8 found
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Nicolas Cornell [8]Nicolas Browne Cornell [1]
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Nicolas Cornell
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
  1. Wrongs, Rights, and Third Parties.Nicolas Cornell - 2015 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 43 (2):109-143.
  2. A Third Theory of Paternalism.Nicolas Cornell - 2015 - Michigan Law Review 113:1295-1336.
  3.  93
    The Possibility of Preemptive Forgiving.Nicolas Cornell - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (2):241-272.
    This essay defends the possibility of preemptive forgiving, that is, forgiving before the offending action has taken place. This essay argues that our moral practices and emotions admit such a possibility, and it attempts to offer examples to illustrate this phenomenon. There are two main reasons why someone might doubt the possibility of preemptive forgiving. First, one might think that preemptive forgiving would amount to granting permission. Second, one might think that forgiving requires emotional content that is not available prior (...)
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  4. A Complainant-Oriented Approach to Unconscionability and Contract Law.Nicolas Cornell - 2016 - University of Pennsylvania Law Review 164:1131-1175.
    This Article draws attention to a conceptual point that has been overlooked in recent discussions about the theoretical foundations of contract law. I argue that, rather than enforcing the obligations of promises, contract law concerns complaints against promissory wrongs. This conceptual distinction is easy to miss. If one assumes that complaints arise whenever an obligation has been violated, then the distinction does not seem meaningful. I show, however, that an obligation can be breached without giving rise to a valid complaint. (...)
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  5. The Puzzle of the Beneficiary's Bargain.Nicolas Cornell - 2015 - Tulane Law Review 90:75-128.
    This Article describes a jurisprudential puzzle—what I call the puzzle of the beneficiary’s bargain—and contends that adequately resolving this puzzle will require significant revisions to basic premises of contract law. The puzzle arises when one party enters into two contracts requiring the same performance, and the promisee of the second contract is the third-party beneficiary of the first. For example, a taxi driver contracts with a woman to transport her parents from the airport next week, and then the driver separately (...)
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  6.  28
    Complicity and Hypocrisy.Nicolas Cornell & Amy Sepinwall - 2020 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 19 (2):154-181.
    This article offers a justification for accommodating claims of conscience. The standard justification points to the pain that acting against one’s conscience entails. But that defense cannot make sense of the state’s refusal to accommodate individuals where the law interferes with their deeply meaningful but nonmoral projects. An alternative justification, we argue, arises once one recognizes the connection between conscience and moral address: One’s lived moral convictions determine when and with what force one can hold others to account. Acting against (...)
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  7.  30
    Margaret Gilbert, Rights and Demands: A Foundational Inquiry.Nicolas Cornell - 2019 - Ethics 130 (1):107-113.
  8.  14
    On Homer Blosser Reed’s “The Morals of Monopoly and Competition”.Nicolas Cornell - 2015 - Ethics 125 (2):533-535,.
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