Analyzed through a lens of epistemic injustice, the focus of the analysis concerns both what it is, and what its harms are. I argue it is a form of epistemic injustice distinct from testimonial injustice wherein there is a dysfunctional subversion of the epistemic roles of hearer and speaker in a testimonial exchange. As (...)
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  3. Standpoint Moral Epistemology: The Epistemic Advantage Thesis.Nicole Dular - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 181.
    One of standpoint theory’s main claims is the thesis of epistemic advantage, which holds that marginalized agents have epistemic advantages due to their social disadvantage as marginalized. The epistemic advantage thesis has been argued to be true with respect to knowledge about particular dominant ideologies like classism and sexism, as well as knowledge within fields as diverse as sociology and economics. However, it has yet to be analyzed with respect to ethics. This paper sets out to complete this task. Here, (...)
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    The Harms of the Internalized Oppression Worry.Nicole Dular & Madeline Ward - forthcoming - Journal of Social Philosophy.
    In this paper, we locate a general rhetorical strategy employed in theoretical discourse wherein philosophers argue from the mere existence of internalized oppression to some kind of epistemic, moral, political, or cognitive deficiency of oppressed people. We argue that this strategy has harmful consequences for oppressed people, breaking down our analysis in terms of individual and structural harms within both epistemic and moral domains. These harms include attempting to undermine the self-trust of oppressed people, reinforcing unjust epistemic power hierarchies, undermining (...)
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  5. Moral Testimony under Oppression.Nicole Dular - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (2):212-236.
    ​The traditional datum concerning moral testimony is that it is (epistemically or morally) problematic--or at least more problematic--than non-moral testimony. More recently, some have sought to analyze the issue of moral testimony within a narrower lens: instead of questioning whether moral testimony on the whole is (more) problematic or not, they have instead focused on possible conditions under which moral deference would be legitimate or forbidden. In this paper, I consider two such features: that of uncertainty and a belief in (...)
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    Epistemic Reasons, Transparency, and Evolutionary Debunking.Nicole Dular & Nikki Fortier - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1455-1473.
    Recently, evidentialists have argued that only they can explain transparency--the psychological phenomena wherein the question of doxastic deliberation of whether to believe p immediately gives way to the question of whether p--and thus that pragmatism about epistemic reasons is false. In this paper, we provide a defense of pragmatism. We depart from previous defenses of pragmatism which argue against the evidentialist explanation of transparency or the fact of transparency itself, by instead arguing that the pragmatist can provide a sound explanation (...)
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    Boy Bye: A Feminist Defense of Ghosting (2nd edition).Nicole Dular - 2020 - In Bob Fischer (ed.), College Ethics: A Reader on Moral Issues that Affect You.
    “Ghosting”, the act of ceasing all communication with someone with whom you have been romantically involved, is now a normal part of modern dating. The common moral judgment of ghosting is negative, that it is a bad behavior that treats people disrespectfully, and trains up a lack of empathy and accountability in those who engage in it (Abad-Santos 2017; Guilluame 2016; G 2017; Smith 2017). These behaviors and traits are at least morally undesirable if not outright wrong, and so, consequently, (...)
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    Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger: Epistemic Standards and Moral Beliefs.Nicole Dular - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):29-51.
    Much work in moral epistemology is devoted to explaining apparent asymmetries between moral and non-moral epistemology. These asymmetries include testimony, expertise, and disagreement. Surprisingly, these asymmetries have been addressed in isolation from each other, and the explanations offered have been piecemeal, rather than holistic. In this paper, I provide the only unified account on offer of these asymmetries. According to this unified account, moral beliefs typically have a higher epistemic standard than non-moral beliefs. This means, roughly, that it is typically (...)
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