‘Neokantianism and Platonism’ indicates an important issue of Neo-Hellenic Philosophy during the 1920s and the 1930s. The protagonist was Johannes Theodorakopoulos. His Heidelberg dissertation Platons Dialektik des Seins (1927) follows the Neokantian theories of judgement (of Emil Lask and Heinrich Rickert) and explores Plato’s theory of judgement with emphasis on Philebos’ categories of peras and apeiron. Theodorakopoulos’ prolegomena to the Greek translation (1929) of Paul Natorp’s Platos Ideenlehre are relevant here. Nevertheless, Theodorakopoulos developed a personal interpretation of Plato’s philosophy (...) and almost demoted the Neokantian interpretation, as is clear in his Introduction to Plato (1941, in Greek) as also in his Heidelberg Vorlesungen 1969 entitled Die Hauptprobleme der Platonischen Philosophie. Besides, other interpretations of Plato came forward. Evangelos Papanoutsos wrote his Tübingen dissertation Das religiöse Erlebnis bei Platon (1926) under the supervision of Adickes. Konstantinos Georgoules, an earlier student of Husserl and Heidegger, published a translation of Plato’s Politeia (1939, in Greek) with a rather philological introduction.The Marxist Demetres Glenos, an opponent of Neokantianism, proposed a realistic interpretation of Plato’s Sophistes (1939, in Greek). Basileios Tatakes (an adherent of Henri Bergson) presented Plato’s philosophy as a reconciliation of reason and mysticism. (shrink)

The paper deals with neo-Kantianism and the value theory in Hungarian philosophy on the threshold of the 20th century. It shows how neo-Kantianism contributed to the Hungarian philosophy’s being professionalized as well as the transformations of neo-Kantianism in the works of its leading representatives. It also offers a detailed analysis of the value theory of K Böhm, who created the first original Hungarian philosophical system.

In A Parting of the Ways Michael Friedman proposed to conceive the contemporary divide between analytic philosophy (AP) and continental philosophy (CP) as the outcome of the bifurcation between the Neokantians of Heidelbarg and Marburg. According to Friedman, Carnap can be characterized as the executor of the Marburg school, while Heidegger is to be considered as the heir of the Southwest Neokantianism. In this paper it is argued that Carnap was much closer to the Southwest Neokantianism than usually (...) recognized. To some extent, Carnap’s project in the Aufbau may be described as an attempt to modernize the Neokantian approach of the Southwest school with the help of modern relational logic. This entails that Carnap cannot be lined so easily with the Marburg school as Friedman assumes. (shrink)

The first interpretations of Kant’s unfinished work, the so-called Opus postumum, occur almost exclusively within German Neo-Kantianism . The central point of discussion focuses on the relationship between transcendental idealism and empirical realism in Kant’s late thought. Some Neokantians regard the final development of Kant’s philosophy as a radical form of idealism, either a fictionalism or a scientific idealism . Several interpreters attribute the theory of the so-called “double affection” to the Kant of the Opus postumum. Krause tries instead to (...) match transcendental idealism and empirical realism. The aim of this paper is to present and discuss this debate. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss three examples of the appropriation of Kuhn’s ideas in philosophy of science. First we deal with classical logical empiricism. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the arch-logical empiricist Carnap considered Kuhn’s socio-historical account as a useful complementation, and not as a threat of the philosophy of science of logical empiricism. As a second example we consider the attempt of the so-called struc- turalist philosophy of science to provide a “rational reconstruction” of Kuhn’s approach. Finally, we will deal with (...) Friedman’s proposal to apply Kuhn’s ideas to the formulation of a modernized, historically enlightened Kantian approach that is based on the concept of a non-apodictic constitutive and historically moving a priori. (shrink)

A basic thesis of Neokantian epistemology and philosophy of science contends that the knowing subject and the object to be known are only abstractions. What really exists, is the relation between both. For the elucidation of this “knowledge relation ("Erkenntnisrelation") the Neokantians of the Marburg school used a variety of mathematical metaphors. In this con-tribution I reconsider some of these metaphors proposed by Paul Natorp, who was one of the leading members of the Marburg school. It is shown that Natorp's (...) metaphors are not unrelated to those used in some currents of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. (shrink)

A broad overview of the NeoKantian movement in Germany, written as an introduction to a series of essays about that movement. -/- .

This essay is dominated by three themes that recur contrapuntally in Heisenberg’s writings: observation, description, and ontology—prompted always by a concern about the role played by the subjective inquirer in scientific meaning-making, and by the ontology of scientific claims. Among the related themes are; the tension between paradigmatic concerns with structure and philosophical concerns with reality, the possibility of scientific revolutions, such as relativity and quantum mechanics, that can overthrow the classical traditions of natural science and the inadequacy of a (...) psychophysical parallelism for an epistemology of reason. The influence of Husserl and Heidegger is in his neokantian concern about the role of subjectivity. Heisenberg was a long-time friend of Heidegger and familiar with Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology and its critique of Greek philosophy; he also contributed an essay to a Festschrift in Heidegger’s honor in 1959. (shrink)

A filosofia alemã do século XIX posterior a Hegel está bastante estudada em três direções. A primeira, que surge da luta entre hegelianos de esquerda e direita, acaba por conduzir ao materialismo e ao marxismo; a segunda, que se expressa na vertente irracionalista e anti-sistemática, passa por Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard e Nietzsche; a terceira é constituída pelo neo-kantismo e suas derivações, cuja versão oficial teria suas raízes fincadas pelo famoso discurso inaugural de Zeller e pelo livro de Otto Liebmann, que deram (...) o impulso ao movimento “Zurück zu Kant”. Em tal visão de conjunto, o grande ausente é um movimento contínuo, ainda quando irregular e multifacetado, que terminará conduzindo à filosofia contemporânea. Este movimento tem em Trendelenburg uma figura chave. É com suas “Investigações Lógicas” que se inicia a reformulação das relações entre filosofia e ciência e, neste sentido, o verdadeiro retorno a Kant. O fato de sua obra principal ter exatamente o mesmo nome que a coleção de ensaios temáticos de Frege, a obra de ruptura de Husserl e as dissertações de doutorado de Cohen, Dilthey e Brentano significa algo mais que curiosas coincidências. “Zurück zu Kant” (Adolf Trendelenburg the overcoming of idealism and the roots of contemporary philosophy)Considering history of philosophy as a whole, the two main traditions of thought from the 20th century (analytic and phenomenological-hermeneutic) can be regarded as being variants of one same fundamental turn. This systematic relation is connected to a common historical root. To highlight it implies to review the ideas that are deeply in the basis of the historiography of the German thought in the 19th century. Beyond names, problems and theses that may appear to have at first sight no relationship whatsoever, we can notice a continuous unitary development that has not yet received all the attention it deserves. In this movement, Adolf Trendelenburg stands out, once the beginners of both the abovementioned traditions and of neokantianism (Frege, Brentano, Dilthey and Cohen) received a decisive impulse from his reflections. (shrink)

The intention of this article is to make an educational analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of experience in order to see what it implicates for educational practice as well as educational research. In this way, we can attain an understanding what embodied experience might mean both in schools and other educational settings and in researching educational activities. The analysis will take its point of departure in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis and criticism of empiricist and neokantian theories of experience. This will be followed up (...) by an introduction of some central concepts in Merleau-Ponty’s own understanding of experience with emphasis on their relevance for educational analysis. This way of presenting the theory of embodied experience has the advantage of being able to indicate the difference it makes in the field of theories of experience. (shrink)

In this article we intend to analyze Heidegger’s early courses and writings, trying to explain the reasons of his progressive departure from the neokantian field towards the acquisition of the phenomenological method. We will dedicate special attention to the comparison with the work of Emil Lask, a fundamental thinker for the genesis of Heidegger’s philosophy. The ending point of our path will be the outline of Heidegger’s reasons to consider that a hermeneutic approach to phenomenology is necessary.

Both neokantian moral theorists and Kant scholars have begun to incorporate Kant's moral anthropology. The result has been kantian moral theory that pays attention to character, virtue, and the richness of human life, and that takes seriously Kant's own conception of the importance for ethics of moral anthropology. But there is an apparent conflict between Kant's anthropological insights into empirical helps and hindrances to developing moral character and his insistence that transcendental freedom is a condition of the possibility of moral (...) responsibility. ;This problem was originally raised in Schleiermacher's review of Kant's published Anthropology, and hence I call it "Schleiermacher's dilemma." As Schleiermacher points out, Kant's account of freedom implies a fundamental priority of freedom. Free choices can be ultimate grounds of events in the world, but one cannot similarly consider events in the world ultimate grounds of choice. At the same time, Kant's anthropology is both empirical and morally significant. His anthropological accounts of politeness, emotions, and character are all accounts of empirical influences that help or hinder having a good will. ;Contemporary kantian moral theorists have not sufficiently addressed this tension. Some offer promising possibilities for moral anthropology, but either fail to recognize the full moral significance of empirical influences or sacrifice Kant's theory of freedom. My dissertation fills this gap. I reconcile Kant's moral anthropology to his theory of freedom by clearly articulating Kant's notion of a free will "in revolution" against evil. By making clear the relationship between this will and its appearance in the world, an appearance that takes the form of a struggle against evil, I argue that promoting empirical aids to moral "progress" expresses a good will. This preserves the priority of freedom over empirical influences without undermining the moral significance of those influences. I show how this "expression" model of moral anthropology applies to cases of interpersonal moral influence, and I show how far Kant can allow for such influence. Finally, I compare Kant's ethics with Schleiermacher's soft determinist moral theory to show both the limitations and the strengths of Kant's conception of moral anthropology. (shrink)

Hermann Cohen hat mit seiner wissenschaftslogischen Kantinterpretation und programmatischen Orientierung der Erkenntnislehre am ‚Faktum der Wissenschaft‘ das Verständnis von transzendentaler Logik bis in die Gegenwart maßgeblich mitgeprägt. Der zentrale Punkt seiner Kantinterpretation ist die Identifikation der „transzendentalen Methode“ mit der „regressiven Lehrart“ der Prolegomena und damit die Ersetzung der metaphysischen Deduktion der Kategorien durch eine wissenschaftstheoretische Rekonstruktion der synthetischen Grundsätze der mathematischen Naturwissenschaft. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz wird versucht im Anschluss an grundlegende Arbeiten von Kurt Walter Zeidler, die von Cohen in (...) Kants Theorie der Erfahrung entwickelten Argumente für diese Interpretation und die ihr zugrundeliegenden Motive darzulegen und sowohl mit Blick auf Kants eigene methodologische Ausführungen in den Prolegomena und der Kritik der reinen Vernunft als auch mit Blick auf das von Cohen in der Logik der reinen Erkenntnis als „härtestes Problem der Logik“ bezeichnete Problem der Vermittlung von Einzelnem und Allgemeinem kritisch zu hinterfragen. (shrink)

A critique of Peter Hohendahl's account of the fate of Kantianism and Neo-Kantianism in the interwar period. -/- .

The paper considers Cassirer’s account of the philosophical problems raised by the theory of relativity. The main question the paper addresses is how Cassirer, as a Neokantian, responds to the discoveries made by Einstein. The problem here is especially the presupposition of the a priori nature of Euclidean geometry. Cassirer’s answer lies in showing that Kant’s philosophy is broad enough to include also non-Euclidean geometries in the determination of the physical world. He does this by showing that though Kant conceived (...) space and time as forms of pure intuition he already connected them with certain theoretical factors, with the rules of the understanding. Space as the pure form of coexistence and time as the pure form of succession imply no special relations of measurement and it is thus a mistake to assume the a priori nature of Euclidean geometry. The way different geometries can figure in the determination of the physical world is explained in reference to the Klein approach to geometry, which defines geometrical properties as those that stay invariant according to a certain group of transformations. It is the concept of a group that is the real concept a priori. Group theory plays an even larger role in physical theories as well as Cassirer’s epistemology. Namely, with the theory of relativity it becomes evident that physical theories are theories of invariants according to a group of transformations. Cassirer claims that the general doctrine of invariability of certain values must recur in some form in any theory of nature, because it belongs to the logical and epistemological nature of such a theory. (shrink)

Partimos de dos modelos generales del quehacer filosofico, para presentar, a la vez, un trabajo a destiempo que desglosa en varias secciones los pasajes hacia la unidad de lo que venimos a denominar como pensamiento posthumanista. Por tanto, la estructura de este libro y las proposiciones mismas que se defienden en el tiene y tienen una forma fractal, como las munecas rusas, esto es, una forma en la que se reitera y explora en diferentes niveles de emergencia problemas analogos. Simon (...) Royo Hernandez (Madrid, 1967) es profesor TAR en la Universidad Nacional de Educacion a distancia (UNED) donde ha sido tambien profesor tutor de la asignatura Historia de la Filosofia antigua en el Grado de Filosofia. Ha sido profesor de Educacion Secundaria y actualmente simultanea su labor en la UNED con la de Ayudante de Servicios Generales del Ministerio de Trabajo y Empleo. Entre sus numerosas publicaciones cabe destacar: -"Nietzsche and Unamuno: The Meaning of the Earth." New Nietzsche Studies. Nietzsche"s Ecology & Kant, Neokantianism, Nietzsche. Volume 5:1/2 Spring/Summer 2002, pp.42-56. New York, USA. (shrink)

The present text surveys and reevaluates the meaning and scope of Ortega y Gasset’s philosophy. The chapters reveal the most important aspects of his history such as the Neokantian training he went thru in Germany as well as his discovery of Husserl’s phenomenology around 1912. The work also covers his original contributions to philosophy namely vital and historical reason - and the cultural and educational mission he proposed to achieve. The Spanish – and to a certain extent the European – (...) circumstance was the milieu from which his work emerged but this does not limit Ortega’s scope. Rather, he believed that universal truths can only emerge from the particulars in which they are embedded. The publication in 2010 of a critical edition of his Complete Works opened worldwide access for many unpublished manuscripts, and some of his lectures. There is renewed interest among students and researchers in Ortega and this book uniquely delivers scholarship on his content in English. (shrink)

Abstract. In Dynamics of Reason Michael Friedman proposes a kind of synthesis between the neokantianism of Ernst Cassirer, the logical empiricism of Rudolf Carnap, and the historicism of Thomas Kuhn. Cassirer and Carnap are to take care of the Kantian legacy of modern philosophy of science, encapsulated in the concept of a relativized a priori and the globally rational or continuous evolution of scientific knowledge,while Kuhn´s role is to ensure that the historicist character of scientific knowledge is taken seriously. (...) More precisely, Carnapian linguistic frameworks, guarantee that the evolution of science procedes in a rational manner locally,while Cassirer’s concept of an internally defined conceptual convergence of empirical theories provides the means to maintain the global continuity of scientific reason. In this paper it is argued that Friedman’s neokantian account of scientific reason based on the concept of the relativized a priori underestimates the pragmatic aspects of the dynamics of scientific reason. To overcome this short-coming, I propose to reconsider C.I. Lewis’s account of a pragmatic the priori, recently modernized and elaborated by Hasok Chang. This may be<br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br&g t;<br><br><br><br><br><br>Keywords: Dynamics of reason, Paradigms, Logical Empiricism,Neokantianism, Pragmatism, Mathematics, Communicative Rationality. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the Russian Neokantian philosopher, teacher and member of the Kant Society, Moses M. Rubinstein, who attined his doctoral degree under Rickert in 1905 and who was very involved in promoting Kantianism in Russian. He is known for his public defence of Kant in 1914 at the time of the slavophile attacks on Kantian philosophy occasioned by World War I. Rubinstein's essay on “The Logical Foundations of the Hegelian System and the End of History” was published (...) in Kant-Studien in 1906. In his chief work “On the Meaning of Life”, Rubinstein attempted a synthesis of Neokantianism and the philosophy of life. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the Russian Neokantian philosopher, teacher and member of the Kant Society, Moses M. Rubinstein, who attined his doctoral degree under Rickert in 1905 and who was very involved in promoting Kantianism in Russian. He is known for his public defence of Kant in 1914 at the time of the slavophile attacks on Kantian philosophy occasioned by World War I. Rubinstein's essay on “The Logical Foundations of the Hegelian System and the End of History” was published (...) in Kant-Studien in 1906. In his chief work “On the Meaning of Life”, Rubinstein attempted a synthesis of Neokantianism and the philosophy of life. (shrink)

This essay outlines some fundamental differences between the evaluative and explanatory language of Aristotelian practical reason based on his empirical psychological theory of human development, on the one hand, and the late 20th and 21st century discourse of human rights based on a NeoKantian transcendent principle of universal human dignity on the other. To what extent are these two types of political discourse compatible in today’s globalizing world? To the extent that they are not compatible, which should be preferred? My (...) answer is that they are compatible and even complementary, but only if the Aristotelian framework is treated as more fundamental, and the rights-and-dignity perspective is understood as a potentially good political solution, for the time being, in the contemporary context of global politics. (shrink)

This paper examines Slavoj Zizek’s reading of Immanuel Kant. Its undergirding argument is that Zizek’s work as a whole- up to and including his politically radical statements, which have become more and more prominent since 1997- is conceivable as a project in the rereading of the Kantian ‘Copernican Revolution’ via Lacanian psychoanalysis. Critics now agree that Zizek’s orienting aim is to write a philosophy of politics, as more recent texts, like The Ticklish Subject make clear. (Kay, 2003; Sharpe, 2004; Dean (...) 2006) If Zizek’s philosophy is ultimately a philosophy of politics, however, Zizek’s political philosophy is grounded in a wider post or ‘neo’-Kantian philosophy of subjectivity.
The essay has three major parts. Part I gives Zizek’s reading of Kant on the subject of apperception. Part II recounts Zizek’s pivotal reading of Kant on the sublime, which he ties closely to the problematics of the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ of the first Critique. Part III then examines Zizek’s conception of subjectivity in terms of the faculties (and especially the faculty of imagination) that Kant argues are involved in the transcendental constitution of objects in the first half of The Critique of Pure Reason.
In the Conclusion, the force of the paper’s subtitle—‘Politicising the Transcendental Turn’—will become manifest. I lay out three principles of Zizek’s ‘neoKantian/Hegelian’ ontology. These also make clear how his philosophy of political agency is grounded in this apparently suprapolitical or solely philosophical reading of Kant.
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The article considers the theory of cognition of the Russian and Soviet philosopher Vasily Seseman in its relation to the main philosophical orientations in early 20th-century: phenomenology, neokantianism, and intuitionism. Seseman’s theory of cognition is interesting today because, following the tradition of neo-Kantianism, it largely shares the principles and methods of phenomenology, poses epistemological problems that were not explicitly formulated by Edmund Husserl, and offers solutions that are relevant today. The article highlights a common thematic field combining phenomenology, neo-Kantianism, (...) and intuitionism. This field is set by the initial subject-object cognitive attitude, the desire to identify the conditions for the possibility of cognition, the recognition of the presence of a non-linguistic level of knowledge. Moving in this unified theoretical cognitive context of the early twentieth century, Seseman offers his own solution to the following problems: defining the subject of cognition, developing the method of intuition in general and in relation to the contemplation of essence, distinguishing between objective and non-objective attitudes and using this distinction to describe different types of cognition, thematizing the irrational in cognition, and understanding the judgment and its role in the final formation of cognition. Seseman believes that the cognition of reality is preceded by the perception of its objects. He diverges from the Neo-Kantians, who claim that the objects of cognition are formed only in judgment, and holds a position than Husserl, according to whom we perceive the world around us already objectively. However, unlike Husserl, Seseman does not recognize the cognitive nature of perception and argues that knowledge begins with a reflexive fixation of the object of cognition. The cognition of an individual object is embodied in a judgment in which the relation of the object to its environment is fixed and the object is defined as a unique combination of universal properties. Finally, it is shown that the solution of epistemological questions inevitably leads Seseman to ontological issues. (shrink)

The ethics of care, developed in early 1980s within feminism as a critique on the biases of neokantian ethics, is 40 years old. This book presents its key insights, the developments and debates over the years and the challenges care ethics faces. Internationally renown scholars from various continents have contributed, a clear sign that care ethics has spread over the globe. The key insights regard issues close by, care from person to person, but also at an institutional level and questions (...) of global impact. Vulnerability and relationality are examples of these insights. What can caring practices, ranging from social welfare to palliative care, learn from care ethics? Has care ethics had an impact on ethics at large and what is its future? (shrink)

The received view of the anti-metaphysics of Camap's Aufbau finds that it rests exclusively on verificationism. Alberto Coffa has recently put forward an interpretation of the antimetaphysical stance that claims that Camap was confusedly moving from ontological to semantical ideahsm. After raising objections to both of these views another interpretation is put forward. The crucial aspect of Camap's rejection of metaphysics rests on his reinterpretation of epistemology as the logic of objective knowledge. This leads to a rejection of metaphysics inasmuch (...) as the peculiar status of logic as the framework constitutive of the possibility of rational inquiry means that it neither needs nor allows of completion or interpretation by traditional metaphysics. This view of Camap's is compared to the views of the Marburg and Southwest NeoKantians. (shrink)

Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of Carnap's mature logical empiricism. Less well known is the fact that in the Aufbau values were considered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted from value experiences. About 1930, however, values and value judgments were banished to the realm of meaningless metaphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict emotivism. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the question why Carnap abandoned his originally (...) positive attitude concerning values. It is argued that his non-cognitivist attitude was the symptom of a deep-rooted and never properly dissolved tension between conflicting inclinations towards Neokantianism and Lebensphilosophie. In America Carnap's non-cognitivism became a major obstacle for a closer collaboration between logical empiricists and American pragmatists. Carnap's persisting adherence to the dualism of practical life and theoretical science was the ultimate reason why he could not accept Morris's and Kaplan's pragmatist theses that cognitivism might well be compatible with a logical and empiricist scientific philosophy. (shrink)

This Alfred Schutz Memorial Lecture discusses the relationship between the phenomenological life-world analysis and the methodology of the social sciences, which was the central motive of Schutz’s work. I have set two major goals in this lecture. The first is to scrutinize the postulate of adequacy, as this postulate is the most crucial of Schutz’s methodological postulates. Max Weber devised the postulate ‘adequacy of meaning’ in analogy to the postulate of ‘causal adequacy’ (a concept used in jurisprudence) and regarded both (...) as complementary and, in the context of sociological analysis, critical. Schutz extracted the two postulates from the Neokantian epistemology, dismissed the concept of causality, and reduced Weber’s two postulates of adequacy into one, namely, the adequacy of meaning. I discuss the benefits and shortcomings of this reduction. A major problem, in my view, is that Schutz’s reformulation lost the empirical concern that was inherent in Weber’s ‘causal adequacy’. As a result, the models of economics (which shaped Schutz’s conception of social science) are considered to be adequate if they are ‘understandable’ to an everyday actor, even when they are based on the most unrealistic assumptions. To recapture Weber’s empirical orientation I recommend a more restrictive interpretation of the postulate of adequacy that links it to qualitative research and unfolds the critical potential of Schutz’s phenomenological life-world analysis. My second goal is to report on some current developments in German sociology in which a number of approaches explicitly refer to Schutz’s analysis of the life-world and attempt to pursue ‘adequate’ empirical research. This lecture focuses on three approaches: ethnophenomenology, life-world analytic ethnography, and social scientific hermeneutics. (shrink)

Although the few references to the term, Nietzsche's notion of perspectivism is an important assumption of his philosophical reflection. It is a notion, as it will be tried to demonstrate, significant for the understanding of many theoretical positions of the author concerning science and knowledge and decisively for the interpretation of both notions as interpretative perspectives The following argument aims to analyze the influences and assumptions of this notion, highlighting its Kantian (Neokantian), Schopenhaurian background, but also considering influences outside of (...) philosophy, such as Ruggero Boscovich's theoretical physics, which plays a decisive role in the formulation of the notions of perspectivism and perspectivist interpretation in Nietzsche's philosophy. (shrink)

‘Philosophy – what is the use of it?’ Dutch philosophers about education in philosophy This article gives an overview of the ideas of twentieth-century Dutch philosophers on the use and function of education in philosophy, both in a university context and in secondary schools. In the first half of the twentieth century, there was a very strong emphasis on expanding the place of philosophy in other academic programmes, which was related to the neokantian conception of philosophy as the examination of (...) the fundamental assumptions and the interconnectedness of the sciences. After the Second World War, this view had a unique institutional effect, in the form of the establishment of a ‘centrale interfaculteit’ at all Dutch universities, where philosophy was to be practised in relation to other disciplines. This institutional experiment was brought to an end in the 1980s. Since then, there has been a tendency to regard philosophy as an academic discipline in its own right, and less as a place for creating meaningful connections between other disciplines. From the 1970s onwards, the focus of thinking about philosophy education in the Netherlands has shifted from the universities to the secondary schools. Whereas philosophy was practically non-existent as a secondary-school subject in 1970, nowadays it has a remarkably strong presence as an elective in Dutch upper secondary education. Simultaneously, the didactics of philosophy became a flourishing field in the Netherlands, exploring the way in which secondary-school pupils can learn the skill of philosophical thinking. (shrink)

Abstract. Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of Carnap’s mature logical empiricism. Less well known is the fact that in the Aufbau values were con-sidered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted from value experiences. About 1930, however, values were banished to the realm of meaning-less me-taphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict emotivism. The aim of this paper is to shed new light on the question why Carnap abandoned his originally positive (...) attitude concerning values. It is argued that Carnap’s non-cognitivist attitude was the symptom of a deep-rooted and never properly dissolved tension be-tween his conflicting inclinations towards Neokantianism and Lebensphilosophie. In America Carnap’s non-cognitivism became a major obstacle for a closer collaboration between lo-gical empiricists and American pragmatists. Carnap’s persisting ad---herence to the dualism of practical life and theoretical science was the ultimate reason why he could not accept Morris’s and Kaplan’s pragmatist the-ses that cognitivism might well are compatible with a logical and empiricist scientific philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Happiness in Premodern Judaism: Virtue, Knowledge, and Well-BeingDaniel H. FrankHava Tirosh-Samuelson. Happiness in Premodern Judaism: Virtue, Knowledge, and Well-Being. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 2003. Pp. xi + 596. Cloth, $50.00.Franz Rosenzweig tried hard to convince the neoKantian Hermann Cohen of the merits of Zionism and the normalization it would bring to Jews and Jewish life. His attempt met with this response from Cohen: "Oho! So the gang (...) now wants to be happy, does it?" For those ignorant of the history of Jewish philosophy, one might imagine that Jewish philosophers, no less than their non-philosophical kinsmen, were so weighed down by the burdens of history and persecution that happiness could play no role in their theorizing. But happiness plays a key role in the history of Jewish moral and political philosophy, especially in the premodern period. Even Spinoza, the last of the medievals and the first of the moderns, the great critic of the rabbinic tradition and of Maimonides in particular, is concerned in his Ethics with identifying those activities that together constitute human well-being and the good life. Only lately, since the Enlightenment and Kant, has non-eudaimonism been a live option for Jewish thinkers. Only with the rise of (modern) Orthodoxy, and its predilection for construing goodness as rectitude and rule-following, has eudaimonism fallen out of favor. But with Tirosh-Samuelson's weighty volume on happiness in premodern Judaism, there can be no excuse in the future to imagine that all Jews are, or must be, closet Kantians, strict deontologists. To think otherwise seems to come close to taking on the classical (anti-Semitic) dichotomy of legalistic Judaism vs. spiritual Christianity. In it own way, Happiness in Premodern Judaism is a critique of such a one-sided, monochromatic view of Judaism, whether from the Christian or even from the Jewish side.Tirosh-Samuelson writes explicitly as an intellectual historian, rather than as a philosopher. She understands herself and her project as one that presents just the facts, without evaluating them. While one may cavil at a lost opportunity, in the present case this would be churlish, given the enormous erudition on display. After an introductory chapter outlining the foundational moral theories of Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic philosophers, the text presents the (Greek-inspired) areteic wisdom literature of the Second Temple period, the teleological theocentrism of the rabbis, the Greco-Arabic Islamicate culture that nurtured Jewish philosophers from Saadia in the tenth century to Maimonides in the twelfth, the rabbinic and kabbalistic critiques of the philosophical ideal of happiness commencing [End Page 338] with the translation (into Hebrew) of Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and finally, very important and the focus of much recent scholarly work, the transformation of Jewish eudaimonism through direct contact with Christian Scholasticism and later with the humanist Renaissance. All in all, a millennium and a half of Jewish intellectual history is presented in a sober and scholarly way.Not surprisingly Maimonides plays a pivotal role in the story that Tirosh-Samuelson relates. A Janus-like figure, he represents the culmination and height of accommodation with Greek and Greco-Arabic philosophical culture. However, with the gradual worsening of the socio-economic condition of European Jewry in the thirteenth century, his accommodationism seemed traitorous, and as a result generations of thinkers, mystics and philosophers alike, strove to critically distance themselves from Maimonidean Aristotelianism. Tirosh-Samuelson is admirably clear in pointing out that such anti-Maimonidean tendencies are ill-characterized as anti-philosophical. Hasdai Crescas in the late-fourteenth and early-fifteenth centuries launched a massive critique of Maimonides' physics, metaphysics, and moral philosophy, but did so in as rigorous a manner as any philosopher would. The picture that enfolds over the course of the text is one of vigorous dialectic between partisans of 'alien' (Greek) wisdom and those who viewed such wisdom with considerable suspicion. Such a dialectic parallels, not surprisingly, developments in Christian philosophy.The trajectory of the story of premodern Jewish musings on happiness is from the centrality of reason and intellect, and the contemplative activity that is reason's preeminent actuality, to the primacy... (shrink)

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) gilt weithin als einer der bedeutendsten Philosoph*innen der Neuzeit. Seine Überlegungen zu den subjektiven Bedingungen menschlicher Erkenntnis haben sich für die theoretische Philosophie als ähnlich bahnbrechend erwiesen wie seine Untersuchung der Bestimmungsgründe vernünftigen Handelns und der Möglichkeit menschlicher Freiheit für die praktische Philosophie. Ohne Zweifel ist Kant auch diejenige historische Figur, der sich John Rawls am engsten verbunden fühlt. In der Tat lassen sich bereits auf den ersten Blick eine Reihe struktureller und methodischer Ähnlichkeiten zwischen beiden Philosophien (...) feststellen: ein Bekenntnis zum Primat der praktischen Vernunft und dem Vorrang des Rechten vor dem Guten etwa, oder eine Ablehnung ‚erster Prinzipien‘ als Rechtfertigungsgrundlage. Auch auf substantieller Ebene wird Rawls nicht müde, den kantischen Ursprung zentraler Ideen seiner Theorie zu betonen. So überrascht es nicht, dass er weithin als einschlägigster Neokantianer der Gerechtigkeitstheorie gilt. Bei genauerem Hinsehen zeigt sich jedoch, dass Rawls’ Bezugnahme auf Kant komplex ist und im Lauf seines Werkes Veränderungen unterliegt, die wichtige Entwicklungen in Rawls’ eigenen Gedanken spiegeln. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct a peculiar debate between Ernst Cassirer and the Swedish philosopher Konrad Marc-Wogau on Begriffstheorie that took place in the late thirties of the 20th century. This debate may be conceived as sort of ersatz of the discussion between Cas sirer's Neokantian Begriffstheorie on the one hand, and logical empiricist accounts on the other, in particular Schlick's Begriffstheorie as presented in his Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre. Although Schlick did not participate in personam in the discussion (...) that took place between Cassirer and Marc-Wogau, one may consider him as a “virtual” participant of the debate, since his Begriffstheorie played an important role in the background, in particular for Cassirer. More precisely, I'd like to show that the debate can be read as a dispute on the feasibility of a “rich” account of Begriffstheorie, favored by Cassirer, and the necessity of restricting Begriffstheorie to an “austere” approach whose protagonists were Marc-Wogau and Schlick, although in a quite different ways. More generally, the debate on Begriffstheorie exemplifies the complex interactions — and non-interactions — between three important currents of scientific philosophy, namely, the Marburg Neokantianism of Cassirer, the scientifically minded philosophers of the Uppsala School, and, indirectly, the Logical Empiricism of the Vienna Circle. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Historical Dictionary of Kant and KantianismJeffrey L. WilsonHelmut Holzhey and Vilem Mudroch. Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism. Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies, and Movements, 60. Lanham, MD-Toronto-Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, 2005. Pp. xv + 374. Cloth, $75.00.The authors are emeritus professor and research associate (Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter) at the University of Zurich. Although Holzhey is founding director of the Hermann Cohen Archive, Neokantianism is not disproportionately represented (...) here. The emphasis is on Kant, with supplementary treatment of Kant’s predecessors and successors adequate to grasp Kant’s role in various developments in the history of philosophy. At the same time, a reader interested in the various forms of Kantianism will find ample useful information here; for example, Kant’s influence on ethical socialism is documented from several different directions. Even without these supplements, this would be a formidably comprehensive treatment of the central terms in Kant’s writings from the pre-critical period through the Opus postumum. The authors include references to the Reflexionen (Notes and Fragments) where appropriate. They also helpfully adjudicate certain English translation problems from the perspective of native German speakers.A number of articles stand out as especially noteworthy. “Categories” traces this term from Kant’s 1770 Inaugural Dissertation through to its reception by Peirce and C. I. Lewis. “Copernican Revolution” gives in a brief article a surprisingly comprehensive treatment of Kant’s term and its probable origins that is based on very wide study of the scholarship. “Dimensions of Space” deftly clarifies Kant’s changing attitudes toward non-Euclidean geometries. “Ether” discusses Kant’s uses of the term in the Opus postumum against the background of his pre-critical works. “Hegel” is admirably balanced, summarizing Hegel’s encounter with Kant without trying to defend Kant against Hegel’s critique. “Mathematics” includes a breathtakingly concise overview of the philosophy of mathematics from Descartes through Hilbert. “Noumenon” provides a nuanced explication of this term and “thing in itself” based on the differing roles the two expressions play in Kant’s discourse. “Object” gives the clearest explanation of Kant’s use of this term the reviewer has seen anywhere. “Pre-Critical Philosophy” discusses every philosophically relevant aspect of this period of Kant’s writings and its significance for later developments. “Substance,” among other articles, highlights differences between the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason. “World” outlines the developments in Kant’s views of the significance of this term for physics, astronomy, epistemology, ethics, and biology.Although one might assume that having only two authors for a reference work might result in a certain narrowness or bias, the presentation here is comprehensive and balanced. The dictionary has the feel of a project that has been ripening over the course of many years. The advantage of the two-author model is a consistency of voice that makes reading the dictionary through cover to cover pleasant and rewarding. The chronology and sketch of Kant’s life provide an excellent overview, and the judiciously selected bibliography is preceded by the best compact orientation to Kant scholarship available. The topical arrangement of the bibliography, while it creates some difficulty in locating a work cited in the text of the dictionary, allows a reader interested in one area of Kant to find the most important relevant secondary sources instantly.The reviewer is at pains to find something here to criticize. There is the occasional linguistic indiscretion, such as the unidiomatic “dignity to be happy.” The authors refer to Kant-Studien as “Kant Studies,” so that a reader might search in vain for a journal of this name. Such infelicities are notable because they are rare in this well-edited volume. Sometimes information might be better placed under another heading; the reviewer often noted defects in one article that were remedied in a related one. (Following up the cross-referenced terms was the solution in every case.) There are also occasional omissions. Distinguished Kant scholarship taking place in Latin America should be recognized. “Antinomy” overlooks the clearest definition of this term: a necessary conflict of reason with itself. “Cognition” neglects Kant’s puzzling references to “practical cognition” (praktische Erkenntnis). Christian August Crusius, mentioned in... (shrink)

Wybo Houkes - A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 554-555 Book Review A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger Michael Friedman. A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger. Chicago: Open Court, 2000. Pp. xv + 175. Paper, $24.95. For present-day philosophers, the division between "analytic" and "continental" philosophy is a fact of life. In this elegant little book, Michael (...) Friedman studies its origins. In earlier essays, collected in his Reconsidering Logical Positivism , Friedman argued that Carnap and other logical empiricists are best understood as adapting their Neokantian heritage to, among other things, the rapid developments in logic and physics. In A Parting of the Ways, Friedman broadens.. (shrink)

Nach einer kurzen Übersicht über das Leben und Werk von Helmholtz, diskutiere ich die drei Themenbereiche, die für die Beurteilung seines Verhältnisses zu Kant vornehmlich ins Gewicht fallen. Der erste Bereich bildet die Begründung des Energieerhaltungssatzes von 1847, den der späte Helmholtz selbst „durch Kant’s erkenntnistheoretische Ansichten […] beeinflusst“ gesehen hat. Während viele Interpreten diese Selbstauskunft für berechtigt halten, sehe ich in der Struktur der Begründung einen Ausdruck der gegensätzlichen Wissenschaftsauffassungen von Helmholtz und Kant. Als zweites gehe ich auf die (...) Rolle der Kausalität in der Wahrnehmungstheorie ein. In diesem Kontext bezieht sich Helmholtz erstmals und durchaus positiv explizit auf Kant. Seine Rede "Über das Sehen des Menschen" von 1855 zur Einweihung eines Kantdenkmals in Königsberg gilt als eines der Gründungsdokumente des Neukantianismus und spiegelt doch zugleich die tiefgreifenden Differenzen zwischen empiristischer und idealistischer Wissenschaftsphilosophie wider. Zeitlich wiederum nachfolgend steht die Begründung der nichteuklidischen Geometrien als dritter Bereich für die deutlichste Kritik an Kants transzendentaler Begründung der Wissenschaft. Sie ist zugleich wohl auch Helmholtz’ bekanntester Beitrag zur Hypothetisierung der Wissenschaftssauffassung. -/- der Gründungsdokumente des Neukantianismus und spiegelt doch zugleich die tiefgreifenden Differenzen zwischen empiristischer und idealistischer Wissenschaftsphilosophie wider. Zeitlich wiederum nachfolgend steht die Begründung der nichteuklidischen Geometrien als dritter Bereich für die deutlichste Kritik an Kants transzendentaler Begründung der Wissenschaft. Sie ist zugleich wohl auch Helmholtz’ bekanntester Beitrag zur Hypothetisierung der Wissenschaftssauffassung. Dem Werk von Hermann von Helmholtz wird gemeinhin ein maßgeblicher Stellenwert bei der Begründung der neukantianischen Bewegung im 19. Jahrhundert beigemessen. Wo diese Zuordnung Helmholtz’ positive Bezüge auf Immanuel Kant ohne hinreichende Kontextualisierung hervorhebt, läuft sie Gefahr, die Distanz zu übersehen, die zwischen den wissenschaftsphilosophischen Positionen von Helmholtz und Kant bestand. In meinem Beitrag gewinnt das Verhältnis von Helmholtz zu Kant erst seine Bedeutung vor dem Hintergrund ihrer konträren ontologischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Grundannahmen. Helmholtz betrachte ich als repräsentativen Vertreter einer szientistischen Wissenschaftsauffassung in der Naturforschung des 19. Jahrhunderts. Demgegenüber bietet Kant ein paradigmatisches Beispiel einer metaphysischen Wissenschaftsbegründung. Im Gegensatz zu Kant beschränkt Helmholtz seinen Ausgangspunkt nicht auf erfahrungsfreie Prinzipien, sondern entwickelt und stützt seine Begründung des Geltungsanspruches der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis auf forschungsbewährte Theorien und Experimente. Eine Differenz zwischen den beiden Positionen findet sich ebenfalls in den Strukturen der jeweils vertretenen Naturkonzeptionen. Führt Kants dynamischer Mechanismus alle Eigenschaften der Materie auf Kräfte zurück, so geht Helmholtz von einer Dualität von Kraft und Materie aus. (shrink)

The article analyzes the creativity of one of the most famous Russian neokantians Boris V. Yakovenko. Despite the fact that the work of Yakovenko becomes the subject of analysis of an increasing number of researchers both in Russia and abroad, it has not yet taken place in a systematic analysis. The article attempts to consider the philosophical creativity of the Russian philosopher systematically, revealing both the main directions of European thought that had the greatest influence on the position of Yakovenko (...) and the main areas of philosophy to which the efforts of the national thinker were directed. These, according to the author, include the history of philosophy and the system of so-called transcendental pluralism. It is pointed out that the history of philosophy for Yakovenko is a single holistic process and therefore is the history of the development of philosophical ideas, and not the history of life and work of individual philosophers. According to Yakovenko, the general philosophical scheme of historical development looks like this: from Greek cosmism to German epistemology and the beginning ontological turn in modern philosophy. There is also the belief of B.V. Yakovenko that there is no national philosophy. In his opinion, philosophy, as well as science in General, can only be international. His second main thesis concerning the development of philosophy is that philosophy should be independent from other branches of human knowledge and knowledge. She must not be a servant of theology or science. The article also presents various stages of the Russian philosopher's development of his version of the concept of pluralistic philosophy. According to Yakovenko, only pluralistic philosophy is able to know the essence as the main object of philosophy. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that applied ethics originated in the United States in the 1960s as a reaction to new social challenges (particularly in the field of medicine), to some extent superseding the metaethical analyses of moral language dominant at that time. This widespread portrayal of applied ethics as an unforeseen reaction of philosophy to new social challenges is inaccurate. In this article, I seek to show that applied ethics should be regarded as a philosophical innovation whose origins can be (...) traced back to the ethics of Kant and the Neokantianism of Hermann Cohen. It is my central thesis that the key step in its development occurred with American Pragmatism, or, to be precise, in the intellectual environment around American Pragmatism. (shrink)

The A to Z of Kant and Kantianism provides a comprehensive dictionary that will aid not only students but also teachers and the general public, since it contains hundreds of entries describing Kant's life and works and explaining his concepts as well as the contributions of his followers . Furthermore, much of the writings of the Neokantians, as well as the literature dealing with this movement, are not available in English, thus, this book provides an introduction to this phenomenon to (...) the English-language reader. (shrink)

During this sexcentenary of the birth of Nicholas of Cusa, there is an almost ineluctable temptation to super-accentuate Cusa’s modernity—to recall approvingly, for example, that the Neokantian Ernst Cassirer not only designated Cusa “the first Modern thinker”1 but also went on to interpret his epistemology as anticipating Kant’s.2 In this respect Cassirer was following his German predecessor Richard Falckenberg, who wrote: “It remains a pleasure to see, on the threshold of the Modern Age, the doctrine already advanced by Plotinus and (...) Scotus Eriugena, received [by Cusanus] so forcefully that time, numbers, spatial figures, and all categories ... are brought forth out of the creative power of the mind.”3 Others have proclaimed Nicholas to be a forerunner of Spinoza,4 of Leibniz,5 of Hegel,6 and, indeed, of German Idealism generally. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Lotze’s conception of judgement in the framework of his “logic of validity” . I first consider Lotze’s influence on the platonic turn of German philosophy of logic. Second, I explain how Lotze tries to overcome the traditional ontological framework by distinguishing between “being” and “validity”. Finally, I discuss Lotze’s conception of judicative content and point out its consequences for the evolution of the doctrine of judgement in neokantianism and phenomenology.