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Nicholas Baima
Florida Atlantic University
  1. Republic 382a-d: On the Dangers and Benefits of Falsehood.Nicholas R. Baima - 2017 - Classical Philology 112 (1):1-19.
    Socrates' attitude towards falsehood is quite puzzling in the Republic. Although Socrates is clearly committed to truth, at several points he discusses the benefits of falsehood. This occurs most notably in Book 3 with the "noble lie" (414d-415c) and most disturbingly in Book 5 with the "rigged sexual lottery" (459d-460c). This raises the question: What kinds of falsehoods does Socrates think are beneficial, and what kinds of falsehoods does he think are harmful? And more broadly: What can this tell us (...)
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  2. Intrinsic Valuing and the Limits of Justice: Why the Ring of Gyges Matters.Tyler Paytas & Nicholas R. Baima - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (1):1-9.
    Commentators such as Terence Irwin (1999) and Christopher Shields (2006) claim that the Ring of Gyges argument in Republic II cannot demonstrate that justice is chosen only for its consequences. This is because valuing justice for its own sake is compatible with judging its value to be overridable. Through examination of the rational commitments involved in valuing normative ideals such as justice, we aim to show that this analysis is mistaken. If Glaucon is right that everyone would endorse Gyges’ behavior, (...)
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  3. Fighting Pleasure: Plato and the Expansive View of Courage.Nicholas R. Baima - 2019 - Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (2):255-273.
    In both the Laches (191d-e) and the Laws (1.633c-d, 1.634a-b, and 1. 635d), Plato has his protagonist defend the claim that courage (andreia) is not simply a matter of resisting pain and fear but about overcoming pleasure and desire as well. In this paper, I argue that Plato took the expansive view of courage seriously and that there are several reasons why we should too.
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  4. Playing with Intoxication: On the Cultivation of Shame and Virtue in Plato’s Laws.Nicholas R. Baima - 2018 - Apeiron 51 (3):345-370.
    This paper examines Plato’s conception of shame and the role intoxication plays in cultivating it in the Laws. Ultimately, this paper argues that there are two accounts of shame in the Laws. There is a public sense of shame that is more closely tied to the rational faculties and a private sense of shame that is more closely tied to the non-rational faculties. Understanding this division between public and private shame not only informs our understanding of Plato’s moral psychology, but (...)
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  5. Persuasion, Falsehood, and Motivating Reason in Plato’s Laws.Nicholas R. Baima - 2016 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 33 (2).
    In Plato’s Laws, the Athenian Stranger maintains that law should consist of both persuasion (πειθώ) and compulsion (βία) (IV.711c, IV.718b-d, and IV.722b). Persuasion can be achieved by prefacing the laws with preludes (προοίμια), which make the citizens more eager to obey the laws. Although scholars disagree on how to interpret the preludes’ persuasion, they agree that the preludes instill true beliefs and give citizens good reasons for obeying the laws. In this paper I refine this account of the preludes by (...)
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  6. Socrates, Thrasymachus, and Competition among the Unjust: Republic 1.349b–350c.Nicholas R. Baima - 2020 - Ancient Philosophy Today 2 (1):1-23.
    In Republic 1, Thrasymachus makes the radical claim that being just is ‘high-minded simplicity’ and being unjust is ‘good judgment’ (348c–e). Because injustice involves benefiting oneself, while justice involves benefiting others, the unjust are wise and good and the just are foolish and bad (348d–e). The “greedy craftsperson” argument (1.349b–350c) attempts to show that the unjust person's desire to outdo or have more than ( pleon echein) everyone is a symptom of her ignorance. Many commentaries have found the argument problematic (...)
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  7. True in Word and Deed: Plato on the Impossibility of Divine Deception.Nicholas R. Baima & Tyler Paytas - 2020 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (2):193-214.
    A common theological perspective holds that God does not deceive because lying is morally wrong. While Plato denies the possibility of divine deception in the Republic, his explanation does not appeal to the wrongness of lying. Indeed, Plato famously recommends the careful use of lies as a means of promoting justice. Given his endorsement of occasional lying, as well as his claim that humans should strive to emulate the gods, Plato's suggestion that the gods never have reason to lie is (...)
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  8.  14
    Review of Plato’s Epistemology: Being & Seeming, by Jessica Moss. [REVIEW]Nicholas R. Baima - 2022 - Ancient Philosophy 42 (1):312-317.
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    Knowledge and Truth in Plato: Stepping Past the Shadow of Socrates. By Catherine Rowett. [REVIEW]Nicholas R. Baima - 2019 - Ancient Philosophy 39 (1):243-248.
  10.  16
    Plato’s Pragmatism: Rethinking the Relationship Between Ethics and Epistemology.Nicholas R. Baima & Tyler Paytas - 2021 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
    Plato’s Pragmatism offers the first comprehensive defense of a pragmatist reading of Plato. According to Plato, the ultimate rational goal is not to accumulate knowledge and avoid falsehood but rather to live an excellent human life. The book contends that a pragmatic outlook is present throughout the Platonic corpus. The authors argue that the successful pursuit of a good life requires cultivating certain ethical commitments, and that maintaining these commitments often requires violating epistemic norms. In the course of defending the (...)
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