Background: Clinical and experimental findings have suggested that insomnia is associated with altered emotion processing, such as facial emotion recognition and impairments in executive functions. However, the results still appear non-consensual and have recently been presented by a few number of studies. Accordingly, the aim of the present study was to investigate whether patients with Insomnia disorder will present alterations in recognition of facial emotions and that such alterations will be related to Executive Functions and that Insomnia Disorder patients will (...) exhibit a lower Executive Functions performance when compared to normal controls individuals. Method: A total of 11 individuals diagnosed with insomnia disorder and 15 control participants took part in the present cross-sectional study. They completed questionnaires covering socio-demographic data, a sleep and mood evaluation, and a cognitive assessment. Moreover, they underwent a computerized Facial Emotional Recognition test, consisting of facial emotion labeling and facial emotion matching. Results: Individuals with insomnia presented a lower recognition of facial expressions of fear and sadness in comparison to control volunteers. Perceptual Organization Index was found to be statistically significant lower in the insomnia group compared to the control group. There was a statistically significant association between facial recognition emotional and cognitive processes of in executive functions performance, especially in processes related to the inhibitory control, planning capacity, problem solving and cognitive flexibility in insomnia group. Conclusions: Insomnia disorder impairs the facial emotion recognition of the fear and sadness. Insomniacs with impairment in the facial emotion recognition had impaired performance of executive functions. There is a negative impact on processes related to cognitive-emotional capacity than on processes related to social-emotional recognition. Keywords: insomnia, facial emotional recognition, sleep deprivation, cognition, executive functions. (shrink)

Distinção entre consciência e matéria -- Relação entre consciência e matéria -- Consciência, vida e matéria -- Consciência e matéria: imanência e transcendência -- Consciência, matéria e liberdade.

Work done within the realm of what is sometimes called ‘descriptive ethics’ brings two questions readily to mind: How can empirical findings, in general, inform normative debates? and How can these empirical findings, in particular, inform the normative debate at hand? Brick et al 1 confront these questions in their novel investigation of public views about lives worth living and the permissibility of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from critically ill infants. Mindful of the is-ought gap, the authors suggest modestly that their (...) data ‘may be useful when constructing guidelines for clinical practice’. In this commentary, I consider some potential limitations on the generalisability of these data in the context of policy and clinical practice, limitations which may in turn serve as directions for future empirical research. The authors’ study presented participants six case scenarios, five of which involved the possibility of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from critically ill infants. The results revealed that “[a]lmost all respondents agreed that at some level of quality of life, life may be of no benefit or worse than death for an infant” and that “participants significantly favoured withdrawal of treatment for the most severe cases.” One salient detail in these scenarios …. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 2, February 2020, Page 66-68.

The object of this paper is to show how one is able to construct a paraconsistent theory of models that reflects much of the classical one. In other words the aim is to demonstrate that there is a very smooth and natural transition from the model theory of classical logic to that of certain categories of paraconsistent logic. To this end we take an extension of da Costa''sC 1 = (obtained by adding the axiom A A) and prove for it (...) results which correspond to many major classical model theories, taken from Shoenfield [5]. In particular we prove counterparts of the theorems of o-Tarski and Chang-o-Suszko, Craig-Robinson and the Beth definability theorem. (shrink)

In this paper, I start with the opposition between the Husserlian project of a phenomenology of the experience of time, started in 1905, and the mathematical and physical theory of time as it comes out of Einstein’s special theory of relativity in the same year. Although the contrast between the two approaches is apparent, my aim is to show that the original program of Husserl’s time theory is the constitution of an objective time and a time of the world, starting (...) from the intuitive giveness of time, i.e., from time as it appears. To show this, I stress the structural similarity between Husserl’s original question of time and the problem of a phenomenology of space constitution as it was first developed in the his manuscripts from the nineteenth century, in which we find the threefold question of the origin of our representation of space, of the geometrization of intuitive space, and of the constitution of transcendent world space. Finally, I reconsider some of Husserl’s main theses about the phenomenological constitution of objective time in light of the main results of special relativity time-theory, introducing several corrections to central assumptions that underlie Husserl’s theory of time. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the consistency and accuracy of Husserl’s sketch of a theory about non-declarative sentences in the last chapter of Logical Investigations. Whereas the consistency is acknowledged, the accuracy is denied, because Husserl’s treatment of non-declarative phrases such as questions or orders implies that those phrases contain, in some way, a declarative sentence and an objectifying act. To construct a question like “is A B?” as being equivalent to a pseudo-declarative sentence such as “I ask whether A (...) is B” is, however, a false phenomenological analysis, because to ask o r to order or to beg is not to assert. I turn, then, to John Austin ‘s theory of performative (as opposed to constatative) utterances and illocutionary acts in order to find a more accurate approach to the logical-semantic content of non-declarative sentences. Eventually, I show how this Husserlian theory of non-declarative sentences has a negative impact on the phenomenological theory of social ·acts and communication. (shrink)

José Honório Rodrigues foi historiador e autor de vasta obra, principalmente para se entender o Brasil, no sentido de se ter no conhecimento do passado um instrumento para se encontrar explicações e soluções para os problemas atuais. E o presente texto busca apresentar um conceito importante da teoria social honoriana, que é a “conciliação” e as consequências deste comportamento advindo dos grupos oligárquicos brasileiros, mas, igualmente, da importância do povo brasileiro no processo de construção desse país, numa dialética de enfrentamento (...) das injustiças sociais históricas. Para tanto, faz-se uma análise de duas de suas obras: Aspirações Nacionais, de 1963 e republicada em 1970, e Conciliação e Reforma no Brasil, de1965. (shrink)

o presente artigo tem como objetivo discutir a relação entre a aprendizagem histórica e sua função pública na sociedade. Partindo da premissa de que há um embate entre diferentes culturas históricas existentes na sociedade brasileira contemporânea, o texto discute a importância que a ciência histórica e seu repertório cognitivo têm para a formação do pensamento histórico, seja no âmbito acadêmico, seja no contexto da educação básica, pois fornece instrumentos de conhecimento importantes para que professores e estudantes possam refletir, autonomamente, a (...) respeito de sua própria História e da História da sociedade em que estão inseridos. Nesse sentido, o desafio do ensino de História é continuar provendo os meios científicos de possibilitar aos estudantes o conhecimento dessas diferentes narrativas, por meio da diversidade da produção cultural apropriada como fonte histórica, com vistas à construção e desenvolvimento do pensamento histórico, bem como de sua função pública de fortalecimento da democracia, cidadania, autonomia crítica, respeito e acolhimento da alteridade, enfim, de plena humanização da sociedade. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 O presente artigo analisa a passagem da hermenêutica metodológica à experiência hermenêutica como crítica e fundamento do saber filosófico. Inicialmente, apresenta a crítica da hermenêutica à absolutizaçáo da lógica matemática como estrutura da pesquisa e produçáo de sentido na filosofia. A lógica matemática sedimenta a dinâmica da vida do homem por náo estar aberta às contingências da existência, porém a vida do homem náo se compreende sob a forma da lógica matemática. Posteriormente, demonstra (...) que compreender a dinâmica da vida do sujeito pressupõe uma hermenêutica filosófica, que interprete o verdadeiro sentido do humano. Essa compreensáo hermenêutico-filosófica se estabelece mediante uma inter-relaçáo entre o sujeito e o algo a ser interpretado. Por fim, defende que a condiçáo de possibilidade dessa inter-relaçáo é a experiência hermenêutica, o que implica uma abertura ao que esse algo tem a dizer ao sujeito, tornando-se, assim, o ponto de partida da compreensáo e fundamentaçáo do saber crítico-reflexivo. (shrink)

Oliveira Vianna e seu tempo -- Oliveira Vianna como intérprete do Brasil -- Questões polêmicas -- A guisa de conclusão.

O republicanismo é constituído de diversas matrizes, entre elas a matriz inglesa e a matriz francesa às quais vinculam-se os pensadores modernos Algernon Sidney e Jean-Jacques Rousseau respectivamente. Buscando uma provável relação teórica entre o autor inglês e o pensador de Genebra quanto à tradição republicana, o presente artigo promoverá um exame e quiçá uma reflexão acerca do “espírito republicano” em Sidney e Rousseau assinalando as possíveis afinidades e divergências entre eles, embora sejam vinculações a diferentes matrizes. Para tanto, indaga-se: (...) é possível constatar alguma relação teórica entre esses dois pensadores? Preliminarmente, julgamos que seja possível, sim, realizar tal constatação a partir de uma análise do “espírito republicano” presente sob as penas desses pensadores. (shrink)

RESUMO O artigo visa relacionar a tese da centralidade do outlaw, para se pensar o direito, em Hannah Arendt, com a sua compreensão do direito como “direito a ter direitos”, esboçada em “Origens do totalitarismo”. Partindo da desintegração europeia no início do século XX e do surgimento do outlaw contemporâneo, o refugiado, refletiremos sobre o sentido do princípio da legalidade, sua relação, em Arendt, com a plural condição humana e o mundo comum. Mostraremos como estão contidos, na obra mencionada, elementos (...) para uma articulação inicial entre a ideia do direito como “direito a ter direitos” e uma teoria da cidadania na pensadora judia-alemã. ABSTRACT This article aims to relate the thesis of the centrality of the outlaw to think of Law, in Hannah Arendt with her understanding of Law as "right to have rights" drafted in Origins of totalitarianism. Starting from the European disintegration in the early twentieth century and the emergence of the contemporary outlaw, the refugee, we will reflect on the meaning of the principle of legality, its relationship, in Arendt, with a plural human condition and the common world. We will show how there are elements contained, in the work mentioned, for an initial articulation between an idea of law as "right to have rights" and a theory of citizenship in the Jewish-German thinker. (shrink)

What follows is an attempt to do some conceptual housekeeping around the notion of secret law as provided by Christopher Kutz (2013). First I consider low-salience (or merely obscure) law, suggesting that it fails to capture the legal and moral facts that are at stake in the case which Kutz used to motivate it. Then I outline a theoretical contrast between mere obscurity and secrecy, in contrast to the 'neutral' account of secrecy provided by Sissela Bok (1989). The upshot of (...) the two sections is that low-salience law is neither secret law nor necessarily problematic, though it closely resembles a kind of law that is both secret and problematic: namely, those legal obscurities that subvert manifest interests related to the informational needs of citizens. The ensuing argument undermines the fiction of constructive presence found in Austin and Blackstone. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2020, Page 48-50.

This paper explores the possibility that Hobbesian jurisprudence is best understood as a ‘third way’ in legal theory, irreducible to classical natural law or legal positivism. I sketch two potential ‘third theories’ of law -- legal pragmatism and legal dualism -- and argue that, when considered in its broadest sense, Leviathan is best viewed as an example of legal pragmatism. I consider whether this legal pragmatist interpretation can be sustained in the examination of Leviathan’s treatment of civil law, and argue (...) that the pragmatic interpretation can only be successful if we can resolve two textual issues in that chapter. First, while Hobbes argues that law entails the existence of public (sharable) reasons, he does not adequately defend the view that the sovereign is the unique authority over such reasons in all cases, especially as far as they concern known collective emergencies. Second, Hobbes both affirms and denies that a sovereign can fail to do justice, which is paradoxical. Both problems are best resolved by legal pragmatism, though the second problem resists a fully satisfying resolution. The upshot is that, although Leviathan ought to be regarded as an episode of legal pragmatism, there are trade-offs on every reading. (shrink)