This paper analyses the use of strategies and instruments for organising ethics by small and large business in the Netherlands. We find that large firms mostly prefer an integrity strategy to foster ethical behaviour in the organisation, whereas small enterprises prefer a dialogue strategy. Both large and small firms make least use of a compliance strategy that focuses on controlling and sanctioning the ethical behaviour of workers. The size of the business is found to have a positive impact on the (...) use of several instruments, like code of conduct, ISO certification, social reporting, social handbook and confidential person. Also being a subsidiary of a larger firm has a significant positive influence on the use of instruments. The most popular instrument used by small firms is to let one member of the board be answerable for ethical questions, which fits the informal culture of most small firms. With respect to sectorial differences, we find that firms in the metal manufacturing and construction sectors are more actively using formal instruments than firms in the financial service sector and retail sector. The distinction between family and non-family firms hardly affects the use of instruments. (shrink)

Physicien théoricien, philosophe de la physique et historien des théo­ries physiques, le savant catholique français Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) a profondément marqué la pensée du vingtième siècle. Chacun connaît le Système du monde, dont les dix volu­mes ont contribué à la redécouverte de la science médiévale, et La théorie physique, qui a notamment donné lieu à la célèbre «thèse Duhem-Quine». Si Clio a donc gardé de Duhem le sou­venir d’un grand historien des sciences et d’un philosophe perspicace de la physique, lui-même (...) cependant n’aspirait qu’à être reconnu comme physicien. Son œuvre est en effet traver­sée par un projet scientifique qui consiste à ordonner et à réunir les diverses branches de la physique sous l’égide de la thermo­dynamique dans le cadre d’une théorie représentative et non explicative du réel. C’est ce projet que Duhem a voulu réaliser dans ses publications scientifiques, exposer dans ses écrits philoso­phiques, et finalement cautionner par ses recherches historiques. Cependant l’investissement toujours plus important de Duhem en histoire des sciences et la présence dans son œuvre de con­sidéra­tions apologétiques et d’écrits patriotiques peuvent don­ner à penser qu’il s’est progressivement détourné de ce projet primordial au profit d’autres préoccupations. De même, les tensions qui, à l’inté­rieur de ce projet scientifique, subsistent entre sa volonté unificatrice et sa revendication phénoménaliste peuvent conduire à une relativi­sation de cette dernière, conçue comme une demande contextuelle, passa­gère et finalement peu significative. Sans ignorer ces préoccu­pations historiques, religieuses ou patriotiques, sans négliger ce con­flit d’intérêt entre les deux parties constitutives du projet duhémien, cette étude entend tout d’abord réaffirmer que ce projet scientifique ne sera jamais ni abandonné, ni amputé. Toutefois, dès lors que sont maintenues la permanence, la prio­rité et l’intégralité de ce projet, trois paradoxes surgissent im­médiatement. Si Duhem se voulait avant tout physicien et souhaitait être reconnu comme tel, par quelle extravagance de l’histoire est-il finalement connu pour ses recherches histori­ques et ses travaux philosophiques et non pour ce qui lui tenait le plus à cœur? S’il ne voulait être qu’un illustre physicien, pourquoi s’est-il acharné, au retour du laboratoire, à exhumer de l’oubli les manuscrits et les théories scientifiques des au­teurs médiévaux? Enfin, s’il voulait vraiment établir une physi­que qui soit unifiée, cohérente et parfaite, pourquoi se prive-t-il du réa­lisme et s’embarrasse-t-il du phénoménalisme? Basée sur la corres­pondance inédite de Duhem, cette étude, centrée plus particu­liè­rement sur ce troisième paradoxe, contribue fina­lement à élucider chacun d’eux. (shrink)

This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic (...) and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this.;This book is a good example of the contribution a clear conceptual analysis can make to highlighting and clarifying problematic thinking about real issues in education. In the literature there are different claims of varying strength and plausibility which require very careful sorting. David Carr demonstrates such careful sorting in the difficult field of ethics and maps some paths for fruitful thinking about professionalism in teaching. &lsquoThe distinctions of Peters and others between education and teaching, theory and practice, and intrinsic and instrumental value, stand in need of more careful mapping and refinement&rsquo which could enable us to steer clear of &lsquoeducationally pernicious conclusions&rsquo . Carr succeeds in doing just this. (shrink)

Health professionals increasingly face patients with complex health problems and this pressurizes them to cooperate. The authors have analyzed how the complexity of health care problems relates to two types of cooperation: consultation and multidisciplinary teamwork (MTW). Moreover, they have analyzed the impact of these two types of cooperation on perceived professional autonomy. Two teams were studied, one team dealing with geriatric patients and another treating oncology patients. The authors conducted semi-structured interviews, studied written documents, held informal discussions and observed (...) the teams at work. Consultation was most likely to take place when a patient had multiple problems. However, if these problems were interrelated, i.e. the solution for one problem interfered with solving another, then MTW was favored. The same was true when the available information was equivocal such that there were conflicting interpretations of a problem. How the professionals perceived the relationship between complexity and the need to cooperate depended on their expertise, their occupational background, and their work orientation. Consultation did not affect the professional autonomy of the health care professionals. MTW however did decrease the perceived level of professional autonomy. The extent to which this occurred seemed to depend on the quality of the interpersonal relations within the team. The findings can help in selecting the most appropriate and efficient type of cooperation based on the complexity of a patient’s problems. They can also help team leaders to stimulate reflection and feedback processes, and medical trainers to develop competencies among students related to such teamwork behaviors. (shrink)

French text publication of the manuscript of the English article en-titled "Physics, History of" and published by Duhem in Volume 12 of the 1911 "Catholic Encyclopedia".

This article starts, on the one hand, with a consideration of the paradoxical way in which, namely when he wanted to evoke those intellectual figures that have decidedly contributed to the revelation of the "true Pascal", i. e., of the Pascal that had known the good usage of reason, Fortunat Strowski comes to the idea of putting side by side Pierre Duhem and Leon Brunschvicg. On the other, a reference is made to the fact that Duhem only published two articles (...) and a preface on Pascal while Brunschvicg is the author of a major work on the great figure of the XVIIth -Century. Hence, the question raised is about the consideration that shall be given to a paradoxical affirmation that seems to place on equal terms the few pages that Duhem has written on Pascal with the imposing contributions of Brunschvicg. For the author of the article, it would not be very consequent to take such affirmations as if they were unreflected ones, since it is clear that Strowski knew exactly what he was writing as we can see from the very good knowledge he had of the writings of both Blaise Pascal and Pierre Duhem. Indeed, and more than anyone else, Strowski was in a very good position to enlighten us about these two thinkers and to write about them in the terms he effectively did. The goal of the article, therefore, is to justify that assertion, which on its face is quite paradoxical, by showing in concrete terms the extent to which Pierre Duhem was truly influenced by Blaise Pascal. ––– O presente artigo começa por realçar o modo paradoxal como, uma vez que ele se dá ao trabalho de evocar aqueles autores que contribuíram para a revelação do verdadeiro Pascal, ou seja, daquele que conheceu o bom uso da razão, Fortunat Strowski não hesita em colocar o nome de Pierre Duhem lado a lado com o de Léon Brunschvicg. O facto, porém, é que Pierre Duhem não fez mais do que publicar dois artigos e um prefácio sobre Blaise Pascal, ao passo que Brunschvicg lhe dedicou uma obra que haveria de ficar famosa. O problema, portanto, consiste em saber qual o valor que se deve atribuir a uma tal afirmação desconcertante, a qual parece simplesmente equalizar as poucas páginas de Duhem sobre Pascal com as imponentes contribuições de Brunschvicg. Nesse sentido, a estratégia do autor do artigo consiste em não tomar de forma ligeira uma tal afirmação, como se Strowski não tivesse considerado bem as consequências e o alcance daquilo que escrevia, pois a verdade é que ele conhecia não só a obra de Pascal mas também a de Duhem. Ou seja, mais do que ninguém, ele estava perfeitamente à altura de nos comunicar algo de substancial acerca de cada um destes pensadores e de escrever a seu propósito aquilo que ele efectivamente escreveu. Em suma, o presente artigo não tem outra pretensão que não a de justificar essa afirmação aparentemente paradoxal segundo a qual Pierre Duhem foi um verdadeiro pascaliano. (shrink)

I cannot be certain what people have in mind when they wish to expose medical students to ethics, but if what I have said so far is sound, then they ought not to mean moral philosophy alone. The moral life of medicine and the moral life in general have certainly given rise to rules of thumb, guidelines and principles which summarise our sentiments about interactions within that life. However, the substance of that life is human vulnerability and our responses to (...) it. This is not to say that the theories found in moral philosophy are not a rich terrain for intellectual ingenuity, they are, but there is no reason whatever to believe that their study sharpens moral sensitivity.Sensitivity to human vulnerability is the dimension which medical ethics education should seek to explore. One reason is that medical practice is at the hard edge of moral practice, and the character of the practitioners is one of our major concerns as consumers of health care.My conclusion is easy enough to state. Many have started the business of medical ethics on the assumption that moral philosophy has an applied correlate. This has proven to be a chimera. Let's have the courage to admit that a promising research project has petered out and start to look for a more plausible one. Perhaps we could start by looking for good narratives of suffering, of living under adversity, and of caring for the suffering. (shrink)

Selon l’interprétation traditionnelle, la révolution copernicienne, qui opère le passage du géocentrisme à l’héliocentrisme, aurait détrôné et dévalorisé l’homme, en lui retirant sa position cen­trale, et donc privilégiée, dans le cosmos, pour le reléguer sur une planète devenue analogue aux autres et occupant une place quelconque à l’intérieur du système solaire. Cette inter­prétation ne pèche pas seulement dans sa compréhension de l’héliocentrisme copernicien, mais également dans sa percep­tion du géocentrisme aristotélico-médiéval. Il faut donc dénon­cer sa fausseté générale et, plus encore, (...) lui substituer un autre schéma interprétatif qui, peut-être moins évocateur de notre rapport au monde, soit plus respectueux de la vérité historique. ––– According to the traditional interpretation, the Copernican revo­lution, which brought about the transfer from geocentrism to heliocentrism, is said to have dethroned and devalued man by removing his central and hence privileged position in the cos­mos and by relegating him to a planet now seen as analogous to others occupying an insignificant position within the solar system. This interpretation fails not only in its understanding of Copernican heliocentrism, but also in its percep­tion of Aristo­telian mediaeval geocentrism. It is necessary, therefore, not only to denounce its general falsity, but also to substitute for it a different interpretative scheme which, although it may empha­size less our link with the world, may be more respectful of historical truth. (shrink)

Bien sûr, «la philosophie des sciences sans l’histoire des scien­ces est vide et l’histoire des sciences sans la philosophie des sciences est aveugle» (Lakatos), mais cette formule célèbre ne méconnaît-elle pas l’importance dissymétrique de cette relation de dépendance réci­proque ? En effet, ne pourrait-on pas soute­nir que les philoso­phes des sciences désireux d’arriver à une juste et saine philosophie des sciences ont besoin, pour ce faire, des travaux des historiens des sciences, bien plus que ces der­­niers n’ont besoin, pour leurs (...) recons­tructions historiques, des écrits des philosophes des sciences ? Telle est la thèse, quelque peu provocatrice, que l’auteur tente de défendre : un séminaire ne doit-il pas être un lieu de débat ? ––– Of course, «the philosophy of science is empty without the history of science and the history of science is blind without the philosophy of science» (Lakatos). But does not this famous formula fail to recognize the importance of the dyssymetry of this relationship of mutual dependence ? Could it not be main­tained that the philos­ophers of science, in their search for a correct and healthy philos­ophy of science, need the works of the historians of science far more than the latter need the works of the philosophers of science for their historical work ? This is the somewhat provocative thesis we shall attempt to defend : should not a seminar be a forum for debate ? (shrink)

In Epistles 3,7, Pliny the Younger gives a short account of the life of Silius Italicus, who had recently committed suicide at his Neapolitan villa. Scholarship has not only considered this letter as a rather critical and unsympathetic description of the epic poet’s vita, but has also read some of its information (for example Silius’ veneration of Vergil and his passion for antiquities) to Silius’ poetics in general. In this paper, I shall highlight one specific intertextual connection - not proposed (...) to date - between this epistle and the Capua episode in Book 11 of Silius’ „Punica“. I shall show that Pliny the Younger, concurring with Martial’s similar representation of Silius (Epigr. 4,14), has to some extent modelled Silius’ retirement in Campania upon Hannibal’s enervating winter in the luxurious city of Capua. (shrink)

Journal Name: Philologus Issue: Ahead of print.

This book presents the first English translation of the original French treatise “La Physique d’Einstein” written by the young Georges Lemaître in 1922, only six years after the publication of Albert Einstein’s theory of General Relativity. It includes an historical introduction and a critical edition of the original treatise in French supplemented by the author’s own later additions and corrections. -/- Monsignor Georges Lemaître can be considered the founder of the “Big Bang Theory” and a visionary architect of modern Cosmology. (...) The scientific community is only beginning to grasp the full extent of the legacy of this towering figure of 20th century physics. Against the best advice of the greatest names of his time, the young Lemaître was convinced, solely through the study of Einstein’s theory of General Relativity, that space and time must have had a beginning with a tremendous “Big Bang” from a “quantum primeval atom” resulting in an ever-expanding Universe with a positive cosmological constant. -/- But how did the young Lemaître, essentially on his own, come to grips with the physics of Einstein? A year before his ordination as a diocesan priest, he submitted the audacious treatise, published in this book, that was to earn him Fellowships to study at Cambridge, MIT and Harvard, and launched him on a scientific path of ground-breaking discoveries. Almost a century after Lemaître’s seminal publications of 1927 and 1931, this highly pedagogical treatise is still of timely interest to young minds and remains of great value from a history of science perspective. (shrink)

Dr Gillian Craig (1) has argued that palliative medicine services have tended to adopt a policy of sedation without hydration, which under certain circumstances may be medically inappropriate, causative of death and distressing to family and friends. We welcome this opportunity to defend, with an important modification, the approach we proposed without substantive background argument in our original article (2). We maintain that slowing and eventual cessation of oral intake is a normal part of a natural dying process, that artificial (...) hydration and alimentation (AHA) are not justified unless thirst or hunger are present and cannot be relieved by other means, but food and fluids for (natural) oral consumption should never be 'withdrawn'. The intention of this practice is not to alter the timing of an inevitable death, and sedation is not used, as has been alleged, to mask the effects of dehydration or starvation. The artificial provision of hydration and alimentation is now widely accepted as medical treatment. We believe that arguments that it is not have led to confusion as to whether or not non-provision or withdrawal of AHA constitutes a cause of death in law. Arguments that it is such a cause appear to be tenuously based on an extraordinary/ordinary categorisation of treatments by Kelly (3) which has subsequently been interpreted as prescriptive in a way quite inconsistent with the Catholic moral theological tradition from which the distinction is derived. The focus of ethical discourse on decisions at the end of life should be shifted to an analysis of care, needs, proportionality of medical interventions, and processes of communication. (shrink)

Introduction / St.L. JAKI (pp. 9-19). Présentation / J.-Fr. STOFFEL (p. 21). – L'œuvre de Pierre Duhem (pp. 25-113). Publications post­humes (pp. 115-129). – IIe partie : Les travaux de ses doc­torands. Fernand Caubet (pp. 133-135). Henry Chevallier (pp. 137-141). Émile Lenoble (pp. 143-144). Lucien Marchis (pp. 145-154). Eugène Monnet (pp. 155-156). Henri Pélabon (pp. 157-168). Paul Saurel (pp. 169-172). Albert Turpain (pp. 173-197). – IIIe partie : La litté­rature secondaire. Thèses et mé­moires (pp. 201-202). Livres (pp. 203-205). Biographies et (...) étu­des générales (pp. 207-209). Duhem en perspective (pp. 211-212). Le philosophe de la physique (pp. 213-234). L'histo­rien des théories physiques (pp. 235-243). Le physicien (pp. 245-251). Le croyant (pp. 253-256). Notices nécrologiques (pp. 257-258). Notices de dictionnaires et d'encyclopédies (pp. 259-260). – IVe partie : Index. (shrink)

Lucien BOSSY, «La physique d’Einstein» de Georges Lemaître, 1922 (pp. 9-22). Jean-Marc GÉRARD, Georges Lemaître et l’his­toire de notre Univers (pp. 23-55). Jean LADRIÈRE, La portée philo­sophique de l’hypothèse de l’atome primitif (pp. 57-80). Dominique LAMBERT, Pie XII et Georges Lemaître : deux visions distinctes des rapports sciences-foi (pp. 81-111). Marc LEC­LERC, La liberté intellectuelle de l’homme de sciences catho­lique (pp. 113-117). Alfonso PÉREZ DE LABORDA, Cosmologies et dogma­tiques : un problème d’interférence et de représen­tation (pp. 119-142). Jean-François STOFFEL, Mgr (...) Georges Lemaître : bio-biblio­graphie (pp. 145-220). Jean-François STOFFEL, «La physique d’Einstein», texte inédit de Georges Lemaître (pp. 223-360). (shrink)

Selon l’interprétation traditionnelle, la révolution copernicienne, en arrachant l’homme de sa position centrale dans le cosmos, lui a infligé une profonde vexation. Si elle dit bien notre désarroi contemporain face à un univers devenu infini, cette inter­pré­tation ne reflète pas suffisamment la complexité historique du passage du géocentrisme à l’héliocentrisme. Aussi convient-il de la remettre en question. Mais pour ce faire, il faut d’abord bien la connaître. Aussi cet article étudie-t-il la phase de structu­ration de cette interprétation (1835-1925), dans le (...) contexte du positivisme, du darwinisme, du marxisme et enfin du freudisme. ––– Según la interpretación tradicional, la revolución copernicana, al sacar al hombre de su ubicación central en el cosmos, le propinó una profunda incomodidad. Esta interpretación corres­ponde a nuestra desazón actual provocada por un universo infinito pero desconoce la complejidad histórica implícita en el tránsito desde el geocentrismo al heliocentrismo. Por ello es necesario volver a plantear el problema, y para hacerlo hay que abordar correctamente el tema. De ahí que el presente artículo estudie el período de estructuración de esta interpretación (1835-1925) en los contextos del positivismo, del darwinismo, del marxismo y finalmente del freudismo. (shrink)

Most models of patient-physician communication take decision-making as a central concept. However, we found that often the treatment course of metastatic cancer patients is not easy to describe in straightforward terms used in decision-making models but is instead frequently more erratic. Our aim was to analyse these processes as trajectories. We used a longitudinal case study of 13 patients with metastatic colorectal and pancreatic cancer for whom palliative chemotherapy was a treatment option, and analysed 65 semi-structured interviews. We analysed three (...) characteristics of the treatment course that contributed to the ‘erraticness’ of the course: (1) The treatment (with or without chemotherapy) contained many options; (2) these options were not stable entities to be decided upon, but changed identity over the course of treatment, and (3) contrary to the closure (option X means no option Y, Z, etc.) a decision implies, the treatment course was a continuous process in which options instead remained open. When the treatment course is characterised by these many and changeable options that do not result in closure, the shared decision-making model should take these into account. More attention needs to be paid to the erratic character of the process in which the doctor has to provide continuous information that is related to the changing situation of the patient; also, flexibility in dealing with protocols is warranted, as is vigilance about the overall direction of the process. (shrink)

Selon l'interprétation traditionnelle de la révolution coperni­cienne, le géocentrisme est un anthropocentrisme et l'héliocen­trisme, un anthro­­popériphérisme. C'est cette double assimila­tion que cet article entend remettre en question. En effet, le géocentrisme peut être appréhendé comme un théocentrisme, un héliocentrisme, un diablo­centrisme et un anthropofinalisme, mais il n'en reste pas moins, indubitablement, un anthropopéri­phérisme. Le seul «anthropocentra­lisme» qui lui appartienne est un anthropoconceptualisme qui, hors de toute perspective valo­risante, n'est qu'une incapacité à se dé­centrer. Quant à l'hélio­centrisme proprement dit, s'il s'oppose (...) à l'anthropofinalisme des Anciens et à ce qu'il croit être leur anthropo­centralisme, il ne dégénère pas pour autant en un anthropo­péri­phérisme, car, d'une part, il est davantage préoccupé par la centration du So­leil que par la décentration de la Terre et, d'autre part, il par­vient même à s'accom­moder de perspectives franchement anthro­pocentriques. ––– According to the traditional interpretation of the Copernican revolution, the old geocentric system was anthropocentric and the new heliocentric system anthropoperipheric. The double assimilation is what this article wants to call into question. Although a geocentric system can be seen to be theocentric, a heliocentric system can be interpreted as being diabolocentric and anthropofinalist, but also undeniably anthropoperipheric. The only way a heliocentric system can be seen as anthropo­centric is as being anthropoconceptualist. Far from honouring man, this demonstrates an incapacity to see things from a point of view other than man's own. Although a heliocentric system is opposed to the ancient anthropofinality and what was seen as anthropocentrality, it is not necessarily anthropoperipheric. This is firstly because the new system was far more preoccupied with the new centrality of the sun than with the new position of the earth, and secondly because the new system managed to incorporate many aspects of anthropocentrality in her new vision. (shrink)

First recorded in the 14th century, the analogy of spit-roast meat argues that expecting the Sun to rotate around a strictly immobile Earth would be just as ludicrous as trying to move the fire around the roasting meat. On the contrary, it should be the Earth that spins upon itself in order to glean, from all possible angles, all the benefits of the Sun, just as it is the meat’s responsibility to turn on the spit before the motionless fire for (...) it to be perfectly cooked on all sides. Aimed at demonstrating, in geocentricism, the plausibility of the rotation of the Earth and, in heliocentrism, at supporting the physical reality of this terrestrial rotation, nowadays this analogy barely elicits more than an amused, or even condescending, smile. However, its continued long-term existence and its frequency of use — from the 14th to the 19th century, we found it mentioned by no less than 45 different authors — incited us to finally pay attention to it. We then noticed that beyond its explicitly cosmological scope, it raises, in its own way, the question of the purpose of the natural world: had the latter been conceived based upon humankind, then it is normal, despite what this analogy advocates, that the Sun is at the service of something more important than itself by rotating, to the profit of humankind, around the Earth; conversely, since such an infringement of the rule of common sense, as illustrated by this analogy, can neither be justified nor tolerated, it is up to the Earth to move around the Sun. Tracing the vicissitudes of this analogy, over 6 centuries, is thus not only about reconstructing the largely forgotten history of a presently obsolete analogy, but also about discovering the deeper meaning, henceforth incomprehensible, behind it. In describing how this meaning became progressively lost, one can finally pro­vide an understanding of why, in the present day, we are no longer capable of more than an amused smile when happening upon it! (shrink)

There have been few empirical studies into what non-medical factors influence physicians and nurses when deciding about admission and discharge of ICU patients. Information about the attitudes of healthcare professionals about this process can be used to improve decision-making about resource allocation in intensive care. To provide insight into ethical problems that influence the ICU admission and discharge process, we aimed to identify and explore ethical dilemmas healthcare professionals are faced with.

S'étonnant qu'un simple physicien sache traiter des rapports de la physique et de la métaphysique, Edmond Domet de Vorges s'était demandé si Pierre Duhem n'avait pas bénéficié de l'aide de quelque théologien dans l'élaboration de son articulation de ces deux disci­plines. Faisant suite à cette question très perti­nente, cet article liste d'abord les intellectuels catholiques qui étaient en relation avec Duhem avant la publication, en 1893, de son article Physique et métaphysique et qui auraient effec­tivement pu l'aider à concevoir une (...) telle articulation. Se con­sacrant ensuite spécifiquement à l'un d'entre eux, à savoir Maurice Blondel, il étudie les similitudes et divergences existant entre les pensées du physicien bordelais et du philosophe d'Aix pour conclure que Blondel ne peut pas être celui qui aurait inspiré Duhem. À l'appui de cette conclusion, il fait notamment état d'une lettre inédite adressée par Duhem à Ambroise Gar­deil et dans laquelle celui-ci porte un jugement sévère à l'en­droit de son «pauvre ami» Blondel. ––– One might be surprised to find that a simple physician could be able explain with clarity the subtle relationship between physics and metaphysics. It is with this question in mind that Edmond Domet de Vorges asked himself if it might not have been with the aid of theologians that Pierre Duhem was able to find and express his subtle articulation between the two disciplines. Following in the footsteps of this pertinent question, this article begins by listing the catholic intellectuals who were acquain­tances of Pierre Duhem before the publication in 1893 of “Physique et métaphysique”, who may have been able to help him arrive at the relationship between the two sciences expressed in his publication. This line of questioning is followed by a specific study of one of these men, namely Maurice Blondel. The similarities and differences in the opinions of the physician from Bordeaux and the philosopher from Aix are explored with the resulting conclusion that Blondel could not have been he who inspired Duhem. This conclusion can be confirmed by a previously unpublished letter from Duhem to Ambroise Gardeil which contains a very severe judgement with regards to his “poor friend” Blondel. (shrink)

In what is quite possibly the most famous passage of the De revolutionibus, Copernicus implies that nobody could ever place this supreme flaming torch that is the Sun in another or better place than that from which it can illuminate everything simultaneously, namely the centre of this extremely beautiful temple that is our world. Considering the fact that he leaves an interrogatory twist to this argument of convenience, and since he makes this statement without any justification as it seems entirely (...) evident to him, certain Copernicans choose to illustrate this by means of an analogy: if indeed the Sun must be positioned thus, it is because the most appropriate place for the torch intended to illuminate the room is at its centre, and not in one of its corners. Despite the heliosophy of the Renaissance having been shared by both geocentrists and Copernicans alike, this "torch" argument does not appear to have achieved much success: rarely adopted by the Copernican camp, it was even contested by some of them; as for the geocentrists, it held no appeal for them whatsoever. Did this argument of convenience therefore not benefit from the self-evidence attributed to it by Copernicus, and from, in his wake, it's continued support by a good many commentators? As is often the case when it comes to the history of thought, the pseudo-obviousness of this argument is merely the fruit of a blatant anachronism: presenting heliocentrism as the cosmological system that finally grants the Sun its worthy centrality by placing it in the centre of the room and not in a corner, is to ignore the fact that this star of the day already enjoyed, in geocentrism, a centrality esteemed to be perfectly in keeping with both its dignity and its inherent illuminative function. Having lost their grasp on this worldview that no longer belonged to them, the Copernicans thus put forward an argument which, for the geocentrists, is worthless. Yet they could have argued the objective superiority of their centrality over that accorded to the Sun by geocentrism: while the latter is only numerical, on a purely planetary scale, and frankly fictitious, the former is thoroughly spatial, of cosmic proportions and, at least on first approximation, very real. In order to produce arguments of convenience that could carry their own weight, the protagonists of the new cosmology would have benefited from getting to know the world vision of their adversaries a little better instead of addressing them from their own point of view; similarly, instead of treating as an obvious fact that which is only evident to one of the two parties present, historians of scientific thought would also be well advised to have a better understanding of the world vision of those who history now considers as the losers! (shrink)

Cette analyse critique se propose, dans un premier temps, de reconstituer le raisonnement apologétique de l'auteur et, dans un second temps, de l'évaluer critiquement. Ce raisonnement nous semble pouvoir se synthétiser comme suit. L’Église, qui tenait que «tout ce qui est contenu dans l’Écriture doit être cru» tant que des raisons contraignantes n’ont pas été avancées, a démontré, contrairement au seul exemple de condamnation portée au nom de convictions religieuses qui est le fait de l’antiquité païenne, qu’elle a été capable (...) de renoncer à la lettre de l’Écriture, avant l’«affaire Galilée», en acceptant la sphéricité de la Terre et, après cette «affaire», en abandonnant le géo­cen­trisme, qui n’était pas seulement la façon de parler du «vul­gaire», mais celle de tous, au profit de l’héliocentrisme en 1757. Mais elle l’a fait, dans un cas comme dans l’autre, à condition que lui soit donnée une preuve valable, ce qui n’était pas le cas lors des événements de 1616 et 1633, comme en témoigne d’ailleurs le fait que les Coperniciens n’ont pas cessé d’avoir recours à la Bible et à des arguments de convenance. En revanche, en présence de tels arguments, l’Église n’aurait pas hésité à réviser son exégèse. Alors que le conflit entre l’astro­nomie nouvelle et l’Écriture sainte était potentiellement inévi­table dès l’apparition de l’héliocentrisme, car le nouveau sys­tème cosmologique touche indirectement une question aussi essentielle que le géocentrisme anthropocentrique chrétien, l’Église, malgré une première hésitation, a pu laisser libre cours à la nouvelle théorie durant une septantaine d’années. Sa condamnation de l’héliocentrisme copernicien en 1616, qui n’est donc nullement la conséquence ni d’une acte précipité et irréfléchi de la part des Consulteurs du Saint-Office, ni d’une méconnaissance de leur part des connaissances scientifiques de l’époque, ni d’un durcissement consécutif au Concile de Trente et à la Réforme, ni la conséquence d’une attaque de Galilée portée sur le terrain de la Bible à défaut de pouvoir être menée avec efficacité au niveau astronomique, a été rendue nécessaire par l’attitude de Galilée et témoigne du souci de l’Église de sauver «les “tout-petits du Christ” qui pouvaient être atteints dans leur foi». Une telle condamnation, aujourd’hui inimaginable en raison d’une séparation des savoirs dont il faut bien se rappeler qu’elle n’était aucunement de mise lors de ces événements, aurait sans doute pu être évitée si l’Église avait tiré les leçons du premier conflit (celui de la sphéricité de la Terre), en prenant conscience de l’historicité du texte biblique, au lieu d’occulter quelle était la véritable cosmologie biblique. (shrink)

Recenze knihy:Georges Lemaître, Learning the Physics of Einstein with Georges Lemaître. Before the Big Bang Theory. Jan Govaerts and Jean-François Stoffel, Springer, 2019, 257 s.

Le Père Ignace Carbonnelle, l'un des principaux fondateurs de la Société scientifique de Bruxelles en 1875 et son secrétaire général depuis cette époque, décède inopinément en 1889 après une quin­zaine d'années durant lesquelles il fut «l'homme fort» de ladite Société. Aussitôt, la Revue des questions scienti­fiques annonce la triste nouvelle, promettant, pour un prochain numéro, une étude détaillée de sa vie et de son œuvre. Elle ne paraîtra jamais, de sorte que sa mort ne fut pas saluée avec l'ampleur qu'on (...) était en droit d'attendre. Et pour cause ! Au ter­me d'une enquête digne d'un roman policier, cette étude révèle que Rome, agacée par l'atomisme de Carbonnelle, profita de sa mort pour rappeler à l'ordre la Société en l'invitant à marcher dans les pas de l'Aquinate. En réponse à cette pressante invi­tation et par un excès de zèle non requis, la Société élut comme président le célèbre thomiste français Edmond Domet de Vor­ges, cependant que le mathématicien Paul Mansion s'attacha d'établir, à partir des publications de Pierre Duhem prônant un retour à une physique des qualités, que la Société se conformait bien, mais à sa manière, aux injonctions romaines. ––– Fr. Ignace Carbonnelle, who founded the Brussels Scientific Society in 1875 and was from this date onwards her Secretary General, passed away suddenly in 1889, after fifteen years during which he was the leading figure of the aforementioned Society. “La Revue des Question scientifique” announced the sad news but promised that their next publication would include a detailed article on the great man and his works. Sadly this article never appeared, meaning that the passing of Fr. Carbonnelle was not marked with the importance which we might have otherwise expected. For what reason, you may well ask? After a detailed investigation, worthy of Agatha Christie herself, it would appear that Rome had been rather alarmed by the “atomism” present in Fr. Carbonnelle's reflections, and had taken the opportunity of his death to invite the Scientific Society to opinions more in line with those of St Thomas. In response to this firmly worded invitation, and with overzealous spontaneity, the Society elected the celebrated French Thomiste Edmond Domet de Vorges as their new President. At the same time the mathematician Paul Mansion relied on the publications of Pierre Duhem, which advocated a stronger adhesion to a physics of an object's qualities, to establish that the Society was, in fact, well aligned with the desires of Rome. (shrink)