In voting theory, monotonicity is the axiom that an improvement in the ranking of a candidate by voters cannot cause a candidate who would otherwise win to lose. The participation axiom states that the sincere report of a voter’s preferences cannot cause an outcome that the voter regards as less attractive than the one that would result from the voter’s non-participation. This article identifies three binary distinctions in the types of circumstances in which failures of monotonicity or participation can occur. (...) Two of the three distinctions apply to monotonicity, while one of those and the third apply to participation. The distinction that is unique to monotonicity is whether the voters whose changed rankings demonstrate non-monotonicity are better off or worse off. The distinction that is unique to participation is whether the marginally participating voter causes his first choice to lose or his last choice to win. The overlapping distinction is whether the profile of voters’ rankings has a Condorcet winner or a cycle at the top. This article traces the occurrence of all of the resulting combination of characteristics in the voting methods that can exhibit failures of monotonicity. (shrink)

If people are to have rights to themselves, then they must have the right to affiliate in sovereign entities composed of people who mutually agree to affiliate with one another. This requires that any individual or group has a right to secede from any sovereign entity. The article develops the idea that a right of secession is natural when rights to territory and other gifts of nature are regarded as belonging equally to all persons, and all persons have rights to (...) themselves. The article also argues that a world that recognizes a right of secession is feasible. (shrink)